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31 December 2006

WMDs In the Middle East - Israel at Risk

Note: The information contained in this article gives the reader a startling but true picture of the WMD crisis. It would be difficult to find this information elsewhere. B'nai Elim Blogmaster

Assessing WMD Programmes in Syria and Iran: Criteria for Future Inspection Regimes

“The failure of the Americans to prove that Iraq was developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not create a false picture when it comes to Syria.”

Eyal Zissler


Although Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are generally grouped together, they represent distinctly different classes of weapons. This common misnomer perpetuated by the media, has obscured not only what was recovered in Iraq by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) but more crucially, the detection criteria employed for each class of weapon and the future for inspection regimes where pre-emptive engagement may be critically necessary[1].

"We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means...Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can easily be concealed, delivered covertly and used without warning.”-National Security Strategy of the United States of America

Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear weapons are all capable of producing mass casualties and in some instances global catastrophic consequences. Chemical and Nuclear weapon classes both have international treaties and comprehensive inspection regimes: the Chemical Weapons Convention and inspection body the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); Nuclear Proliferation Treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the inspecting body and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) which is the only class of weapons which do not have a verification or inspection regime. Moreover while chemical weapon stockpiling and nuclear weapons development can be monitored by satellites and other technologies, the nature of biological “weapons” development is generally not detectible with standard methods.

The inherent characteristics, the technology required for stockpiling, deployment and use, set WMD apart; but none more so than with biological ‘weapons’ for biological pathogens can be considered a ‘weapon’ even when not ‘weaponized.’ The major differences between biological weapons and other unconventional warfare munitions include:

· The release of an agent is not immediately detectable as it the case with chemical and nuclear munitions. There are systems that detect biological agents, but most have a delay between acquiring the agent and identifying it;

· The effects of an attack are not immediately recognizable. People may become exposed to an agent soon after its release, but the infection requires time to cause illness[2] (the incubation period in some instances can be lengthy up to 17 days from exposure or longer);

· The effect of biological weapons can continue after initial release for months as in the case of a highly communicable and highly infectious virus such as smallpox. This would result in secondary infections in areas far from initial release/index case and geographic regions where such diseases could present virgin soil epidemics.

· Global commercial airline travel makes the pace (of communicable diseases) not the space, critical to containment strategies;

· If you took a gram of smallpox, which is highly contagious and infectious and for which there is no vaccine available globally, and released it in the air and created about a hundred index cases, the chances are excellent that the virus would go global in six weeks as people traveled, the death toll could easily hit the hundreds of millions…in scale, that’s like a nuclear war.[3]

Additional differences which set biological weapons apart include strain selection. Selecting an agent requires matching the desired results of an attack with an agent’s characteristics. Those characteristics may include: how much of an agent can cause disease (pathogenicity); time between exposure and illness (incubation period); how debilitating the resulting disease is (virulence); its lethality; and how readily the disease spreads to others (transmissibility).[4] Generally, the technological requirements associated with chemical and nuclear munitions and their deployment platforms are significantly different than for biological weapons.

There are about 48 organisms that could be used offensively--25 viruses, 13 bacteria, and 10 toxins. Although advances in genomics, molecular biology, combinatorial chemistry and understanding of microbial structure and replication and synthetic biology will effect future non-conventional weapons development, several nations of concern continue to build the majority of their offensive biological weapons programmes around the 5 or 6 Category A agents.[5]

“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.” - President George Bush, West Point, New York, 1 June, 2002

Currently there are about 18 nations suspected of having or trying to develop offensive biological weapons. The degree of sophistication of each country’s research program will determine how advanced biological agents will be.[6] Even the most rudimentary program will likely have lethal agents that have been a threat for some time.[7] Botulism, anthrax, plague and variola (smallpox) are high-probability candidates for most bio-weapons programmes. In addition, the revolution in biotechnology may produce other agents that are even more toxic and resilient. Without getting into the technical aspects, relatively minor molecular adjustments may produce a more toxic, fast acting, and stable biological agent.[8] However developing recombinant strains and then ‘weaponsizing’ them is a more involved process which also requires testing and demonstrating consistent results which can take years to perfect. State bio-defence laboratories throughout the world conduct advanced defence research to prepare for biological warfare. While the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibits ‘offensive’ biological weapons research it does not prohibit defensive research which is completely legitimate. With nations who conduct offensive research or are seeking to acquire the knowledge and technology to do so, such programmes are the most highly guarded national security areas such a nation can possess. The nature of biological weapons research makes such research highly complimentary to compartmentalization and embedding or running studies along side legitimate research; one reason is the dual-use nature of bio-weapons research, the other is the need to hide such activities. Nations conducting offensive research such as the former Soviet Union, the DPRK, Iran, Syria and previously Iraq have all embedded their programmes. Since the programmes are hidden and often run within legitimate research programmes criteria for assessing, what amounts to very subtle indicators, must be constructed. Iraq and the failure to develop such criteria to be utilized by the ISG is a good starting point for future inspection regimes.

Assessing the Iraq Survey Group as an Inspection Regime

Given the nature of biological weapons, their proliferation and potential use by rouge states, it is imperative we have sound criteria in order to asses both the current and future threat. In terms of future inspection regimes, nothing could be more significant or offer more of a road map for conducting inspections than the words of Dr. David Kay in his Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the ISG before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Photo: Container with vials. Vials: A total of 97 vials-including those with labels consistent with the al Hakam cover stories of single-cell protein and biopesticides, as well as strains that could be used to produce BW agents-were recovered from a scientist's residence.


October 2, 2003

“With regard to biological weapons activities, which has been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are uncovering significant information - including research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents. (Why search for a stockpile when you know what bio-warfare programme development entails?)

Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to the UN and was previously unknown. We are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D - all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production. The IIS also played a prominent role in sponsoring students for overseas graduate studies in the biological sciences, according to Iraqi scientists and IIS sources, providing an important avenue for furthering BW-applicable research. This was the only area of graduate work that the IIS appeared to sponsor.

Discussions with Iraqi scientists’ uncovered agent R&D work that paired overt work with nonpathogenic organisms serving as surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic agents. Examples include: B. Thurengiensis (Bt) with B. anthracis (anthrax), and medicinal plants with ricin. In a similar vein, two key former BW scientists confirmed that Iraq under the guise of legitimate activity developed refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents. The scientists discussed the development of improved, simplified fermentation and spray drying capabilities for the simulant Bt that would have been directly applicable to anthrax, and one scientist confirmed that the production line for Bt could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the seed stock were available.

A very large body of information has been developed through debriefings, site visits, and exploitation of captured Iraqi documents that confirms that Iraq concealed equipment and materials from UN inspectors when they returned in 2002. One noteworthy example is a collection of reference strains that ought to have been declared to the UN. Among them was a vial of live C. botulinum Okra B. from which a biological agent can be produced. This discovery - hidden in the home of a BW scientist - illustrates the point I made earlier about the difficulty of locating small stocks of material that can be used to covertly surge production of deadly weapons. The scientist who concealed the vials containing this agent has identified a large cache of agents that he was asked, but refused, to conceal. ISG is actively searching for this second cache.

Additional information is beginning to corroborate reporting since 1996 about human testing activities using chemical and biological substances, but progress in this area is slow given the concern of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel about their being prosecuted for crimes against humanity.”

Iraq and the Search for WMD

Given Dr. Kay’s above statements it’s perhaps surprising that the ISG took the course they did and finished in three months.

  • They apparently discovered pathogens suitable for biological warfare;
  • They discovered evidence of the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities;
  • They believed Iraq after 1996 had further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents;
  • Discovered a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities suitable for BW research and development;
  • Evidence of human testing with bio-warfare pathogens.

When we then consider inspection regimes, the criteria for estimating biological ‘weapons’ and weapons programmes is in need of urgent review.

For example, it has been claimed that the duration of the ISG inspections and Sector Control Point Baghdad (SCP-B) recovered chemical weapons on only two occasions. The first was a sarin mortar shell reconfigured into an IED (improvised explosive device). The second occasion was the discovery of several 122-mm rocket warheads filled with inert mustard gas recovered near Babylon.[9] Both were considered to be remainders from the Iran-Iraq War and useless as offensive weapons.[10]

The ISG focus on the search for biological weapons appeared solely pinned to the discovery of mobile laboratories, an unusual criteria for assessing an offensive biological weapons programme by any standard. Then there is the issue of stockpiling biological weapons; this paper contends that both of these criteria are low-level indicators if not irrelevant to assessing an advanced, offensive biological weapons programme. At issue, certainly is the perception that the failure to find biological ‘weapons’ in Iraq has lead to serious miscalculations. There is an underlying assumption that since no biological weapons were found in Iraq any claim that for example, Smallpox exists in other national offensive research programmes is dismissible and baseless. In fact lack of finding biological weapons in one country has no bearing on the situation in a number of other nations and is not in any way an indicator of proliferation to hostile regimes.

Why Mobile Laboratories?

While the nature of chemical weapons makes them well suited for ‘stockpiling’ as would be the case with radioactive and nuclear weapons; the nature of biological weapons generally does not make them as suitable for stockpiling. Therefore this particular class of weapon has significantly different inspection criteria, most of which is subtle and differentiated from searching for a so-called “stockpile.” One could be lead to believe that the same criterion for searching for chemical, nuclear and radioactive stockpiles was applied by the ISG in their search for biological weapons or “mobile” laboratories. In fact, if this were the case, the criteria would be almost irrelevant in determining a biological weapons capability. One simply has to question why there was such tremendous focus placed on the ‘mobile labs’ in the first place when such labs would be but one indicator among other more discrete criteria which certainly would have yielded the existence of an offensive programme; a programme which to this day may remain a real threat in terms of proliferation to states that currently sponsor terrorism.

Mobile Production Plant versus Mobile Laboratory?

Although individuals often interchangeably use the terms production plant and laboratory, they have distinct meanings.[11] The mobile production plants are designed for batch production of biological material and not for laboratory analysis of samples.[12] A truck-mounted mobile laboratory would be equipped for analysis and small-scale laboratory activities; US forces discovered one such laboratory in late April of 2003.

  • The mobile laboratory—installed in a box-bodied truck—is equipped with standard, dual-use laboratory equipment, including autoclaves, an incubator, centrifuges, and laboratory test tubes and glassware.
  • These laboratories could be used to support a mobile BW production plant but serve legitimate functions that are applicable to public heath and environmental monitoring, such as water-quality sampling.

Iraqi mobile laboratory

Interior view of mobile Laboratory

The mobile lab issue is one, portrayed by the media and intelligence sections as crucial to proving
Hussein had a biological weapons programme, The failure to find more “mobile” labs or even pathogens in the mobile lab which was discovered is completely irrelevant to any kind of programme the Iraqi regime was running. It simply was a convenient and not terribly sophisticated criterion which was asserted as evidentiary of an offensive weapons programme. Biological weapons programmes are complex, embedded, usually latent and highly technologically and scientifically sophisticated programmes, mobile labs are an easy simple target, those who aren’t biological weapons experts fixed upon, convincing the public and the Bush administration this was a viable indicator for assessing a biological weapons programme. One can speculate that their own lack of known (current) biological weapons programme construction lead them to fix on this indicator or perhaps they had another agenda in mind; at any rate mobile labs were selected and nothing short of finding them would suffice. Failure then to discover any pathogens or pre-cursors, media etc. meant there was no evidence of an active, existing biological programme; a very dangerous conclusion to have draw from a singular and isolated marker. It’s also notable that although Dr. Kay would later assert that they did find a ‘clandestine network of laboratories’ the criteria which would then be applied after such a finding was not.

Although Iraq's known bio-weapons labs were so carefully hidden that U.N. officials failed to discover them until 1995 -- four years after the start of inspections[13]; the second time around Kay spent only three months searching. Given the previous round which took four years to discover, it’s shocking to think three months would constitute a comprehensive inspection.

As Duelfer's September 2004 report noted, the ISG “fully evaluated less than one quarter of one percent of the over 10,000 weapons caches throughout Iraq, and visited fewer than ten ammunition depots identified prior to OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] as suspect CW [Chemical Weapons] sites.” In addition, the ISG had inspected approximately 10 percent “or less of the total Iraqi munitions stocks” that were estimated at over 600,000 tons.”[14]

“In the end, the Duelfer report stated, the ISG visited only two dozen or so sites. Out of 104 ammunition storage points within the "Red Line" ringing Baghdad, the ISG used “indicators of CW—such as possible decontamination vehicles—to narrow the search to 26 sites.” The result of this search uncovered “no caches of CW munitions.” The Duelfer report concluded: “[A]lthough only a fraction of the hundreds of thousands of tons of Iraqi munitions were inspected, ISG has a high confidence that there are no CW present in the Iraqi inventory.” [15]

If this is an indicator of the thoroughness with which they conducted inspections of ammunition storage sites then the potential of the ISG inspectors to utilize standard criteria for assessing biological weapons programmes would be beyond their capability.

Why Intelligence Seized on Mobile Laboratories as a Standard for Assessment

During the 1990’s it was only after the defection of the program's chief, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, that inspectors found secret laboratories that were producing lethal bacteria by the ton. [16]While conclusive proof remains elusive, there have been persistent reports since the late 1990s suggesting that Iraq has continued biological weapons research using small labs built underground or concealed inside specially modified trucks. Detailed accounts of what were described as secret labs were given to U.S. intelligence officials by Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, an engineer specializing in constructing dust-free "clean rooms" needed for certain types of laboratory suggested that as many as 300 secret weapons facilities had been "reactivated" since the withdrawal of U.N. inspectors.[17] Even if such claims proved false, existing and known research laboratories, veterinary institutes, bio-pharma research facilities, university hospitals and pediatric units should have been searched and their programmes detailed to develop a concise framework of biological research activities and compartmentalization.

Saeed was kept in a safe house by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which declined requests to interview him. But according to a transcript of his debriefing session, which was made available by the Iraqi National Congress, a leading opposition group, Saeed said most of the facilities were small and cleverly disguised.[18] Again, a bit concerning that the ISG focused on finding weapon stockpiles.

"In some areas, houses or a small factory would get converted into labs," Saeed said. He also described a visit to an underground biological lab on the grounds of one of Hussein's Baghdad palaces, and his account is similar to reports of the Tahhaddy biological site offered by the Iraqi National Congress, which claims to have investigated the facility using informants. A document provided to The Washington Post by the group gives directions to the lab, lists its senior officers and describes a layout that includes above-ground offices and rooms for a security detachment assigned to the building. Most of its 85 employees work in a small underground lab that conducts research on pathogens, including a mysterious Blue Nile strain, officials of the opposition group said. Bio-warfare experts suggested the name may refer to Ebola, a usually fatal hemorrhagic disease.” [19]

Two issues must be immediately dispensed with: the mobile laboratories as an indicator of an offensive weapons programme; and second the lack of incorporating viable criteria for determining a biological weapons capability and programme in spite of historic and current knowledge on how biological programmes are constructed today and how they have been constructed for decades in nations who conduct offensive research. What are mobile labs? Why would mobile labs be selected as an indicator? Who selected this?

What are mobile laboratories?

Where did the notion of the possibility of an Iraqi mobile biological weapons (BW) production capability come from? In 1995, Lt. Gen. Amir al-Sa’adi told UNSCOM officials that in 1988 he had suggested that perhaps Iraq should develop its BW production on mobile platforms.[20] The suggestion was rejected as not being feasible. During the war against Iran, General Sa’adi had been head of the Iraq government’s Special Office for Technical Industry (SOTI), he later became deputy to General Hussein Kammel, he Head of all of Iraq’s WMD programmes in the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI). Although Sa’adi said he only provided a ‘concept’ and not a detailed drawing, the CIA gleaning ‘details’ from a source known as curveball, would certainly have had to substantially enhance the mobile laboratory concept, which eventually appeared in Secretary Powell’s illustration at the UN on the 4th of February 2003. Unfortunately Secretary Powell was never informed of the enhancement. Mobile Laboratories appear to be a convenient, simple to understand, concept promoted by the CIA as criteria for a BW programme.

Claims about Iraq's mobile laboratories first appeared in September 2002, with the intelligence dossier released by Blair saying a number were in use.
The next month the CIA asserted,
Iraq had "large-scale" biological warfare production capabilities in mobile laboratories. Bizarrely, this became the standard by which the CIA sought to gauge a biological weapons programme by. It could be proposed that the CIA placed a high value on mobile laboratories because they can evade detection and are highly survivable however the latent nature of all biological programmes rather negates this as a probability. If evasion were the motive, embedded programmes can evade most inspection regimes and Iraq had a history of doing this not a history of mobile laboratories.

Mobile laboratories are also employed by militaries throughout the world for force protection. Generally they are termed ‘forward deployed mobile laboratories’ for field identification of known and unknown agents. Although the CIA claimed that the mobile platforms they recovered did not appear suited for this use.

Possession of mobile laboratories does not constitute a biological weapons programme, which would have been known certainly by microbiologists on the ISG inspections, even given intelligence on hidden laboratories; but other criteria do; criteria which were selectively ignored.

What does a real state biological weapons programme look like?

In assessing the Iraqi programme and challenging the criteria used by the ISG we need only look at how programmes are constructed today. It’s stated that “survey teams (Task Force 75) combed laboratories and munitions plants, bunkers and distilleries, bakeries and vaccine factories, file cabinets and holes in the ground where tipsters advised them to dig. Most of the assignments came with classified "target folders" describing U.S. intelligence leads. Others, known as the "ad hocs," came to the task force's attention by way of plausible human sources on the ground.

Several nations currently have latent offensive biological weapons programmes and in this sense Iraq did not stand out. Their intent to activate the programme certainly required pre-emptive and immediate action as the consequences could conceivably be global pandemics and catastrophic devastation. What is and remains disturbing is that given an historic precedence (the Soviet Biopreparat programme) to go by, the inspection criteria employed to discover an Iraqi biological weapons programme, reflected none of the criteria which would be drawn by assessing the Soviet programme or even the previous Iraqi programme. This is unusual and one must consider that there were other dominant reasons for not conducting an inspection using normal criteria i.e. deciding to search instead for mobile biological laboratories which would demonstrate nothing or the stockpiles which would have been unlikely.

To touch upon one of the most notable and successful biological weapons programmes to date, the soviet programme known as Biopreparat was a massive biological weapons research and development programme that went completely unnoticed by all western intelligence agencies for over three decades. Only 15% percent of research conducted at all 52 of the identified Biopreparat sites was legitimate. Nearly 50,000 scientists worked within the Biopreparat system under the guise of highly compartmentalized legitimate research. Even when the programme was detailed by two scientists who defected, most US bio-weapons continued to rejected how advanced the programme was…in fact it was the most advanced biological weapons programme ever run. Biopreparat is an outstanding example of both an active and latent programme. It is a framework currently employed by a number of states to hide their offensive bio-weapons research. Biopreparat and other programmes in North Korea, Iran, Syria and China offer constructive, defined criteria for how to evaluate the advancement of a biological weapons programme.

What is perhaps most surprising, given the ISG’s failure to conduct an adequate inspection, is a statement by Dr. Kay acknowledging the significance of ‘surge capability’. “David Kay, chief U.S. weapons inspector, told Congress that “Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of [biological weapons] agents” and that Iraq concealed relevant “equipment and materials” from UN inspectors in violation of Security Council Resolution 1441. His most prominent piece of evidence, however, was that an Iraqi scientist hid “a vial of live C. botulinum Okra B. from which a biological agent can be produced” in his home; Kay later acknowledged that the vial had been hidden in the scientist’s home since 1993. Kay also said that a “very large body of information has been developed…that confirms” Iraq’s concealment efforts, but he did not elaborate.[21]

The nature of an offensive biological weapons programme incorporates a number of institutions, expertise and testing, most of which is completely dual-use and some of which is entirely legitimate. Evaluating a bio-programme requires a comprehensive approach to a very substantial framework of activities. The institutional framework includes defence laboratories, veterinary vaccine research facilities, medical research facilities, university hospitals, prison populations (with a focus on political prison sections); military populations and bio-pharma institutions and in the case of most nations possessing offensive bio-programmes the freezers and refrigerators of scientists from bench to defence.. The Stepnagorsk facility, a center of excellence in the Biopreparat programme, conducted dozens of developmental and test runs with anthrax so as to be ready to launch full production should Moscow declare a ‘special period’ for doing so. Moscow never did and Stepnagorsk never produced a stockpile of weapons. [22]Similar to Iran, Iraq, the DPRK, and Syria, the purpose of the facility and other institutions in the Biopreparat network, was to maintain the capability to start production on short notice. This is the model still in use today by most nations in possession of a biological weapons programme. The latent nature is essential to maintaining not necessarily the weapons, or a stockpile, but in fact the capability to produce such weapons as this is the most unstable and technologically complex aspect of retaining an offensive programme.

“Now the really sobering part—biological warfare agents are very difficult, if not impossible, to detect while they are in the research, production, transit, or employment phases.”[23] Normal biological warfare research facilities resemble completely legitimate biotechnical and medical research facilities; the challenge this presents is in distinguishing legitimate production plants from illicit ones.[24] As demonstrated in Iraq, this needs to be done to verify a programme’s existence or in the case of Syria, to use pre-emptive strikes on biological weapons production facilities.

For this reason, it is critical new, more advanced approaches be developed and instituted in order to identify latent programme structure, institutional organization and network interaction between civilian and defence research facilities, such criteria was never employed by the ISG inspections in Iraq and therefore none of the programmes were ever discovered.

Detecting Latent Biological Weapons Programmes: Critical Criteria for

Inspection Regimes

“David Kay, reported that "we know from some of the interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD program." Among the things left behind, Kay reported finding a "clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses," and "a prison laboratory complex... that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN." The ISG's investigation revealed "new research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin.”[25]

Interestingly, as dismissive as the ISG was of Iraq’s biological programme, generally because the criteria it employed was very crude and simplistic, they made a similar assessment of Iraqi chemical programmes. If the findings didn’t fit their pre-conceived ‘stockpile’ concept, they negated it which is a fabrication of what indeed existed. This is well illustrated by Kenneth Timmerman in the following quote:

“When coalition forces entered Iraq, "huge warehouses and caches of 'commercial and agricultural' chemicals were seized and painstakingly tested by Army and Marine chemical specialists," Hanson writes. "What was surprising was how quickly the ISG refuted the findings of our ground forces and how silent they have been on the significance of these caches." Caches of "commercial and agricultural" chemicals don't match the expectation of "stockpiles" of chemical weapons. But, in fact, that is precisely what they are. "At a very minimum," Hanson tells Insight, "they were storing the precursors to restart a chemical-warfare program very quickly."

Kay and Duelfer came to a similar conclusion, telling Congress under oath that Saddam had built new facilities and stockpiled the materials to re-launch production of chemical and biological weapons at a moment's notice. At Karbala, U.S. troops stumbled upon 55-gallon drums of pesticides at what appeared to be a very large "agricultural supply" area, Hanson says. Some of the drums were stored in a "camouflaged bunker complex" that was shown to reporters -- with unpleasant results.

"More than a dozen soldiers, a Knight-Ridder reporter, a CNN cameraman, and two Iraqi POWs came down with symptoms consistent with exposure to a nerve agent," Hanson says. "But later ISG tests resulted in a proclamation of negative, end of story, nothing to see here, etc., and the earlier findings and injuries dissolved into nonexistence. Left unexplained is the small matter of the obvious pains taken to disguise the cache of ostensibly legitimate pesticides. One wonders about the advantage an agricultural-commodities business gains by securing drums of pesticide in camouflaged bunkers 6 feet underground. The 'agricultural site' was also co-located with a military ammunition dump -- evidently nothing more than a coincidence in the eyes of the ISG." [26]

Timmerman further contents that:

“The discoveries Hanson describes are not dramatic. And that's the problem: Finding real stockpiles in grubby ammo dumps doesn't fit the image the media and the president's critics carefully have fed to the public of what Iraq's weapons ought to look like. A senior administration official who has gone through the intelligence reporting from Iraq as well as the earlier reports from U.N. arms inspectors refers to another well-documented allegation.”[27]

Indeed, this is the same side of the coin with Saddam’s biological weapons programmes and the ISG failure to construct normal criteria in order to assess a real and active offensive capability. Instead the ISG chose a media produced concept of biological weapons, in a neat stockpile waiting near military instillations to be deployed. This is not how things are remotely done today by any nation on earth in possession of a full scale biological weapons programme with production capability.

North Korea

Camp 22 is a North Korean prison for political prisoners. There are an estimated 50,000 prisoners held in the camp. North Korea’s State Security Agency maintains a dozen political prisons and about 30 forced labor and labor camps. The worst are in the countries far northeast near the border with China and Russia. At least two of the camps, Haengyong and Huaong, are larger in area than the District of Columbia, with Huaong being three times the size of the U.S. capital district. Camp 22 in particular is known to conduct biological weapons testing on prisoners, women and children. North Korea's Army is the only army in the world with mandatory smallpox vaccinations. The DPRK is suspected of conducting human experiments with most Category A biological pathogens including plague, anthrax, botulium, smallpox and Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (VHF). Four years ago there was a suspected outbreak of smallpox in a camp on the border with China which purportedly killed 40,000 of the camps internees. As variola has been eradicated since 1980 and the remaining strains are held at only two repositories: the CDC in Atlanta Georgia and Vector in Novosibirsk, Siberia, the only possible explanation for this outbreak is the illegal retention and use of smallpox for building a biological weapons capability and potential experimentation on humans which then lead to an accidental outbreak.


Throughout their frustrating years of cat-and-mouse searches, the U.N. inspection teams stumbled across several chilling clues that hinted at human testing projects in Iraq.[28] The most compelling case involved alleged biological weapons tests carried out on Shiite political prisoners by a mysterious Unit 2100, a U.N. inspection team document shows.[29]

According to the document, at least 50 prisoners from Abu Gharib prison west of Baghdad were rounded up in 1995 and sent to a secret testing facility in Al-Haditha, a remote community in Iraq's western desert.

"Unit 2100 was subordinate directly to the Ministry for Military Industry ... which was headed by Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamil," states the document, which is based on intelligence supplied by a senior Iraqi defector.

"The unit conducted experiments on human subjects using chemical and biological warfare agents," the document goes on. "Prisoners who were sent to Unit 2100 did not return."[30] While these statements may be true, and inspectors who apparently went to recover ‘documents’ of all things which were missing, did not conduct serological testing on in-mates; such testing would have yielded conclusive results as would test known areas where mass graves were dug to dump the bodies.

Informed that the Americans had probed the mass grave of the alleged chemical test victims and turned up nothing, the officer seemed unfazed. Instead, he produced a colleague, a lieutenant in the Iraqi Second Army Corps that purportedly oversaw the operation, who confirmed the broad outlines of his story.” The Americans," the officer insisted, "have a lot more digging to do."[31]

According to a report by the Arms Control Association, the ISG found that:

  • Iraqi scientists experimented with “nonpathogenic organisms serving as surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic agents.” For example, they conducted experiments with a substitute for anthrax that would have been “directly applicable” to producing anthrax for weapons.

  • Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were “explicitly ordered not to declare” a prison laboratory complex that was possibly used in human testing of biological weapons agents.

  • New research was being conducted on biological-weapon applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever, and that continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin were not declared to the UN.

  • Iraq never declared a “clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus.” The network “was suitable for preserving [biological weapons] expertise, [biological weapons] capable facilities and continuing R&D [research and development]—all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming biological weapons production.” The ISG is “still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or…weapons.”


One of the first research facilities established in 1986 under the new program was the Tehran based Pasteur Institute, which started to work on the development of toxic fungus and microbiological substances. During its first stages, the center concentrated on producing aflatoxin, a potent natural mycotoxin produced by aspergillus flavus, which can be weaponised by certain biochemical procedures.
At the same time similar research was undertaken at the Vira Laboratory Shari'ati under Dr Gholamhossein Riazi.[32]

A 1989 US intelligence report mentioned Iranian agents trying to buy two new strains of fungi, Fusarium from Canada and the Netherlands that can be used to produce T-2 mycotoxins.[33] The Imam Reza Medical Center at Mashhad Medical Sciences University and the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology were ostensibly identified as the end users for this purchasing effort, "but more likely was that the true end user was an Iranian government agency specializing in biological warfare." [34]Some of the most common agents that are associated with the Iranian BW program are Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), botulinum toxin, ricin, T-2 mycotoxin, and Variola virus the causative agent of smallpox. The many sophisticated research facilities in Iran could easily serve as a front for illicit BW-related activities and could offer a legitimate excuse to import dual-use material.[35] (see list of institutes at bottom)


Although Syria’s biological weapons research programme is centered on a number of Category A agents, among them smallpox, plague and anthrax with ricin representing a Category B agent which they also are conducting tests on at the biological section of the CERS Center, (Scientific Research Council and Scientific Studies and Research Center SSRC); Syria’s strategic research, development and production facility located in Damascus. The project started in the early 1980s; in recent years, we have been witness to an upsurge in activities that might indicate a change of concept triggered by Syria’s intentions to amplify its arsenal of such weapons.[36] The extensive foreign activities of Syrian intelligence services include substantial acquisition efforts focused on biological and chemical weapons. The Syrian procurement structure uses the Scientific Studies and Research Center as cover.[37]

Given the vast array and scope of activities which are involved in a biological weapons programme, future inspection criteria must incorporate far more discrete indicators and a broader base of methods to fully assess an offensive weapons programme and to unequivocally establish the threat such a programme poses both in the near and long term. A couple of the criteria noted herewith (there are a total of seven) will be discussed in greater detail within the up-coming book.

The Institutional Framework Criteria

1.Vaccine Research Sites and Veterinary Research Laboratories

Because the technology used to produce vaccines can also be used until the very final stages to produce biological weapons and the knowledge base is essentially the same, vaccine research facilities and veterinary research laboratories in rouge states pose a credible target for inspection. In fact Iraq is a case in point and a few of it’s facilities were indeed rigorously monitored. However, there are research sites which never make it onto the radar and which should be carefully screened.

During the first Gulf War, the evidence for Baghdad’s efforts to sustain and expand it’s biological weapons program was substancial. According to the CIA report, the Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, which employs a sophisticated air filtration system, was used to produce biological agents before the Gulf War. UNSCOM destroyed equipment at the facility associated with biological weapons but left other equipment in place. In 2001, without U.N. approval, Baghdad announced that it would renovate the facility to produce vaccine to treat an outbreak of foot and mouth disease, even though it could much more easily and quickly import the vaccine it needed (citations) Iraq greatly expanded the storage capacity of the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, which records show was used to store cultures, agents and equipment for biological weapons before the Gulf War. Similarly, authorities worked to rebuild the Fallujah III Caster Oil Production Facility, which was used to manufacture ricin.[38]

Veterinary research facilities are highly complimentary to biological weapons programmes and must be investigated with the same rigor one would apply to a defence laboratory.

2. Medical and Scientific Community Freezers and Refridgerators

During the consolidation of global smallpox (variola major) stocks by the World Health Organization, D.A. Henderson, a renown smallpox expert, when asked if he thought all smallpox samples were accounted for and turned into the two official repositories: CDC and Vector, replied “It would be impossible to know what is in everyone freezer.” This may indeed be the case however in accounting for potential pathogens, particularly Category A biological pathogens suitable for warfare, it is incombant upon those inspectors to assess both defence and commerical staff from bench docs to full scientific team leaders and to in fact do a comprehensive search of their homes and offices. While this task would take more than three months, the western concept of bio-safety which would inhibit most scientists from transporting and maintaining live warfare strains in their home refridgerators is not inhibitory in most mid-east nations and others throughout the would. Moreover, unlike scientific communities in the West who face innumerable standards and review committees when conducting clinical trials, many research teams in the far east and mid-east conduct trials using themselves as guinea pigs. This is another scope which was never fully verified.The scientific community should have submitted to blood screening. While this goes against western concepts of civil liberties, it is essential in determining a covert programme. Comprehensive lists of lab-techs and scientists working in vaccine institutes, veterinary research facilities and university laboratories should be screened against a number of criteria (define in my book) to determine the likelihood of their concealing or being asked to conceal biological agents at their home.

3. Serological and Toxicological Testing of Political Prison Populations and Post Humosly

One of the most important criteria inspection regimes could imploy in future inspection regimes is the testing of the prison population and post-humosly testing of prisoners bodies; specifically political prisoners. As previosly mentioned, today North Korea (DPRK), Iran, Syria, and other nations are strongly suspected of conducting biological weapons testing on live human subjects drawn from the prison population and among military personal (for less lethal, vaccine related testing). For example the above noted cases are not exemplary and should today be considered mainstream practice for these nations. Serological testing is a relatively simple task, the prisoners are encarcerated so they are accessible, do not have to be located or tracked and testing can be easily documented.


With the increasing potential for future inspection regimes in countries such as Syria and Iran, defining inspection criteria, clearly not employed by the ISG, for assessing state run offensive biological weapons programmes, which by their nature tend to be ‘latent’ is critical.

There are a number of reasons why state’s adopt ‘latent’ programmes for biological weapons development instead of stockpiling. Some of these reasons were discussed above, some have to do with the nature of biological pathogens themselves, as living and replicating organisms, some have to do with the ability to hide an offensive programme behind legitimate research and some have to do with long-term strategic defence planning.
Latent BW programmes are not dormant or virtual, they are existing, active programmes imbedded in research, industry and defence sectors. Many nations throughout the world possess a ‘latent’ capability through the framework of legitimate advanced life-sciences, pharmaceutical industries and research laboratories.[39] Inspection regimes are simply not prepared to conduct the type of detailed advanced inspections required to verify biological weapons production and use. Similar to how ‘weapons’ are conceived of, science and technology have so advanced, coupled with a basic mis-understanding of what constitutes a biological weapons programme, that unless the criteria is significantly altered, future inspections which may be undertaken in various nations will continue to yield little or no results.

List of Iranian Institutes Suspected of Research and Development for WMD

The Pasteur Institute
69 Pasteur Avenue Tehran
Located at the Iranian Science Center for Biotechnology and Molecular Biology.
Established in 1920 as a primary center for research of infectious desease and production of biological vaccines.The Biotechnology Department was formed in 1993 as a modern genetic engineering research institute.
According to intelligence reports, the Defence Ministry operates a secret experimental laboratory within the institute, studying toxic fungus, specialising in aflatoxin. A special MOD official supervises the work on biological agents.
Heading the institute is Dr Mortez Azartush, who denied 1999 reports that illegal activities are taking place at the Pasteur Institute.

The Vira Laboratory
Shari'ati Street Tehran
Also known under the name of Sina Industries it operates ostensibly focusing on agriculture and medical research, but actually its main function seems to be as the chemical laboratory of the Defence Ministry Special Industries Organisation. It functions as research center for testing and production of chemical and biological warfare-related substances. Several reports mention Vira having field tested biological agents on animals.
Heading the laboratories during the nineties was Dr Gholamhossein Riazi, a specialist in biological fermentation process.
His deputy, Dr Yousefi is now in charge.

Special Industries Organisation ( Ministry of Defence)
Gostaresh Research Center Tehran ( Zartosht Street?)
Formed in 1999 ( some reports mention an earlier date as 1993) to develop chemical weapons. The SIO supervises and coordinates various scientific programs, including biological research, with a special branch studying and developing biological weapon grade bacterial agents.
Intelligence reports, probably based on internal HUMINT indicate the location of a special facility related to SIO being camouflaged from sight along the Tehran-Karaj highway, known locally as Shahid Meysami Industry. Apparently this site also acts as storage depot for chemical (and biological?) artillery shells for the Revolutionary Guards units. Some years ago, rumours spread, that lax safety procedures caused severe health hazards to workers employed there.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) website has published some interesting details on SIO activities in its Country Information on Iran:
"Two Swiss firms, Bio Engineering (a subsidiary of Bayer AG) and MBR Company, had been selling fermenters to Iran in the 1990s that were claimed to be entirely for civilian use. Company officials insisted that the Iranian purchasers were the Ministry of Agriculture and an entity they identified as MIDSPGIC Co. However, the People's Mujahadin of Iran claimed that MIDSPGIC is an abbreviation for the Special Industries Organization of the Defense Ministry. Bio Engineering was attacked two times in 1992, once at its office outside of Zurich (apparently by a terrorist group) and once at its Munich-based delivery company. Equipment destroyed in the attacks included a 15-liter lab fermenter and a 750 production fermenter, similar to those used by Iraq for its BW program." (NTI August 2003)

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Imam Hussein University

Located in Tehran, the university complex houses extensive, but highly secret research departments led by scientists, members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or Pasdaran. According to reports, this establishment focuses on weaponisation of several biological agents, including anthrax, smallpox, typhoid, plague and cholera bacteria. IRGC scientists also engage in weapons-related genetic engineering research at the Malek Ashtar University, Shahinshahr,based in the Lavizan Shian Technological Research Center and headed by Dr Maqsudi, who is in charge of the affiliated center for Scientific and Growth Technology. Dr Hossein San'ati heads this center and has been active in this field since the eighties. Jointly with Dr Mirza'i and Karami, the team became known as architects of the national microbial weapons research project.
Experiments have been taken place at the IRGC Imam University, testing of microbial bombs using anthrax, smallpox, typhoid fever, as well as high dosage aflatoxin.
The authorities have placed substantial effort in coordinating all these functions, by establishing a new department named Directorate to Asess Weapons of Mass Destruction, which also focuses on recruiting foreign WMD related advanced technologies in biochemistry. This diretorate also supervises activities in acquisition, training and supplying various special forces with bioweapon related technologies.
A special organisation in the Ministry of Defence is charged with Chemical, Biological and Nuclear industries to supervise all production activities, headed by Brigadier General Seyyedi.
Heading the new directorate is Brigadier General Nasser Toqyani, a senior IRGC commander. His superior is Major General Hassan Firouzabadi chairman of the Joint Command HQ of the IRGC. In charge of microbiological weapons development section is Brigadier General Abroumand.

Other Biological Facilities related to BioWeapons Program

Biological Research Center of SIO
Located at Shahid Meisami Martyr Complex Special Karaj Highway
Revolutionary Guards Baqiyatolla Research Center
affiliated to the Guard's Baqiyatolla hospital works under Dr Karami, an experienced member of the IRGC Imam Hussein University scientific staff in the study and development of biological weapons.

Damghan Weapons Production Facility
Located near a dry lake approximately 375 miles to the southwest of Mashad, or 300km east of Teheran.
Unconfirmed reports indicate that Damghan is the site of a biological weapons research laboratory constructed with Russian assistance.

Other facilities who could be, or become related to the production of biochemical weapons grade material are widely dispersed in almost all major Iranian cities.
There are also numerous research institutions, in which various dual related biological studies could take place. Among the major "civilian" institutes are:
Biotechnology Research Center, Group of Fermentation and Biological Technology
No.71 Forsat St.,
Ferdowsi Square

National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology Research
No. 15,
Abbas Shafiee Alley,
Quds St.,
Inqilah Ave.

Sharif University of Technology
Biochemical and Bioenvironmental Research Center

The Institute of Biochemistry and Biophysics (IBB)
University of Tehran

Source: Iran’s National Deterrent: Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, Defence Update News Commentary, 4, April, 2004.

[1] Preemption, defined as the anticipatory use of force in the face of an imminent attack, has long been accepted as legitimate and appropriate under international law. The continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the transfer of technology and knowledge to states with a history of aggression and who support terrorist groups, creates an unacceptable level of risk, and “ presents a compelling case for taking anticipatory actions to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack." (Michael E. O'Hanlon, Susan E. Rice, and James B. Steinberg, “The National Security Strategy and Pre-emption”, Policy Brief No. 113, Global Politics, The Brookings Institution, December, 2002. URL: http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb113.htm

[2] “Biological Weapons Production”, Federation of American Scientists, URL: http://www.fas.org/biosecurity/resource/bioweapons.htm

[3] Microbiology 101 Internet Text, Chapter XV, Addendum: Biological Weapons, Malignant Biology, 2000 URL: http://www.slic2.wsu.edu:82/hurlbert/micro101/pages/101biologicalweapons.html#advantagesofBW

[4] For a full description of the process of selection and potential weaponization process see “Biological Weapons Production”, Federation of American Scientists, URL: http://www.fas.org/biosecurity/resource/bioweapons.htm [A pathogen can be obtained from two major sources: its natural environment and a microbiology laboratory or bank. When acquired from environmental sources such as soil, water, or infected animals, enough of the microorganism would have to be obtained to allow purification and testing of its characteristics. The difficulty in acquiring agents stored in labs and banks, such as the American Type Culture Collection, depends on accessibility to the pathogens, security for the facility, or security measures for the bank’s ordering process. These agents are purified and of a known quality. An alternative to acquiring agents is creating them. Toxins can be produced by adding the DNA coding for its production to bacteria. Also, advances in biotechnology have made it possible to synthesize certain viruses based on its genome, or an organism’s genetic instructions, and using basic materials such as DNA. Dr. Eckard Wimmer first demonstrated this by re-creating the poliovirus in 2001, which was followed by Dr. Craig Venter’s synthesis of the bacteriophage Greek symbol phiX174 in 2003 and the 2005 re-creation of the 1918 flu virus by Dr. Jeffrey Taubenberger and Dr. Terrence Tumpey. Modification of microorganisms through selection techniques and advances in genetic engineering could alter an agent so it will function in a particular manner. Agents modified for increased pathogenicity and a shorter incubation period could result in a more severe, fast-acting disease. Microorganisms that, under normal circumstances, do not infect potential targets could be modified to do so. Other changes could make treatments, vaccines, or the body’s immune system useless. Delivering an agent requires preparing it to remain effective when outside of its optimal growing conditions. Exposure to environmental stresses such as temperature, ultraviolet radiation, and drying can reduce the agent’s activity. Some pathogens, like the anthrax bacteria, can encapsulate itself into a hardy, long-lasting spore not easily susceptible to those conditions. Other agents require further processing that minimizes damage to it and allows it to retain its activity when dispersed. These procedures include: direct freeze drying (lyophilization); formulation into a special stabilizing solid, liquid, or gaseous solution; deep freezing; and powdering and milling. Once stabilized, the pathogens are ready for dispersal.

[5]Category A includes the highest priority agents: anthrax(bacillus anthracis), botulism (clostridium botulinium toxin),plague (yersinia pestis) smallpox (variola major), tularemia (francisella tularenis) and viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses e.g. Ebola, Marburg, and arenaviruses e.g. Lassa, Machupo) that pose a risk to national security because of the following features For a biological weapon to be highly effective, three conditions should be optimized. The biological agent should consistently produce the desired effect of death or disease. It should be highly contagious with short and predictable incubation period and infective in low doses. The disease should be difficult to identify and be suspected as an act of bioterrorism. The agents should be suitable for mass production, storage, weaponisation, and stable during dissemination. The target population should have little or no herd immunity and little or no access to treatment. The terrorist should have means to protect or treat their own forces and population against the infectious agents or the toxins. Beeching NJ, Dance DA, Miller AR, et.al. Biological warfare and bioterrorism. BMJ. 2002; 324:336-339.

[6] Mayer, Terry, Lt.Col.USAF, “ The Biological Weapon: A Poor Nations Weapon of Mass Destruction” Battlefield of the Future, United States Air Force, Air University. URLfile:///C:/DOCUME~1/JILLDE~1/MYDOCU~1/Battlefield%20of%20the%20Future.htm

[7] Ibid.

[8] Rose, Stephen, “The Coming Explosion of Silent Weapons,” Naval War College Review, 42, (Summer 1989): 26–27.

[9] Iraq Survey Group, Definition Wikipedia, 27, July, 2006 URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_Survey_Group

[10] Iraq Survey Group, Definition Wikipedia, 27, July, 2006 URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_Survey_Group

[11] Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants”, URL: https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraqi_mobile_plants/index.html#01

[12] Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants”, URL: https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraqi_mobile_plants/index.html#01

[13] Joby Warrick, “In Assessing Iraq’s Arsenal the Reality is Uncertain”, Washington Post, 31 July, 2002, p.AOI.

[14] McKivergan, Daniel, Worldwide Standard.Com. 8 February, 2006 URL: http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2006/02/todays_ny_sun_iraqwmd_piece_an.html

[15] McKivergan, Daniel, Worldwide Standard.Com. 8 February, 2006 URL: http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2006/02/todays_ny_sun_iraqwmd_piece_an.html

[16] Joby Warrick, “In Assessing Iraq’s Arsenal the Reality is Uncertain”, Washington Post, 31 July, 2002, p.AOI.

[17]Joby Warrick, “In Assessing Iraq’s Arsenal the Reality is Uncertain”, Washington Post, 31 July, 2002, p.AOI.

[18] Joby Warrick, “In Assessing Iraq’s Arsenal the Reality is Uncertain”, Washington Post, 31 July, 2002, p.AOI.

[19] Joby Warrick, “In Assessing Iraq’s Arsenal the Reality is Uncertain”, Washington Post, 31 July, 2002, p.AOI.

[20] Leitenburg, Milton, “Unresolved Questions Regarding the US Government Attribution of a Mobile Biological Production Capacity by Iraq” URL:

[21] Kerr, Paul, “Deconstruction: Kay’s Congressional Testimony” Arms Control Association, November 2003. URL: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/KayReport.asp

[22] Meselson, Matthew, “Bio-Terror: What Can Be Done?” The New York Review of Books, Vol.48, No.20, December 2001

[23] Ibid., Mayer.

[24] Ibid., Mayer

[25] Mariani, Joe, “Iraq’s WMD Redux”, The Conservative Voice, 21, Febuary, 2006, URL: http://www.theconservativevoice.com/article/12525.html

[26] Timmerman, Kenneth, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Saddam’s WMD have been Found: New Evidence Unveils Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Ballistic Arms”, 26 April, 2004, WorldNet Daily. URL: http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=38213

[27] Timmerman, Kenneth, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Saddam’s WMD have been Found: New Evidence Unveils Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Ballistic Arms”, 26 April, 2004, WorldNet Daily. URL: http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=38213

[28] Salopek, Paul, “Reports Surface that Saddam Tested Biological, Chemical Weapons on Humans”, Foundation for Defence Democracies, 16, July, 2003. URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=183756&attrib_id=7511

[29] Salopek, Paul, “Reports Surface that Saddam Tested Biological, Chemical Weapons on Humans”, Foundation for Defence Democracies, 16, July, 2003. URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=183756&attrib_id=7511

[30] Salopek, Paul, “Reports Surface that Saddam Tested Biological, Chemical Weapons on Humans”, Foundation for Defence Democracies, 16, July, 2003. URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=183756&attrib_id=7511

[31] Salopek, Paul, “Reports Surface that Saddam Tested Biological, Chemical Weapons on Humans”, Foundation for Defence Democracies, 16, July, 2003. URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=183756&attrib_id=7511

[32] Iran’s National Deterrent: Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, Defence Update News Commentary, 4, April, 2004. URL: http://www.defense-update.com/2004/04/irans-national-deterrent-weapons-of.html

[33] Iran’s National Deterrent: Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, Defence Update News Commentary, 4, April, 2004. URL: http://www.defense-update.com/2004/04/irans-national-deterrent-weapons-of.html

[34] Iran’s National Deterrent: Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, Defence Update News Commentary, 4, April, 2004. URL: http://www.defense-update.com/2004/04/irans-national-deterrent-weapons-of.html

[35] Iran’s National Deterrent: Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, Defence Update News Commentary, 4, April, 2004. URL: http://www.defense-update.com/2004/04/irans-national-deterrent-weapons-of.html

[36] Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies.

[37] Federation of American Scientists, “Syria-Special Weapons”,

[38]Iraq: WMD: The Deadliest Threat of all”, 30 July, 2006, U.S. Department of State. URL: http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/iraq/threat.htm

[39] Report from Wilton Park Conference 797, 30 September- 2 October 2005 on “CBW Proliferation: Developing New Responses.”

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