TALKING WITH IRAN' LEADER - PROBLEMATIC

The Problems of Engaging with Iran's Supreme Leader
By Mehdi Khalaji

November 12, 2008Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's congratulatory letter to U.S. president-elect Barack Obama was the first of its kind in the history of the Islamic Republic. In his letter, Ahmadinezhad expressed his hope for fundamental change in U.S. domestic and foreign policies. Although some observers speculate that the letter suggests a transformation in the mindset of Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, about normalizing relations between Iran and the United States, this is unlikely. Majlis speaker Ali Larijani expressed the widespread attitude of Iranian leaders on November 9, saying, "Whoever thinks that Obama will change the U.S. foreign policy is naive."

Background

The United States has made efforts to reach out to the Islamic Republic's leaders in the past, beginning with Zbigniew Brzezinski's November 1, 1979, meeting with the Iranian prime minister, which led four days later to the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. These efforts have largely failed, primarily because the United States was attempting to work with Iranian presidents and diplomats, despite the fact that they are not in charge of key foreign policy issues or the nuclear program. Ayatollah Khamenei as the supreme leader and the commander in chief of armed forces has the ultimate supervision over the nuclear program, Iran's military strategy in the region, and Iran's foreign policy in general. Any attempt to reach Iran's government is more likely to be successful if it involves the supreme leader. But Khamenei would have to resolve many paradoxes before receiving any American overture directly.
Isolated but Powerful Supreme Leader

In an October 30 speech, Ayatollah Khamenei reiterated that "the Islamic Republic of Iran's differences with America are beyond political differences and [are] more fundamental than that." He urged Iranians to read the documents seized by students from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran twenty-nine years ago, saying that "the goals of Americans are to deprive Iran of its independence and dignity, cause it to regret the Islamic Revolution, and make it again dependent on and obedient to America." The supreme leader added, "The hatred and abhorrence of Iran's nation toward America is deep."

Khamenei's unapologetic, uncompromising hatred for the United States has remained unchanged, a profound mistrust that causes him to underestimate changes in the U.S. political atmosphere or policy. On the eve of the U.S. election, Kayhan, an Iranian newspaper affiliated with the supreme leader, wrote that "no matter who is elected tomorrow, America is our enemy and our relations with it will remain deadlocked. Why? The reason is found in the essence of the two parties. The Islamic Republic of Iran in its government structure relies on the pure Mohammedan Islam, the main feature of which is fighting injustice, while America has an unjust and imperialist nature."

Although some Iranian diplomats and presidents, whether radicals or reformists, have been interested in opening doors to the United States -- and this would seem to include President Ahmadinezhad, as evidenced by his frequent trips to New York -- Ayatollah Khamenei has been able to sabotage any attempt at serious dialogue.

Leading a Country or an Ideology?

Khamenei considers himself not only the leader of the Islamic Republic but also the highest authority on Islamic ideology in the world. He therefore sees himself as responsible for the survival of Islamic ideology and its values, as well as his image as its leader. Because the Islamic Republic has failed to meet its economic, cultural, and social promises, Khamenei has made anti-Americanism the cornerstone of that Islamic ideology.

"America" for Khamenei does not refer to a country like any other, but rather to a point of view diametrically opposed to Islamic ideology, on which the Iranian regime relies for its legitimacy. In his mind, allowing the level of "hatred" toward the United States to diminish is tantamount to recognizing the supremacy of "Western culture." Such a development would be disastrous for Khamenei, because for the last twenty years Khamenei has lived in fear of a "velvet revolution" -- an infusion of Western culture and values that would lead to the overthrow of the regime. Indeed, this fear has led him to kill or arrest political activists and intellectuals and crack down on civil activists, syndicates, and nongovernmental organizations, because he considers them the West's most effective means of waging a "soft war" against Iran.

In order to accept any offer for direct negotiation with the United States, Ayatollah Khamenei would first have to accept that his position is limited to heading a country, not a broader ideology. This could effect a drastic change in Iran's policy in the region and its diplomacy in general.

Today the Islamic Republic's leadership is arguably in a worse position than at any point in the last three decades due to the country's economic crisis, the leadership's lack of a power base in society, and international pressure on the regime. For some Iranian leaders, this state of affairs might justify taking advantage of the election of a new U.S. president to change the tenor of the bilateral relationship. But there is no evidence that Khamenei is among those officials. Although many Iranians may disapprove of Khamenei as a leader, he has succeeded in expanding his power throughout the Islamic world, especially in the Arab Middle East.

How to Reach Out to the Supreme Leader

Based on past experience, as long as the Iranian supreme leader does not see dialogue with the United States as necessary for the survival of the regime, he will be unlikely to make much effort to alter the status quo. Of course, receiving an offer from the next administration for unconditional negotiations will place Khamenei in a difficult position. He has always tried to portray America as responsible for the strains in U.S.-Iranian relations. Asking him to negotiate would undercut this argument and place the burden of responsibility on him for the lack of dialogue.

Khamenei's management model in the past two decades has been to have as much authority as possible with as little responsibility as possible. The first step for dealing directly with the Iranian government is to make its supreme leader responsible. Addressing him directly and publicly with a call to initiate a dialogue will close the exit doors available to him and require him to make a decision. In dealing with the United States, Khamenei's ideal scenario has been "no war, no peace." This strategy has allowed him to continue the nuclear program and minimize the damage associated with it. Given the fact that Iran could well obtain the ability to produce a nuclear bomb in the near future, the United States has to convince him that the "no war, no peace" strategy will no longer work, and that he has to choose either war or peace.

A bold and direct U.S. offer to Ayatollah Khamenei, such as proposing that a top U.S. official meet with him in his Tehran office, would put Khamenei in a difficult position. It is possible -- although not likely -- that he would accept, especially if he believes that Iran faces a direct threat from economic failure or Israeli attack, or if he thought that American officials would treat him respectfully and end U.S. pressures on his regime. But even if he refused to meet, the United States, having tried to solve the problem through diplomacy at the highest level, would most likely find it easier to reach consensus with its strategic allies to increase sanctions on Iran.

Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on the role of politics in contemporary Shiite clericalism in Iran and Iraq.

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A STUNNING U.S. REFUSAL TO AID ISRAEL

Blogmaster's remarks: We have long realized that Washington treats Israel as it's unruly child, prone to misbehavior which can place the U.S. in precarious international political positions. However, we also realize that abandonment of Israel by America is impossible considering the considerable support we enjoy in Congress today (which could easily change within a relatively short period). The State Department's influence on the sale of military hardware to Israel is overpowering. In no uncertain terms, State used its influence to hold the "status quo" and prevented the transfer of any military hardware to Israel that would have upset the "balance of power" in the Middle East. It is essential that Israel crank up our defense industry, and as rapidly as possible, produce and stockpile what we need for any military eventuality. It is not at all certain that the umbrella of protection from the United States over Israel will be maintained. We must wean ourselves from dependence upon anyone but ourselves.



DANGER MOUNTS AS ISRAEL'S DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN ARMAMENTS WEAKENS ISRAEL’S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES…






[Reminder of danger of forfeiting domestic capabilities]








U.S. rebuffs Israeli request for arms

geared toward Iran strike

[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA:

A stunning reminder to Israel why it is so important to continue developing and maintaining the Israeli arms industry.]

U.S. rebuffs Israeli request for arms geared toward Iran strike

By Aluf Benn, Haaretz Correspondent Last update - www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1010938.html

The American administration has rejected an Israeli request for military equipment and support that would improve Israel's ability to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.

The Americans viewed the request, which was transmitted (and rejected) at the highest level, as a sign that Israel is in the advanced stages of preparations to attack Iran. They therefore warned Israel against attacking, saying such a strike would undermine American interests. They also demanded that Israel give them prior notice if it nevertheless decided to strike Iran.

As compensation for the requests it rejected, Washington offered to improve Israel's defenses against surface-to-surface missiles.

Israel responded by saying it reserves the right to take whatever action it deems necessary if diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's nuclearization fail.

Senior Israeli officials had originally hoped that U.S. President George Bush would order an American strike on Iran's nuclear facilities before leaving office, as America's military is far better equipped to conduct such a strike successfully than is Israel's.

Jerusalem also fears that an Israeli strike, even if it succeeded well enough to delay Iran's nuclear development for a few years, would give Iran international legitimacy for its program, which it currently lacks. Israel, in contrast, would be portrayed as an aggressor, and would be forced to contend alone with Iran's retaliation, which would probably include thousands of missile strikes by Iranian allies Hezbollah, Hamas and perhaps even Syria.

Recently, however, Israel has concluded that Bush is unlikely to attack, and will focus instead on ratcheting up diplomatic pressure on Tehran. It prefers to wait until this process has been exhausted, though without conceding the military option. Israel's assumption is that Iran will continue to use delaying tactics, and may even agree to briefly suspend its uranium enrichment program in an effort to see out the rest of Bush's term in peace.

The American-Israeli dispute over a military strike against Iran erupted during Bush's visit to Jerusalem in May. At the time, Bush held a private meeting on the Iranian threat with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and the Israelis presented their request for certain specific items of military equipment, along with diplomatic and security backing.

Following Bush's return to Washington, the administration studied Israel's request, and this led it to suspect that Israel was planning to attack Iran within the next few months. The Americans therefore decided to send a strong message warning it not to do so.
U.S. National Intelligence Director Mike McConnell and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen both visited here in June and, according to the Washington Post, told senior Israeli defense officials that Iran is still far from obtaining nuclear weapons, and that an attack on Iran would undermine American interests. Therefore, they said, the U.S. would not allow Israeli planes to overfly Iraq en route to Iran.

The Americans sent a similar message to Iraq, which had objected vociferously to the idea of its air space being used for an Israeli attack on Iran.

These private messages were accompanied by a series of leaks from the Pentagon that Israel interpreted as attempts to thwart any possibility of an attack on Iran. For instance, the Americans revealed details of a major Israel Air Force exercise in the Mediterranean; they also said they doubted Israel had adequate intelligence about Iran's nuclear facilities. In addition, Mullen spoke out publicly against an attack on Iran.

Two weeks ago, Barak visited Washington for talks with his American counterpart, Robert Gates, and Vice President Richard Cheney. Both conversations focused on Iran, but the two Americans presented conflicting views: Gates vehemently opposes an attack on Iran, while Cheney is the administration's leading hawk.

Barak presented Israel's assessments of the Iranian situation and warned that Iran was liable to advance its nuclear program under cover of the endless deliberations about sanctions - which have thus far produced little in the way of action. He also acknowledged that effective sanctions would require cooperation from Russia, China and India, all of which currently oppose sanctions with real teeth.

Russia, however, is considered key to efforts to isolate Iran, and Israeli officials have therefore urged their American counterparts in recent months to tone down Washington's other disputes with Moscow to focus all its efforts on obtaining Russia's backing against Iran. For instance, they suggested that Washington offer to drop its plan to station a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic - a proposal Russia views as a threat, though Washington insists the system is aimed solely at Iran - in exchange for Russia agreeing to stiffer sanctions against Iran. However, the administration rejected this idea.

In an attempt to compensate Israel for having rejected all its proposals, Washington then offered to bolster Israel's defenses against ballistic missiles. For instance, Gates proposed stationing an advanced radar system in Israel and linking Israel directly into America's early warning satellite network; he also offered increased American funding for the development of two Israeli missile defense systems - the Arrow-3, an upgrade of Israel's existing Arrow system for intercepting ballistic missiles, and Iron Dome, a system designed to intercept short-range rockets. In addition, Washington agreed to sell Israel nine Super Hercules long-range transport aircraft for $2 billion. However, it would not agree to supply Israel with any offensive systems.

Now, Israel is awaiting the outcome of the latest talks between the West and Iran, as well as a formal announcement of the opening of an American interests section in Tehran. Israel views the latter as sure proof that Washington is not planning a military strike.

Iran 'hoodwinked' CIA over nuclear plans

Iran 'hoodwinked' CIA over nuclear plans

By Tim Shipman in Washington, Philip Sherwell and Carolynne Wheeler
Last Updated: 1:39am GMT 09/12/2007

Analysts believe that Iranian staff, knowing their phones
were tapped, deliberately gave misinformation


British spy chiefs have grave doubts that Iran has mothballed its nuclear weapons programme, as a US intelligence report claimed last week, and believe the CIA has been hoodwinked by Teheran.

Analysts believe that Iranian staff, knowing their phones were tapped, deliberately gave misinformation
The timing of the CIA report has also provoked fury in the British Government, where officials believe it has undermined efforts to impose tough new sanctions on Iran and made an Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities more likely.
The security services in London want concrete evidence to allay concerns that the Islamic state has fed disinformation to the CIA.
The report used new evidence - including human sources, wireless intercepts and evidence from an Iranian defector - to conclude that Teheran suspended the bomb-making side of its nuclear programme in 2003. But British intelligence is concerned that US spy chiefs were so determined to avoid giving President Bush a reason to go to war - as their reports on Saddam Hussein's weapons programmes did in Iraq - that they got it wrong this time.
A senior British official delivered a withering assessment of US intelligence-gathering abilities in the Middle East and revealed that British spies shared the concerns of Israeli defence chiefs that Iran was still pursuing nuclear weapons.
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The source said British analysts believed that Iranian nuclear staff, knowing their phones were tapped, deliberately gave misinformation. "We are sceptical. We want to know what the basis of it is, where did it come from? Was it on the basis of the defector? Was it on the basis of the intercept material? They say things on the phone because they know we are up on the phones. They say black is white. They will say anything to throw us off.
"It's not as if the American intelligence agencies are regarded as brilliant performers in that region. They got badly burned over Iraq."
A US intelligence source has revealed that some American spies share the concerns of the British and the Israelis. "Many middle- ranking CIA veterans believe Iran is still committed to producing nuclear weapons and are concerned that the agency lost a number of its best sources in Iran in 2004," the official said.
The Foreign Office is studying a new text of a third United Nations Security Council resolution that would impose tough travel bans on regime figures and penalise banks that do business with Iran.
But diplomats say the chances of winning Chinese and Russian support for the move are in freefall. A Western diplomat said: "It's created a lot of difficulties because of the timing, just as we were about to go for a third resolution."
Bruce Reidel, who spent 25 years on the Middle East desks at the CIA and the National Security Council, said: "By going public they have embarrassed our friends, particularly the British and the Israelis. They have given our foes insights into our most secret intelligence and taken most of the options off the table."
Ephraim Sneh, until recently Israel's deputy minister of defence, warned that military action would be the only option if the world community did not institute robust sanctions. "No one can rule out with high confidence that somewhere in Iran, 70 times the size of Israel, there is one lab working on the weapons programme," Mr Sneh told The Sunday Telegraph.
"[Military action] is not a desired option; it is a last resort. That's why sanctions are so important. We have to urge the international community to be serious about sanctions and to take necessary measures to defend the civilian population."