FBI To Return Seized Material To Jewish Hatikvah Identity Center

4 Nissan 5769

PRESS RELEASE:

The FBI is expected to return over 70 crates of seized material to Jewish Hatikvah Identity Center

When? TODAY SUNDAY March 29, 2009 at 10 AM (EDT)

Where? Self storage facility 41 Flatbush Ave Brooklyn NY 11217

Background: On January 4, 2001 (more than 8 years ago) the FBI seized property with an 18-wheeler truck from the Hatikvah Jewish Identity Center at 1090 Coney Island Ave Brooklyn NY. The reason for the original seizure was a terrorism related investigation into Kach and Kahane Chai.

Now, nine years later the FBI is returning the material. No charges of any kind were brought as a result of this investigation.

The Hatikvah Jewish Identity Center was forced to close in part due to this large seizure of all of its material which included Books, tapes, computers, magazines and office equipment.

For more information contact:

Michael Guzofsky
Former Director of Hatikvah Jewish Identity Center
011-972-544-876-709
guzofskyyekutiel@gmail.com

Cross-posted on Esser Agaroth.

American Jewish man arrested this week for spying for Israel

Blogmaster's Opinion: Arresting Ben-Ami smacks of the worst kind of governmental terrorism. First, it's strange that after all these years, suddenly he should be grabbed just after Jimmy Carter pals up with Hamas (Makes Carter look good doesn't it). Why arrest him on Passover? They are sending Israel a message: Don't oppose the Bush Peace Plan - cooperate fully with Condileeza Rice, give away Jewish land and partition Jerusalem...or else! Look at the information that was furnished our ally... Patriot Missile System - A Defensive Weapon good only for shooting down incoming missiles. F-15 upgrades...Israel had F-15s but the aircraft we gave the Arabs had superior avionics - he warned Israel of the imbalance in the Arab's favor given them by America - hardly damaging to the U.S. Lastly, information that was "Atomic Related", again, only defensive information. Ben-Ami Kadish is 85 years old... he fought with the Haganah in 1948, he was an American G.I. fighting the Nazis during WWII, and was commander of the Jewish War Veterans (JWV) in Monroe, N.J. In my book, he's a hero. If he is prosecuted by Bush's anti-Israel coterie (persecuted would be more accurate) then we should all stand with Ben-Ami Kadish - Enough with the bedevilment of Jews in America! A Communist Chinese spy who was employed by a U.S. Department of Defense Contractor steals current top secret “offensive” military information, takes it to his Commie bosses in Beijing and all he gets is deported. Now they have an old Jew to torment and molest. Thank him for his service to both of our countries and let him go.

JTA - MOBILE
Last updated 04/22/2008 @ 03:26PM ET

American arrested for spying for Israel

The American Jewish man arrested this week for spying for Israel was released on $300,000 bond.

The Justice Department disclosed Tuesday that Ben-Ami Kadish, a mechanical engineer at a U.S. Army facility in Dover, N.J., was arrested on charges of relaying secrets to Israel from 1979 to 1985, including nuclear secrets. Kadish speaks Hebrew and has an Israeli brother, according to the Justice Department.

Kadish allegedly "borrowed" classified documents from the facility's library and took them home to be copied by an Israeli diplomat employed at Israel’s consulate in New York, according to a sealed complaint filed Monday in a federal district court in New York.

One of the documents "contained information concerning nuclear weaponry and was classified as 'Restricted Data,' a specific designation by the U.S. Department of Energy, because the document contained atomic-related information," said a statement Tuesday from the Justice Department.

Another classified document "contained information concerning a major weapons system -- a modified version of an F-15 fighter jet that the United States had sold to another country. This document was classified by the Department of Defense as 'Secret' and was further restricted as 'Noforn,' or 'Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.'"

Kadish, who allegedly was not paid for relaying the documents, appeared in court Tuesday and was released after posting $300,000 bond, putting his New Jersey home up as collateral.

He allegedly spoke with his Israeli co-conspirator by phone on March 20, before he was due to meet with U.S. officials. According to the Justice Department, the Israeli instructed Kadish to lie to law enforcement officials. The following day, March 21, Kadish denied having had the phone call.

The alleged spying took place before U.S. Navy analyst Jonathan Pollard was sentenced to life for spying for Israel. Israeli diplomats have said that Pollard's case led the United States to increase its information sharing with Israel and at the same time led Israel to clamp down on any Israeli espionage in the United States.

Ben-Ami, who lives in New Jersey, grew up in pre-state Palestine and fought with the Haganah, the Jewish military organization that was the precursor to the Israel Defense Forces, according to a 2006 story on Kadish and his wife, Doris, published in the New Jersey Jewish News. Ben-Ami served in both the British and U.S. militaries during World War II and is an ex-commander of the Jewish War Veterans Post 609 in Monroe, N.J., the story said. The newspaper also said Kadish was active in the Jewish Federation of Greater Middlesex County. « Return to JTA Breaking News

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASETUESDAY, APRIL 22, 2008WWW.USDOJ.GOV
NSD(202) 514-2007TDD (202) 514-1888

Man Arrested for Disclosing National Defense Information to Israel

MANHATTAN — Michael J. Garcia, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Mark J. Mershon, the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and Weysan Dun, the Special Agent-in-Charge of the Newark Office of the FBI, in conjunction with the U.S. Army, announced today the arrest of Ben-Ami Kadish on charges that he participated in a conspiracy to disclose to the Government of Israel documents related to the national defense of the United States and, in connection with that unauthorized disclosure, that he participated in a conspiracy to act as an agent of the Government of Israel. According to the Complaint filed in Manhattan federal court:

From about 1979 through 1985, Kadish, a citizen of the United States, was a mechanical engineer, employed at the U.S. Army’s Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, New Jersey (the “Arsenal”). The Arsenal kept a library of documents with classified information related to the national defense of the United States (the “Library”).

On numerous occasions during this time period, Kadish borrowed classified documents (the “Classified Documents”) from the Library and took the Classified Documents to his residence in New Jersey (the “Residence”). At the Residence, Kadish would then provide the Classified Documents to a co-conspirator not named herein as a defendant (“CC-1”), who would photograph the Classified Documents in the basement of the Residence.
From at least 1980 through 1985, CC-1, a citizen of Israel, was employed by the Government of Israel as the Consul for Science Affairs at the Israeli Consulate General in Manhattan and directed Kadish to provide the Classified Documents to him (CC-1).
One of the Classified Documents that Kadish provided to CC-1 contained information concerning nuclear weaponry and was classified as “Restricted Data,” a specific designation by the U.S. Department of Energy, because the document contained atomic-related information.

Another one of the Classified Documents that Kadish provided CC-1 contained information concerning a major weapons system -- a modified version of an F-15 fighter jet that the United States had sold to another country. This document was classified by the Department of Defense as “Secret” and was further restricted as “Noforn,” or “Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals.”

Another one of the Classified Documents borrowed by Kadish from the Arsenal Library contained information concerning a major weapons system and major element of defense strategy -- the U.S. Patriot missile air defense system. This document was classified by the Department of Defense as “Secret.”

On March 20, 2008, Kadish and CC-1 had a telephone conversation, during which CC-1 instructed Kadish to lie to federal law enforcement officials. The following day, during an interview with the FBI, Kadish denied having had the telephone conversation with CC-1.

Kadish is charged with four counts: one count of conspiring to disclose documents related to the national defense of the United States to the Government of Israel; one count of conspiring to act as an agent of the Government of Israel; one count of conspiring to hinder a communication to a law enforcement officer; and one count of conspiring to make a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer.
Kadish is scheduled to appear this afternoon before United States Magistrate Judge Douglas F. Eaton in Manhattan federal court.

Mr. Garcia praised the FBI and the U.S. Army for their efforts in this continuing investigation.

This prosecution is being handled by Assistant United States Attorney Iris Lan of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and Trial Attorney Kathleen Kedian of the Counterespionage Section of the Justice Department’s National Security Division.

The charges and allegations contained in the Complaint are merely accusations, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.
###
08-324

US Army engineer arrested on suspicion of spying for Israel

GIL HOFFMAN, HERB KEINON and AP , THE JERUSALEM POST

Apr. 22, 2008

An 85-year-old former US Army mechanical engineer was arrested Tuesday on charges he slipped classified documents about nuclear weapons to an employee of the Israeli Consulate who also received information from convicted Pentagon spy Jonathan Pollard, US authorities announced.

Ben-Ami Kadish was charged in US District Court in Manhattan with four counts of conspiracy, including allegations that he disclosed US national defense documents to Israel and acted as an agent of the Israeli government.

At a court hearing Tuesday afternoon, Kadish, who was wearing black sweatpants, was released on a $300,000 property bond. He was required tosurrender his passport and can travel only in New Jersey and southern Manhattan. A potential preliminary hearing is set for May 22.

Prosecutors say Kadish, a US citizen who worked at an Army base in New Jersey, took home classified documents for six years and let the Israeli photograph them in his basement. Those documents included information about nuclear weapons, a modified version of an F-15 fighter jet, and the US Patriot missile air defense system.

A criminal complaint said Kadish confessed to FBI agents on Sunday that he had given the Israeli between 50 and 100 classified documents and accepted no cash in return, only small gifts and occasional dinners for him and his family.

Kadish admitted to the charges in court, saying that he wanted to help Israel.
Calls requesting comment from the Israeli consulate in the United States were referred to officials in Israel.

The Prime Minister's Office referred queries on the matter to the Foreign Ministry. Foreign Ministry spokesman Arye Mekel said: "We know nothing about it. We have nothing to say."

Kadish worked at the Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center at the Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, New Jersey. On numerous occasions between 1979 and 1985, the agent provided Kadish with lists of US national defense classified documents he was interested in, according to the complaint. Kadish worked at the military facility from 1963 through 1990.

The complaint described a close relationship between the two men that continued beyond 1985, and included telephone and e-mail conversations exchanged as recently as Sunday.

The unidentified Israeli agent - since identified in Israel as Yossi Yagur - was described in the complaint as a one-time employee of Israeli Aircraft Industries, which since at least the late 1970s has been a defense manufacturing contractor for the Israeli government. The company is now known as Israeli Aerospace Industries.

From July 1980 through November 1985, Yagur worked for the Israeli government as the consul for science affairs at the Israeli consulate in Manhattan.

The two men were introduced by Kadish's brother, who worked with Yagur at the manufacturing plant in Israel.

The research center where Kadish worked housed a library of documents, including many with classified information related to US national defense. From 1979 through 1985, Kadish signed out at least 35 classified documents, according to the complaint.
Kadish told the FBI that he knew that one restricted document he provided to Yagur included atomic-related information and that he did not have the required clearance to borrow it, according to the complaint.

Prosecutors say Yagur called Kadish on March 20 and told him to lie to federal law enforcement agents who were investigating possible espionage.

"Don't say anything. Let them say whatever they want. You didn't ... do anything. ... What happened 25 years ago? You didn't remember anything," Yagur allegedly told Kadish in Hebrew.

In addition to the spying counts, Kadish is charged with conspiring to hinder a communication with, and to make a materially false statement to, a law enforcement officer. Those charges stem from the March conversation.

Yagur left the United States in November 1985 and has not returned, according to the complaint, which described him as the same Israeli to whom Pollard provided classified information.

Pollard, a former civilian intelligence analyst for the US Navy, pleaded guilty to transferring military secrets to Israel while working at the Pentagon. He is serving a life sentence in a US federal prison.

US State Department spokesman Tom Casey said that more than 20 years ago, when the Pollard affair emerged, the US said that it had not expected such conduct from a close ally and that the same applied in the Kadish case.

Pollard's wife, Esther, a vocal critic of both the US and Israeli governments' handling of her husband's case, said there was no connection between Kadish and her husband, and expressed concerned that the new case "could result in a further delay in Jonathan's release from prison."

"This kind of propaganda plays right into the hands of the people in Israel who are not interested in Jonathan's release," she said.

The Kadish story, she added, was no different from other reports that have been used in the past to embarrass Israel, and called upon Prime Minister Ehud Olmert "not to be distracted by this case from what he should be doing and that's bringing Jonathan home."
She said she was worried that Olmert might now decide that it was "too delicate a time" to make a serious effort to bring Jonathan home in honor of Israel's 60th birthday celebrations.

Gerrie Bamira, the executive director of the Jewish Federation of Greater Middlesex County, in which Kadish's home in Monroe Township is located, said she knew Kadish and his wife, Doris, through their supported of the Federation.

"Information is still being gathered with respect to this case, and we look forward to the due process of law," Bamira said. "Individuals are innocent until proven guilty."
According to some accounts, Kadish was born in Connecticut and moved to pre-state Israel, where he fought with the Hagana. Other accounts say he served in the American military during World War II.
Michal Lando contributed to this report.

FBI NABS AL QAEDA TERRORIST FROM CHECH REPUBLIC

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2007
WWW.USDOJ.GOV
NSD
(202) 514-2007
TDD (202) 514-1888

UNITED STATES ANNOUNCES EXTRADITION


OF ACCUSED TERRORIST FROM CZECH REPUBLIC

WASHINGTON – Oussama Abdullah Kassir, a/k/a “Abu Abdullah,” a/k/a “Abu Khadija,” an individual who is charged in the Southern District of New York with, among other things, conspiring to provide material support and resources to al Qaeda, has been extradited from the Czech Republic. The charges relate to his participation in an effort to establish a jihad training camp in Bly, Oregon, and his operation of several terrorist websites. Kassir was taken into FBI custody this morning in Prague.

The announcement was made today by Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Michael J. Garcia, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Mark J. Merson, Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner of the City of New York.

On Dec. 11, 2005, Kassir was arrested by Czech authorities, during a layover in Prague, as he was traveling from Stockholm, Sweden, to Beirut, Lebanon. The arrest was based on a criminal complaint filed in the Southern District of New York, and a corresponding arrest warrant on file with Interpol. Kassir was thereafter detained in Prague, awaiting extradition to the United States. The superseding indictment was returned on Feb. 6, 2006 by a federal grand jury sitting in the Southern District of New York. The case is assigned to U.S. District Judge John F. Keenan. According to the complaint and the superseding indictment filed in Manhattan federal court:

Kassir conspired with Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, a/k/a "Abu Hamza" (hereafter “Abu Hamza”) and Haroon Rashid Aswat, and others, to establish a jihad training camp on a parcel of property located in Bly, Ore. As it was used by the conspirators in this case, the term "jihad" meant defending Islam against its enemies through violence and armed aggression, including killing the enemies of Islam, if necessary, in order to expel non-believers from holy Muslim lands.

The purpose of the Bly jihad training camp was to provide a place where Muslims could receive various types of training, including military-style jihad training, in preparation for a community of Muslims to move to Afghanistan. Once in Afghanistan, the men in the community would have gained enough familiarity with weapons at the Bly jihad training camp to fight jihad or to continue with additional jihad training in Afghanistan. In a letter faxed from one of the co-conspirators to another, the property in Bly was described as located in a "pro-militia and fire-arms state" that "looks just like Afghanistan," and the author stated that the group was "stock-piling weapons and ammunition."

In late 1999, Abu Hamza asked Kassir and Aswat to travel from London, England, to Bly, Ore., to assist with establishing the jihad training camp. Prior to their departure, Abu Hamza gave Kassir and Aswat approximately £4,000 to pay for expenses incurred while establishing the jihad training camp. Thereafter, on Nov. 26, 1999, Kassir and Aswat arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, after which they traveled to Seattle, Wash. and then to Bly, Ore.

In Bly, Kassir complained to a witness that there were only a few men available to train at the jihad training camp. Kassir also told witnesses that he supported Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda, and that he had previously undertaken jihad training in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Lebanon. A witness also saw Kassir in possession of a compact disc that contained instructions on how to make bombs and poisons.

Kassir's terrorist Web sites, which he operated from approximately December 2001 until the time of his arrest, also contained instructions about how to make bombs and poisons. Kassir established at least three different websites, listed in the superseding indictment, which contained such instructions, including “The Mujahideen Explosives Handbook” and “The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook,” as well as other terrorist materials. At least one of these websites was located on an internet server that was at the time located in White Plains, N.Y.

The superseding indictment, which names Kassir as a defendant in 12 of its 19 counts, also charges Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, a/k/a “Abu Hamza,” and Haroon Rashid Aswat, both of whom are presently detained in England awaiting extradition to the United States on the charges. The three men are charged together in four counts with offenses relating to their efforts to establish the jihad training camp in Bly, Ore. Kassir is charged individually in a separate count relating to the jihad training camp, and in seven counts relating to his operation of terrorist websites. Seven counts in the Superseding indictment charge Abu Hamza individually with conspiracy and substantive offenses relating to hostage taking in Yemen, in 1998, and facilitating violent jihad in Afghanistan and supplying goods and services to the Taliban, in 2000 and 2001.

Abu Hamza was arrested in May 2004 by the Metropolitan Police at New Scotland Yard in London, England, on a warrant relating to these charges. Thereafter, Abu Hamza was charged with terrorism offenses by the U.K. authorities, which resulted in a conviction in the U.K. on Feb. 7, 2006. The extradition proceedings against Abu Hamza were stayed pending completion of the U.K. criminal proceedings. After Abu Hamza’s U.K. conviction was affirmed on appeal, the United States immediately renewed its efforts to extradite Abu Hamza to the United States to face the charges in the superseding indictment. The extradition proceedings against Abu Hamza are ongoing and the next court appearances in that matter are scheduled for Oct. 22, 23, and 29, 2007 in the U.K.

Aswat was arrested in Zambia in July 2005, and then deported to England, where he was arrested on the extradition request related to this case. The U.K. High Court has affirmed an extradition ordered entered against Aswat, and he has recently appealed his case to the European Court of Human Rights.

The attached chart identifies the counts in the superseding indictment with which Kassir is charged, and provides the corresponding statutory maximum terms of imprisonment.

Kassir, 41, is a Lebanese national, and also a citizen of Sweden. His last known residence was in Stockholm.

Kassir is expected to be arraigned today by Judge Keenan in Manhattan federal court at 4:15 p.m.

Mr. Wainstein and Mr. Garcia praised the New York Joint Terrorist Task Force, which includes agents from the FBI and detectives from the New York City Police Department. He also expressed appreciation to the U.S. Embassy in Prague and the FBI's Legal Attaché Offices in Prague; Copenhagen, Denmark; and London, for their assistance in this investigation. Mr. Wainstein and Mr. Garcia further expressed his appreciation to FBI Headquarters and the FBI field offices in Seattle; Salt Lake City, Utah; and San Francisco, Calif., as well as the U.S. Attorney's Office in Seattle and the Counterterrorism Section at the Department of Justice, for their assistance in the investigation of Kassir. Finally, Mr. Wainstein and Mr. Garcia also thanked the Office of International Affairs of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, Interpol, the Department of Homeland Security, the Czech Ministry of Justice, the Police of the Czech Republic, and the Prison Service of the Czech Republic for their assistance during the arrest and extradition proceedings involving Kassir.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Eric B. Bruce and Michael Farbiarz, and Trial Attorney George Z. Toscas from the Counterterrorism Section at the Department of Justice, are in charge of the prosecution.

The charges contained in the complaint and superseding indictment are merely accusations, and the defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty.

New York FBI Home Page
Press Releases

The FBI Six Years After 9/11

THE TERRORIST THREAT

And Our Concerted Response
09/10/07
On Monday, Director Mueller joined Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell and other top officials in testifying before a Senate Committee on the current terrorist threat nearly six years to the day after the 9/11 attacks.
Some highlights of his remarks, which are posted in full online.



The threat.

• Al Qaeda, of course, remains the most serious threat, and it continues to evolve—developing new safe havens, reconstituting its leadership, and merging with regional terrorist groups that “may be more willing to assist al Qaeda in carrying out attacks against the homeland.”
  
• Homegrown extremists, radicalized here and willing to strike within the U.S. either in cells or as lone wolves, have become “one of the gravest domestic threats,” as evidenced by recent plots targeting the J.F.K. airport and Fort Dix that the FBI disrupted with its partners. The Director did say that “the level of intensity of extremism inside the United States does not equal that in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in Europe…”
  
• Understanding the tools of terrorists—especially improvised explosive devices—are an integral part of tackling the threat. The Director called for a “unified national approach” to addressing IEDs and stressed that terrorists will continue trying to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction. Single issue groups and domestic terrorists, which include “white supremacists, anarchists, and eco-terrorists,” continue to be a concern.
  

Our response.

• 
  The last six years have seen “unprecedented change” in the FBI, as we have transformed ourselves and re-tooled on many levels—from intelligence…to personnel…to training and partnerships.
  
• Our response to terrorism is now strategic, with our annual international terrorism threat assessments providing “strategic warning of the most critical threats,” identifying key gaps in intelligence, and pinpointing “emerging operational trends that require immediate collection and analysis.”
  
• We’re now highly integrated with our local, state, and national partners, with more than 250 of our personnel, for example, working in 36 fusion centers nationwide. Sixteen of these fusion centers are co-located with our Field Intelligence Groups, our primary hub for information sharing.
  
• We’re producing more and better threat assessments and “situational awareness bulletins” for law enforcement, including more than 260 since 2002, that highlight terrorist tactics and vulnerabilities and potential indicators of extremist activity.
  
• Our “extensive outreach” to Muslim, South Asian, and Sikh communities—including regular meetings at national and local levels—is building trust and dispelling myths about the FBI.
  
• We continue to strengthen our training, with 100 extra hours in national security areas for new agents, an improved 10-week course for analysts developed in concert with the Director of National Intelligence and the CIA, and other efforts.
  

As the Director points out, we are a stronger organization today, and even though the events of 9/11 are painful to remember, they continue to inspire us to improve.
Resources: - July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate- January 2007 Worldwide Threat Testimony- Inside the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force series

FBI REPORT: THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

Blogmaster's Note: The report below was released in July of this year but received little or no media attention. It should be a must read for everyone living in the United States.

The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland

July 2007

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the Intelligence Community
(IC), overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and
acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is charged with:
• Integrating the domestic and foreign dimensions of US intelligence so that there are
no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security;
• Bringing more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis; and
• Ensuring that US intelligence resources generate future capabilities as well as
present results.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

Since its formation in 1973, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) has served as a bridge
between the intelligence and policy communities, a source of deep substantive expertise on critical national security issues, and as a focal point for Intelligence Community
collaboration. The NIC's key goal is to provide policymakers with the best, unvarnished,
and unbiased information. Its primary functions are to:

• Support the DNI in his role as Principal Intelligence Advisor to the President and
other senior policymakers.
• Lead the Intelligence Community's effort to produce National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) and other NIC products that address key national security
concerns.
• Provide a focal point for policymakers, warfighters, and Congressional leaders to
task the Intelligence Community for answers to important questions.
• Reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector—and use
alternative analyses and new analytic tools—to broaden and deepen the Intelligence
Community's perspective.

NIEs are the DNI's most authoritative written judgments concerning national security
issues. They contain the coordinated judgments of the Intelligence Community regarding
the likely course of future events.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND THE NIE PROCESS

National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most
authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US
civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests.
NIEs usually provide information on the current state of play but are primarily
“estimative”—that is, they make judgments about the likely course of future events and
identify the implications for US policy.

The NIEs are typically requested by senior civilian and military policymakers,
Congressional leaders and at times are initiated by the National Intelligence Council (NIC).

Before a NIE is drafted, the relevant National Intelligence Officer is responsible for
producing a concept paper, or terms of reference (TOR), and circulates it throughout the
Intelligence Community for comment. The TOR defines the key estimative questions,
determines drafting responsibilities, and sets the drafting and publication schedule. One or more IC analysts are usually assigned to produce the initial text. The NIC then meets to
critique the draft before it is circulated to the broader IC. Representatives from the
relevant IC agencies meet to hone and coordinate line-by-line the full text of the NIE.
Working with their Agencies, representatives also assign the level of confidence they have in key judgments. IC representatives discuss the quality of sources with collectors, and the National Clandestine Service vets the sources used to ensure the draft does not include any that have been recalled or otherwise seriously questioned.

All NIEs are reviewed by National Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the DNI and is
composed of the heads of relevant IC agencies. Once approved by the NIB, NIEs are
briefed to the President and senior policymakers. The whole process of producing NIEs
normally takes at least several months.

The NIC has undertaken a number of steps to improve the NIE process under the DNI.
These steps are in accordance with the goals and recommendations set out in the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and WMD Commission reports and the 2004 Intelligence
Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act. Most notably, over the last two years the IC has:

• Created new procedures to integrate formal reviews of source reporting and
technical judgments. The Director of CIA, as the National HUMINT Manager, as
well as the Directors of NSA, NGA, and DIA and the Assistant Secretary/INR are now
required to submit formal assessments that highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and
overall credibility of their sources used in developing the critical judgments of the NIE.

• Applied more rigorous standards. A textbox is incorporated into all NIEs that
explains what we mean by such terms as “we judge” and that clarifies the difference
between judgments of likelihood and confidence levels. We have made a concerted
effort to not only highlight differences among agencies but to explain the reasons for
such differences and to display them prominently in the Key Judgments.

THE US HOMELAND THREAT ESTIMATE: HOW IT WAS PRODUCED

The Estimate, Terrorist Threats to the US Homeland, followed the standard process for
producing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), including a thorough review of
sourcing, in-depth Community coordination, the use of alternative analysis, and review by outside experts. Starting in October 2006, the NIC organized a series of roundtables with IC experts to scope out terms of reference (TOR) for the Estimate. Drafters from
throughout the Community contributed to the draft. In May, a draft was submitted to IC
officers in advance of a series of coordination meetings that spanned several days. The
National Clandestine Service, FBI, and other IC collection officers reviewed the text for
the reliability and proper use of the sourcing. As part of the normal coordination process,
analysts had the opportunity--and were encouraged--to register “dissents” and provide
alternative analysis. Reactions by the two outside experts who read the final product were highlighted in the text. The National Intelligence Board, composed of the heads of the 16 IC agencies and chaired by the ODNI, reviewed and approved the Estimate on 21 June. As with other NIEs, it is being distributed to senior Administration officials and Members of Congress.

What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language

When we use words such as “we judge” or “we assess”—terms we use synonymously—
as well as “we estimate,” “likely” or “indicate,” we are trying to convey an analytical
assessment or judgment. These assessments, which are based on incomplete or at times
fragmentary information are not a fact, proof, or knowledge. Some analytical judgments
are based directly on collected information; others rest on previous judgments, which
serve as building blocks. In either type of judgment, we do not have “evidence” that
shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.

Intelligence judgments pertaining to likelihood are intended to reflect the Community’s
sense of the probability of a development or event. Assigning precise numerical ratings
to such judgments would imply more rigor than we intend.

We do not intend the term “unlikely” to imply an event will not happen. We use
“probably” and “likely” to indicate there is a greater than even chance. We use words
such as “we cannot dismiss,” “we cannot rule out,” and “we cannot discount” to reflect
an unlikely—or even remote—event whose consequences are such it warrants
mentioning. Words such as “may be” and “suggest” are used to reflect situations in
which we are unable to assess the likelihood generally because relevant information is
nonexistent, sketchy, or fragmented.

In addition to using words within a judgment to convey degrees of likelihood, we also
ascribe “high,” “moderate,” or “low” confidence levels based on the scope and quality of
information supporting our judgments.

• “High confidence” generally indicates our judgments are based on high-quality
information and/or the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid
judgment.

• “Moderate confidence” generally means the information is interpreted in various
ways, we have alternative views, or the information is credible and plausible but not
corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.

• “Low confidence” generally means the information is scant, questionable, or very
fragmented and it is difficult to make solid analytic inferences, or we have significant
concerns or problems with the sources.

Key Judgments

We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities.
We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have constrained the ability of al-Qa’ida to attack the US Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11.

These measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11.

• We are concerned, however, that this level of international cooperation may wane as
9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge.
Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.

• As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat
environment. We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the Homeland through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that al-Qa’ida will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the Homeland. In addition, we assess that its association with AQI helps al-Qa’ida to energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks.

We assess that al-Qa’ida’s Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent
political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties,
visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the US population. The group is proficient with conventional small arms and improvised explosive devices, and is innovative in creating new capabilities and overcoming security obstacles.

• We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use
them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability.

We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-US attacks outside the United
States in the past, may be more likely to consider attacking the Homeland over the next three years if it perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the group or Iran.
We assess that the spread of radical—especially Salafi—Internet sites, increasingly
aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the West’s Muslim population is expanding, including in the United States. The arrest and prosecution by US law enforcement of a small number of violent Islamic extremists inside the United States—who are becoming more connected ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical sense to the global extremist movement—points to the possibility that others may become sufficiently radicalized that they will view the use of violence here as legitimate.

We assess that this internal Muslim terrorist threat is not likely to be as severe as it is in Europe, however.

We assess that other, non-Muslim terrorist groups—often referred to as “single-issue” groups by the FBI—probably will conduct attacks over the next three years given their violent histories, but we assess this violence is likely to be on a small scale.

We assess that globalization trends and recent technological advances will continue to enable even small numbers of alienated people to find and connect with one another, justify and intensify their anger, and mobilize resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.

• The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment
will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt
plots. It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local
level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of
terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.

POLLARD GETS SCREWED.... AGAIN!!!

Blogmaster's two shekles worth: I think that the conviction of someone spying for the People's Republic of China and stealing sensitive military secrets and equipment to enhance China's military capabilities is a supurb peace of work. Where my stomach turns is the Plea-bargain that gets this putz only two years behind bars. Think about it.... this guy Ming gets a lousy 2 years for giving military secrets to a proven adversary of the U.S. and the West. Pollard gives some intelligence information about Arab troop movements to Israel, and he gets life in prison. What's wrong with this picture???? Write your Congressman and Senator, Jonathan Pollard's life depends on it. Shabbat Shalom


Department of Justice
United States Attorney Scott N. Schools
Northern District of California

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

August 2, 2007

WWW.USDOJ.GOV/USAO/CAN Natalya.LaBauve@usdoj.gov
CONTACT: Natalya LaBauve
(415) 436-7055 Natalya.LaBauve@usdoj.gov

FORMER CHINESE NATIONAL CONVICTED FOR

COMMITTING ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE TO BENEFIT

CHINA NAVY RESEARCH CENTER IN BEIJING

AND FOR VIOLATING THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT

First Conviction in the Country Involving Source Code Under the Arms Export Control Act

WASHINGTON– Xiaodong Sheldon Meng, 42, formerly a resident of Beijing, China, and resident of Cupertino, Calif., pleaded guilty yesterday to violating the Foreign Economic Espionage and violating the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), announced Assistant Attorney General for National Security Kenneth L. Wainstein and Scott N. Schools U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California.

The defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty to Count Five (EEA) and Count Seven (AECA) of a superseding indictment that had been filed on December 13, 2006.

Count Five charged that Meng violated the EEA by possessing a trade secret belonging to Quantum3D, a San Jose company by whom he was formerly employed, intending and knowing that this possession would benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent, namely the People’s Republic of China ("PRC") Navy Research Center.
The trade secret at issue, known as "Mantis," is a Quantum3D product used to simulate real world motion for military training purposes. Meng installed a demonstration unit of Mantis on the PRC Navy site. Meng also altered Mantis to make it appear as if it belonged to ORAD, Meng’s new employer, a competitor of Quantum3D based in PRC. This altered version of Mantis was included as part of the demonstration project in the PRC.
Count Seven charged that defendant Meng knowingly and willfully violated the AECA and ITAR when he exported "viXsen" source code, a Quantum 3D product that is a designated defense article on the United States Munitions List, and for which Meng had no Department of State export license. viXsen is a visual simulation software program used for training military fighter pilots.

United States Attorney Scott N. Schools noted that this prosecution is the result of a nearly three-year joint investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) Unit, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) - Office of Investigations, as well as Customs & Border Protection (CBP). The Department of State and the Department of Defense also provided valuable assistance on the case.
"This conviction, the first in the nation for illegal exports of military-related source code, demonstrates the importance of safeguarding our nation’s military secrets and should serve notice to others who would compromise our national security for profit," said Assistant Attorney General for National Security Kenneth L. Wainstein. "This case is the latest evidence of the Department’s enhanced investigative and prosecutorial efforts to keep America’s critical technology from falling into the wrong hands."

"One of ICE’s top priorities is ensuring that U.S. military products and sensitive technology does not fall into the hands of those who might inflict harm upon America or its allies," said Julie L. Myers, Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for ICE. "These items, such as the proprietary source code stolen and altered by the defendant in this case, are controlled in the interest of national security. We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners and industry to enforce U.S. technology export laws."

"The economic -- and often national -- security of the United States rests largely upon a foundation of technological superiority, and to maintain that superiority our trade secrets must be protected with the fervency with which we guard other vital interests," said Charlene B. Thornton, special agent in charge of the FBI’s San Francisco office. "The successful prosecution of Mr. Meng is a blow to those who seek to circumvent the long and costly process of research and development to gain a technological advantage through lies, deceit, and theft; it is a victory in the struggle to ensure the economic security of Silicon Valley and the United States."

Quantum3D, Inc. has cooperated fully in the government's investigation. A company official noted that the company "believes that enforcement of export and trade secret laws is critical to the functioning of our industry and we’re pleased to work with the government in these efforts."

The U.S. Attorney’s Offices in the Northern District of Alabama, District of Minnesota, and Middle District of Florida also joined the plea agreement as some of the conduct in the case occurred in those jurisdictions.

Defendant Meng is scheduled to be sentenced before United States District Judge Jeremy Fogel in San Jose on January 23, 2008, at 10:00 a.m. Meng is currently out of custody on $500,000 bond.

Under the terms of the plea agreement, the maximum term of imprisonment is twenty-four months. Meng also is subject to a maximum fine of $500,000 on the Economic Espionage Act conviction and a maximum fine of $1,000,000 on the Arm Export Control Act conviction, and a three-year term of supervised release. However, any sentence following conviction would be imposed by the court after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the federal statute governing the imposition of a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553.

Mark L. Krotoski is the Assistant U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case out of the CHIP Unit of the United States Attorney’s Office with the assistance of Legal Tech Lori Gomez.
Prior Economic Espionage Prosecutions:

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the Meng case is the second conviction and only the third case charging violation of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996, under 18 U.S.C. § 1831. Both EEA convictions have been obtained within the last nine months by the CHIP Unit in the Northern District of California.

The first economic espionage indictment was returned on May 8, 2001, in the Northern District of Ohio in United States v. Okamoto and Serizawa. (For more information: http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Okamoto_SerizawaIndict.htm).
The second economic espionage indictment was filed on December 4, 2002, by the Northern District of California CHIP Unit in United States v. Fei Ye and Ming Zhong, CR 02-20145-JW. The first EEA convictions, involving defendants Ye and Zhong, were obtained on December 14, 2006.

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FBI SEEKING INFORMATION

Aafia Siddiqui DESCRIPTION Date of Birth Used: March 2, 1972 Place of Birth: Pakistan Sex: Female Remarks: Aafia Siddiqui's current whereabouts are unknown. DETAILS Although the FBI has no information indicating this individual is connected to specific terrorist activities, the FBI would like to locate and question this individual. IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE OR THE NEAREST AMERICAN EMBASSY OR CONSULATE. ___________________________________________________________________ Adnan G. El Shukrijumah Video of Adnan G. El Shukrijumah View with RealPlayer Download Free Realplayer View with Windows Media Player Transcript of Video DESCRIPTION Aliases: Adnan G. El Shukri Jumah, Abu Arif, Ja'far Al-Tayar, Jaffar Al-Tayyar, Jafar Tayar, Jaafar Al-Tayyar Date of Birth Used: August 4, 1975 Hair: Black Place of Birth: Saudi Arabia Eyes: Black Height: 5'3" to 5'6" Sex: Male Weight: 132 pounds Complexion: Dark, Mediterranean Build: Average Remarks: El Shukrijumah occasionally wears a beard. He has a pronounced nose and is asthmatic. El Shukrijumah speaks English and carries a Guyanese passport, but may attempt to enter the United States with a Saudi, Canadian, or Trinidadian passport. DETAILS Adnan G. El Shukrijumah is wanted in connection with possible terrorist threats against the United States. REWARD The Rewards For Justice Program, United States Department of State, is offering a reward of up to $5 million for information leading directly to the capture of Adnan G. El Shukrijumah. ADDITIONAL PHOTOGRAPHS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE OR THE NEAREST AMERICAN EMBASSY OR CONSULATE.

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