FBI REPORT: THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

Blogmaster's Note: The report below was released in July of this year but received little or no media attention. It should be a must read for everyone living in the United States.

The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland

July 2007

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the Intelligence Community
(IC), overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and
acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is charged with:
• Integrating the domestic and foreign dimensions of US intelligence so that there are
no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security;
• Bringing more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis; and
• Ensuring that US intelligence resources generate future capabilities as well as
present results.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

Since its formation in 1973, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) has served as a bridge
between the intelligence and policy communities, a source of deep substantive expertise on critical national security issues, and as a focal point for Intelligence Community
collaboration. The NIC's key goal is to provide policymakers with the best, unvarnished,
and unbiased information. Its primary functions are to:

• Support the DNI in his role as Principal Intelligence Advisor to the President and
other senior policymakers.
• Lead the Intelligence Community's effort to produce National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) and other NIC products that address key national security
concerns.
• Provide a focal point for policymakers, warfighters, and Congressional leaders to
task the Intelligence Community for answers to important questions.
• Reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector—and use
alternative analyses and new analytic tools—to broaden and deepen the Intelligence
Community's perspective.

NIEs are the DNI's most authoritative written judgments concerning national security
issues. They contain the coordinated judgments of the Intelligence Community regarding
the likely course of future events.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND THE NIE PROCESS

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most
authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US
civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests.
NIEs usually provide information on the current state of play but are primarily
“estimative”—that is, they make judgments about the likely course of future events and
identify the implications for US policy.

The NIEs are typically requested by senior civilian and military policymakers,
Congressional leaders and at times are initiated by the National Intelligence Council (NIC).

Before a NIE is drafted, the relevant National Intelligence Officer is responsible for
producing a concept paper, or terms of reference (TOR), and circulates it throughout the
Intelligence Community for comment. The TOR defines the key estimative questions,
determines drafting responsibilities, and sets the drafting and publication schedule. One or more IC analysts are usually assigned to produce the initial text. The NIC then meets to
critique the draft before it is circulated to the broader IC. Representatives from the
relevant IC agencies meet to hone and coordinate line-by-line the full text of the NIE.
Working with their Agencies, representatives also assign the level of confidence they have in key judgments. IC representatives discuss the quality of sources with collectors, and the National Clandestine Service vets the sources used to ensure the draft does not include any that have been recalled or otherwise seriously questioned.

All NIEs are reviewed by National Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the DNI and is
composed of the heads of relevant IC agencies. Once approved by the NIB, NIEs are
briefed to the President and senior policymakers. The whole process of producing NIEs
normally takes at least several months.

The NIC has undertaken a number of steps to improve the NIE process under the DNI.
These steps are in accordance with the goals and recommendations set out in the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and WMD Commission reports and the 2004 Intelligence
Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act. Most notably, over the last two years the IC has:

• Created new procedures to integrate formal reviews of source reporting and
technical judgments. The Director of CIA, as the National HUMINT Manager, as
well as the Directors of NSA, NGA, and DIA and the Assistant Secretary/INR are now
required to submit formal assessments that highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and
overall credibility of their sources used in developing the critical judgments of the NIE.

• Applied more rigorous standards. A textbox is incorporated into all NIEs that
explains what we mean by such terms as “we judge” and that clarifies the difference
between judgments of likelihood and confidence levels. We have made a concerted
effort to not only highlight differences among agencies but to explain the reasons for
such differences and to display them prominently in the Key Judgments.

THE US HOMELAND THREAT ESTIMATE: HOW IT WAS PRODUCED

The Estimate, Terrorist Threats to the US Homeland, followed the standard process for
producing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), including a thorough review of
sourcing, in-depth Community coordination, the use of alternative analysis, and review by outside experts. Starting in October 2006, the NIC organized a series of roundtables with IC experts to scope out terms of reference (TOR) for the Estimate. Drafters from
throughout the Community contributed to the draft. In May, a draft was submitted to IC
officers in advance of a series of coordination meetings that spanned several days. The
National Clandestine Service, FBI, and other IC collection officers reviewed the text for
the reliability and proper use of the sourcing. As part of the normal coordination process,
analysts had the opportunity--and were encouraged--to register “dissents” and provide
alternative analysis. Reactions by the two outside experts who read the final product were highlighted in the text. The National Intelligence Board, composed of the heads of the 16 IC agencies and chaired by the ODNI, reviewed and approved the Estimate on 21 June. As with other NIEs, it is being distributed to senior Administration officials and Members of Congress.

What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language

When we use words such as “we judge” or “we assess”—terms we use synonymously—
as well as “we estimate,” “likely” or “indicate,” we are trying to convey an analytical
assessment or judgment. These assessments, which are based on incomplete or at times
fragmentary information are not a fact, proof, or knowledge. Some analytical judgments
are based directly on collected information; others rest on previous judgments, which
serve as building blocks. In either type of judgment, we do not have “evidence” that
shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.

Intelligence judgments pertaining to likelihood are intended to reflect the Community’s
sense of the probability of a development or event. Assigning precise numerical ratings
to such judgments would imply more rigor than we intend.

We do not intend the term “unlikely” to imply an event will not happen. We use
“probably” and “likely” to indicate there is a greater than even chance. We use words
such as “we cannot dismiss,” “we cannot rule out,” and “we cannot discount” to reflect
an unlikely—or even remote—event whose consequences are such it warrants
mentioning. Words such as “may be” and “suggest” are used to reflect situations in
which we are unable to assess the likelihood generally because relevant information is
nonexistent, sketchy, or fragmented.

In addition to using words within a judgment to convey degrees of likelihood, we also
ascribe “high,” “moderate,” or “low” confidence levels based on the scope and quality of
information supporting our judgments.

• “High confidence” generally indicates our judgments are based on high-quality
information and/or the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid
judgment.

• “Moderate confidence” generally means the information is interpreted in various
ways, we have alternative views, or the information is credible and plausible but not
corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

• “Low confidence” generally means the information is scant, questionable, or very
fragmented and it is difficult to make solid analytic inferences, or we have significant
concerns or problems with the sources.

Key Judgments

We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities.
We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have constrained the ability of al-Qa’ida to attack the US Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11.

These measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11.

• We are concerned, however, that this level of international cooperation may wane as
9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge.
Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.

• As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat
environment. We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the Homeland through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that al-Qa’ida will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the Homeland. In addition, we assess that its association with AQI helps al-Qa’ida to energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks.

We assess that al-Qa’ida’s Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent
political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties,
visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the US population. The group is proficient with conventional small arms and improvised explosive devices, and is innovative in creating new capabilities and overcoming security obstacles.

• We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use
them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability.

We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-US attacks outside the United
States in the past, may be more likely to consider attacking the Homeland over the next three years if it perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the group or Iran.
We assess that the spread of radical—especially Salafi—Internet sites, increasingly
aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the West’s Muslim population is expanding, including in the United States. The arrest and prosecution by US law enforcement of a small number of violent Islamic extremists inside the United States—who are becoming more connected ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical sense to the global extremist movement—points to the possibility that others may become sufficiently radicalized that they will view the use of violence here as legitimate.

We assess that this internal Muslim terrorist threat is not likely to be as severe as it is in Europe, however.

We assess that other, non-Muslim terrorist groups—often referred to as “single-issue” groups by the FBI—probably will conduct attacks over the next three years given their violent histories, but we assess this violence is likely to be on a small scale.

We assess that globalization trends and recent technological advances will continue to enable even small numbers of alienated people to find and connect with one another, justify and intensify their anger, and mobilize resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.

• The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment
will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt
plots. It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local
level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of
terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.

POLLARD GETS SCREWED.... AGAIN!!!

Blogmaster's two shekles worth: I think that the conviction of someone spying for the People's Republic of China and stealing sensitive military secrets and equipment to enhance China's military capabilities is a supurb peace of work. Where my stomach turns is the Plea-bargain that gets this putz only two years behind bars. Think about it.... this guy Ming gets a lousy 2 years for giving military secrets to a proven adversary of the U.S. and the West. Pollard gives some intelligence information about Arab troop movements to Israel, and he gets life in prison. What's wrong with this picture???? Write your Congressman and Senator, Jonathan Pollard's life depends on it. Shabbat Shalom


Department of Justice
United States Attorney Scott N. Schools
Northern District of California

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

August 2, 2007

WWW.USDOJ.GOV/USAO/CAN Natalya.LaBauve@usdoj.gov
CONTACT: Natalya LaBauve
(415) 436-7055 Natalya.LaBauve@usdoj.gov

FORMER CHINESE NATIONAL CONVICTED FOR

COMMITTING ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE TO BENEFIT

CHINA NAVY RESEARCH CENTER IN BEIJING

AND FOR VIOLATING THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

First Conviction in the Country Involving Source Code Under the Arms Export Control Act

WASHINGTON– Xiaodong Sheldon Meng, 42, formerly a resident of Beijing, China, and resident of Cupertino, Calif., pleaded guilty yesterday to violating the Foreign Economic Espionage and violating the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), announced Assistant Attorney General for National Security Kenneth L. Wainstein and Scott N. Schools U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California.

The defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty to Count Five (EEA) and Count Seven (AECA) of a superseding indictment that had been filed on December 13, 2006.

Count Five charged that Meng violated the EEA by possessing a trade secret belonging to Quantum3D, a San Jose company by whom he was formerly employed, intending and knowing that this possession would benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent, namely the People’s Republic of China ("PRC") Navy Research Center.
The trade secret at issue, known as "Mantis," is a Quantum3D product used to simulate real world motion for military training purposes. Meng installed a demonstration unit of Mantis on the PRC Navy site. Meng also altered Mantis to make it appear as if it belonged to ORAD, Meng’s new employer, a competitor of Quantum3D based in PRC. This altered version of Mantis was included as part of the demonstration project in the PRC.
Count Seven charged that defendant Meng knowingly and willfully violated the AECA and ITAR when he exported "viXsen" source code, a Quantum 3D product that is a designated defense article on the United States Munitions List, and for which Meng had no Department of State export license. viXsen is a visual simulation software program used for training military fighter pilots.

United States Attorney Scott N. Schools noted that this prosecution is the result of a nearly three-year joint investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) Unit, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) - Office of Investigations, as well as Customs & Border Protection (CBP). The Department of State and the Department of Defense also provided valuable assistance on the case.
"This conviction, the first in the nation for illegal exports of military-related source code, demonstrates the importance of safeguarding our nation’s military secrets and should serve notice to others who would compromise our national security for profit," said Assistant Attorney General for National Security Kenneth L. Wainstein. "This case is the latest evidence of the Department’s enhanced investigative and prosecutorial efforts to keep America’s critical technology from falling into the wrong hands."

"One of ICE’s top priorities is ensuring that U.S. military products and sensitive technology does not fall into the hands of those who might inflict harm upon America or its allies," said Julie L. Myers, Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for ICE. "These items, such as the proprietary source code stolen and altered by the defendant in this case, are controlled in the interest of national security. We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners and industry to enforce U.S. technology export laws."

"The economic -- and often national -- security of the United States rests largely upon a foundation of technological superiority, and to maintain that superiority our trade secrets must be protected with the fervency with which we guard other vital interests," said Charlene B. Thornton, special agent in charge of the FBI’s San Francisco office. "The successful prosecution of Mr. Meng is a blow to those who seek to circumvent the long and costly process of research and development to gain a technological advantage through lies, deceit, and theft; it is a victory in the struggle to ensure the economic security of Silicon Valley and the United States."

Quantum3D, Inc. has cooperated fully in the government's investigation. A company official noted that the company "believes that enforcement of export and trade secret laws is critical to the functioning of our industry and we’re pleased to work with the government in these efforts."

The U.S. Attorney’s Offices in the Northern District of Alabama, District of Minnesota, and Middle District of Florida also joined the plea agreement as some of the conduct in the case occurred in those jurisdictions.

Defendant Meng is scheduled to be sentenced before United States District Judge Jeremy Fogel in San Jose on January 23, 2008, at 10:00 a.m. Meng is currently out of custody on $500,000 bond.

Under the terms of the plea agreement, the maximum term of imprisonment is twenty-four months. Meng also is subject to a maximum fine of $500,000 on the Economic Espionage Act conviction and a maximum fine of $1,000,000 on the Arm Export Control Act conviction, and a three-year term of supervised release. However, any sentence following conviction would be imposed by the court after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the federal statute governing the imposition of a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553.

Mark L. Krotoski is the Assistant U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case out of the CHIP Unit of the United States Attorney’s Office with the assistance of Legal Tech Lori Gomez.
Prior Economic Espionage Prosecutions:

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the Meng case is the second conviction and only the third case charging violation of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996, under 18 U.S.C. § 1831. Both EEA convictions have been obtained within the last nine months by the CHIP Unit in the Northern District of California.

The first economic espionage indictment was returned on May 8, 2001, in the Northern District of Ohio in United States v. Okamoto and Serizawa. (For more information: http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Okamoto_SerizawaIndict.htm).
The second economic espionage indictment was filed on December 4, 2002, by the Northern District of California CHIP Unit in United States v. Fei Ye and Ming Zhong, CR 02-20145-JW. The first EEA convictions, involving defendants Ye and Zhong, were obtained on December 14, 2006.

FBI San Francisco Press Page FBI San Francisco Home Page Privacy Policy

Chertoff's ‘Gut Feeling' Could Be a Nuclear Detonation

Paul L. Williams, Ph.D. (B'nai Elim Director of Christian Affairs)

Paul Williams is the bestselling author of "Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World" – which details al-Qaeda's efforts to acquire and detonate nuclear devices on U.S. soil. In this special to NewsMax, Williams, a former FBI consultant, reveals what al-Qaida may be planning this summer. To get a free offer copy of Williams book Click Here Now


Experiencing extreme intestinal discomfort, U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said in Chicago last week that America faces a heightened chance of an attack this summer.

"I believe we are entering a period this summer of increased risk," Chertoff told the Chicago Tribune's editorial board in a blunt assessment of America's terror threat level.
"Summer-time seems to be appealing to them," he said of al-Qaeda. "We do worry that they are rebuilding their activities."

Chertoff indicated his remarks were based on "a gut feeling" formed by past seasonal patterns of terrorist attacks, recent al-Qaeda statements, and intelligence he did not disclose.
Days before Chertoff made this announcement; ABC News reported that a secret law enforcement report prepared for homeland security warns that al-Qaeda is preparing a "spectacular" summer attack.

On Tuesday, ABC News also reported that "new intelligence suggests a small al-Qaeda cell is on its way to the United States, or may already be here."

Adding more fuel to the mounting fears, FBI Director Robert Mueller confirmed to NewsMax that al-Qaeda intends to detonate a nuclear device that would kill millions of Americans. He said that the threat is so real he lies awake at night thinking about the effects of such an attack.

These unprecedented announcements are based on the realization that al-Qaeda has achieved its goal of developing nuclear and radiological weapons for a simultaneous attack on seven to 10 American cities. READ MORE