NEGEV & ASHKELON SEE HAIL OF ROCKETS

Blogmaster: Isn't it about time we shot back???? Barak - get off your touches and do what you were hired to do - protect Israeli citizens!

Terrifying weekend for Negev and Ashkelon residents


On Friday, eight Qassam rockets and three mortars shells were fired into southern Israel. Two more Qassam rockets hit nearby the kibbutzim in Sha’ar Hanegev Regional Council on Friday afternoon, along with a mortar shell.

(Archive)

On Saturday, Palestinians fired two Grad-type rockets, two Qassam rockets and three mortar shells into the Negev during the day. At six o’clock in the evening, Ashkelon residents raced into shelters, as the siren went off warning of impending rocket attacks. One Palestinian rocket exploded in the southern industrial zone and the other landed in an open area in the northern area of the city.

There were no wounded or damages reported in any of the attacks.
In total, over 15 Palestinian rockets were fired upon Israeli civilians during the weekend.

WHAT SHOULD ISRAEL DO...LIVE OR COMMIT SUICIDE

Nine immoral solutions for Gaza -
a guideBy Bradley Burston

For a moral compass, Gaza is the North Pole. The needle spins so continually, and at such speed, that no reading is possible.

For Israelis, the quandary of Gaza is a powerful Rorshach of the role and the burdens of Israel, of mood and injury, of personal tragedy and official befuddlement, of social conscience, ethical outlook, and sense of history.

The Gaza Strip, unwanted by the world, unwanted by Israel, unwanted by the Arabs and even by many Palestinians, forlorn, violent, seething, unlivable, has become the great moral test for the Jewish people.

All it took was rockets.

Seven years of rockets. Rockets launched toward civilian populations, schools, a college, rockets that slammed through private homes, children's bedrooms in the blue collar Israeli town of Sderot. More than a thousand rockets a year for seven years, directed at kibbutzim which for decades had supported an end to occupation and the rise of a Palestinian state. Eight thousand rockets, fired when Israel had 25 settlements and 20,000 troops in the Gaza Strip, and when Israel expelled the settlers and withdrew its troops, rockets fired from the ruins of the settlements and former emplacements of the IDF.

For Palestinians, Gaza was a prison before the disengagement, and a maximum security lockup thereafter. For Palestinians, the end of Israeli rule and the subsequent rise of Hamas were a human rights tragedy turned human rights catastrophe. For Palestinians, there is no more work in Israel, no more work in Gaza, no more hope anywhere.

When Israel ended its operation in the Strip on Monday, a Hamas radio announcer declared victory, saying that despite all of the destruction and death, Hamas gunners were still hitting Sderot and Ashkelon and even Netivot. Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar addressed a rally to mark what he called Hamas' success in the Five Day War. Taking the trouble to thank the news media in general for its coverage of Palestinian casualties, Al Jazeera and Hamas' own Al Aqsa TV in particular, he told a cheering, chanting crowd, in effect: We showed them. The Israelis?ll think twice before invading ever again.

He's right. Israelis will think twice, and many times again. This is why: Hamas, with the direct or inadvertent cooperation of Hezbollah, Iran, the Islamic Jihad, Fatah fatcats, Fatah rebels, the Bush administration, and, of course, Israel itself, has created a situation in which every one of Israel's moral and strategic options is a bad one.

This is the test for Israel: There is no way to ace it, and there are countless ways to fail. Here are a few.

Choose your poison:

1. A massive IDF ground offensive.

Arguments in favor: There is no alternative but to use overwhelming if tactically directed force to root out terror groups which fire the rockets, and to break the back of the Hamas government and remove it from power.

Marshalled example: Operation Defensive Shield, 2002

Arguments against: The risk-benefit equation suggests that large numbers of Gaza non-combatants as well as Israeli forces would be killed and wounded, without truly material success in curbing Qassam and Katyusha attacks.

International outrage could cause Israel great political, economic, even strategic harm.

2. Reoccupy the Gaza Strip

Arguments in favor: Israel cannot abide a terrorist state less than an hour's drive from Tel Aviv. Hamas, if allowed to rule, will eventually take over the West Bank and, effectively, East Jerusalem as well. Even a large-scale IDF offensive, if only temporary, will leave the field open to rearmament and continued attacks.

Arguments against: Israel militarily occupied the Gaza Strip for nearly forty years, but was unable to prevent the manufacture and firing of Qassams. Qassam firing continued under Israeli occupation for more than three years until the disengagement in 2005. Finally, Israel lacks the will and the forces to occupy Gaza indefinitely.

3. Shell sources of rocket fire

Arguments in favor: Use of long-range artillery will save the lives of soldiers who would be out at risk in a ground offensive. If Israel puts Gazans on notice that artillery will immediately and consistently shell any area from which rockets are fired, they will either prevent Hamas gunners from using their homes and yards, or will flee before the firing begins.

Arguments against: Artillery has proven markedly inaccurate as retaliatory fire against small crews of armed men, often with disastrous consequences. Cases of innocent civilians killed in error, tragic in themselves, have in many cases also made it impossible for the IDF to continue to pursue its military targets.

4. Assassinate Hamas leaders

Arguments in favor: Assassinations of commanders and political leaders can paralyze the organization, sending leading figures underground, cutting lines of communication, interrupting chains of command, while at the same time causing less danger to Palestinian civilians and to IDF soldiers. When Israel assassinated Hamas founders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abed Aziz Rantisi in 2004, threats os monumental retaliation never materialized, and the organization subsequently offered a limited truce.

Arguments against: Civilians are often killed by mistake in assassination attempts. Assassination is also a dangerous policy, as it invites counter-attempts, such as the murder of then-cabinet minister Rehavam Ze'evi in Jerusalem in 2001. Finally, it fails to address core concerns, and may cause deadly reprisals, as in the suicide bombings that killed 60 people in Israel after the 1996 assassination of Hamas bomb mastermind Yihye Ayyash.

5. Negotiate with Hamas

Arguments for: Hamas is not only the democratically elected ruler of Gaza, it also still enjoys broad, if somewhat dimished, popular support in the Strip. Because it trades on an ideology of martyrdom and steadfastness in the face of attack, it will be defeated neither by economic sanctions nor military confrontation. There is no alternative to talks toward a cease-fire, which Hamas has been proposing for years, holding out the offer of the return of captured IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in an exchange for jailed Hamas men.

Arguments against: Negotiations would constitute a major victory for Hamas, and tacit Israeli recognition of the organization, further undermining the standing of Mahmoud Abbas and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority and perhaps paving way for future Hamas control of the West Bank.

The Hamas charter continues to call explicitly for the violent destruction of the state of Israel, and any expansion of Hamas hegemony to the West Bank could put large swathes of central Israel, the bulk of Israel's population, in range of Katyusha-Grad rockets.

6. Tighten the economic siege over Gaza

Arguments for: How can a nation at war justify supplying its enemy with fuel, electricity, water, and even supplies which may be used for producing rockets and other armaments?

Arguments against: The people of Gaza as a whole should not be punished for the actions of a small number of armed men. Collective punishment, moreover, increases hatred toward Israel and will, in the end, persuade more youths to become terrorists.

7. Lift the economic siege over Gaza

Arguments in favor: Such a step could, if carried out in cooperation with Abbas and the PA, strengthen Abbas' hand. (Also see arguments against, numbers 6 and, if carried out in cooperation with Hamas, 5 above)

Arguments against: Such a step could bolster Hamas, whioch could list it as a strategic victory and an indication that its policies were correct all along.

8. Increase IDF operations in the West Bank

Arguments in favor: Israel must do everything it can to confront and contain Hamas in the West Bank, to keep it from taking over.

Arguments against: Such operations sap the limited sovereignty of Abbas and the PA, which has taken action of its own against Hamas in the West Bank. Such operations also cast Abbas in the role of collaborator with Israel, cutting his support among Palestinians.

9. Do nothing

Arguments for: This stance, which, while it may have adherents in practice, has no proponents.

Arguments against. Israel does not have the option of doing nothing. To do nothing is, in effect, a violation of the human rights of the people of Sderot and the western Megev, who are the targets of Hamas war crimes.

IRON DOME = TISSUE PAPER & LIES

Iron Dome system found to be helpless against Qassams

By Reuven Pedatzur,
Haaretz Correspondent
Last update - 03:19 22/02/2008
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/956859.html

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was surprised to learn last Sunday that the Iron
Dome defense system, which was approved last year and was supposed to
protect Israel's citizens against Qassam rockets, is not capable of
alleviating the distress of Sderot inhabitants. "Recent tests found the
system to be effective against rockets fired from more than four kilometers
away, but not against those fired from closer range," Haaretz noted that
same day in its lead story. Because Sderot is less than two kilometers from
Beit Hanun, from which the rockets are being fired, Iron Dome will be
helpless against them.
The upshot is that the prime minister, who just two months ago declared that
"we will not fortify ourselves to death," was compelled to approve
recommendations to fortify 8,000 homes in Sderot and the communities of the
"Gaza envelope," to the tune of NIS 300 million. Such protection is
necessary because these homes lie within 4.5 kilometers of the Gaza Strip.
But a mere day later, it turned out that the plan was too ambitious and that
budget shortfalls meant that only 3,600 homes in Sderot and the Gaza
envelope can be fortified within the next two years. The solemn declarations
to fortify the homes, revoked only hours later, are just the latest chapter
in a gloomy saga replete with deception, lies, concealment of the truth from
policymakers, groundless promises to Sderot residents, the unexplained
rejection of the arguments for examining additional defense systems other
than Iron Dome, and bizarre decisions made in the Defense Ministry.
The decision to focus on the development of Iron Dome raises so many
questions that an examination of the process that led to it is in order. The
questions include, for example, whether the decision was influenced by
considerations relating to commercial bodies, the likely implications of a
deal to export this defense system to a foreign country which is not located
in the NATO continents (America and Europe), and the motives of some of
those involved in the process. It may well be that nothing concrete lurks
behind these questions, but we must not ignore the need to find satisfactory
answers for them.
The fact that Iron Dome is not effective against short-range rockets and
therefore cannot protect Sderot was long known to the system's developers
and to the Defense Ministry officials who chose to focus on it. For some
reason, they decided not to go public with their information. When the
Defense Ministry officials, led by the defense minister, promised that the
residents of Sderot would be protected after the installation of the Iron
Dome system, they knew they would not be able to deliver on this promise.
One need not be privy to classified information in order to understand that
Iron Dome is not the solution to the Qassam rockets. The data are public
knowledge: The Qassam's speed in the air is 200 meters per second. The
distance from the edge of Beit Hanun to the outskirts of Sderot is 1,800
meters. Therefore, a rocket launched from Beit Hanun takes about nine
seconds to hit Sderot. The developers of Iron Dome at Rafael Advance Defense
Systems know that the preparations to simply launch the intercept missiles
at their target take up to about 15 seconds (during which time the system
locates the target, determines the flight path and calculates the intercept
route). Obviously, then, the Qassam will slam into Sderot quite a number of
seconds before the missile meant to intercept it is even launched.
But besides not being able to protect the border communities, Iron Dome will
also not be able to cope with rockets that are launched much farther away.
According to data available from Rafael, the average flight time of the
intercept missile to the point of encounter is another 15 seconds. In other
words, to intercept a rocket using Iron Dome requires at least 30 seconds.
This is the time it takes a Qassam to cover six kilometers.
The disturbing question is why no one bothered to apprise the prime minister
of this simple calculation, to make it clear to him that Iron Dome, in the
development of which his government decided to invest hundreds of millions
of dollars, will not be able to protect Sderot. The questions multiply when
it emerges that on January 13 an urgent personal letter was sent to Defense
Minister Ehud Barak by the head of the Sha'ar Hanegev Regional Council, Alon
Schuster. He referred to the Qassam's short flight time, noted that the
reaction time of Iron Dome is too long to cope with the rockets, and added
that the system is incapable of protecting Sderot and many of the
communities bordering the Gaza Strip.
The reply of the Defense Ministry was sent to the council head on February
10. The letter is signed by attorney Ruth Bar, the defense minister's
assistant. "The analysis [done by the Defense Ministry] found that in regard
to the threats that were identified by the warning system during
April-November 2007, one Iron Dome battery has the ability to cope and cover
an area far larger than that of Sderot. The capability of Iron Dome to cope
with mortar shells has not yet been examined in depth. I will add that the
issue of the flight time cannot be detailed in this letter, owing to
security considerations."
The money issue
An examination of the economic aspect also casts grave doubts on the
decision to choose Iron Dome. The cost of each intercept missile will
probably be about $100,000. (Rafael claims the cost of a missile will be
about $40,000, but given the cost of similar missiles, that does not seem
reasonable.) In contrast, the cost of making a Qassam rocket is well under
$100,000. So, if the Palestinians produce thousands of Qassams, the Israeli
defense establishment will have to respond by manufacturing thousands of
Iron Dome missiles, at a prohibitive cost of hundreds of millions of
shekels. On the assumption that this information is known to everyone
involved, it must be asked, again, how it came about that Iron Dome was
chosen as the preferred solution to the Qassam rockets while other options
were vehemently rejected.
The decision was made, seemingly, via a proper, orderly procedure. The
Defense Ministry set up a professional committee to look into the matter,
headed by Yaakov Nagel, the deputy chief for scientific affairs of the
ministry's Directorate of Defense R&D. The committee examined 14 proposals
for anti-rocket defense systems and chose Iron Dome. Two defense ministers
approved the choice - Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak.
However, the impression of an orderly decision-making process is upended
when it turns out that the senior staff at the Defense Ministry's R&D
directorate strongly rejected the proposal to bring into Israel the
laser-based Nautilus defense system, whose development is nearly complete
and whose effectiveness was proved in a series of tests (100 percent success
in 46 tests, including success in intercepting mortar shells).
Nautilus was developed in the United States in conjunction with Israel, but
the Israeli defense establishment ended its participation in the project in
2001. The Americans went on with it, improved the system and changed its
name to Skyguard. Northrop Grumman, the company that is developing the
missile, promises that it can be delivered within 18 months at a relatively
low cost. The Nautilus system itself, devised to protect Kiryat Shmona
against Katyusha rockets, can be installed in Sderot within six months. By
comparison, the development of Iron Dome will take another three years.
The major advantage of Skyguard is its use of a laser beam for
interceptions. The beam travels at the speed of light, allowing the system
to intercept short-range rockets like the ones aimed at Sderot. The cost of
implementing the laser system is also far lower than Iron Dome. The cost of
launching one laser beam will be between $1,000 and $2,000. On February 6,
2007, Mike McVey, vice president of Northrop Grumman's Directed Energy
Systems business area, sent a letter to Ehud Olmert, with copies to the
defense minister at the time, Amir Peretz, and the then director general of
the Defense Ministry and present chief of staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, undertaking
to install in Israel an operational system within 18 months and at a fixed
price ($177 million for the first system). As far as is known, McVey has not
received a reply to this day.
Asked why Israel rejected the laser system, the Defense Ministry's spokesman
replied: "The Nautilus system is defined as exemplifying technologies and
not as an operational instrument. Bringing the Nautilus system into Israel
today will cost about $100 million, and it might take up to two years for
the system to become active. The Nautilus system is operationally inferior
to the Iron Dome system, is far more costly and does not provide an answer
to volleys of missiles, as Iron Dome is meant to do. Tests of Nautilus did
not achieve the goal of 100 percent hits but far less, and even that under
optimal conditions, which, regrettably, do not exist in the western Negev."
The reply is studded with inaccuracies, to say the least. The Nautilus /
Skyguard will not be "far more costly" than Iron Dome, but probably "far
less costly." Nor is it clear what the Defense Ministry spokesman is
referring to when he states that Nautilus "did not achieve the goal of 100
percent hits but far less." For his part, the IDF Spokesman, who was also
asked to comment on the decision not to acquire the laser system, copied the
reply of the Defense Ministry spokesman. Former air force commander Major
General (res.) David Ivry is one of those who favors adopting the laser
system, but the ministry's R&D directorate did not accept his position.
Another former air force commander, Major General (res.) Herzl Bodinger,
also tried to persuade the ministry to purchase the laser defense system,
again to no avail.
Buy blue-and-white
Part of the explanation for the opposition to the laser system may lie in
remarks made by Shimon Lavie, from the R&D directorate, who was the officer
of the Nautilus project in the United States, on the "Fact" TV program,
broadcast on Channel 2 last December. "We in the directorate are responsible
for developing blue-and-white [Israeli-made] systems, which the Nautilus was
not. We had hoped for intense cooperation with Israeli firms. If that had
happened, it might have had an influence [on the decision about whether to
acquire the laser system]."
Another question concerns the extent to which decision-makers were
influenced by an export deal with a foreign country not among those under
the jurisdiction and protection of NATO. Under the deal, said country was to
purchase the Iron Dome system and share in financing the project. Also worth
looking into is the influence exerted by MK Isaac Ben-Israel (Kadima), a
professor and retired major general, who was formerly head of the R&D
directorate, on the decision to choose Iron Dome. Until not long ago,
Ben-Israel was an enthusiastic advocate of the laser-based system,
explaining his position in detail in an interview with the newspaper Makor
Rishon in December 2006. "The limited range between the launch site and its
target allow a very short time for intercepting efforts," he said, and
stressed the high cost of rocket-based interception systems. "Those the
issues decide in favor of the laser weapon," he added. What made him change
his mind?
In a conversation this week, Ben-Israel denied that he had changed his mind
regarding the anti-rocket defense system. He says he continues to advocate
the laser-based defense, but believes that the technology by which the laser
beam is produced in Nautilus / Skyguard is obsolete. A little more than a
year ago, Ben-Israel still believed that the laser system was preferential
and efficient. It would be interesting to know what caused him to consider
this system obsolete not long afterward. When asked if he serves as an
adviser to the Singapore government, he said that being an MK does not allow
for it. When asked if he had served as an adviser to the Singapore
government in the past, he said: "I don't have to answer that question."
It is possible that some of the answers to these questions will be
forthcoming in court. This week, 50 Sderot residents petitioned the
Jerusalem District Court against the defense minister, requesting that the
court instruct the minister "to install and operate in the city of Sderot,
within six months from today, the laser-based intercept system (known as
Nautilus) to provide an immediate solution to the shelling of Sderot by
Qassams; to instruct the completion of the laser-based intercept system in
its full operational version, known as Skyguard, and to order deployment of
Skyguard systems for defense of all Western Negev settlements ... within two
years from today."
Sderot inhabitants continue to wait for fortification of their houses and
installment of a system that will stop the Qassam barrages. In the time that
has elapsed since the decision to develop Iron Dome, they could at least
have had their houses fortified. Will the public again require the help of
the court to figure out what is really going on in the corridors of the
Defense Ministry, because the policymakers, who are supposed to supervise it
and examine the peculiar decisions made there, are not doing their job?
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