The thrill is gone....

Buyer's Remorse: Or, the thrill is gone
By Arlene Peck

There was a time when I considered myself politically savvy. I took pride in the fact that I have never missed an election since I've been old enough to vote. Aw, but that has all changed, I no longer look forward to doing my civic duty and check out the people that are running for office. I know now, at this point in time, for whom I'm voting months before an election.

I don't consider myself a republican or a democrat at this point; I am an independent. I think both major parties are corrupt and when the next election comes around, no matter who is on the ballot, I'm voting for the other one.

For those of you who are in the self imposed trance of “Oh, I don't keep up with politics.” Or worse, "Obama is the man and going to bring change attitude,” I want to talk to you about buyer's remorse.

Everyone knows about Sarah Palin and her "Going Rogue," and I am a believer in breaking ranks. I have taken pride in breaking ranks with those who surround me. The American Jews are the ones that put the Muslim (Obama) into power and I live in the land of the most liberal enclave in the nation of liberalism. Nowhere is more so than Los Angeles .

We are in a war of individual freedom. Yet, we have allowed ourselves to fall into global socialism, in which we are now drowning. Where are those who ought to know better? Where are those who have cut us to the core in our fight for these freedoms? Why do Jews continue to vote for the Demo c rats?

In decades past, Jewish communities were poor. They were newcomers to the wealth and civil rights and liberty afforded to them. The Democratic Party represented a party that they could identify with and relate to. However, over the years, times and conditions began to change. Jews reached an level of success and the needs of the previously downtrodden c hanged. They were no longer on the socio-economic plateau of the poor and deprived.

The quota system was always used against the Jewish community to suppress them. I remember when I was growing up in Atlanta , Georgia , and we had the quota system. Meaning, although we were less than three percent of the student body, at the local universities the Jewish applicant, even if he were an A student, would be passed over in favor of a wasp" student, even if he had a C average, if the school already had three percent of the class filled with Jewish students. I remember that was the system at Emory, which was predominantly a medical and dental school, which had a large waiting list of Jewish students who were not accepted because the "quota system" always worked against the Jews.

After the astounding Six Day War, a new outbreak of anti-Semitism began. What was always directed toward the Jewish people was now redirected to resentment of the Jewish State. The thinking of Jews was that adopting the new platform of liberalism would somehow make them accepted as "good Jews." We are no longer oppressed and living in an unjust country. Why not be realistic?

We enjoy freedom and liberties unheard of in past decades Our social, political and moral system is not the same that it once was and the liberals of today refuse to recognize that and remain blind to the real world.

Obama ran on a platform to change the face of the United State and he is accomplishing his goals. He has been a "false Messiah to many of my neighbors, who I know supported him and my privileged neighbors in LaLa Land are now living through "Buyer's Remorse," even though it’s not politically correct to admit it. So many of the media here in California are Jewish themselves and there is a cultural trickle down attitude, which the entertainment industry here has absorbed into their DNA without their apparent knowledge.

I am wondering what this guy is really going to do, not only for them but for this country. If the country is injured, they will be injured. That may be sinking in. I truly believe that the Big Daddy czar with the good old wholesome name of Barak Hussein Obama has created a government sub- culture of czars who are not overseen or responsible to anyone. But, they want to "share the wealth." Have you noticed, however, that those serving in the Senate and House, who want all this change, sure don’t plan on giving up any of their wonderful health care coverage ?

Obama is a master con-artist who came out of nowhere and ran on the perfect wave of resentment created by Bush. The country was so dissatisfied that, at that time, with the same old, same old, we would have elected Jack the Ripper. And, that folks is exactly who we have put in power. Obama, at the United Nations, spoke at length about the need for Israel to fulfill Palestinian claims and rights; and, used his favorite word, "refugees," and the hope of "returning" millions of Arabs to the Jewish State.

I thought that was pretty bad when he awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to two of the most virulent anti-Israel and anti-Semitic people today, Mary Robinson of Ireland and Desmond Tutu of South Africa . But the folks in Norway outdid even that fiasco with the Nobel Peace Prize. This is going to set off a new wave of Obama idolatry and that is dangerous. There was a time when I took pride in the accomplishments of the Jews and the vast numbers who had joined the exclusive company of Nobel Prize winners. But, then came the likes of Arafat and Jimmy Carter, who I believe are evil to the core. Arafat's legacy is being known as the Father of Terrorism, and the damage he managed to accomplish will be felt for decades to come. Carter? Never a man of peace, but an anti-Semite, who when he was governor of my state of Georgia was the most incompetent in memory. And, now with Obama’s inclusion in this group completes my loss of faith in the value of this award. Elie Wiesel has reason to be pretty pissed.

In closing, I'd just like to mention that Obama and Company have quietly and with little fan-fare decided to hand over to Hamas three hundred million of our tax payer dollars, supposedly to be used to "re-build" Gaza and provide for its perpetual refugees caused by what he considers to be a war of aggression by Israel. While Obama is getting ready to pressure Israel into opening the jails and letting the tigers (aka, terrorists) back into the population so they can butcher more Jews, why doesn’t someone pressure the White House to tie that tainted money to the release of captured Gilad Shalit and ensure his freedom?

Arlene Peck is an internationally syndicated columnist and television talk show hostess. She travels extensively worldwide, reporting to her audience about political events, social happenings (Cannes Film Festival, London event for the Variety Club, etc.) and "must see" spots. If there is a place to see and be seen, she'll write about it for her international audience. Arlene's syndicated column is read weekly by millions and her television show ("Wow! It's Arlene Peck!") can be seen throughout Southern California every Monday night. Please browse through all our pages to see Arlene's upcoming show schedules, photos of various events, and what's happening around town.

Do Not Call For another Palestinian Free Election!

Hamas Set to Win Election in Palestinian Authority

October 6, 2009 6:30 AM

by Khaled Abu Toameh Journalist

If the U.S. and its allies want to avoid another Hamas victory, they should reconsider their demand that the Palestinians hold another free election. Otherwise they will be repeating the same mistake they made in 2006.

Backed by the U.S., the Egyptians are now pushing the Palestinians toward holding new elections for president and parliament. By doing so, Cairo and Washington are taking a big risk: There is no guarantee that a majority of Palestinians would not vote for Hamas again.

Palestinians went to the polls three times in the past fives years to vote - - Twice they voted for Hamas.

Hamas candidates scored major victories in the municipal and parliamentary elections.
Hamas boycotted the presidential election that was held in January 2005, and which brought Mahmoud Abbas to power. Had Hamas participated in the presidential election, some Palestinians argue that its chances of winning that vote too would have been good.
Prior to the January 2006 parliamentary election, the US, Israel and many Western countries ignored warnings that Hamas was headed toward victory. Hamas won that vote largely because of the Palestinian public’s disenchantment with Fatah's corruption, mismanagement and abuse of power.

Such was the degree of contempt for Fatah and its representatives that even Christians and secular Palestinians cast their ballots for the radical Islamic movement.
Fatah itself was even so aware of its poor performance and blunders that it dispatched some of its representatives to the US in a bid to persuade the Bush Administration to abandon its plan to hold free elections in the Palestinian territories.

Today Fatah is not in a better situation and its chances of winning in the planned elections next year do not appear to be high.

Fatah's dwindling popularity is mainly attributed to the faction's failure to draw conclusions from its defeat to Hamas in the 2006 election - Fatah’s failure to reform itself and get rid of icons of financial corruption and thugs who continue to call the shots in the faction.

The feeling among many Palestinians is that Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO, is continuing to march backward ever since it lost one of its founders and symbols, Yasser Arafat.

In the past few weeks, Fatah's credibility suffered one blow after another.
First, Fatah's Sixth General Assembly, which was held in Bethlehem for the first time in 20 years, failed to inject new and fresh blood into the faction. Instead, Fatah saw the return of most of Arafat's former cronies who were responsible for abuse of human rights, mismanagement and financial corruption.

Second, Fatah's open affiliation and cooperation with Israel and the US is causing tremendous damage to its credibility among Palestinians. This, of course, plays into the hands of Hamas. The next election will be presented as a contest between “collaborators with Israel and America” (Fatah), and Muslim candidates who reject any form of affiliation with the West.

Third, the recent summit in New York, where the US literally forced Abbas to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, has made Fatah appear as if it is incapable of taking independent decisions. For months, Abbas had vowed not to meet with Netanyahu or resume peace talks with Israel unless construction in the settlements was completely halted.

Fourth, Abbas's decision to withdraw a proposal to the UN Human Rights Council regarding the report of Justice Richard Goldstone on the Gaza war has also undermined his credibility among many Palestinians. Abbas and Fatah are now being accused of “helping Israel bury its war crimes.”

Meanwhile, Hamas appears to be increasing its power. A prisoner-exchange agreement with Israel, which would see the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jail in return for IDF soldier Gilad Schalit, will undoubtedly boost Hamas's popularity.
Despite its failure to improve the living conditions of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and its responsibility for the ongoing suffering there, Hamas is still admired by many because of its continued defiance and refusal to bow to US, Israeli and Arab pressure.

Barring last-minute obstacles, Hamas and Fatah are expected to sign a “reconciliation” accord on October 22 in the Egyptian capital of Cairo.

The Egyptian-brokered agreement calls, among other things, for holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the Palestinian territories sometime during the first half of 2010.
Under such circumstances, it is easy to see why Hamas could win the next election.

Sweden's hatred for Israel boils to the surface...

Sweden's Refusal
to Condemn Organ Libel is Bogus

by Alan M. Dershowitz

Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law School

Posted: 25 Aug 2009 03:58 PM PDT

The Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, has refused to condemn a “blood libel” published by one of Sweden’s leading newspapers, Aftonbladet. The article outrageously claims that Jewish soldiers in Israel killed Palestinians in order to harvest their organs. The writer of the article, Donald Bostrom has acknowledged, according to the New York Times, that “he has no idea whether the accusations are true.” Yet a widely-read Swedish newspaper was prepared to publish this undocumented and highly volatile accusation, without requiring its author to present any credible evidence.

This false accusation is reminiscent of the medieval blood libels that falsely accused Jews of killing Christian children in order to use their blood for religious rituals.

Not only has foreign minister Bildt refused to issue to a personal condemnation of the current “organ libel,” his foreign ministry explicitly disavowed the denunciation that was issued by Sweden’s Ambassador to Israel, who had called the article “shocking and appalling.” In a self-righteous statement, Mr. Bildt claimed that condemnation of the article would be inappropriate because freedom of expression is a part of the Swedish Constitution.

This is a bogus and ignorant argument, as anyone who understands freedom of speech will attest. I have devoted much of my life to defending freedom of speech and consider myself something of an expert on the matter. Nobody is talking about censoring the Swedish press or imprisoning the writer of the absurd article. What we are talking about is expanding the marketplace of ideas to include a completely warranted condemnation of sloppy journalism and outrageous accusations that foment an already increasing anti-Semitism in Sweden. Freedom of speech is based on an open and vibrant marketplace of ideas. No journalist is immune from criticism for bigotry and defamation, even from high ranking government officials.

Recall that virtually every government official in Europe went out of their way to condemn the depiction of perfectly innocent cartoons that offended some Muslims by portraying Mohammed. (More recently, the Yale Press withdrew these cartoons and other classic art depicting Mohammed out of fear of violent reaction.) Without getting into the business of comparative offensiveness, no reasonable person could argue that depicting a long-dead religious figure comes anywhere close to falsely accusing contemporary Jews of murdering innocent Palestinians to steal their organs.

The reality is that the Swedish government, long known for its cowardice, simply does not want to get into a fight with the Muslim world, much as it didn’t want to get into a fight with the Nazi’s during the Second World War. Sweden is perfectly willing to sell out the Jews in the name of neutrality, or in this case, in the false name of freedom of expression. Its silence is beneath contempt.

I am offended by Sweden’s craven complicity with evil not only as a Jew, but also as a strong defender of freedom of speech. Freedom of speech carries with it certain obligations as well. One of those is to condemn false speech. The best answer to false speech is not censorship, it is truthfulness. By remaining silent in the face of the bigoted falsities contained in the Aftonbladet article, the Swedish foreign minister inevitably creates the impression that he sympathizes with the writer, and perhaps even with his conclusions. Mr. Bildt, too, has freedom of speech, which he has exercised on many occasions. By choosing not to exercise it on this occasion—or even worse, by exercising it to criticize the Swedish Ambassador to Israel for her condemnation of the article—Bildt becomes a facilitator of bigotry. He should be ashamed of himself. His country should be ashamed of him. And if his country is not ashamed of him, then every decent person in the world should be ashamed of Sweden.

Silence in the face of evil is not an option. As Edmund Burke reminded us many years ago: “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.” To that I may add, “Or say nothing.”

Precisely Wrong: War Crimes Accusations against the IDF

Absolutely Wrong:

Analysis of HRW report, “Precisely Wrong: Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles,” 30 June 2009

NGO Monitor
August 06, 2009

In this report, and accompanying press releases and conference, interviews, etc., HRW accuses the IDF of using drones to launch precise weapons during the Gaza operation, leading to wrongful civilian deaths. The entire publication is based on allegations from only 6 ambiguous incidents.

The term “war crimes” is used 7 times, and the alleged drone attacks are termed “unlawful”. The case is entirely speculative, but the conclusions are stated with absolute assurance, as if the evidence was totally clear.

Instead of credible evidence, HRW emphasizes technical and legal claims that are unfounded or irrelevant, but present the facade of expertise. These include references to satellite imaging, precise GPS coordinates, weapons specifications, Geneva conventions, etc., none of which offset the complete absence of verifiable evidence.

Robert Hewson, editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, stated “Human Rights Watch makes a lot of claims and assumptions about weapons and drones, all of which is still fairly speculative, because we have so little evidence.” (Dan Williams, “Human Rights Watch accuses Israel over Gaza drones,” June 30, 2009)

On HRW’s “evidence” quoting Palestinian claims to have seen and heard the missiles, a retired British colonel and Commander of British forces in Afghanistan “questioned whether such distinctions could be made, not least as the Spike’s range is 8 km (5 miles) …In a battlefield, in an urban environment, with all the other noises, it's certainly more than likely you would not hear something five miles away.” (Reuters, June 30)
Additional “evidence” and references are from unverifiable Palestinian “testimony,” reports from journalists (such as an email from the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation quoting a Jane’s Defence Weekly staffer), and from other NGO officials.

On the legal issue of military necessity, the report takes at face value the Palestinian claims of seeing no active Hamas fighters in the area of the alleged attacks. The Israeli government’s report on the Gaza combat provides details that refute this speculation.
HRW asserts that drone operators in the midst of the conflict should have consulted with military lawyers “to help determine whether targets are legitimate.” This suggests that the authors have no significant battlefield experience in which split-second decisions must be made, or are simply inventing claims.

HRW accuses the IDF of using drones to launch precise weapons during the Gaza operation, leading to civilian deaths in the absence of military necessity. “The analysis is based on 6 case studies involving an alleged 29 civilian deaths.” HRW claims that these deaths should have been avoided, and that IDF drone operators failed to act accordingly.

The term “war crimes” is used 7 times, and the alleged drone attacks are termed “unlawful”. The case is entirely speculative, but the conclusions are stated with absolute assurance, as if the evidence was totally clear. [“During the recent fighting in Gaza from December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed dozens of Palestinian civilians with one of the most precise weapons in its arsenal: missiles launched from an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV)… (p. 3)… Individuals who have committed violations ……are responsible for war crimes. …Military or civilian personnel found responsible for committing or ordering unlawful drone attacks should be disciplined or prosecuted as appropriate.” p.8].

Instead of credible evidence, this report emphasizes numerous technical and legal claims that are unfounded or irrelevant to the case, but present the facade of expertise. These include references to satellite imaging, detailed maps, precise GPS coordinates, weapons specifications, Geneva conventions, etc., none of which offset the complete absence of verifiable evidence. Additional “evidence” and references are from Palestinian “testimony”, journalists, and other NGO officials.

The lack of credibility is clear regarding each of the following issues:

(1) The identification of the weapons involved

The report hinges on the allegation that the IDF used drones to deliver Spike missiles in these 6 cases and that “Israel’s drone-launched missiles are incredibly precise.” (p. 18.) HRW states that the IDF used two types of “drones armed with the Spike, though it may have also used other missiles”, the evidence is largely non-existent. This statement cites an email from the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation quoting a Jane’s Defence Weekly staffer, April 27, 2009. (p. 18, footnote 14.)

To be credible, the report would need to demonstrate that: a) Spike missiles were indeed used in these attacks; and that b) they were launched from drones. However, the report fails on both counts, and the evidence is based on a combination of fragments allegedly found at the scenes, and claims by Palestinians related to weapons identification.

a) Regarding the warheads, this claim rests on the assumption that the fragments found by HRW were actually from Spike missiles, that they were recovered from missiles used in this conflict, rather than earlier engagements in Gaza, and that they were found in situ, rather than having been collected elsewhere by Palestinians. None of these claims can be proven – all may be incorrect.

b) If all of the conditions in a) are assumed to be accurate, the Spike missiles involved may have been launched from platforms other than drones (helicopters, ground forces, or ships). In this case, the foundation of the report and the claims that follow regarding improper IDF actions and “war crimes” is false.

In this regard, Robert Hewson, editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, stated "Human Rights Watch makes a lot of claims and assumptions about weapons and drones, all of which is still fairly speculative, because we have so little evidence". (Dan Williams, “Human Rights Watch accuses Israel over Gaza drones,” June 30, 2009) Commenting on the HRW evidence based on what Palestinians claimed to have seen and heard, retired British army colonel Richard Kemp, a veteran of Iraq and Commander of British forces in Afghanistan, “questioned whether such distinctions could be made, not least as the Spike’s range is 8 km (5 miles) -- enough to put helicopters or naval boats out of earshot. In a battlefield, in an urban environment, with all the other noises, it's certainly more than likely you would not hear something five miles away." (Reuters, June 30)

(2) Visual capabilities, precision and time

As “evidence” that the IDF should have been able to prevent civilian deaths, HRW quotes an interview (p. 11) with an Israeli drone operator in the Israeli online military journal Shavuz. The interview discusses identification capabilities regarding a static target (“We identified a terrorist that looked like an Israeli soldier. Our camera enabled us to see him very clearly. He was wearing a green parka jacket and he was walking with a huge radio that looked just like an army radio. ……We saw him leaving an explosive device at a distance of 100 meters from the [Israeli] forces along with a dummy.”) In contrast, the HRW report on Gaza deals with rapidly moving targets in a battle zone, which is completely different. The attempt to transfer static capabilities to a dynamic context demonstrates the professional incompetence or the deliberate distortions of the authors of the HRW report.

Using the term “incredibly precise”, HRW claims: “With these visual capabilities, drone operators should have been able to tell the difference between fighters and others directly participating in hostilities, who are legitimate targets, and civilians, who are immune from attack, and to hold fire if that determination could not be made.” (p. 18.) But HRW does not quantify or indicate the criteria used for this assertion, nor do the authors provide sources.

On page 5, the report asserts that these visual capabilities enable operators to consult with military lawyers “to help determine whether targets are legitimate.” This suggests that the authors have no real battlefield experience in which split-second decisions must be made, or are simply inventing claims. HRW also suggests that the slow speed and long flight time of drones are also factors in precise target decision making. Again, the assertion is very general and entirely subjective.

Indeed, the uncertainty and speculative nature of HRWs claims is reflected in the questions that they sent to the IDF. (p. 42.) If HRW knew the answers, why ask the questions, other than to make the claim that the IDF did not provide classified information to a hostile organization.

(3) Military necessity (location of drone incidents “kilometers” from fighting)
For example, regarding a case study in Gaza city, HRW claims: “On January 4, 2009…an IDF drone launched a missile at two boys playing on the rooftop of a two-story home…According to residents, the site was at least five kilometers from any fighting at the time between the IDF and Palestinian armed groups. IDF statements and media reports also report no fighting in that area at that time; Israeli forces did not enter central Gaza City until later in the ground offensive. Because the house is surrounded by taller buildings in the center of Gaza City, it is a highly unlikely site for firing rockets, and it would be a poor location for artillery spotting or reconnaissance.” (p. 27.)

Each claim in the above paragraph is speculative or based on unverifiable testimony from Palestinians who are not likely to have known whether there were legitimate military targets in the area. These could have included command and control centers, weapons’ storage sites, and other Hamas facilities. In addition, Israeli military operations included efforts to locate and free kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit (who is not mentioned in this report, despite the obvious centrality to the conflict and all military engagements).
HRW’s reliance on “eyewitness” testimony on the question of legitimate military targets in the area of an alleged attack is also reflected in the other case studies. In the “Al-Habbash family house” case, in which two girls were allegedly killed, HRW presents the following testimony:

“‘There were no Israelis in the area; it was the second day of ground fighting,’ … ‘And if there had been fighters nearby we would have left. It was a normal busy day, and if there had been fighting the children would not have been playing on the roof.’,,,” (p. 29.)
Beyond the unverifiable nature of such testimony (see Section 5 below), particularly regarding the presence of Hamas “fighters”, HRW’s reliance on this evidence reflects two highly speculative assumptions:

(1) that the presence or absence of visible Israeli forces in an area is a central criteria;

(2) that there were no legitimate targets (Hamas fighters, weapons, communications assets, etc.) in the area, visible or not visible.

In a third case (“Gaza Technical College”), HRW again propagates the misleading concept that there were no legitimate targets unless locals, UN staff, journalists or human rights activists (unnamed) claim to have observed “active” local fighters or fighting:

“According to nine witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, including three international UN staff, no Palestinian fighters were active on the street or in the immediate area just prior to or at the time of the attack. Fighters from Hamas and the other Palestinian factions were rarely seen in the Rimal neighborhood where the attack took place, witnesses as well as Palestinian journalists and human rights activists based in Gaza said.” (p.20)

HRW’s report here suggests, ironically, that there were in fact Hamas fighters in the area: they just weren’t “active on the street or in the immediate area just prior to or at the time of the attack.” Again, HRW’s speculation is based on incorrect assumptions and unverifiable testimony of locals and others.

(4) Oxygen tanks or Grad rockets – immoral act or understandable error in asymmetric warfare?

On December 29, 2008, the IDF attacked a truck which appeared to be carrying rockets, but later acknowledged that an error had been made.

Although HRW includes this as one of its 6 “drone” incidents, and a potential war crime, the report relies on the same highly problematic evidence as in other cases. In order to cast doubt on the IDF’s report that four Hamas operatives were killed, HRW refers to a list of “martyrs” provided in a Hamas website. (p. 27), from which the names of alleged casualties in this incident are absent. On the use of oxygen tanks for rocket manufacture and related evidence presented by the IDF, HRW makes the clearly illogical argument that “dual use” objects in his context “are presumed to be civilian”.

HRW also rejects IDF claims that the oxygen tanks appeared to be Grad rockets, pointing out difference in length (2.87 meters vs. 1.62 meters). “The Russian-designed Grad rocket is a known weapon in the Hamas arsenal, and consequently recognizable to IDF personnel. As such, given the visual evidence, the drone operator should have considered the likelihood that these were not Grad rockets. In addition, according to the IDF video of the attack, the truck was under surveillance for more than two minutes, and possibly longer because the truck was not moving, so the operator should have had time to consult with superior officers on whether the truck could be considered a legitimate target.” (pp. 25-26.) HRW presents no information on ability to instantly distinguish between the different lengths involved. The authors also makes assertions about what IDF personnel should have considered and with whom they should have consulted in the context of an ongoing war, but have no independent knowledge of the decision making process.

The MFA report “IDF Operation in Gaza” discusses this incident in great detail (p. 144).

(5) Reliance on Palestinian testimony

A large portion of the case study material is dedicated to the testimony of Palestinians interviewed by HRW --of the 34 footnotes in the case studies section, 13 are citations to HRW interviews with Palestinian witnesses, including family members of the deceased, one is to an UNRWA security guard, name withheld on request, and many others cite journalists and NGOs that quote Palestinian claims.

The named interview subjects are:
Adib Munthir al-Rayyis, Gaza City
Ibrahim Nehru al-Rayyis, Gaza City
Nehru al-Rayyis, Gaza City
Muhammad Sa’di Ghabayen, Gaza City
Basil Nabil Ghabayen, Gaza City
Ashraf Mashhrawi, Gaza City
Ashraf ‘Issawi, Gaza City
Mahmud al-Habbash, Gaza City
Muhammad al-Habbash, Gaza City
Nahla ‘Allaw, Gaza City
Muhammad ‘Allaw, Gaza City
Hamada al-Sultan, Beit Lahiya
Mahmud al-Sultan, Beit Lahiya

(6) Moral/legal issue: should the IDF be condemned for using precise technology intended to reduce civilian casualties in the context of asymmetric warfare?

This report purports to deal with the consequences of the IDF’s use of technology that HRW admits enhances accuracy and minimizes collateral damage. HRW discounts the relevance of the fact that the urban battle zone was chosen by Hamas, when it based itself within the civilian population, and Israel actions are entirely responsive. HRW also ignores the irony in the juxtaposition of the use by Hamas of indiscriminate rockets aimed at civilian areas, in contrast to the IDF’s precision weapons designed to avoid such indiscriminate attacks.

As a matter of moral reasoning and logic, there is also no basis for holding one side to a higher standard precisely because it sought and used technology meant to prevent harm to civilians, in a conflict it did not initiate and sought to avoid.

In the legal dimension, HRW wants the IDF to be subject to a much stricter standard of liability for harm to civilians in comparison to Hamas (or Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon war) precisely because the IDF took steps to prevent such harm. The illogic of this notion is clear, and HRW cites no authority or references to support this argument.

(7) HRW’s letter to IDF seeking classified material – admission of ignorance, cynicism or both HRW’s ignorance about what actually happened in the alleged IDF strikes discussed in this report is reflected in the questions sent in a letter addressed to the IDF. (pp. 41-43.) Many of these questions inquire as to the IDF’s military objectives in the strikes covered in the report, or ask for information on the drones HRW claims that the IDF employed.

These questions reflect HRW’s lack of information on the very issues on which they claimed expertise in this report. As noted above, the questions related to the drone technology and the level of precision also reveal either a damning ignorance or an effort to increase criticism of the IDF for not revealing classified information necessary to disprove HRW allegations.

THE TRUE STORY OF: The Operation in Gaza - 27 Dec 2008 - 18 Jan 2009

The Operation in Gaza - Legal and Factual Aspects:

The definitive Israeli version
(Communicated by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman)

On July 30, the Government of Israel released a detailed paper addressing a wide range of factual and international legal issues relating to the military operation undertaken by the Israel Defence Forces in Gaza in December 2008 - January 2009.

The Paper, 160 pages long, describes in detail the context of the Gaza Operation. It documents the Hamas attacks on Israeli civilians in the years prior to the Operation and the increasing range of Hamas rocket and mortar attacks, as well as Israel's efforts to prevent the attacks and avoid the conflict.

The Paper contains an extensive legal analysis of the legal principles and of State practice regarding the use of force and examines in detail the application of the principles of necessity, distinction and proportionality. In particular, with photographic and video evidence, it documents the tactics adopted by Hamas in launching attacks from within civilian populations and describes the IDF precautions and efforts to limit civilian harm in such situations.

The Paper also gives a detailed account of Israel's humanitarian efforts in the course of the operation, particularly in the face of Hamas attempts to launch attacks during humanitarian pauses to allow aid to reach civilians, hijack aid and assistance, and hide within and behind medical and international facilities.

The Paper also gives previously unpublished details of the multiple IDF investigations into allegations made by various groups of violations of the law. It reveals that IDF investigative teams are currently examining approximately 100 complaints, including 13 criminal investigations opened so far. The Paper describes the preliminary findings of some of the IDF field investigations, which can be released without comprising the integrity and independence of these investigations including some of the lessons learned. It notes that these investigations will be reviewed by the Military Advocate General and may be subject to further review by the Attorney General and the Supreme Court of Israel.

The

Paper, with a brief executive summary, has been posted on the web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ISRAEL'S FRIENDS IN THE WORLD - NAME THEM

Israel's Diplomatic Isolation

By John R. Bolton

Commentary magazine

Even though it shares the same island with some of the most imaginative theatrical talent in the world, the United Nations prefers comforting, dull, tedious repetition to interesting, unexpected, dramatic surprise. That is especially true when it comes to Israel, which is always cast in the role of villain and for which matters are therefore certain to end unhappily.
Thus, every year the UN General Assembly approves resolutions highly unfavorable to Israel by huge majorities, often with only Israel, the United States, and a trusted ally like Palau voting against and a few European stragglers abstaining. On occasion, the Security Council will meet in emergency session to consider an alleged crime against humanity committed by Israel; the Council chamber is filled to capacity with delegates and spectators, many heated speeches are given, and Israel is saved from condemnation only by the threat or exercise of the U.S. veto.

In 2006, the anti-Israel UN Human Rights Commission was replaced by the newly minted UN Human Rights Council. But to the shock and wonderment of absolutely no one, the new HRC turns out to be just like the old HRC, spending most of its time criticizing Israel, or preparing for conferences like Durban II that are political free-fire zones against Israel.

These and similar set pieces have become so commonplace they rarely receive much U.S. media coverage; most Americans have simply and understandably lost interest in the clichéd theater of the United Nations. In the world outside the United States, the story is very different. Even the most heavily scripted, unspontaneous, and intolerably pedantic UN meetings generate substantial press attention abroad, and that press attention, in turn, adds to the growing sense that Israel is among the most solitary nations on the face of the earth.
Nor does that isolation seem limited to the UN's chilly corridors. Israelis are concerned about a growing estrangement from the nations of the European Union (EU)--not just a lack of substantive support from Western Europe, but an acute lack of the warmth and empathy that was directed toward the Jewish state from the continent in earlier days. Even more profoundly, Middle Eastern hostility to Israel's creation and continued existence is now reinforced by the growth of a radically politicized, militant Islamism. And the new administration in Washington has already demonstrated that it will not match its predecessor's sense of connection to the democratic bright light in the Middle East. If America's responses to the threats before Israel, such as Iran's nuclear weapons program, prove less robust, will Israel find itself in a circumstance in which it will have only its own will and capabilities to rely upon?

Israel's protection against existential threat begins at home.

These are legitimate questions, but fortunately, the answers are not as clear as they might seem to distressed friends and frightened supporters of Israel. Unquestionably, Israel's diplomatic position is different from earlier times, but a dispassionate analysis suggests that it is not necessarily worse--if, that is, the standard for judgment is not Israel's popularity but rather its ability to maneuver and function as an actor of moment in the international community.

Most important, even in the midst of economic crisis, the United States is far stronger than it was at the Cold War's height, both comparatively and absolutely. Neither the United States nor Israel can be defeated in conventional military hostilities by any conceivable coalition of adversaries. There are, to be sure, acute, even existential threats caused by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of international terrorism, but the problems of the 1950s and the 1960s are over. That is unequivocally good news.

And yet Israel still suffers emotionally from the slings and arrows aimed at it. A significant cause of the angst is the entirely understandable sentiment that after all the difficulties Israel has faced over its 61 years, there should come a point where it is "accepted," after which its singular external troubles will subside. This is a very European sentiment, both feudal and social-democratic in its roots, resting on the idea that stability is the norm and threat the exception. Unfortunately, however, neither for Israel, nor the United States, nor anyone else, is there one fixed point of stability or safety that can be reached. Such a point simply does not exist. The nations of Western Europe, however, seem intent on believing otherwise.
Israel's chief external strength, its closeness to the United States, may be ironically responsible for some aspects of Western Europe's diplomatic turn against it. Whether at the United Nations or elsewhere, the nations of Western Europe know that Israel will not be politically eviscerated by resolutions or actions because the United States will intervene before terrible damage can be done. In the tedious business of drafting resolutions, ministerial statements, or press communiqués, most EU foreign ministries know that the United States will do the heavy lifting--and shoulder the blame from Israel's adversaries--in order to achieve acceptable verbiage.

The certainty of American action has freed Western Europeans from bearing any diplomatic responsibility in relation to Israel. They need not demonstrate sympathy for Israel's position, even if they might be inclined to feel such sympathy. Indeed, it is clear that the central American role has granted them precious liberty to cast a free vote--a vote they can use for their own political purposes, both domestic and international.

This attitude is desperately painful for Israelis, especially older ones, many of whom cannot help but hark back to the two decades following World War II. Europe then seemed both viscerally and operationally more engaged with Israel; indeed, at the time, the collectivist convictions of many Israeli leaders and the country's socialist domestic policies generated more empathy from like-minded Europeans than from the determinedly individualistic and capitalist United States. Kibbutzim? Not in Kansas, Dorothy. Indeed, in certain sectors of the American Right, Israel's original ideological path was a generator of a hostility that still burns today, even as the country is moving to supplant its socialist economy with a system that more closely approximates the free market. In those halcyon days, among leftist elites in Europe's great capitals, Israel looked like a chip off the old block.

That was then. Whatever commonality European socialists might once have felt with Israelis has long since passed. Even more important, Western European guilt about the depths of anti-Semitic sentiment across the continent and the role it played in stoking the flames of the Holocaust has all but dissipated. Monuments, memorial ceremonies at cemeteries, and obligatory passages in official speeches are all that remain.

Just as Europe's gratitude to America for liberating it from fascism only lasted so long, so too with the continent's sense of guilt about what took place on its soil and in its name. And neither gratitude nor guilt will be motivating factors in European policy anytime soon.
Israel's estrangement from Western Europe is one of the most pronounced diplomatic markers of the profound lassitude, the end-of-civilization weariness that has EU members at the UN and other diplomatic venues in its grip. It is beyond my scope here to deal with the causes of this continental fatigue--declining birthrates, aging populations, expensive social welfare programs, immigration--but suffice it to say that their combined effect is overwhelming. Add to that the desire of many Europeans to believe they can now be liberated for all time from transnational conflict, and Israel's Europe problem becomes insoluble. From the European perspective, threats to international comity come not from external hostile forces--for them, such forces barely exist--but rather from seemingly friendly quarters, like the United States and Israel. They believe they are endangered by those nations that have decided (so far) that they cannot afford to fall prey to the false dream of extricating themselves from the world's dangers by remaining in slumber or going prone in the wake of attack.

What Western Europe's ennui and its descent into a fantasy of having moved beyond history demonstrate is that little or nothing will change the continent's attitudes toward the Jewish state. Both Israel and America can and should do diplomatic damage-control with the European Union's member countries to try and ballast Israel's position; that is, after all, what diplomacy is for. But mitigation of Europe's concerns will not be enough to change Europe's course.

Instead, Israel needs to look elsewhere to decrease its isolation. Surprising though it may sound, the prospects for success in other parts of the world are far from dismal. The first place to look is the Middle East, where Iran's growing menace has created significant possibilities for ad hoc alliances of convenience.

Iran's decades-old nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, and its role as the central banker of international terrorism, obviously constitute direct, mortal threats to Israel. But not solely to Israel. Other international terrorist groups supported and assisted by Iran, the Taliban and al Qaeda foremost among them, threaten regimes like Pakistan. Arab regimes are increasingly alarmed by the growing implications of Persian aggression. Tehran's support for terrorists is nonsectarian, including both predominantly Sunni groups like Hamas, Taliban, and al Qaeda, as well as Shiite terrorists like Hizballah. Thus, the six oil- and gas-rich members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GC)--among them Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates--fear Iranian support both for dissident Shiite populations in their own countries and for terrorism by other Islamic extremists.

Just as Iran has effectively assumed hegemony over largely Sunni Syria, and through Hizballah now effectively has sway over Lebanon, so too other Sunni Arab countries could be at risk of domination by Iran's allies. In Egypt, the succession crisis that will arise when the eighty-one-year-old Hosni Mubarak passes from the political scene will offer a real opportunity for the Muslim Brotherhood, the parent of Hamas.

Arab leaders do not wish to become Iranian satellites in the manner of Damascus. Moreover, watching the bullheadedness of radical Palestinian leaders pursuing their own political objectives at the expense of the day-to-day well-being of average Palestinians, more and more Arab leaders now appreciate how much Hamas's agenda stems from Iran's objectives rather than Arab solidarity. One must be careful not to overstate all this--the Arab vs. Persian conflict that now seems to be surfacing is opaque and multifarious, and the political tectonic plates shift frequently. Still, the malevolent role of Iran in the broader Middle East is something from which no Arab leader can afford to avert his eyes.

An Iran with nuclear weapons is a palpable risk not only for Israel, and the Arab states know it. That is what accounts for the mysterious silence on the part of the Arab world in September 2007, when Israel bombed the nearly completed North Korean nuclear reactor on the Euphrates River in Syria. Israel exposed and degraded yet another Middle Eastern clandestine nuclear program, one that could not have come into being without some measure of Iranian support, and the lack of Arab protest was deafening.

Arab states were comparably muted, at least at the outset, during the 2006 Hizballah-Israel war and more recently during Israel's military operation in Gaza. Only when the conflicts dragged on did the iron laws of the anti-Israel catechism require Arab states to join in the condemnation. But make no mistake: in various Arab capitals there was no mourning for the body blows dealt to both Hizballah and Hamas. In the same fashion, should Israel undertake the targeted use of military force against Iran's nuclear program, there will be voiceless thanksgiving in those same capitals.

There is, it would appear, a propitious route for quiet Israeli diplomacy, especially through back channels and unofficial contacts, to seek common ground against the common foe. Among possible areas for fruitful cooperative action are: first, exchanges of intelligence information on dual-use nuclear and ballistic missile trading by Iran; second, common efforts against Iran's terrorist assistance, training and equipping, and financing; and third, establishing notification procedures and mechanisms to reduce subsidiary conflicts in the event of Iran-related hostilities.

Obviously, virtually none of this would ever become public, at least if it is working right. Nor would it change much of the public rhetoric of the Arab states on matters like the Palestinians and Jerusalem. Nonetheless, by shifting the common focus toward defending against Iran, time can be gained during which other breakthroughs might be possible, even if unlikely. At a minimum, shadow diplomacy and cooperation against the common foe could buy breathing time for Israel and the Palestinians to consider alternatives other than the increasingly dead-end "two-state solution."

Another place for Israel to go fishing is within the so-called Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The movement, a Cold War relic initially proposed by Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia comprising nations that sought to associate themselves neither with the United States nor the Soviet Union, is still active at the UN. Sometimes joined by nations in Latin America and Asia, the NAM coalition is now largely made up of African and Arab states. It can and often does constitute an overwhelming voting bloc in the UN General Assembly. Sundering this coalition on key issues is both doable and desirable, and should be a long-term Western goal in the UN and elsewhere.

In 1991, the decisive 1991 General Assembly vote repealing the infamous "Zionism is racism" resolution of 1975 was the direct result of a successful effort to introduce divisions into NAM. It was a difficult and time-consuming task, but in the end, many African nations voted for the 1991 repeal or abstained; Latin America (with the exception most notably of Cuba) also voted to repeal, as did India and other Asian countries. The Arabs were left isolated and defeated.
Working to split the NAM coalition should be a key aspect of Israel's diplomatic strategy going forward (and America's), in hopes of creating new breakthroughs on the model of the "Zionism is racism" repeal. Today, Africa has its own problems with Islamic extremism, on the Mediterranean, in the Sahara, and in the vast Sub-Saharan region.

India, an early leader of the NAM, also has a grave terrorism problem, and could play a role in turning the NAM away from knee-jerk attacks on Israel and toward objectives actually helpful to the citizens of its members. In any event, even occasional political forays behind NAM lines could serve to distract its members from helping Israel's adversaries burn it at the political stake at the UN.

Having the ability to undertake such diplomatic counterattacks does not mean that the anti-Zionist theater at the UN and elsewhere is meaningless. The public abuse that Israel is experiencing along with the accompanying rise of anti-Semitic agitation in Europe undermines the Israeli public's morale. The drumbeat of criticism aimed at delegitimizing its acts of self-defense against terrorism can also deter its political leadership from undertaking other initiatives that might stir up even more criticism.

Nevertheless, recognizing the declining role of former supporters and the surprising rise of new and tricky diplomatic opportunities has to be the real policy for avoiding or at least minimizing the threats to Israel, of which isolation is only one, and by no means the most significant. What has only become more important is the role of the United States, for which there is simply no substitute. This is something Israel's well-wishers must keep firmly in mind, especially in the United States: Israel's protection against existential threat begins at home.
John R. Bolton is a senior fellow at AEI.

Setting the Stage for an Iranian Takeover of Lebanon

No. 571 May-June 2009

Hizbullah’s Struggle to Change the Lebanese Regime


by: Shimon Shapira and Yair Minzili


• The publication of Hizbullah’s subversive plan against Egypt and the exposure of a Shiite group headed by a Hizbullah activist that planned to act against Egyptian targets diverted
attention from the challenge that Hizbullah has made against the very foundations of
Lebanese authority.

• On April 3, 2009, Hizbullah published its political platform in advance of elections to the
Lebanese parliament scheduled for June 7, 2009. The document calls for the abolition of
sectarian politics and for the enactment of a new election law that would alter the
equation of sectarian forces in Lebanon.

• In this manner, Hizbullah seeks to destroy the foundations of the sectarian regime in
Lebanon agreed upon in the National Pact of 1943 that has been preserved by the
Lebanese state ever since. The abolition of the existing political system will advance
Hizbullah toward its fundamental goal: the establishment of an Islamic state and a
complete Iranian takeover of Lebanon.

• The scholarly analyses that define Hizbullah as a Lebanese national movement are
baseless. What Lebanese national interests are served by subversive activity in Egypt?
What Lebanese interests seek the transfer of Iranian arms from Sudan and Sinai to Gaza?
What national Lebanese ideology seeks to subvert the delicate sectarian structure upon
which the modern Lebanese state is predicated?

A Pattern of Hizbullah Subversion

The publication of Hizbullah’s subversive plan against Egypt and the exposure of a Shiite group headed by a Hizbullah activist, that planned to act against Egyptian targets under the cover of “logistical assistance” to the Palestinians, diverted attention from the challenge that Hizbullah has made against the very foundations of Lebanese authority.

One can safely assume that Hizbullah activity in Egypt was performed with the full knowledge of Iran. The weapons shipment that departed Iran for Gaza was dispatched with Tehran’s blessing. Iran was undoubtedly aware that the Egyptian security authorities could uncover Hizbullah’s subversive activity, but believed that the Egyptians would prefer to turn a blind eye and allow the passage of the weapons inventory to Gaza. Even if this was not the case, the Iranians posited military assistance to Hamas as a supreme interest of the Islamic Revolution and were prepared to pay the price of a deterioration in relations between the countries. The attacks by Hassan Nasrallah against Egypt, including a summons to the Egyptian army to overthrow the Mubarak regime during Israel’s Gaza operation, would not have been made had Nasrallah not understood that in this fashion he was serving the wishes of his masters in Tehran.

Ever since the disclosures, the mass media in the Arab world and in the West has been
preoccupied with the dispute that has erupted between Hizbullah and Egypt, and have almost totally ignored the struggle that Hizbullah has initiated to change the face of the Lebanese regime.

While Britain adopted the questionable decision to open a dialogue with the “political wing” of Hizbullah and in practice recognized Hizbullah as a legitimate movement, it would appear that the artificial distinction drawn by the UK between the political and the military wings of Hizbullah has totally collapsed with the discovery of Hizbullah’s subversion in Egypt, which merely compounds what was previously discovered in Morocco. In that Sunni Arab kingdom, the king severed ties with Iran in March 2009, accusing it of supporting Shiite Islamic missionary activity.

Hizbullah’s Election Platform:
Setting the Stage for an Iranian Takeover of Lebanon

On April 3, 2009, Hizbullah published its political platform in advance of elections to the
Lebanese parliament scheduled for June 7, 2009. The document calls for the abolition of
sectarian politics and for the enactment of a new election law that would alter the equation of sectarian forces in Lebanon. (The English text of the 2009 Hizbullah platform appears at the end of this essay.)

The 2009 election platform joins a series of basic documents of the Hizbullah movement: These include the Open Letter (Risala Maftuha) from 1985, the first Hizbullah election platform for parliament from 1992, the Hizbullah political document ratified at the movement’s Third Congress in 1993, Hizbullah’s election platform for the 2000 parliamentary elections, and its platform for the municipal elections of 2004.
These two components – the unequivocal call to abolish sectarian politics and the enactment of a new election law – were placed at the very beginning of the platform in order to emphasize Hizbullah’s priorities. In the electoral platform of 2000, Hizbullah had called for establishing a national body for the abolishment of political sectarianism, but only in the fourth section of the platform. It is assumed that in this manner Hizbullah seeks to advance its aspiration to destroy the foundations of the sectarian regime in Lebanon agreed upon in the National Pact of 1943 that has been preserved by the Lebanese state ever since, amidst repeated crises. The abolition of the existing political system will advance Hizbullah toward its fundamental goal: the establishment of an Islamic state that provides political expression to the Shiite majority and a complete Iranian takeover of Lebanon.

What is missing in the new Hizbullah platform? There is no reference to its militia and weapons, as well as to the call from inside Lebanon to dismantle Hizbullah’s military capability and to integrate it into the Lebanese Armed Forces. Hizbullah ignores this aspect and insists on keeping its independent military wing as a “resistance” force against Israel.

However, it is clear that the preservation of Hizbullah’s military strength is intended primarily to allow the movement to translate its military power and demographic weight into a fundamental change of the Lebanese political system. In addition to this purpose, and no less important, Hizbullah’s military power serves as the cutting edge of Iran on Israel’s northern border, enabling the Islamic Republic to employ the military power that it erected in Lebanon to serve its strategic interests.

In recent years, and in the course of the severe political crises that have struck Lebanon since the murder of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in March 2005, Hizbullah has not concealed its intentions to realize the mission entrusted to it by the Iranian Revolutionary regime. The movement is to seize power in Lebanon and thus create another stable and trustworthy link in the Shiite axis of evil under Iranian leadership. In the Lebanese political realm, Hizbullah has labored to reinforce “the (Shiite) Opposition Camp” by aligning with powerful factions beyond the Shiite community against the Sunni-Shiite coalition headed by Saad al-Hariri. In practice, Hizbullah scored a major success by attracting to its side the Christian Free Patriotic Movement headed by Gen. Michel Aoun, and has strengthened its alliance with extremist Salafist Sunni groups. In a show of force, Hizbullah undertook an unprecedented brutal action when it effectively took over Beirut on May 7, 2008, in response to a government attempt to bring about the dismantling of Hizbullah’s independent communications infrastructure within Lebanon.

Hizbullah’s call for ending political sectarianism, coupled with the enactment of a new election law, came after this demonstration of power and self-confidence, and constitutes the apogee of its indefatigable efforts to attain power in Lebanon. The formulation of an electoral program in a manner that awards Hizbullah the deceptive image of an authentic Lebanese party operating on the basis of Lebanese interests was calculated to attract maximal representation and perhaps even a majority in parliament. However, its political rivals at home will seek to exploit Hizbullah’s recent entanglements in subversion against Egypt in order to expose Hizbullah as a disruptive force operating in the service of Iran and Syria.

Once again, it has been demonstrated that all the scholarly analyses that define Hizbullah as a Lebanese national movement are baseless. What Lebanese national interests are served by
subversive activity in Egypt? What Lebanese interests seek the transfer of Iranian arms from
Sudan and Sinai to Gaza? What national Lebanese ideology seeks to subvert the delicate
sectarian structure upon which the modern Lebanese state is predicated? The responses to these questions may be found in the framework of relations between Revolutionary Iran and its protégé in Lebanon, and between Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his loyal and obedient representative Hassan Nasrallah. The essence of the tie between them is not simply religious, but has far-reaching political implications influencing the range of Hizbullah behavior in the Lebanese arena and beyond, and symbolizes the growing influence of Iran in the Arab world.

The Hizbullah Platform for the June 2009 Parliamentary Elections

Introduction

Mohammed Ra’ad, the head of Hizbullah’s parliamentary bloc, presented Hizbullah’s election
platform on April 3, 2009:

With the approach of the parliamentary elections on June 7, we are seeking to
reformulate the political process and deal with the collapse of authority that has
resulted in crises that have adversely influenced national life and have plunged this
country into a cycle of instability.

UN Resolution 1559 of 2004 [which calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all
militias in Lebanon] constituted in some respects a portal for an internal civil war and
opened the gates to regional and international intervention that occasioned bitter
divisions. These divisions were exploited by international forces headed by the
United States in order to transfer the Lebanese arena to their tutelage.

When Hizbullah joined the national dialogue, we expected that this would serve as an
opportunity to reformulate a national consensus, and step away from the division into
camps, for we believe that we cannot safeguard the homeland and its unity unless a
spirit of mutual understanding and dialogue triumphs. We were always those who
sought Islamic unity and national unity. Subsequently, mutual understanding was
achieved between Hizbullah and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement [led by Gen.
Michel Aoun] as a pioneering step on this track.

The Zionist war of aggression in July 2006 touched off an unprecedented
international attack upon Lebanon. It strove to liquidate the Lebanese desire to
maintain the resistance and subordinate Lebanon. However, the major achievements
and acts of bravery of the holy warriors (mujaheddin) of the Islamic resistance turned
the criminal aggression supported by international and regional forces into a
disgraceful debacle which found expression in the downfall of the political and
military team of the Zionist entity, and the evaporation of illusions of an American
takeover of the region. Lebanon’s victory in this war was recognized throughout the
entire world.

The resistance is determined to complete the liberation of the remaining occupied
lands, and particularly the Shebaa Farms and the hills of Kfar Shuba. We believe that
any strategy of defense must integrate the current capabilities of the resistance and
the capabilities of the Lebanese army, enabling it to stand up to Israeli aspirations
regarding our lands and our water sources.

We affirm our enmity to Israel, our support and assistance to our Palestinian brothers
to liberate their land and the holy places, and our assiduous efforts to establish
excellent ties of fraternity with the Syrian Arab Republic.

In the Field of Political Reform P1

A. Cancelling Political Sectarianism

Forming the National Committee for Cancelling Political Sectarianism in accordance with the
Lebanese national consensus document, so that it will start its work and take the practical
measures to implement the recommendations that it will reach.

B. Electoral Law

The sound way to effect reform lies in enacting a modern electoral law based on proportionality. At the same time, the constitutional amendment concerning lowering the voting age to 18 years must be finalized, in addition to finalizing another amendment related to the separation of the parliamentary membership from the cabinet membership.

C. Equitable Development

The principle of equitable development constitutes one of the pillars of political reform. For this purpose it was enunciated in the contractual preamble of the constitution. In order to realize this, we demand the restoration of the Planning Ministry, drawing up five-or 10-year plans that monitor the needs of all areas in various sectors.

D. Administrative Decentralization

In its preamble, the constitution stipulates a revision of the administrative divisions, taking into consideration national unity and the preservation of coexistence. The administrative
decentralization means granting expanded administrative powers to smaller units –
municipalities, districts, and governorates. The aim is to strengthen development opportunities and facilitate the quick handling of paperwork and administrative duties.
E. The Judiciary

Since the Lebanese constitution has stipulated that the judiciary is an independent authority, side by side with the legislative and executive branches of power, and since the fair and impartial judiciary is a guarantee for the establishment of the state of law and preserving the rights of both the individual and the society – and hence there can be no political reform without it – we are of the opinion that work is necessary to enact and implement laws that help organize the judiciary under a higher independent judicial committee.

Administrative Reform

Administrative reform constitutes a major challenge in all societies. Trim and efficient
administration is the characteristic of modern states where administrative reform aims to reduce the burdens on the citizens, mobilize resources and capabilities, and carry out duties with speed and efficiency. In this regard, work should proceed in accordance with the following principles:

A. Drawing up a comprehensive blueprint for the administration and its needs, making an
inventory of the shortages and vacant positions and filling them.
B. Stressing scientific qualifications and practical skills.
C. Introducing modernization, automation, and information networking, and fighting
bureaucracy.
D. Activating monitoring and accountability and strengthening and bolstering monitoring
establishments – Civil Service Commission, Central Inspection, and the Public
Disciplinary Council, in addition to the Auditing Commission.
E. Developing laws and regulations in the field of administration and the budget, ensuring
speed in the performance of work, stopping waste, and ending bribery.
F. Adopting a scientific and methodological plan in the appointment of employees,
especially the senior officials (grades one and two) within efforts to enhance efficiency
and good performance in the official administration.
G. Enhancing efforts to implement the creation of the two governorates of Baalbek-Hermel
and Akkar, and completing the issuance of the applicable decisions in this regard.

Economic and Financial Reform

Since independence, Lebanon has been suffering from the absence of carefully studied economic and developmental visions that are based on the available resources, national requirements, and regional harmony. For these reasons the process of improving and developing economic performance has been proceeding in a haphazard manner. This led to the deterioration of some productive sectors, the termination of others, and the growth of others in an illogical manner. The Lebanese economy has been steered to promote services and realize profit. This resulted in harming economies that were considered productive and providing employment for skilled people, such as agriculture and industry.

In order to begin a genuine economic reform, we must first draw up a natural role of the state and move from an indifferent state with limited social and economic contributions to a state that is responsible for realizing growth and justice. Therefore, it is necessary to work along the following tracks:

1. The development track, through an equitable development of the various sectors and
areas, a partnership in development between the public and private sectors, and fair
distribution of profits.
2. The economic track, by realizing a sustainable and firm growth in domestic production,
raising production competitiveness in the economic sectors, and merging with the
regional surroundings (the Arab and Islamic markets).
3. The social track, by lowering the unemployment level, fighting poverty, and developing
the means of redistribution of income and providing basic services.
4. The financial track, by ending the vicious circle of public debt, reducing the servicing of
debts, reducing the budget deficit, fighting dissipation, and carrying out fair taxation
reforms.
5. In this connection, emphasis must be laid on the need to develop and sustain the policy of
activating the productive sectors such as agriculture, industry, and tourism by ensuring
loans on easy terms, providing taxation incentives, encouraging small businesses to
merge, strengthening cooperative work, providing guidance, extending support through
needed equipment, increasing irrigated areas, studying the needs of the domestic and
external markets by aiming at agricultural industrialization, developing the animal
production sector, and backing various types of exports.

The ultimate aim is to fight poverty and social marginalization, and this requires joint
efforts by the public and private sectors in concentrating on economic activities that
provide job opportunities and which are directed at the countryside and remote areas.

Education and Learning Sector

The Lebanese University is the most important higher education institution in Lebanon in terms of its size, its specialties, and the number of its students, especially those who come from limited income families. It is supposed to contribute to building the future of the homeland’s generations. This requires backing and developing by implementing the law that pertains to it, which protects its financial and administrative independence, ensures its development, and strengthens its scientific research resources. Unresolved issues must be resolved such as the problem of full time teachers and their protection, supporting the Contracting Fund, and reviving the Lebanese University’s Students National Union.

As for the public education sector, duty calls for drawing up a comprehensive educational plan, stressing a higher level of educational qualifications, providing the necessary needs for schools, ensuring heating fuel during winter, backing the School Fund Program, revising the map of the distribution of schools in conformity with the requirements of equitable development, in addition to developing educational institutions, stressing the powers of educational inspection, implementing the system of compulsory and free education, enhancing academic, vocational, and technical education, and treating the chronic needs of the teachers and instructors in various stages in a responsible and positive way.

Civil Society Organizations

Within the framework of enhancing the national sense of responsibility, efforts must be exerted to develop party and trade union activities and open the way for civic society organizations to be active and to become a vital supporter and an effective monitor of the performance of the ruling authority’s departments. This will lead to enhancing the awareness of society to the need to shoulder its duties in managing public life. In this regard, we emphasize the following:

1. The media

Freedom of expression must be preserved and protected, as stipulated in the preamble of the constitution, considering it an unchanging right that cannot be infringed upon within the
framework of the law. Thus, emphasis will be laid on freedom of the media and the revision of certain laws, especially the Publications Law, thus lifting the threats against the media.

2. Women

Efforts should be exerted to strengthen the role of women and develop their participation in the political, cultural, educational, media and social fields, and to exploit this role in establishing a balance in society in terms of psychology and values.

3. Youth

Taking care of the rising generations and the young, developing their resources and talents,
guiding them towards sublime national and humanitarian objectives, and protecting them from corrupt thought and the tools and means of deviation and immorality.

4. Fighting the deviations and the harmful ailments in our society, whether through the media or by other means, emphasizing educational and media guidance, warning against the spread of corruption and dissolute values, and augment the monitoring of scenes and pictures that infringe on public morality and harm the humanitarian image of women.


5. Protecting the privacy of citizens by preventing indiscriminate wiretapping of their telephone conversations, and respecting the laws that pertain to these issues and bringing the violators of these laws, whoever they may be, to account for what they do.

Improving and Developing Social Services

In light of our conviction that the state cannot shirk its caring role nor behave in an indifferent manner or be apathetic towards the needs of the citizens, it is the duty of the state to improve services in the fields of health, education, housing, and social care. Of these duties, we mention the following:


A. Activating the public health sector, generalizing the principle of healthcare and
preventive medicine, putting an end to monopolization in the drug market, and unifying
the hospitalization funds.
B. Backing efforts to develop and reform the National Fund for Social Security and
expanding the circle of its beneficiaries.
C. Drawing up a housing strategy that takes into consideration the comprehensive
development of all areas, in addition to enhancing the state’s support for housing loans.
D. Continuing the process of land planning and specification, enhancing the work pertaining
to the annexation and demarcation of land, and treating property problems and issues
pertaining to joint possession of property, and dealing with violations of the law by
owners of buildings.


Energy and the Protection of Resources

Squandering water and natural resources is one of the chronic problems in Lebanon. Despite
huge precipitation and multiple sources of water, the hardship continues to be great, especially during the dry season. Therefore, work should be done on the following:

A. Protecting water resources, especially the ones that are being threatened by the Israeli
enemy.
B. Completing Canal 800 of the Litani River project.
C. Exerting serious efforts to complete the dams and lakes projects in accordance with a
specific timeframe.
D. Expanding and rehabilitating the irrigation networks, especially in agricultural areas.
E. Completing the establishment and the rehabilitation of the domestic water networks.

As for the electricity sector, what is required is work to complete the electric power lines,
modernize the production plants, treat the technical waste, fight transgressions on energy
sources, and expand to create new and environment-friendly means of production.

As for the communications sector, we are required to preserve this national resource by
developing this sector and improving its services, offering the consumers further services and observing the rule of providing the best service at the least cost.

Environmental Protection

The environment in Lebanon has been exposed to a large-scale process of destruction and
violations, such as forest fires, indiscriminate felling of trees, lawlessness in opening quarries
and gravel facilities, polluting the rivers with sewage water, and indiscriminate burial of sold
waste. All of this makes us sound the alarm and declare a state of national emergency to do the following:

A. Adopting a guiding scientific environmental plan on sites for quarries and gravel
production.
B. Enhancing the completion of building sewage systems in all areas.
C. Drawing up a modern study for the best means of getting rid of solid waste and
transforming it into energy instead of burying it under the ground.
D. Providing effective means of firefighting, imposing strict measures to prevent tampering
with the environment, and combating transgressions on the seacoast and rivers.
E. Launching a national campaign to enhance the green picture of Lebanon by cooperation
with all organizations, both local and foreign, that care for the environment

* * *
Note

1. This translation of the Hizbullah platform appeared on the “Now Lebanon” website, based on the speech by Mohammad Raad broadcast on Hizbullah-affiliated Al-Manar TV on April 6,
2009, http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=89737

* * *
Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Shimon Shapira is the author of Hizballah: Between Iran and Lebanon, 4th ed. (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, 2006). He is a senior research associate at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

Yair Minzili is a senior researcher in the fields of economics, political policy, and Islam in the
Middle East.
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THE MISUSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Warfare Through

Misuse of International Law

Posted: 27 Mar 2009 02:42 PM PDT

BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 73, March 23, 2009 http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives73.html

Defining “Lawfare”

There is a new kind of warfare being waged across the globe. The antagonists in the struggle are employing the weapon of their adversaries - the rule of law - in a strategy called “Lawfare” which involves the misuse of the law to achieve objectives that cannot be achieved militarily. Lawfare can be undertaken by any group of actors of any nationality or religion, but presently Lawfare is being pursued largely by Islamic ideologues, their supporters, and their financiers who sympathize with the actions of Islamic militants. Lawfare is exponentially effective because one lawsuit can silence thousands who have neither the time nor the financial resources to challenge well-funded terror financiers or the vast machine of the international judicial system. The potential for a “chilling effect” on both speech and conduct are limitless and the consequence can have a devastating effect on public safety and international security.

Categories of Lawfare

There are three primary categories of Lawfare. The first category is the initiation of lawsuits before courts in the international system. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) serve complementary but different purposes. The ICJ, established in 1945, resolves disputes between states and renders advisory opinions on legal issues submitted by international organs, agencies, and the UN General Assembly. As the ICJ solves disputes in cases that states bring before it, there is rarely a question about whether the court has jurisdiction in those matters. In contrast, the 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court established the ICC as a permanent tribunal to prosecute individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. UN member states had to decide whether to submit to its jurisdiction and allow their citizens to be prosecuted.

The United States and Israel had an intuitive understanding that this presented a potential for abuse in the absence of a system of checks and balances. They rejected participating in the ICC because they feared that hostile nations would initiate politically motivated lawsuits against their soldiers or political leaders and that the impartiality of the court would be compromised. The ICC is only permitted to try nations that are party to the Rome Statute, unless the United Nations Security Council permits otherwise by vote. For now, the United States and Israel are safe from prosecution by the ICC, but it is not an absolute certainty.

In the second category, the misuse of legal terminology to manipulate international institutions and the public is an underhanded mode of Lawfare because it relies on the relative inexperience of laypeople to advance ideas. United Nations resolutions, for example, are used to gain sympathy for the cause of Lawfare combatants and to intimidate their opposition. However, just as ICJ Advisory Opinions are non-binding, UN Resolutions also do not have the force of law and are simply an expression of sentiment and are often precursors to the establishment of authoritative international law by way of a UN Convention. This gives reason to worry, particularly with respect to a resolution that will be at the top of the agenda of the upcoming anti-racism conference in Geneva this April, familiarly known as Durban II.

Every year since 1999, at the request and direction of the 57-state Organization of the Islamic Conference, the United Nations has passed a resolution on Combating Defamation of Religions. The resolution has two major intrinsic flaws and is merely a political attempt by the OIC to stifle free speech and criticism of Islam. The first flaw is that it singles out Islam as a victim and makes no mention of any other religion. The second flaw is that “defamation of religions” is a legal impossibility.

Defamation involves the publication of a false statement about a person, business, group or government, all of which are tangible entities. A religion cannot be defamed because it is only a set of beliefs and, therefore, cannot sue in its own name. Even if, hypothetically, a defamation case were brought, the falsehood of a statement about a religion can never be established, because religious beliefs are subjectively determined. Furthermore, it is not possible for a judge to render a decision on a matter the very nature of which is inconclusive. By supporting this resolution, the OIC is taking advantage of the public’s general lack of knowledge about defamation, which does not include a religion as a protected category.

The third and arguably most threatening category of Lawfare relates to the prosecution of foreign nationals in domestic courts for military and civilian action. With respect to military cases, there is the recent example of the prosecution of Israeli officials by a Spanish Court at the instigation of the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, an NGO based in Gaza City. The organization requested that two Israeli officials, National Infrastructure Minister and former Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and former IAF and IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz be investigated for alleged crimes against humanity for their involvement in the assassination of a Hamas operative in 2002. Invoking the controversial international legal principle of “universal jurisdiction,” the Justice of the Spanish Court granted the Palestinian petition.

As distinguished from the criminal jurisdiction of an international tribunal which is exercised by an international organization such as the ICC or the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, universal jurisdiction is exercised by states who feel that it is within their moral obligation to mankind to prosecute individuals who allegedly committed crimes outside the boundaries of the prosecuting state, regardless of any relation of the person with that state. The claim is premised on the notion that each state has the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Henry Kissinger denounced universal jurisdiction as a breach of state sovereignty and said it creates the risk of universal tyranny by judges. Despite his objections and by others in the international community, universal jurisdiction persists as evidenced by the prosecution in the Spanish Court.

Prosecutions like the one in Spain pose two dangers. They undermine international sympathy for the plight of the Israeli people, as well as other global citizens, in dealing with terrorism. But even more significantly, a defeat creates a dangerous precedent for future losses because the standard it sets can be incorporated into mainstream international law by way of customary international law - which is comprised of state practice - the repetition of similar acts by other states over time, and opinio juris - the sense of obligation of all states to act in the same manner. This would have disastrous consequences for any state in carrying out military actions and would essentially imprison the defendants in their home countries out of concern for being arrested once they step beyond their own borders. This is exemplified in the case of the attempted arrest of Israeli Major General Doron Almog at Heathrow Airport in the United Kingdom in September 2005, over accusations by Palestinian groups that he ordered the destruction of more than 50 homes in Gaza in 2002.

In cases against civilian (as opposed to military) personnel, Lawfare in both Western and non-Western domestic courts has also been attempted by Islamic groups with the goal of suppressing the free speech of their critics. To combat anti-Islamic rhetoric in the West, Islamic organizations and individuals have stepped up a legal campaign to silence criticism of Islam through attempts at civil litigation and criminal prosecution of private citizens.

A growing phenomenon called “libel tourism” has gained international notoriety as one of the most broadly threatening means of Lawfare. Libel tourism is a form of international forum shopping whereby plaintiffs bring defamation lawsuits in plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions. The United Kingdom, infamously known as the “libel capital of the Western world,” has been home to nearly all the libel tourism cases in recent years. What makes British courts so appealing is that libel plaintiffs need not prove the guilt of the accused, but rather the accused must prove their own innocence - the exact opposite of the system in the United States - and often at great cost to themselves and over lengthy periods of time. In the process, the defendants are also barred from reporting about the subject matter of the ongoing litigation, which often takes years.

In a libel tourism case, free speech is shut down, posing a threat to international security when writers can no longer report about suspicious activity or the sources of terror financing. One of the plaintiffs on the libel circuit is a Saudi citizen named Sheikh Khalid Salim bin Mahfouz who has initiated roughly 40 libel cases in British courts. Two of his cases stand out which exemplify the problem of libel tourism. The first involves the publication of a book called “Alms for Jihad” in which Mahfouz is accused of funding Al-Qaeda. Cambridge University Press, the publisher, removed the book from circulation and destroyed existing copies in order to end the lawsuit that Mahfouz brought against them.

The second is the case of Rachel Ehrenfeld who Mahfouz sued over allegations that he funded terrorist groups in her book entitled “Funding Evil.” As distinguished from the first case which related to a British publication, Ehrenfeld’s book was neither published nor distributed in the UK, but the court granted jurisdiction because Mahfouz was able to buy 20 copies of “Funding Evil” on Amazon.com and ship them to England. Ehrenfeld lost her case in the British Court and was ruled in contempt of court for not submitting to the judgment, putting herself at risk of arrest if she travels to Britain. However, she appealed to the federal and state courts in New York to protect her from Mahfouz enforcing the judgment in the US, arguing the injustice of being prosecuted under a harsher standard than American law allowed.

In early January 2008, the New York State Assembly introduced the “Libel Terrorism Protection Act” to ensure that foreign judgments that are at odds with American law and public policy will not be enforceable in New York. The Act, signed by the Governor of New York on 30 April 2008, served as the prototype for federal legislation entitled the “Freedom of Speech Protection Act” now under review by the US Congress. Despite the American attempts to protect its citizens at home, they cannot change British laws. Therefore, libel tourism remains a threat to free speech and consequently to international security.

With regard to domestic criminal prosecutions, Jordan charged 12 Europeans in 2008 with blasphemy, demeaning Islam and Muslim feelings, and slandering and insulting the prophet Muhammad in violation of the Jordanian Penal Code. Eleven of the defendants were Danish journalists involved in publishing a cartoon of Muhammad, and the twelfth was the controversial Dutch politician Geert Wilders. Jordan requested that Interpol apprehend the defendants and bring them to trial. The case is pending, but the effect of such prosecutions, if recognized in the West, are self-evident. Countries that do not respect free speech, and whose laws are informed by their religious beliefs, oftentimes antithetical to the values that promote free expression, will be encouraged to follow Jordan’s example. Essentially no one will be safe from being sued abroad in a domestic court.

Conclusion

We cannot ignore Lawfare tactics or downgrade them as benign methods simply because they do not cause physical injury. Lawfare is a serious assault on the ability of free nations and their citizens to exercise their legal rights under both international and domestic law and to live, speak, travel and defend themselves.

Lawfare has developed to combat the terrorists’ most enigmatic enemy. They are not fighting an occupier or challenging a military incursion - they are fighting the forces of freedom, they are fighting the voice of reason, and they are attacking those who have the liberty to speak and act openly. And the weapon that the enemy is using was created by our own hands - that is the rule of law, a weapon designed to subdue dictators and tyrants is now being misused to empower the very same, and being manipulated to subvert real justice and indisputable truth. That is not the purpose the law is designed to serve.

Elizabeth Samson is a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute. She is an attorney specializing in international law and constitutional law. This paper is based on her lecture at the BESA Center on February 25, 2009.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Littauer Foundation.