Terrorists Train to Manufacture Anthrax

Jihadi Website Supplies

Instructions for Anthrax Production

By Abdul Hameed Bakier

Much has been said about al-Qaeda’s quest to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a means of striking at the heart of their number one enemy, the United States. The latest example of these ongoing efforts to acquire WMD capabilities is a recent posting in a jihadi internet forum entitled: “Good News – Anthrax Production Technique” (al-ekhlaas.net, March 3).

A forum participant, nicknamed al-Faz, posted a detailed description of anthrax production techniques dedicated to jihadis everywhere: “Long awaited good news for you, God’s soldiers. It’s time to use biological weapons against God’s enemies.” Al-Faz commences his posting with an introduction to anthrax and the pathology of the disease, including symptoms, parts of human body infected when exposed to anthrax and fatality percentages. Al-Faz notes that anthrax bacteria can be found in Africa, Asia and in some parts of Europe where the soil contains 10 anthrax bacteria per gram.

According to the jihadi forum, the following factors make anthrax the weapon of choice:

• Anthrax is powerful, lethal, cheap and easy to prepare.
• 50 grams of anthrax, when dispersed in a 2-kilometer line, forms a deadly cloud that can cover 20 kilometers.
• One kilogram of anthrax can be produced in a small laboratory in 96 hours.
• Anthrax bacteria spores are available worldwide and can be easily extracted.
• Production costs are low; one kilogram of anthrax bacteria costs about $50 even though a lethal dose can be as little as one millionth of a gram. • Colorless and odorless anthrax is easily concealed.
• Anthrax is a stable and dry substance that can be easily transported and used.

Before proceeding to anthrax production, al-Faz includes in his posting a picture of one of the anthrax-contaminated letters used in the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks that killed five and infected 17 others. Undoubtedly included in an effort to encourage jihadis to try anthrax as a weapon, the letter reads: “You cannot stop us. We have this anthrax. You die now. Are you afraid? Death to America. Death to Israel. Allah is great.” The photo of the letter in no way establishes a jihadi connection to the still unsolved anthrax attacks—it is one of several released by the FBI and is easily available on the internet. Nevertheless, anthrax continues to be a feared weapon—only last week an Albany, Oregon courthouse was closed and the National Guard called in to deal with threats of anthrax contamination, which later proved to be a hoax (Albany Democrat Herald, March 4).

The second part of al-Faz’s posting elaborates on two methods of anthrax production. Photos are included of the microscopic phases of the process, including the extraction of anthrax bacteria from a sample of dirt that contains the infected remains of dead goats or other grazing animals’ remnants. A sample of a dead animal’s blood or tissue can also be used by cultivating it in a blood agar substance containing 0.7% sodium bicarbonate.

The attached pictures illustrate bacilli bacteria, spirochetes and bacteria clusters. The posting further includes precautionary instructions for the different phases of production. “Agar is a nutrient environment for cultivation that can be bought without drawing any suspicions from research centers for 70 Riyals or $20 per one kilogram,” says al-Faz.

The second method of producing anthrax involves cultivating the anthrax in horse blood and bentonite clay for five hours. Bentonite clay, an absorbent form of clay with multiple industrial uses, can be found in Iraq and two other countries in the region.

In conclusion, al-Faz says, “I wanted to contribute in the preparations against enemies of God. Consider me the servant of the mujahideen. I closely follow your news. May God reward you for your sacrifices. It would make me very happy to see you use biological weapons against God’s enemies. Wait for my next detailed posting on how to build a Cessna 128 aircraft,” which is an easily maintained agricultural aircraft designed to carry and spread a chemical load of 200 to 280 gallons.

Although there is no tangible evidence to confirm that jihadis have produced or procured mass quantities of biological weapons, the use of anthrax spores in bioterrorism has been discussed by jihadis for some time now. In theory, at least, cultivating anthrax spores can be achieved with minimum know-how and equipment, suggesting it is only a matter of time until jihadis succeed in producing some kind of biological weapon. There are, however, many dangers involved in the process and the development of a weaponized aerosol version of the bacterium requires scientific skills and equipment unavailable to most jihadis.

Biological Weapons Programs...Things you should know

Blogmaster's preface: You may find the following information a bit technical, however it is vital that everyone who may be at risk as a victim of islamic terrorisim understand as much as possible about what types of weapons may be used against us.

Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Consequences for Future Inspection Regimes and Syrian Biological Weapons Development

“The failure of the Americans to prove that Iraq was developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not create a false picture when it comes to Syria.” Eyal Zissler

Background

Although Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are generally grouped together, they represent distinctly different classes of weapons. This common misnomer perpetuated by the media, has obscured not only what was recovered in Iraq by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) but more crucially, the detection criteria employed for each class of weapon and the future for inspection regimes where pre-emptive engagement may be critically necessary .

"We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means...Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can easily be concealed, delivered covertly and used without warning.”-National Security Strategy of the United States of America
Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear weapons are all capable of producing mass casualties and in some instances global catastrophic consequences. Chemical and Nuclear weapon classes both have international treaties and comprehensive inspection regimes: the Chemical Weapons Convention and inspection body the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); Nuclear Proliferation Treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the inspecting body and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) which is the only class of weapons which do not have a verification or inspection regime. Moreover while chemical weapon stockpiling and nuclear weapons development can be monitored by satellites and other technologies, the nature of biological “weapons” development is generally not detectible with standard methods.

The inherent characteristics, the technology required for stockpiling, deployment and use, set WMD apart; but none more so than with biological ‘weapons’ for biological pathogens can be considered a ‘weapon’ even when not ‘weaponized.’ The major differences between biological weapons and other unconventional warfare munitions include:
• The release of an agent is not immediately detectable as it the case with chemical and nuclear munitions. There are systems that detect biological agents, but most have a delay between acquiring the agent and identifying it;
• The effects of an attack are not immediately recognizable. People may become exposed to an agent soon after its release, but the infection requires time to cause illness (the incubation period in some instances can be lengthy up to 17 days from exposure or longer);
• The effect of biological weapons can continue after initial release for months as in the case of a highly communicable and highly infectious virus such as smallpox. This would result in secondary infections in areas far from initial release/index case and geographic regions where such diseases could present virgin soil epidemics.
• Global commercial airline travel makes the pace (of communicable diseases) not the space, critical to containment strategies;
• If you took a gram of smallpox, which is highly contagious and infectious and for which there is no vaccine available globally, and released it in the air and created about a hundred index cases, the chances are excellent that the virus would go global in six weeks as people traveled, the death toll could easily hit the hundreds of millions…in scale, that’s like a nuclear war.

Additional differences which set biological weapons apart include strain selection. Selecting an agent requires matching the desired results of an attack with an agent’s characteristics. Those characteristics may include: how much of an agent can cause disease (pathogenicity); time between exposure and illness (incubation period); how debilitating the resulting disease is (virulence); its lethality; and how readily the disease spreads to others (transmissibility). Generally, the technological requirements associated with chemical and nuclear munitions and their deployment platforms are significantly different than for biological weapons.

There are about 48 organisms that could be used offensively--25 viruses, 13 bacteria, and 10 toxins. Although advances in genomics, molecular biology, combinatorial chemistry and understanding of microbial structure and replication and synthetic biology will effect future non-conventional weapons development, several nations of concern continue to build the majority of their offensive biological weapons programmes around the 5 or 6 Category A agents.

“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.” - President George Bush, West Point, New York, 1 June, 2002

Currently there are about 23 nations suspected of having or trying to develop offensive biological weapons. The degree of sophistication of each country’s research program will determine how advanced biological agents will be. Even the most rudimentary program will likely have lethal agents that have been a threat for some time. Botulism, anthrax, plague and variola (smallpox) are high-probability candidates for most bio-weapons programmes.

In addition, the revolution in biotechnology may produce other agents that are even more toxic and resilient. Without getting into the technical aspects, relatively minor molecular adjustments may produce a more toxic, fast acting, and stable biological agent. However developing recombinant strains and then ‘weaponsizing’ them is a more involved process which also requires testing and demonstrating consistent results which can take years to perfect. State bio-defence laboratories throughout the world conduct advanced defence research to prepare for biological warfare. While the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibits ‘offensive’ biological weapons research it does not prohibit defensive research which is completely legitimate.

With nations who conduct offensive research or are seeking to acquire the knowledge and technology to do so, such programmes are the most highly guarded national security areas such a nation can possess. The nature of biological weapons research makes such research highly complimentary to compartmentalization and embedding or running studies along side legitimate research; one reason is the dual-use nature of bio-weapons research, the other is the need to hide such activities. Nations conducting offensive research such as the former Soviet Union, the DPRK, Iran, Syria and previously Iraq have all embedded their programmes. Since the programmes are hidden and often run within legitimate research programmes criteria for assessing, what amounts to very subtle indicators, must be constructed. Iraq and the failure to develop such criteria to be utilized by the ISG is a good starting point for future inspection regimes.

Assessing the Iraq Survey Group as an Inspection Regime

Given the nature of biological weapons, their proliferation and potential use by rouge states, it is imperative we have sound criteria in order to asses both the current and future threat. In terms of future inspection regimes, nothing could be more significant or offer more of a road map for conducting inspections than the words of Dr. David Kay in his Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the ISG before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Vials: A total of 97 vials-including those with labels consistent with the al Hakam cover stories of single-cell protein and biopesticides, as well as strains that could be used to produce BW agents-were recovered from a scientist's residence.


-STATEMENT BY DAVID KAY ON THE INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP (ISG)BEFORE THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE, AND THESENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

October 2, 2003
“With regard to biological weapons activities, which has been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are uncovering significant information - including research and development of BW-applicable organisms, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities, and deliberate concealment activities. All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents. (Why search for a stockpile when you know what bio-warfare programme development entails?)

Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to the UN and was previously unknown. We are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D - all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production. The IIS also played a prominent role in sponsoring students for overseas graduate studies in the biological sciences, according to Iraqi scientists and IIS sources, providing an important avenue for furthering BW-applicable research. This was the only area of graduate work that the IIS appeared to sponsor.

Discussions with Iraqi scientists’ uncovered agent R&D work that paired overt work with nonpathogenic organisms serving as surrogates for prohibited investigation with pathogenic agents. Examples include: B. Thurengiensis (Bt) with B. anthracis (anthrax), and medicinal plants with ricin. In a similar vein, two key former BW scientists confirmed that Iraq under the guise of legitimate activity developed refinements of processes and products relevant to BW agents. The scientists discussed the development of improved, simplified fermentation and spray drying capabilities for the simulant Bt that would have been directly applicable to anthrax, and one scientist confirmed that the production line for Bt could be switched to produce anthrax in one week if the seed stock were available.

A very large body of information has been developed through debriefings, site visits, and exploitation of captured Iraqi documents that confirms that Iraq concealed equipment and materials from UN inspectors when they returned in 2002. One noteworthy example is a collection of reference strains that ought to have been declared to the UN. Among them was a vial of live C. botulinum Okra B. from which a biological agent can be produced. This discovery - hidden in the home of a BW scientist - illustrates the point I made earlier about the difficulty of locating small stocks of material that can be used to covertly surge production of deadly weapons. The scientist who concealed the vials containing this agent has identified a large cache of agents that he was asked, but refused, to conceal. ISG is actively searching for this second cache.

Additional information is beginning to corroborate reporting since 1996 about human testing activities using chemical and biological substances, but progress in this area is slow given the concern of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel about their being prosecuted for crimes against humanity.”

Iraq and the Search for WMD

Given Dr. Kay’s above statements it’s perhaps surprising that the ISG took the course they did and finished in three months.

• They apparently discovered pathogens suitable for biological warfare;
• They discovered evidence of the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in possible BW activities;
• They believed Iraq after 1996 had further compartmentalized its program and focused on maintaining smaller, covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents;
• Discovered a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities suitable for BW research and development;
• Evidence of human testing with bio-warfare pathogens.

When we then consider inspection regimes, the criteria for estimating biological ‘weapons’ and weapons programmes is in need of urgent review.
For example, it has been claimed that the duration of the ISG inspections and Sector Control Point Baghdad (SCP-B) recovered chemical weapons on only two occasions. The first was a sarin mortar shell reconfigured into an IED (improvised explosive device). The second occasion was the discovery of several 122-mm rocket warheads filled with inert mustard gas recovered near Babylon. Both were considered to be remainders from the Iran-Iraq War and useless as offensive weapons. The ISG focus on the search for biological weapons appeared solely pinned to the discovery of mobile laboratories, a very unusual criteria for assessing an offensive biological weapons programme by any standard. Then there is the issue of stockpiling biological weapons; this paper contends that both of these criteria are low-level indicators if not irrelevant to assessing an advanced, offensive biological weapons programme. At issue, certainly is the perception that the failure to find biological ‘weapons’ in Iraq has lead to serious miscalculations. There is an underlying assumption that since no biological weapons were found in Iraq any claim that for example, Smallpox exists in other national offensive research programmes is dismissible as another fox hunt. In fact lack of finding biological weapons in one country has no bearing on the situation in a number of other nations and is not in any way an indicator of proliferation to hostile regimes.

Why Mobile Laboratories?

While the nature of chemical weapons makes them well suited for ‘stockpiling’ as would be the case with radioactive and nuclear weapons; the nature of biological weapons generally does not make them as suitable for stockpiling. Therefore this particular class of weapon has significantly different inspection criteria, most of which is subtle and differentiated from searching for a so-called stockpile. One could be lead to believe that the same criterion for searching for chemical, nuclear and radioactive stockpiles was applied by the ISG in their search for biological weapons or “mobile” laboratories. In fact, if this were the case, the criteria would be almost irrelevant in determining a biological weapons capability. One simply has to question why there was such tremendous focus placed on the ‘mobile labs’ in the first place when such labs would be but one indicator among other more discrete criteria which certainly would have yielded the existence of an offensive programme; a programme which to this day may remain a real threat in terms of proliferation to states that sponsor terrorism.

Mobile Production Plant versus Mobile Laboratory?
Although individuals often interchangeably use the terms production plant and laboratory, they have distinct meanings. The mobile production plants are designed for batch production of biological material and not for laboratory analysis of samples. A truck-mounted mobile laboratory would be equipped for analysis and small-scale laboratory activities; US forces discovered one such laboratory in late April of 2003.
• The mobile laboratory—installed in a box-bodied truck—is equipped with standard, dual-use laboratory equipment, including autoclaves, an incubator, centrifuges, and laboratory test tubes and glassware.
• These laboratories could be used to support a mobile BW production plant but serve legitimate functions that are applicable to public heath and environmental monitoring, such as water-quality sampling.

The mobile lab issue is one, portrayed by the media and intelligence sections as somehow crucial to proving Hussein had a biological programme, nothing could be farther from the truth. The failure to find more mobile labs or even pathogens in the mobile lab which was discovered is completely irrelevant to any kind of programme the Iraqi regime was running. It simply was a convenient and not terribly sophisticated criterion which was asserted as evidentiary of an offensive weapons programme. Biological weapons programmes are complex, embedded, usually latent and highly technologically and scientifically sophisticated programmes, mobile labs are an easy simple target, those who aren’t biological weapons experts fixed upon, convincing the public and the Bush administration this was a viable indicator. One can speculate that their own lack of known (current) biological weapons programme construction lead them to fix on this indicator or perhaps they had another agenda in mind; at any rate mobile labs were selected and nothing short of finding them would suffice. Failure then to discover any pathogens or pre-cursors, media etc. meant there was no evidence of an active, existing biological programme; a very dangerous conclusion to draw from a singular and isolated marker. It’s also notable that although Dr. Kay would later assert that they did find a ‘clandestine network of laboratories’ the criteria which would then be applied after such a finding was not.
Although Iraq's known bio-weapons labs were so carefully hidden that U.N. officials failed to discover them until 1995 -- four years after the start of inspections ; the second time around Kay spent only three months searching. Given the previous round which took four years to discover, it’s shocking to think three months would constitute a comprehensive inspection.
During the 1990’s it was only after the defection of the program's chief, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamal, that inspectors found secret laboratories that were producing lethal bacteria by the ton. While conclusive proof remains elusive, there have been persistent reports since the late 1990s suggesting that Iraq has continued biological weapons research using small labs built underground or concealed inside specially modified trucks. Detailed accounts of what were described as secret labs were given to U.S. intelligence officials by Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri, an engineer specializing in constructing dust-free "clean rooms" needed for certain types of laboratory suggested that as many as 300 secret weapons facilities had been "reactivated" since the withdrawal of U.N. inspectors. Even if such claims proved false, existing and known research laboratories, veterinary institutes, bio-pharma research facilities should have been searched and their programmes detailed to develop a concise framework of biological research activities and compartmentalization.
Saeed was kept in a safe house by the Defense Intelligence Agency, which declined requests to interview him. But according to a transcript of his debriefing session, which was made available by the Iraqi National Congress, a leading opposition group, Saeed said most of the facilities were small and cleverly disguised. Again, a bit concerning that the ISG focused on finding weapon stockpiles.
"In some areas, houses or a small factory would get converted into labs," Saeed said. He also described a visit to an underground biological lab on the grounds of one of Hussein's Baghdad palaces, and his account is similar to reports of the Tahhaddy biological site offered by the Iraqi National Congress, which claims to have investigated the facility using informants. A document provided to The Washington Post by the group gives directions to the lab, lists its senior officers and describes a layout that includes above-ground offices and rooms for a security detachment assigned to the building. Most of its 85 employees work in a small underground lab that conducts research on pathogens, including a mysterious Blue Nile strain, officials of the opposition group said. Bio-warfare experts suggested the name may refer to Ebola, a usually fatal hemorrhagic disease.”
Two issues must be immediately dispensed with: the mobile laboratories as an indicator of an offensive weapons programme; and second the lack of incorporating viable criteria for determining a biological weapons capability and programme in spite of historic and current knowledge on how biological programmes are constructed today and how they have been constructed for decades in nations who conduct offensive research. What are mobile labs? Why would mobile labs be selected as an indicator? Who selected this?
What are mobile laboratories?
Where did the notion of the possibility of an Iraqi mobile biological weapons (BW) production capability come from? In 1995, Lt. Gen. Amir al-Sa’adi told UNSCOM officials that in 1988 he had suggested that perhaps Iraq should develop its BW production on mobile platforms. The suggestion was rejected as not being feasible. During the war against Iran, General Sa’adi had been head of the Iraq government’s Special Office for Technical Industry (SOTI), he later became deputy to General Hussein Kammel, he Head of all of Iraq’s WMD programmes in the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI). Although Sa’adi said he only provided a ‘concept’ and not a detailed drawing, the CIA gleaning ‘details’ from a source known as curveball, would certainly have had to substantially enhance the mobile laboratory concept, which eventually appeared in Secretary Powell’s illustration at the UN on the 4th of February 2003. Unfortunately Secretary Powell was never informed of the enhancement. Mobile Laboratories appear to be a convenient, simple to understand, concept promoted by the CIA as criteria for a BW programme.
Claims about Iraq's mobile laboratories first appeared in September 2002, with the intelligence dossier released by Blair saying a number were in use.
The next month the CIA asserted, Iraq had "large-scale" biological warfare production capabilities in mobile laboratories. Bizarrely, this became the standard by which the CIA sought to gauge a biological weapons programme by. It could be proposed that the CIA placed a high value on mobile laboratories because they can evade detection and are highly survivable however the latent nature of all biological programmes rather negates this as a probability. If evasion were the motive, embedded programmes can evade most inspection regimes and Iraq had a history of doing this not a history of mobile laboratories.
Mobile laboratories are also employed by militaries throughout the world for force protection. Generally they are termed ‘forward deployed mobile laboratories’ for field identification of known and unknown agents. Although the CIA claimed that the mobile platforms they recovered did not appear suited for this use.
Possession of mobile laboratories does not constitute a biological weapons programme, which would have been known certainly by microbiologists on the ISG inspections, even given intelligence on hidden laboratories; but other criteria do; criteria which were selectively ignored.
What does a real state biological weapons programme look like?
In assessing the Iraqi programme and challenging the criteria used by the ISG we need only look at how programmes are constructed today. It’s stated that “survey teams (Task Force 75) combed laboratories and munitions plants, bunkers and distilleries, bakeries and vaccine factories, file cabinets and holes in the ground where tipsters advised them to dig. Most of the assignments came with classified "target folders" describing U.S. intelligence leads. Others, known as the "ad hocs," came to the task force's attention by way of plausible human sources on the ground.

Several nations currently have latent offensive biological weapons programmes and in this sense Iraq did not stand out. Their intent to activate the programme certainly required pre-emptive and immediate action as the consequences could conceivably be global pandemics and catastrophic devastation. What is and remains disturbing is that given an historic precedence (the Soviet Biopreparat programme) to go by, the inspection criteria employed to discover an Iraqi biological weapons programme, reflected none of the criteria which would be drawn by assessing the Soviet programme or even the previous Iraqi programme. This is unusual and one must consider that there were other dominant reasons for not conducting an inspection using normal criteria i.e. deciding to search instead for mobile biological laboratories which would demonstrate nothing.

To touch upon one of the most notable and successful biological weapons programmes to date, the soviet programme known as Biopreparat was a massive biological weapons research and development programme that went completely unnoticed by all western intelligence agencies for over three decades. Only 15% percent of research conducted at all 52 of the identified Biopreparat sites was legitimate. Nearly 50,000 scientists worked within the Biopreparat system under the guise of highly compartmentalized legitimate research. Even when the programme was detailed by two scientists who defected, most US bio-weapons scientist rejected how advanced the programme was…in fact it was the most advanced biological weapons programme ever run. Biopreparat is an outstanding example of both an active and latent programme. It is a framework currently employed by a number of states to hide their offensive bio-weapons research. Biopreparat and other programmes in North Korea, Iran, Syria and China offer constructive, defined criteria for how to evaluate the advancement of a biological weapons programme.

The nature of an offensive biological weapons programme incorporates a number of institutions, expertise and testing, most of which is completely dual-use and some of which is entirely legitimate. Evaluating a bio-programme requires a comprehensive approach to a very substantial framework of activities. The institutional framework includes defence laboratories, veterinary vaccine research facilities, medical research facilities, university hospitals, prison populations (with a focus on political prison sections); military populations and bio-pharma institutions. The Stepnagorsk facility, a center of excellence in the Biopreparat programme, conducted dozens of developmental and test runs with anthrax so as to be ready to launch full production should Moscow declare a ‘special period’ for doing so. Moscow never did and Stepnagorsk never produced a stockpile of weapons. Similar to Iran, Iraq, the DPRK, and Syria, the purpose of the facility and other institutions in the Biopreparat network, was to maintain the capability to start production on short notice. This is the model still in use today by most nations in possession of a biological weapons programme. The latent nature is essential to maintaining not necessarily the weapons, or a stockpile, but in fact the capability to produce such weapons as this is the most unstable and technologically complex aspect of retaining an offensive programme.

“Now the really sobering part—biological warfare agents are very difficult, if not impossible, to detect while they are in the research, production, transit, or employment phases.” Normal biological warfare research facilities resemble completely legitimate biotechnical and medical research facilities; the challenge this presents is in distinguishing legitimate production plants from illicit ones. As demonstrated in Iraq, this needs to be done to verify a programme’s existence or in the case of Syria, to use pre-emptive strikes on biological weapons production facilities.

For this reason, it is critical new, more advanced approaches be developed and instituted in order to identify latent programme structure, institutional organization and network interaction between civilian and defence research facilities, such criteria was never employed by the ISG inspections in Iraq and therefore none of the programmes were ever discovered.

Detecting Latent Biological Weapons Programmes: Critical Criteria for
Inspection Regimes

“David Kay, original head of the Iraq Survey group, reported that "we know from some of the interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD program." Among the things left behind, Kay reported finding a "clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses," and "a prison laboratory complex... that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN." The ISG's investigation revealed "new research on BW-applicable agents, Brucella and Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), and continuing work on ricin and aflatoxin.”

Taking Syria as a case in point, this paper defines criteria for assessing state run offensive biological weapons programmes, which by their nature tend to be ‘latent.’ With the high potential for future inspection regimes, it’s vital that criteria which were never included by the ISG be developed and adopted for the use in future inspection regimes.

“The discoveries made by the ISG include a "clandestine network of laboratories . . . that contained equipment suitable for continuing chemical biological weapons research" and vials of "live C botulinum Okra B from which a biological agent can be produced." [1]. Lines of enquiry adopted by the ISG include the examination of sites across Iraq, as well as interviewing scientists, truck drivers and other workers with possible knowledge of WMD.”

Although Syria’s biological weapons research programme is centered on a number of Category A agents, among them smallpox, plague and anthrax with ricin representing a Category B agent which they also are conducting tests on at the biological section of the CERS Center, (Scientific Research Council and Scientific Studies and Research Center SSRC); Syria’s strategic research, development and production facility located in Damascus. The project started in the early 1980s; in recent years, we have been witness to an upsurge in activities that might indicate a change of concept triggered by Syria’s intentions to amplify its arsenal of such weapons. The extensive foreign activities of Syrian intelligence services include substantial acquisition efforts focused on biological and chemical weapons. The Syrian procurement structure uses the Scientific Studies and Research Center as cover.

There are a number of reasons why state’s adopt ‘latent’ programmes for biological weapons development instead of stockpiling. Some of these reasons were discussed above, some have to do with the nature of biological pathogens themselves, as living and replicating organisms, some have to do with the ability to hide an offensive programme behind legitimate research and some have to do with long-term strategic defence planning. Latent BW programmes are not dormant or virtual, they are existing, active programmes imbedded in research, industry and defence sectors. Many nations throughout the world possess a ‘latent’ capability through the framework of legitimate advanced life-sciences, pharmaceutical industries and research laboratories. Inspection regimes are simply not prepared to conduct the type of detailed advanced inspections required to verify biological weapons production and use. Similar to how ‘weapons’ are conceived of, science and technology have so advanced, coupled with a basic mis-understanding of what constitutes a biological weapons programme, that unless the criteria is significantly altered, future inspections which may be undertaken in various nations will continue to yield little or no results.

Interestingly, as dismissive as the ISG was of Iraq’s biological programme, generally because the criteria it employed was very crude and simplistic, they made a similar assessment of Iraqi chemical programmes. If the findings didn’t fit their pre-conceived ‘stockpile’ concept, they negated it which is a fabrication of what indeed existed. This is well illustrated by Kenneth Timmerman in the following quote:

“When coalition forces entered Iraq, "huge warehouses and caches of 'commercial and agricultural' chemicals were seized and painstakingly tested by Army and Marine chemical specialists," Hanson writes. "What was surprising was how quickly the ISG refuted the findings of our ground forces and how silent they have been on the significance of these caches." Caches of "commercial and agricultural" chemicals don't match the expectation of "stockpiles" of chemical weapons. But, in fact, that is precisely what they are. "At a very minimum," Hanson tells Insight, "they were storing the precursors to restart a chemical-warfare program very quickly."

Kay and Duelfer came to a similar conclusion, telling Congress under oath that Saddam had built new facilities and stockpiled the materials to re-launch production of chemical and biological weapons at a moment's notice. At Karbala, U.S. troops stumbled upon 55-gallon drums of pesticides at what appeared to be a very large "agricultural supply" area, Hanson says. Some of the drums were stored in a "camouflaged bunker complex" that was shown to reporters -- with unpleasant results.

"More than a dozen soldiers, a Knight-Ridder reporter, a CNN cameraman, and two Iraqi POWs came down with symptoms consistent with exposure to a nerve agent," Hanson says. "But later ISG tests resulted in a proclamation of negative, end of story, nothing to see here, etc., and the earlier findings and injuries dissolved into nonexistence. Left unexplained is the small matter of the obvious pains taken to disguise the cache of ostensibly legitimate pesticides. One wonders about the advantage an agricultural-commodities business gains by securing drums of pesticide in camouflaged bunkers 6 feet underground. The 'agricultural site' was also co-located with a military ammunition dump -- evidently nothing more than a coincidence in the eyes of the ISG."
Timmerman further contents that:
“The discoveries Hanson describes are not dramatic. And that's the problem: Finding real stockpiles in grubby ammo dumps doesn't fit the image the media and the president's critics carefully have fed to the public of what Iraq's weapons ought to look like. A senior administration official who has gone through the intelligence reporting from Iraq as well as the earlier reports from U.N. arms inspectors refers to another well-documented allegation.”
Indeed, this is the same side of the coin with Saddam’s biological weapons programmes and the ISG failure to construct normal criteria in order to assess a real and active offensive capability. Instead the ISG chose a media produced concept of biological weapons, in a neat stockpile waiting near military instillations to be deployed. This is not how things are remotely done today by any nation on earth in possession of a full scale biological weapons programme with production capability.

“We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.” The National Security Strategy of the United States
The Institutional Framework Criteria

1.Vaccine Research Sites and Veterinary Research Laboratories

Because the technology used to produce vaccines can also be used until the very final stages to produce biological weapons and the knowledge base is essentially the same, vaccine research facilities and veterinary research laboratories in rouge states pose a credible target for inspection. In fact Iraq is a case in point and a few of it’s facilities were indeed rigorously monitored. However, there are far more research sites which never make it onto the radar and which should be carefully screened.

During the first Gulf War, the evidence for Baghdad’s efforts to sustain and expand it’s biological weapons program was substancial. According to the CIA report, the Al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Facility, which employs a sophisticated air filtration system, was used to produce biological agents before the Gulf War. UNSCOM destroyed equipment at the facility associated with biological weapons but left other equipment in place. In 2001, without U.N. approval, Baghdad announced that it would renovate the facility to produce vaccine to treat an outbreak of foot and mouth disease, even though it could much more easily and quickly import the vaccine it needed (citations) Iraq greatly expanded the storage capacity of the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute, which records show was used to store cultures, agents and equipment for biological weapons before the Gulf War. Similarly, authorities worked to rebuild the Fallujah III Caster Oil Production Facility, which was used to manufacture ricin.

2. Medical and Scientific Community Freezers and Refrigerators

During the consolidation of global smallpox (variola major) stocks by the World Health Organization, D.A. Henderson, a renown smallpox expert, when asked if he thought all smallpox samples were accounted for and turned into the two official repositories: CDC and Vector, replied “It would be impossible to know what is in everyone freezer.” This may indeed be the case however in accounting for potential pathogens, particularly Category A biological pathogens suitable for warfare, it is incombant upon those inspectors to assess both defence and commerical staff from bench docs to full scientific team leaders and to in fact do a comprehensive search of their homes and offices. While this task would take more than three months, the western concept of bio-safety which would inhibit most scientists from transporting and maintaining live warfare strains in their home refrigerators is not inhibitory in most mid-east nations and others throughout the would. Moreover, Unlike scientific communities in the West who face innumerable standards and review committees when conducting clinical trials, many research teams in the far east and mid-east conduct trials using themselves as guinea pigs. This is another scope which was never fully verified.The scientific community should have submitted to blood screening. While this goes against western concepts of civil liberties, it is essential in determining a covert programme.

3. Serological and Toxicological Testing of Political Prison Populations and Post Humosly

One of the most important criteria inspection regimes could imploy is the testing of the prison population and post-humosly testing of prisoners bodies; specifically political prisoners. Today North Korea (DPRK), Iran, Syria, and other nations are strongly suspected of conducting biological weapons testing on live human subjects drawn from the prison population and among military personal (for less lethal, vaccine related testing). For example the below cases are not exemplary and should today be considered mainstream for these nations.

North Korea

Camp 22 is a North Korean prison for political prisoners. There are an estimated 50,000 prisoners held in the camp. North Korea’s State Security Agency maintains a dozen political prisons and about 30 forced labor and labor camps. The worst are in the countries far northeast near the border with China and Russia. At least two of the camps, Haengyong and Huaong, are larger in area than the District of Columbia, with Huaong being three times the size of the U.S. capital district. Camp 22 in particular is known to conduct biological weapons testing on prisoners, women and children. North Korea's Army is the only army in the world with mandatory smallpox vaccinations. The DPRK is suspected of conducting human experiments with most Category A biological pathogens including plague, anthrax, botulium, smallpox and Viral Hemoragic Fevers (VHF). Four years ago there was a suspected outbreak of smallpox in a camp on the border with China which purportedly killed 40,000 of the camps internees. As variola has been eradicated since 1980 and the remaining strains are held at only two repositories: the CDC in Atlanta, Georgia and Vector in Novosibirsk, Siberia, the only possible explanation for this outbreak is the illegal retention and use of smallpox for building a biological weapons capability and potential experimentation on humans which then lead to an accidental outbreak.

Iraq

Throughout their frustrating years of cat-and-mouse searches, the U.N. inspection teams stumbled across several chilling clues that hinted at human testing projects in Iraq. The most compelling case involved alleged biological weapons tests carried out on Shiite political prisoners by a mysterious Unit 2100, a U.N. inspection team document shows.
According to the document, at least 50 prisoners from Abu Gharib prison west of Baghdad were rounded up in 1995 and sent to a secret testing facility in Al-Haditha, a remote community in Iraq's western desert.

"Unit 2100 was subordinate directly to the Ministry for Military Industry ... which was headed by Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamil," states the document, which is based on intelligence supplied by a senior Iraqi defector.

"The unit conducted experiments on human subjects using chemical and biological warfare agents," the document goes on. "Prisoners who were sent to Unit 2100 did not return." While these statements may be true, and inspectors who apparently went to recover ‘documents’ of all things which were missing..did not conduct serological testing on in-mates. Such testing would have yielded conclusive results as would testing known areas where mass graves were dug to dump the bodies.

Informed that the Americans had probed the mass grave of the alleged chemical test victims and turned up nothing, the officer seemed unfazed. Instead, he produced a colleague, a lieutenant in the Iraqi Second Army Corps that purportedly oversaw the operation, who confirmed the broad outlines of his story.

"The Americans," the officer insisted, "have a lot more digging to do."

B’nai Elim would like to thank Dr. Jill Dekker, a consultant to the NATO Defense Establishment in bio-warfare and counter terrorism for contributing this article. Dr. Dekker is also a member of the board of advisers of the Intelligence Summit.

Syria’s Bio-Warfare Threat

Syria’s Bio-Warfare Threat: an interview with Dr. Jill Dekker

by Jerry Gordon (Dec. 2007)

Introduction

When news leaked out of the September 6th Israeli Air Force and commando raid on a Syrian Nuclear facility followed by revelations about the deaths of dozens of Iranians and Syrians in a Chemical warfare missile accident in July the world was jarred. Recently, it was revealed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) had aided Syria in its chemical warfare programs. I noted in a recent interview with former US UN Ambassador John Bolton his early concerns about the Syrian Bio Warfare threat. Questions arose, specifically about the size, nature and danger of the Syrian bio-warfare military programs. For answers and professional views on how extensive the Syrian bio-warfare threat is, we turned to Dr. Jill Dekker, a consultant to the NATO Defense Establishment in bio-warfare and counter terrorism. Dr. Dekker is also a member of the board of advisors of the Intelligence Summit.

Dr. Dekker’s answers give a foreboding picture of how large and refined the Syrian bio-warfare programs are and how little Western Intelligence knows about how the programs were developed. The potential exists for a significant WMD threat in the Middle East and the West, especially, against America. Syria is a proxy ally of Iran, North Korea (DPRK) and terror groups such as Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Thus, the supply of bio-weapons and delivery platforms that could results in mass casualties makes it a real and present danger.

We were pleased that Dr. Dekker took time out from her professional work to answer questions about the Syrian bio-warfare establishment and WMD threat.

Jerry Gordon: Tell us briefly about your professional background and research background in Bio-warfare.

Jill Dekker: Well, I started working on bio-safety several years ago under the guidance of a colleague at the World Health Organization in Geneva and the concern then was Laboratory Acquired Diseases (LAD’s) and how best to protect workers and the environment from accidental exposure to dangerous pathogens. There were few national requirements to report sharps and sticks accidents as well as other accidents. If you recall Vector in Novosibirsk Russia had an accident with a senior scientist who subsequently contracted Ebola-Vector failed to report the incident until 12 day had passed and by then it was too late for the US team en route to save her life. I also worked on notification for zoonotic diseases (transmissible from animal to human) to public health authorities. Back then in the EU emergency animal disease outbreaks, even with public health consequences, were only notified to the OIE, which is the World Organization for Animal Health. There was little regulation on the reporting of public health cases of Campylobactor, Listeriosis, E-coli 0157 and or strains of Salmonella. Keeping in mind here that with the exception of variola (smallpox) nearly all Category A biological warfare pathogens are zoonotic. I then worked with several organizations involved with the UN Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in Geneva. It was during this work in 2000 that I really came to understand the threat state biological weapons programs posed.

In 2001, when the US suffered its anthrax attacks, everything changed. We went from looking at bio-safety as an aspect of protecting workers and the environment, to bio-security and trying to safe-guard High Consequence Pathogens mainly in P3 and P4 facilities from terrorists. The P4 or Biological Safety Level 4 (BSL4) before 2000 were usually associated with national defense programs. A P4 laboratory or is the highest level of laboratory containment for handling mainly warfare agents or what might be considered battle strains. We went from bio-safety to developing various interventions to prevent the theft, diversion and sale of High Consequence Pathogens by terrorists from laboratories. After the US postal attacks, institutions such as Sandia, the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta and the World Health Organization in Genève were instrumental in developing this concept of “bio-security” or protective measures for laboratories. Bio-security has remained a focus in the United States and Europe. Events over the last three or four years have shifted the perception of bio-security significantly. While bio-security is certainly still on the agenda, the relationship of states and terrorists has changed. I now focus on state supported bio-terrorism whereby pathogens don’t need to be stolen or diverted. A state warfare lab, such as exists in Iran and Syria today, could easily provide their terrorist surrogates with the most advanced biological agents for covert operations. This is far more likely and would be far more devastating in terms of kill ratios than some lone terrorist group trying to weaponize pathogens without state support or a warfare laboratory.

Gordon: You are currently a consultant with the NATO Defense Establishment, what are your principle duties?

Dekker: For the past few years, I’ve developed a number of programs which NATO supports and in which NATO is a full participant. Additionally, I represent both governmental and defense industry clients who are interested in collaboration with supranational military structures such as NATO, US Dept. of Defense or Ministries of Defense on this side of the Atlantic. I’ve also worked on national assessments of Mid-East bio-warfare programs and as a strategic advisor for McKenna, Long and Aldridge, LLP in Washington D.C. on their Bio-Defense practice. I have consulted with the Public Health Preparedness program for the European Homeland Security Association under the French High Committee for Civil Defense. I developed and ran war games for this program.

Gordon: You have written and presented extensively to international groups in the US, EU and Middle East on Syrian Bio-warfare. How did you get interested in the subject?

Dekker: Initially, I became interested in looking at bio-safety standards mainly of East European laboratories and the types of pathogens which were being transported pretty much without regulation to other nations in Africa and the Mid-East. The World Health Organization, which I consulted with, was interested in these areas as well. Some laboratories in Africa and the Mid-East tend to have a lower level of bio-safety containment. A P4 is extremely expensive to build and maintain so nations with fewer resources tend to work on their bio-warfare programs in labs which may not be suitable. In the course of this two things happened; I was looking at issues related to the Soviet programs, what pathogens they may have provided to Iraq, Syria, Iran and the DPRK, specifically I was looking at their smallpox and botulinium programs. Then in Afghanistan, you may recall, the US recovered documents which Al Qaeda had on their bio-programs. I moved from an interest in bio-safety and bio-security to looking at the threat state biological warfare labs pose and the types of criteria we need to assess them. Most biological weapons research is dual use. It is quite difficult to determine if it falls within the BTWC, which allows defensive research, or if it is "offensive" which is prohibited. These programs are usually a nation’s most sensitive weapons sections. Thus, it can be very difficult, but not impossible, to estimate how advanced they are.

Gordon: What have your investigations revealed about the level of commitment and investment in Bio-warfare programs by the Syrian military establishment?

Dekker: Contrary to how the US State Department and other agencies tend to downplay the sophistication of the Syrian biological and nuclear programs, they are very advanced. Syria has always had the most advanced chemical weapons program in the Middle East. The US and other western agencies have in a sense been distracted by this, but their biological programs and the “concept of use” are robust. Syria’s biological weapons capability today is closely tied to the former and current Soviet and Russian programs respectively, the DPRK, Iran and the former Iraq regime. A major concern is their strategic concept of use - which has gone from one of ‘special weapons’ to incorporation into their ‘conventional arsenal.’ That is a significant shift and one that seems to have eluded the US. The Syrians run their biological programs out of the Syrian Scientific Research Council (SSRC) in Damascus. They have separate wings for separate pathogens. They also have a number of programs running in Aleppo. The Syrians are 100% committed to deniable operations as their modus operandi. Biological weapons, particularly those which might occur naturally, are the ultimate in deniability, for example, their cryptosporidium program for force reduction. The Wednesday Report noted a few years ago that in terms of the Syrian anthrax program, Syria has extensive expertise in the industrial cultivation of germs and viruses for the civilian production of anthrax (and smallpox) vaccines. It also noted that Russian experts, contracted by Syria, are apparently helping them to cultivate a highly virulent anthrax germ for installation in missile warheads. Their pharmaceutical infrastructure is fully integrated with their defense structure. Syrians cannot reach parity with US and Israeli conventional weapons. However, they view their bio-chemical arsenal as part of a normal weapons program. This is a huge shift in thinking by the Syrian military. It means they condone the use of biological pathogens as 'offensive' weapons. NATO and the United States should be very concerned about that re-designation.

Gordon: What external resources did the Syrian military establishment draw upon to develop its Bio-warfare capabilities?

Dekker: The Syrians work on most Category A pathogens: anthrax, plague, tularemia, botulinium, smallpox, aflotoxin, cholera, ricin, camelpox. Some of these they acquired during natural outbreaks, others they acquired from the Soviets, Russians, DPRK, Iran and Iraq. Some of these pathogens such as their botulinium program have their own facilities and sections within chemical weapons institutes and defense labs; others are in veterinary vaccine research facilities and have a ‘latent’ component. Keep in mind ‘defensive’ biological research is completely legal and prior to the 1980’s it was normal to trade in pathogens, even dangerous ones. Although the US gave up its bio-warfare program in the 1960’s, the BTWC of 1972, ratified in 1976, had no verification mechanism. Offensive programs were not that uncommon. The Soviets hid theirs (Biopreparat) and it was massive. US intelligence agencies denied the Soviets could possibly have such a massive program - even after the defection of high level scientists- such Vladimir Pasechnik. You have to wonder at what point they are going to sharpen up and see that nations like Syria also have a robust advanced biological weapons program. Things have changed with genetic modification and other technologies which make the need to 'stockpile' biological weapons obsolete. The Syrians are intent on having a very agile program; additionally they work on a number of crash programs. Thus, we see a progression from the old Soviet days of bio-weapon development to a far more contemporary way in which the Syrians have made tremendous gains from the Soviets and more recently the Russians and the DPRK. The Syrians also acquired some of their dual-use technologies completely legally when companies such as Baxter and other bio-pharma concerns were developing factories in Damascus. The majority of their bio-programs stocks have come from Russia, Iran and the DPRK.

Gordon: We heard that some of the late Saddam Hussein’s Bio-warfare research and pathogens may have been transferred to Syria during Operation Enduring Freedom. Is that accurate to your knowledge, and who facilitated the transfer? What types of bio-warfare agents and materials might have been transferred?

Dekker: Yes. It is important to remember that the Iraqi programs were far more advanced at the time than what the Syrians had, and were developing. The delivery of certain pathogens in a ‘weaponized’ form taught the Syrians new techniques they previously had not mastered. This is very problematic. I am less concerned about the types of pathogens or specific pathogens as these were available to Syria from other sources. What Hussein’s transfer taught the Syrians was more sophisticated ways of weaponization and dispersal. I believe Russian special ops- their Spetsnaz teams - transported sections of the programs. Remember these are not MIRVed ICBM’s we are talking about - you don’t need to stockpile biological weapons. It is the quality of the pathogen and ‘weaponization’ or aerosolization, milling processes that count, not the quantity. I don’t believe they moved some biological arsenals into the Baqaa Valley in Lebanon, perhaps sections of their chemical and nuclear weapons, but not the biological programs. Those are much too sensitive to dump in the desert. They must be carefully maintained in a defense laboratory. If you take something like Bot - I gram of crystalline Botulinium is estimated to kill about a million people if it were evenly dispersed - you don't want to bury it out in the desert.

Gordon: To your knowledge what pathogens and toxins are the Syrian bio-warfare establishment developing and what is their propensity to produce mass casualties?

Dekker: Syria posesses Category A, B, and C pathogens and toxins. To my knowledge the most problematic program, I believe was transferred, was the Iraqi camelpox program - the fact that Iraq had this program in the first place is a problem. That it was one of their major programs, which UNMOVIC had detailed the first time around, is a big problem. It’s a problem because camelpox research and other types of orthopox research can and have been used as a safe substitute for conducting smallpox research. A particular issue I have with smallpox research conducted in rogue states is that these programs most likely are not based on vaccine preventable strains. So the US national strategic stockpile of smallpox vaccine, which has cost the US tax payers billions of dollars to stockpile, may be totally non-efficacious against a battle strain developed in Syria, Iran or the DPRK. There were reports a few years back, that something like the India 1 strain, which is considered exceptionally virulent, can be prevented with modern attenuated vaccine. However, this is first of all not an absolute and secondly India 1 which is associated with the 1971 Smallpox outbreak in Aralsk, Kazahkstan which came from Vozrozhdenie Island may not resemble genetically modified strains. It creates a false sense of security to think that out of 128 strains, only four (the most prevalent previously naturally occurring strains) are the ones rogue states would choose to reintroduce smallpox. It is naive to think that states developing weapons of mass destruction are going to select a strain we can prevent. The Soviets ramped up their work on smallpox once they knew the WHO had declared it eradicated and that the United States had ceased vaccination against it. The US national stockpile is based primarily on the Ankara strain (Modified Vaccinia Ankara). Syria also has high capacity samplers now that are exceptionally useful in field testing biological weapons, again, another possible acquisition from Iraq. They have recently mastered different types of dispersal methods which may have come from the Iraqi programs. As I previously mentioned, Syria works ‘offensively’ on most Category A bio-warfare pathogens as do a number of other states.

Gordon: To your knowledge have Syrian Bio-warfare programs been supplied by Russian, West German and even American research and technical processing entities?

Dekker: Yes, several West European nations (Germany, the UK, Holland, France), the US and Russia were trading partners of Syria and supplied technologies which could and were used for offensive programs. At that time it was not illegal - the only firm I know specifically which seems to have caught the attention of the US Dept. of Justice was Baxter Pharmaceutical. At the moment the main bio-pharma trading partners are the DPRK and Russia. The Iranians have supplied scientific teams which will advance their weapons knowledge. The Syrians have also been somewhat successful at third party bidding through countries in Africa.

Gordon: How extensive has the Syrian Bio-warfare program become and who in their military and defense establishment is directing and controlling its development?

Dekker: The Syrian biological warfare programs are administratively run under the SSRC in Damascus. They have one of the most highly developed pharmaceutical industries in the Mid East. It is overseen by the Ministry of Defense under General Talas and their intelligence services. This is rather unusual as most western pharmaceutical firms are overseen by a Ministry of Public Health. There is also Saydalaya which is their foreign procurement board for all chemical and biological imports. I would say the Syrian bio-pharma sector is highly interfaced with the defense establishment. They also have a number of veterinary institutes – again oversight is from the Ministry of Defense.

Gordon: What means of delivery does Syria have available for its bio weapons?

Dekker: Well they’ve mastered micro-encapsulation which is necessary for aerosol dispersal. They have experimented with parachute dispersal techniques for orthopox based on Soviet methods. They are also developing micro aerosol dispersal technologies which have no military application. This is probably the most alarming as it is designed for terrorist use. They are also looking at amplifying virulence. Syria wants to develop a very high quality arsenal and a very agile one, hence their crash programs. They do of course have a sophisticated chemical weapons program for which missile delivery is far more complementary. Remember, if you are preparing to do a covert release of a biological agent you don’t necessarily want to use something as traceable as a crop sprayer. The Syrians are perfecting advanced dispersal technologies that will be for use against civilians but far more sophisticated than the use of a crop duster.

Gordon: How much of a threat is the Syrian Bio-warfare capability to Israel and US forces in the Middle East, e.g. Iraq?

Dekker: Syria poses an immediate and imminent threat to the United States and Israel. The most likely use of their biological weapons arsenal against Israel would be to reduce IDF fighting forces prior to an attack on the Golan. It’s conceivable they could incapacitate the IDF for a few days even with a non-lethal pathogen or repetitively weaken civilians in Lebanon, where the water supplies are unprotected. This could be an optimum use of their bio-arsenal. That might not be as catastrophic as some fear, but it would be very effective. Obviously, there are more serious scenarios one can imagine in terms of deniability, if they have produced vaccines to protect their military and maybe their civilians against more lethal strains of virus such as smallpox. The immediate threat is their ability to reduce fighting forces. They have a strain of pneumonia that is probably very effective and they had a crash program on cryptosporidium prior to last year’s war in Lebanon. If you look at regions in Lebanon with known concentrations of anti-Syrian civilians, it may be possible for Syria to contaminate water distribution systems with a pathogen like Crypto which is impervious to chlorine and will pass through most filtration systems. Such a contamination could infect significant sections of a population. Even in the United States, there have been natural outbreaks. There is no treatment available, so it could have quite an impact. There are other concerns such as the use of pre-deployed biological agents in the event that Iran is attacked by the United States. Again, here we should pay close attention to how the Soviets planned for Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). They planned their smallpox program specifically in the event of MAD so that smallpox would wipe out whoever was left. It’s not beyond reason to consider that the Syrians and Iranians have engaged in such contingency planning

Gordon: Does the Syrian Bio-warfare establishment have co-operative weaponization programs on-going with Iran, Sudan and other terrorist sponsoring states?

Dekker: Similar to Iran’s collaboration on their nuclear testing with the DPRK, Syria has joint efforts for field testing their biological agents. It appears they have done some field testing with the cooperation of Khartoum. There is also evidence to suggest they have conducted tests on sections of their prison populations. Iranian scientific teams are known to work within the SSRC system on bio-warfare programs and certainly they have high level exchanges on their chemical and nuclear programs. Russia has sent scientists recently to work within their bio-chem programs.

Gordon: We noted Israeli and some mainstream media reports about an alleged chemical warfare accident in July 2007 that took place in Syria and killed ‘dozens of Iranian and Syrians technicians and officials.’ Are you able to confirm that through your sources? Have there been equivalent technical accidents in the Syrian Bio-warfare programs?

Dekker: There have been a number of accidents with their biological weapons programs that have killed civilians in the past in cities like Homs and Aleppo. The July 2007 accident was a far more serious and immediate one. As is the case with chemical munitions, the types of previous accidents took time to develop and tended to produce chronic symptoms. Some of those programs were ended and it appears that casualties from former bio-programs were related to ventilation problems. This latest accident appears to have occurred while they were mounting a warhead. Syria is known to have a stockpile of chemical weapons and accidents happen. It is interesting to note that Iranian scientists were involved in that activity.

Gordon: How much does the US Bio-warfare establishment and intelligence community know about the Syrian Bio-warfare threat?

Dekker: It is similar to the US negligent underestimation and denial that the Soviets had a massive biological weapons program. The US Intelligence Community negligently underestimates and denies the sophistication of the Syrian biological weapons programs which is very unfortunate. I think it has been very difficult for the US Intelligence Community to procure knowledgeable sources due to internal institutional problems. Former US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton has tried since 2001 to warn the US about the threat the Syrian biological weapons programs poses. His warnings have fallen on deaf ears. I hope Israel is helping the United States because it would appear the US is really not up to this challenge. The US public should demand that our military is first and foremost protected. Every soldier should carry Factor Seven and should be vaccinated against smallpox, have botulinium anti-toxin available and anthrax vaccine. This should be standard protection for our military personnel operating in the Middle East. Obviously in other areas we need counter medical measures to prevent VHF's (Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers). The US public needs to be informed that the intelligence community is falling far short here in protecting them. Other US allies are not, they are up to speed. Again as an American citizen it is unbelievable to see such negligence in the US intelligence community. Having lived in Europe for 20 years and working as a defense consultant on Category A warfare agents, this is not the standard approach of other NATO nations. There is something deeply disturbing with the US approach. Time will tell as unfortunately it did with 9/11.

Gordon: In your opinion, what has prevented the US from recognizing the significance of the Syrian bio-warfare threat and developing effective counter measures?

Dekker: I believe there is a specific mind-set within the US intelligence community which makes it difficult for them to procure sources in the Middle East and of course the lack of language ability is a problem for them as well. I’ve lived outside the US for nearly 20 years now and what I’ve seen in their approach is not reassuring. Most of their experienced officers are gone. The US State Dept. moves their staff about every three years which is not compatible with building long-term relationships. They appear not to have the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) resources required for long term assessment of WMD programs. Because they have not taken appropriate defensive measures in view of the potential consequences of a WMD attack, they have left the US exposed. It’s also problematic that the US relies heavily on technology and has done so for a number of years. Biological weapons cannot be assessed by satellites anymore. Perhaps during the old Soviet era but now science has moved beyond this. I believe the US incompetence in this field and its arrogance could eventually lead to a successful strike on the US by a rogue nation-possibly in the very near future.

Another problem for the United States as a result of their inability to assess Syrian programs accurately is their failure to inform the US public on the real threat they face. The smallpox program is a case in point. The US may not be able to protect its citizens with its ‘treasured’ national strategic stockpile of smallpox vaccine. Who wants to be the one to come out and announce that to the US public? Who wants to say they have no idea how advanced the Syrian Botulinium or Plague programs are because they don’t have any access? It would be very unpopular if the US public knew they were potentially defenseless and that the people charged with protecting them had dropped the ball again. What is disconcerting is they don’t seem to be able to recognize, acknowledge and correct their prior mistakes, such as the denial of the Soviet Biopreparat programs. If they don’t start taking Mid-East biological weapons programs more seriously the U.S. is likely to suffer far worse attacks than 9/11. The US intelligence community is inadequately equipped to deal with this threat.

Gordon: Could Bio-weapons developed by the Syrian military establishment be used as WMD producing significant mass casualties in Israel, the EU and here in America?

Dekker: Yes, Syria is very good at conducting covert operations. They have a number of technologies available which they could provide to either Special Forces or terrorists who could release them in airports, other transportation hubs, airplane ventilation systems and that would cause mass casualties. I certainly believe they have very advanced biological weapons capabilities and we are at a point where there really aren’t any technological obstacles for them to overcome in dispersal or deployment. This is why intelligence is so vital in this area. It is probably the last line of defense, so to neglect it, or deny that one should allocate resources for prevention, is odd. Some biological weapons use pathogens which don’t need to be ‘weaponized’. This requires specialized intelligence techniques not used for tracking chemical or nuclear weapons. Of all the countries Israel is by far the most prepared to handle the release of biological weapons. The nations of Western Europe are unevenly prepared and the United States is probably not prepared. In such an attack, the country would probably suffer major mass casualties. I think the Syrians are much more sophisticated than the US intelligence community realizes. This puts American lives at immediate risk. The American public should demand that the US intelligence community close the gap in their intelligence on the Syrian biological weapons programs. Additionally, they have underestimated the Syrian nuclear programs for several years as well.

Gordon: In your opinion what should America, Israel and NATO do to combat the Syrian Bio-warfare threat and its proliferation to terrorist groups?

Dekker: The US intelligence community could start by acknowledging that Syria has an advanced, well developed program and take things a bit more seriously. It would be helpful if they stopped tasking resources to intimidate US scientists abroad who are informed on Syrian biological weapons. The US Intelligence Community seems particularly risk averse. It’s almost as if Syria couldn’t possibly have such a program because their scientific community isn’t advanced enough. Syria’s scientific community is exceptionally advanced and sophisticated. They work closely with Iran, Russia and the DPRK. They have vast expertise to draw upon. Their conventional weapons programs may fall far behind Israel and the US but they have leveled the playing field considerably with their unconventional weapons arsenal. It has been their goal to do so. If you deny something exists and seek to intimidate those who say it does, then any preventive measures to protect your citizens are lacking. Other NATO nations are preparing for deliberate disease outbreaks and acknowledge that Syrian biological weapons programs are a threat. These efforts may now be accelerated given concerns over Syria’s nuclear program that caught many off guard.

Israel on the other hand is well prepared. Its citizens have experience with Scud attacks and Israel is poised to interdict WMD attacks because their intelligence services are so competent.

Biological weapons and terrorist use of them require excellence in intelligence not incompetence and denial.

Gordon: Thank you Dr. Dekker for this most informative and I’m sorry to say, frightening discussion of the Syrian bio-warfare threat and why America has not done enough to recognize and combat it.

Dr. Dekker suggests that for more information you consult “Biological Terrorism: The Threat of the 21st Century” by Marie Sultan for the types of technological advancements which might be a concern.

Blogmaster's Comments:

Dr. Jill Dekker is a well respected scientist whose veracity is beyond repute. I have worked in the intelligence field within the Military as well as civilian law enforcement and am now retired but still giving my services to B'nai Elim (a very pro-active Jewish - Zionist organization) as their chief of intelligence and security.

If Dr. Jill Dekker said that a new "Ice Age" was beginning along with rapid "Global Cooling" in January... I would go out and buy some thermal underwear. In other words, the information that she has garnered regarding the Syrian bio-weapons capabilities is totally accurate. It is not surprising however that our own State Department (and others) pulled out its black bag of dirty tricks in an effort to stop her from passing her findings to those who desperately needed this information... the Israeli Military and Intelligence community.

Syria is a very touchy subject with the Bush Administration. First of all, when we attacked Iraq ostensibly because of their WMDs, we already knew that Saddam had transferred them to Syria. We can never admit however, that we knew where they went because to come clean would mean that we would be forced to go after them... into Syria, which obviously we are unable to do.

If the United States were to attack Syria, all of the Arab world, Iran and perhaps Russia, would come to Syria's aid. Israel would be their first target and the entire Middle-East would be inflamed in what would most probably turn into WW III.

When anyone mentions Syria in some areas of the Pentagon, faces go ashen and moods become somber. Syria is the wild card in today's strategic contingency planning for the Middle-East. The United States simply does not have the conventional military capacity to fight to win on another front. The Syrian's know it, their main supporters (who are really the axis of "Super" Evil... Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) know it and are using that knowledge to push the United States into a corner.

The State Department therefore, is walking a tightrope with Saudi Arabia holding both ends. The result of this coercion has been and will continue to be our bullying of Israel into making concessions that will most probably result in national suicide - unless Israel shows much more resolve than Ehud (Neville Chamberlain) Olmert is capable of mustering. If the State Department had to choose today between Saudi Arabia and Israel, Israel's umbilical cord to the United States would be quickly severed.

Doctor Dekker has merely scratched the surface regarding Syrian complicity with Hezbollah, Hamas, Fatah, Al-Queda and other purveyors of terrorism. Literally tons of sophisticated weaponry has been pouring into Syria from Russia and countries in the FSU (Former Soviet Union) all of which ends up in the hands of terrorists whose only goal in life is the destruction of Israel first and then the United States and the rest of Western Civilization.

We are standing on the brink of another World War and no matter which direction we take, we will be risking freedom as we know it today. Our Government’s egregious actions directed at Dr. Dekker in a lame effort to intimidate her signal only the beginning of the erosion of our individual liberties in the name of National Security.

We need a thousand just like Dr. Jill Dekker, and we need strong and courageous leadership not only in the United States and Israel, but in the rest of free world who will not succumb to the Sword of Islam.
Religion of peace... my touches!

Bill Maniaci
Chief, Intelligence and Security
B'nai Elim