Do Not Call For another Palestinian Free Election!

Hamas Set to Win Election in Palestinian Authority

October 6, 2009 6:30 AM

by Khaled Abu Toameh Journalist

If the U.S. and its allies want to avoid another Hamas victory, they should reconsider their demand that the Palestinians hold another free election. Otherwise they will be repeating the same mistake they made in 2006.

Backed by the U.S., the Egyptians are now pushing the Palestinians toward holding new elections for president and parliament. By doing so, Cairo and Washington are taking a big risk: There is no guarantee that a majority of Palestinians would not vote for Hamas again.

Palestinians went to the polls three times in the past fives years to vote - - Twice they voted for Hamas.

Hamas candidates scored major victories in the municipal and parliamentary elections.
Hamas boycotted the presidential election that was held in January 2005, and which brought Mahmoud Abbas to power. Had Hamas participated in the presidential election, some Palestinians argue that its chances of winning that vote too would have been good.
Prior to the January 2006 parliamentary election, the US, Israel and many Western countries ignored warnings that Hamas was headed toward victory. Hamas won that vote largely because of the Palestinian public’s disenchantment with Fatah's corruption, mismanagement and abuse of power.

Such was the degree of contempt for Fatah and its representatives that even Christians and secular Palestinians cast their ballots for the radical Islamic movement.
Fatah itself was even so aware of its poor performance and blunders that it dispatched some of its representatives to the US in a bid to persuade the Bush Administration to abandon its plan to hold free elections in the Palestinian territories.

Today Fatah is not in a better situation and its chances of winning in the planned elections next year do not appear to be high.

Fatah's dwindling popularity is mainly attributed to the faction's failure to draw conclusions from its defeat to Hamas in the 2006 election - Fatah’s failure to reform itself and get rid of icons of financial corruption and thugs who continue to call the shots in the faction.

The feeling among many Palestinians is that Fatah, the largest faction of the PLO, is continuing to march backward ever since it lost one of its founders and symbols, Yasser Arafat.

In the past few weeks, Fatah's credibility suffered one blow after another.
First, Fatah's Sixth General Assembly, which was held in Bethlehem for the first time in 20 years, failed to inject new and fresh blood into the faction. Instead, Fatah saw the return of most of Arafat's former cronies who were responsible for abuse of human rights, mismanagement and financial corruption.

Second, Fatah's open affiliation and cooperation with Israel and the US is causing tremendous damage to its credibility among Palestinians. This, of course, plays into the hands of Hamas. The next election will be presented as a contest between “collaborators with Israel and America” (Fatah), and Muslim candidates who reject any form of affiliation with the West.

Third, the recent summit in New York, where the US literally forced Abbas to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, has made Fatah appear as if it is incapable of taking independent decisions. For months, Abbas had vowed not to meet with Netanyahu or resume peace talks with Israel unless construction in the settlements was completely halted.

Fourth, Abbas's decision to withdraw a proposal to the UN Human Rights Council regarding the report of Justice Richard Goldstone on the Gaza war has also undermined his credibility among many Palestinians. Abbas and Fatah are now being accused of “helping Israel bury its war crimes.”

Meanwhile, Hamas appears to be increasing its power. A prisoner-exchange agreement with Israel, which would see the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jail in return for IDF soldier Gilad Schalit, will undoubtedly boost Hamas's popularity.
Despite its failure to improve the living conditions of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and its responsibility for the ongoing suffering there, Hamas is still admired by many because of its continued defiance and refusal to bow to US, Israeli and Arab pressure.

Barring last-minute obstacles, Hamas and Fatah are expected to sign a “reconciliation” accord on October 22 in the Egyptian capital of Cairo.

The Egyptian-brokered agreement calls, among other things, for holding presidential and parliamentary elections in the Palestinian territories sometime during the first half of 2010.
Under such circumstances, it is easy to see why Hamas could win the next election.

Goldstone Commission report is a mockery of history

President Peres' reply to the Goldstone Commission Report



President Shimon Peres:


"Those in pursuit of peace have justice on their side. Those who monger war will forever be criminals."

(Communicated by President's Spokesperson)

President Shimon Peres (Photo:Emil Salman/Jeni)


A statement by President Shimon Peres: “Goldstone Commission report is a mockery of history”The Goldstone Commission report is a mockery of history. It fails to distinguish between the aggressor and a state exercising its right for self defense.
War itself is a crime. The aggressor is the criminal. The side exercising self-defense has no other alternative.
The Hamas terrorist organization has opened war and perpetrated other horrible crimes. For years, Hamas carried out attacks against the children of Israel, sending suicide bombers into city centers, injuring and killing civilians. They fired over 12,000 rockets and mortar shells at towns and villages with one clear aim - to kill innocent civilians.
The report legitimizes terrorist activity, the pursuit of murder and death. The report disregards the duty and right of self defense, held by every sovereign state as enshrined in the UN Charter. Israel withdrew all of its troops and settlers from the Gaza Strip, opened the border crossings and actively supported its reconstruction. The Israeli presence in Gaza was terminated.
But after Israel completed its redeployment from Gaza, a murderous and illegitimate terror group violently revolted against the legitimate Fatah leadership, overthrowing it by force. Hamas operatives murdered Fatah leaders, at times throwing them from rooftops in broad daylight.
While Hamas continued firing, Israel employed, time and time again, the diplomatic channels, including many appeals to the UN – in an attempt to bring about a cessation of rocket fire.
Israel redeployed and terminated its presence in Gaza. Hamas responded with incessant rocket fire aimed at killing children, women and innocent civilians. Instead of building Gaza and caring for the welfare of its citizens, Hamas built tunnels to attack Israel, cruelly using children and innocent Palestinians to hide terrorists and ammunition.
Hamas terrorists built rocket launching pads and storage facilities near schools, in mosques and kindergartens. They booby-trapped urban neighborhoods and used Palestinian children as human-shields in order to hide terrorists and war materiel.
The State of Israel was forced to defend itself. It acted out of obligation to its citizens, like any sister state in the family of nations would.
Israel has been criticized for its actions against Hezbollah attacks from Lebanon and Hamas attacks from the Gaza Strip, as well as for building the security barrier in the West Bank to prevent suicide bombers from entering the country.
This criticism did not stop the rockets from hitting the South and the North, nor did it stop terrorists from blowing themselves up in our central cities. IDF operations enabled economic prosperity in the West Bank, relieved southern Lebanese citizens from the terror of Hezbollah and have enabled Gazans to have normal lives again.Those in pursuit of peace have justice on their side. Those who monger war will forever be criminals.
Members of the commission would have never compiled such a report if their children resided in Sderot and suffered the terrorism of daily rocket fire.

SAUDIS INFLUENCED MUMBAI MASSACRE

12 February 2009

The Saudi Connection to the Mumbai Massacres:

Strategic Implications for Israel
Col. (res.) Jonathan Fighel

The Mumbai attacks have been linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba and radical Islamic groups in Kashmir generally. Yet it would be a mistake to see Lashkar only as a local organization with only a local agenda.

Saudi Arabia has contributed very much to what Lashkar-e-Taiba looks like, how it thinks, its motivation, ideology, and funding. Saudi Arabia presents itself as the protector and the spearhead of the defense of Muslims around the world against what they define as the Western cultural attack.

The Saudis are very committed to recruiting, funding, and funneling ideology to embattled Muslim minorities, and use Muslim charities as their tool to implement this policy. The Saudi methodology is to take advantage of a humanitarian crisis to get a foot in the door. Who could be against assisting widows and orphans and setting up schools and clinics? Some of the money is indeed funneled to support terrorism - families of suicide bombers.

The notion of global Islam has also penetrated to Gaza and exists under the umbrella of Hamas, which is enabling a revival of global jihadi organizations there such as Jaish al-Islam and others. This phenomenon is radicalizing the already radicalized society in Gaza.

Hamas could agree to a hudna (calm) for fifty years, but there will be no recognition of Israel or a cessation of the struggle against it. If Hamas was ready to act pragmatically, it would no longer be Hamas. And then the frustrated factions within Hamas would break off and join up with the radical global jihadi organizations in Gaza.

The similarity of the November 2008 attack in Mumbai to the attack on the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv in 1975 was striking. At that time, a Palestinian organization based outside the borders of Israel, in a safe haven in Lebanon, had undergone months of specialized training. With a high level of prior intelligence, several very dedicated assault groups attacked a high-value target.

The Mumbai attacks were not a conventional suicide attack. Since 1998, al-Qaeda's hallmark has been suicide attacks, based upon the whole rationale of jihad, sacrifice and martyrdom. But the attacks in Mumbai did not resemble 7/7 in London or the attacks in Madrid or any other al-Qaeda-style attacks.

What Is Lashkar-e-Taiba?

The Mumbai attacks have been linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba and radical Islamic groups in Kashmir generally. Yet it would be a mistake to see Lashkar only as a local organization with only a local agenda.

The creation and flourishing of Lashkar-e-Taiba would not have been possible unless they were supported by three major elements. The first is the ideology of global jihad. The second is funding and support from external sources. And the third is a territorial base which enables them to conduct activities and maintain training camps.

What is Lashkar-e-Taiba and why is it relevant to the Middle East? Lashkar collects funds from Pakistanis and Kashmiris, as well as the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf, in the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Its website appears under the name of Jamaat ud Dawa and the group maintains ties to religious and militant groups around the world. The Jamaat ud Dawa website links directly to the Hamas website.

The Saudi Connection

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia has contributed very much to what Lashkar-e-Taiba looks like, how it thinks, its motivation, ideology, and funding. Saudi newspapers at the time published calls for jihad to support all Muslim struggles around the world. Kashmir was seen as a place where jihad was taking place, so donations were solicited for the Muslims living there. Allah was said to bless the warriors of this financial jihad.

In August 1999, the Saudi newspaper Al Jazeera reported on a press conference conducted by the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), a Saudi-based charity supervised by the government. The group's secretary-general, Maneh al-Johani, praised the role played by Saudi Arabia in providing assistance to Muslims around the world, especially in Kashmir. Johani equated the Kashmir issue with the situation in Kosovo and Palestine, and called on Muslims to help the Kashmiri people.

Radical Wahhabi, Salafi, Saudi Islam sees the world in confrontation, with zones of jihad where Muslim minorities are struggling politically and religiously against other forces. The struggle can be with Israel, Serbia, India, or the Philippines. Saudi Arabia presents itself as the protector and the spearhead of the defense of Muslims around the world against what the former Supreme Religious Authority of Saudi Arabia, the late Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Baz (Ben Baz), defined as the Western cultural attack.

This is the ideology behind Saudi politics. The Saudis are very committed to recruiting, funding, and funneling ideology to those Muslim minorities, and use Muslim charities as their tool to implement this policy. In September 2000, the Saudi newspaper Al Jazeera reported on an additional press conference by WAMY Secretary-General Johani, who discussed Saudi Arabia's role in providing aid to Kashmir and asked the Islamic countries to play an effective part in saving Kashmir's Muslims. Johani described the Kashmiri people's jihad and noted that they had suffered thousands of casualties. "The Kashmiri people want to protect their Islamic entity and we must help them," he concluded.
Since the end of the war in Afghanistan in 1989, the Saudi contribution to entrenching the phenomenon of global jihad around the world has mushroomed, whether in Chechnya, the Philippines, Kosovo, or the Palestinian territories. Yet for all this, Saudi Arabia is not held accountable.

The Saudi methodology is to take advantage of a humanitarian crisis to get a foot in the door. Who could be against assisting widows and orphans and setting up schools and clinics? It is a methodology that has been duplicated all around the world. Since direct assistance to armed groups is problematic for Saudi Arabia, they use "charities," which are actually organizations that use the social network called the dawa to propagate their ideology through mosques, health clinics, and madrassas, to influence minds and recruit supporters to Wahhabi-style ideology and commitment. Some of the money is indeed funneled to support terrorism - families of suicide bombers.

It is now evident that the so-called Saudi non-governmental charities are closely monitored by the Saudi government. The Saudis have understood that they were under pressure from the West and so they were very willing to sacrifice the Al-Haramain charity. It was banned and dismantled, but other charities were not, like the Islamic Relief Organization (IRO). The Saudi charities just change names and, unfortunately, nothing concrete is being done. There is no all-out campaign to dismantle all those charities.

Training Camps in Pakistan

Lashkar-e-Taiba has created an infrastructure inside Pakistan which is relevant to struggles beyond the boundaries of Kashmir or India. It has created an operational capability in its training camps through the use of highly skilled instructors, veterans of the Afghan war. Some well-known terrorists have passed through those training camps before launching their attacks. The shoe bomber, Richard Reid, was trained in a Lashkar training camp, as was Dhiren Barot, a British subject and a Hindu who converted to Islam, who was the mastermind of a failed gas cylinder bombing plot in London and who also prepared detailed blueprints for al-Qaeda of the buildings in New York's financial district.

Lashkar-e-Taiba is headed by Muhammad Saeed, who plays a key role in the group's operational activities, terrorist training camps, ideology, and in its worldwide activities. Saeed was reportedly arrested in Pakistan in February 2009. Saeed determines where the graduates of the Lashkar camps in Pakistan are sent to fight and in 2005 he personally organized the infiltration of Lashkar militants into Iraq. He was in Saudi Arabia at the time, with the knowledge of the Saudi government (you cannot enter Saudi Arabia without permission). He also arranged for Lashkar operatives to be sent to Europe as fundraising coordinators. So Saudi Arabia again was a launching pad for sending highly-trained mujahidin to the war against the Americans in Iraq. This shows the global nature of Lashkar-e-Taiba. It is not just a provincial organization but one that has a global reach.

Haji Mohammad Ashraf has been Lashkar's chief financier since 2003, expanding the organization and increasing its fundraising activities. Mahmoud Mohammed Ahmad Ba'aziq, a Saudi national, served as the Lashkar leader in Saudi Arabia during the 1980s and 1990s, before Ashraf, and coordinated fundraising activity with non-governmental charities and businessmen in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime is aware of the money going to Lashkar in Saudi Arabia for its activities around the world.

Lashkar operations chief Zakir Rehman Lakvi was also reportedly arrested in a Pakistani raid on a Lashkar training camp. He was one of the masterminds of the Mumbai attack and was in constant cellular phone contact with the attackers. Lakvi has been very much involved in military operations in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Iraq.

Lashkar-e-Taiba would not have evolved to the scale they have reached without Saudi assistance. One key Saudi who helped build Lashkar into such an efficient and highly-trained organization is Abdul Aziz Barbaros. Barbaros, whose real name is Abdul Ahman el-Dosfari, fought with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. He was one of the founding members of Lashkar in Kashmir after the end of the Afghan war. He also traveled to Bosnia to assist the al-Qaeda-oriented mujahidin brigades there. During the 1980s and 1990s Barbaros served as a critical link between Lashkar, wealthy and pious Saudi financiers, and Pakistani and Muslim fanatics around the world.

Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin in Gaza routinely delivered speeches addressed to Lashkar-e-Taiba militant rallies in Kashmir and Pakistan. This is an example of the general mindset of radical Islamic solidarity. The Hamas leader in Gaza showed that he cared about what was happening with other Muslim minorities around the world, as they should care about what is happening in Gaza or the West Bank. This is not necessarily directly connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Iraq, this is seen as a struggle against the American "Crusade occupation." This reflects Bin Laden's 1998 declaration of jihad, when he spoke of the Islamic front against the Crusaders and the Jews. So everything is linked and what happened in Mumbai has a wider perspective.

Global Islam Penetrates Gaza

The notion of global Islam has also penetrated to Gaza and to some extent in the West Bank. This phenomenon exists under the umbrella of Hamas, which enables a revival of global jihadi organizations in Gaza such as Jaish al-Islam and others. The emergence of these groups is worrying because they are very much inspired by the global jihadi, Saudi Wahhabi ideology - a strict interpretation of Islam which is being interpreted into political and terrorist activity. What is important in this phenomenon is the radicalization of the already radicalized society in Gaza.

The bottom line is that we are seeing the same pattern of global jihad-oriented groups starting to be active in Gaza. They have carried out some attacks, mostly directed against foreign, Western institutions like the YMCA and the American School. Yet they have played only a marginal role in attacks against Israeli targets.

Hamas in Gaza

I think the situation of Hamas control in Gaza is irreversible. From my reading of Hamas publications in Arabic, it is clear that there is no way back, only ahead, to take control in the West Bank if they become strong enough. Hamas could agree to a hudna (calm) for fifty years, but there will be no recognition of Israel or a cessation of the struggle against it.

If Hamas was ready to act pragmatically, it would no longer be Hamas. It would be something else. And then the frustrated factions within Hamas would break off and join up with the radical global jihadi organizations in Gaza. Those organizations hope to provide a refuge for Hamas radicals who believe that any normalization or pragmatism would be harmful to the Hamas cause.

This is not just my hypothesis. The declarations of Hamas leaders Zahar and Siam have hinted that if Hamas were to lose its real identity, people would shift their loyalties and activities to a more genuine Islamic organization, not a pragmatic, opportunistic, hudna-style one.

Should we talk with Hamas? Is the international community ready to sit down with al-Qaeda? There is no difference. It is a total misrepresentation to say Hamas is like the IRA. There is no political wing of Hamas disconnected from the operational wing. There are no pragmatists to speak to. At the end of the day, those who believe that trying to talk to Hamas is the right way to conduct business here in the Middle East will be in for a big disappointment.

* * *
Col. (res.) Jonathan Fighel is a senior research scholar at the International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT). He is also a member of the International Academic Counter Terrorism Community (ICTAC) and serves as a consultant and expert witness for the U.S. Department of Justice on Hamas trials, as well as to private U.S.-based law firms in cases of prosecuting al-Qaeda terrorism. His expertise also includes the Palestinian Authority, Islamist terror groups (Hamas, PIJ, al-Qaeda), funding, Palestinian terrorism and the Palestinian suicide terrorism phenomenon. This Jerusalem Issue Brief is based on his presentation at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs in Jerusalem on December 9, 2008.

HAMAS BUDDY "CAIR"(the Council on American-Islamic Relations) IS RUNNING SCARED

In the past seven days, evidence surfaced that the FBI was cutting off its primary contacts with CAIR (the Council on American-Islamic Relations), after CAIR refused to address FBI questions about CAIR’s relationship to Hamas (a designated terrorist organization). Then, five members of Congress sent a letter to other members of Congress entitled “Beware of CAIR,” citing the evidence that the FBI had severed ties with CAIR. CAIR has responded in its predictable fashion – attack the messengers. The commentary below, from the website of SANE (Society of Americans for National Existence), includes the response letter that CAIR sent to Congresswoman Sue Myrick, co-chair of the House Anti-Terrorism Caucus. One line in CAIR’s letter is telling:
“If enduring these baseless attacks from you is part of God’s price for freedom, we embrace them.”
Playing the victim, or in this case, the martyr, is a common tactic among Islamists. In CAIR’s world, any critique or criticism of it, no matter how reasoned or documented, is anti-Muslim bigotry. For CAIR to claim that allegations against it are “baseless” is, well, baseless. Why would the FBI finally make the decision it did to sever ties with CAIR if there was no basis for doing so? Why would the Justice Department list CAIR as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation terrorism financing trial if there was no basis for doing so? Why would an FBI agent, testifying under oath during that trial, label CAIR as a front organization for Islamist extremism if there was no basis for saying so? The answer is they wouldn’t.
Updated: CAIR, the unindicted Hamas-Muslim Brotherhood co-conspirator, is running scared! by SANE Staff, Thu, February 05, 2009, 08:00:AM Available files: CAIR Scare Letter to Cong Sue Myrick When Representative Sue Myrick learned that the FBI had severed its connections with and ties to CAIR, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, based in Washington, D.C., she understood the significance of this event. On the one hand, the US Attorneys prosecuting the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (the largest Muslim charity in the US post-9/11), CAIR Texas officials and others for materially supporting terrorism in the Middle East had taken the unprecedented step to publicly identify CAIR, ISNA, and other such groups as unindicted co-conspirators in the HLF criminal trial. On the other hand, members of the FBI would use CAIR as a sounding board for the "Muslim community" notwithstanding the lack of any evidence that CAIR represents anyone much less a "Muslim community" known largely for its lack of community organization. As a result, Rep. Myrick, who is deeply involved in counterterrorism issues in Congress, wrote a letter outlining this new awareness by the FBI to her congressional colleagues. (See here, here, and here for the fallout from the FBI decision to cut ties with CAIR and Rep. Myrick's letter to her colleagues warning them of CAIR's nefarious beginnings, middles, and ends.) As a result, and almost precisely on cue, CAIR went on the offensive in an abject display of desperation. In the midst of their explanation that they are just a "civil rights organization" defending the downtrodden and oppressed among Muslims in America, they launch into a personal attack on Rep. Myrick, and this organization, SANE. (The letter is available above in pdf format for download at the unique url for this entry.) What CAIR has done here they have done before and will continue to do in the future. SANE, David Yerushalmi, Rep. Myrick, Robert Spencer, Stephen Coughlin, Dr. Andy Bostom, Frank Gaffney, Brigitte Gabriel, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Tawfiq Hamid, and many others, have taken on the difficult but critically important task to identify precisely the Enemy Common Threat Doctrine which animates the worldwide jihad against unbelievers and the West generally. This doctrine is of course Shariah or Islamic law. This doctrine commands the faithful to engage in the conversion, subjugation or murder of those who resist Shariah's call for submission to a worldwide hegemony called a caliphate. CAIR's approach to public discourse on this subject, however, is to take writings out of context and to conceal the careful and thoughtful analysis of Shariah and to distort that body of work into a caricature of simple anti-Muslim bigotry. We have responded to this ad hominem approach in broad strokes here but for those interested, the more telling response to CAIR is to simply quote two of the most authoritative and "mainstream" Shariah authorities in the world. The first is the Dow Jones Shariah advisor Mufti Taqi Usmani, who has written a book on how a "good" Muslim ought to behave while living among the infidels in the West. In that book, published in 1999 in English and available on Amazon.com, Usmani wrote:
I am in receipt of your esteemed letter. Whatever you have written about Jehad can be summarized as this “If a non-Muslim state allows for preaching Islam in its country, Jehad against it does not remain lawful.” If this is what you mean, my humble self does not agree with it. Obstruction in the way of preaching Islam does not mean only a legal obstacle, but greater power or domination of a non-Muslim state against Muslims is by itself a great obstacle in the propagation of Islam. There are no legal restrictions in most of the countries today on preaching Islam, but since their grandeur and authority is established in the world, it has led to developing a universal feeling which forms a greater obstacle than the greatest legal binding in the way of free propagation of Islam. For this reason the most important purpose of Jehad is to break this grandeur so that the resulting psychological subordination should come to an end and the way of accepting the Truth become smooth. As long as this grandeur and domination persists the hearts of people will remain subdued and will not be fully inclined to accept the religion of Truth. Hence Jehad will continue. The Qur'an said in Sura Tauba:
Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worship and pay the poor-due, then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.
Here, killing is to continue until the unbelievers pay Jizyah [subjugation tax on non-Muslims] after they are humbled or overpowered. If the purpose of killing was only to acquire permission and freedom of preaching Islam, it would have been said “until they allow for preaching Islam.” But the obligation of Jizyah and along with it the mention of their subordination is a clear proof that the purpose is to smash their grandeur, so that the veils of their domination should be raised and people get a free chance to think over the blessings of Islam. Imam Razi has written the following commentary on this verse:
The purpose of “Jizyah” is not to let the unbelievers stay in their contumacy against Islam but sparing their lives to give them a chance for a time during which they may hopefully get convinced of the truth of Islam and embrace it. So when an unbeliever is given time wherein he would be observing the respect and honour of Islam, and hearing the arguments of its validity, and also observing the baselesness of disbelief, these things would convince him to turn towards Islam. This, in fact, is the real purpose of legalizing Jizyah.
According to CAIR and it's national leadership, the most important and authoritative Shariah authority for them and their Muslim Brotherhood associates is Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Mr. Qaradawi is well known for his fatwa ordering the mujahideen of Afghanistan and Iraq to murder American combat soldiers and civilian contractors. He has also issued a fatwa authorizing the suicide-murder of any Jew in Israel--man, woman, or child. He is quoted from Al-Jazeera t.v. as follows: Oh Allah, take your enemies, the enemies of Islam. Oh Allah, take the Jews, the treacherous aggressors. Oh Allah, take this profligate, cunning, arrogant band of people. Oh Allah, they have spread much tyranny and corruption in the land. Pour Your wrath upon them, oh our God. Lie in wait for them. Oh Allah, You annihilated the people of Thamoud at the hand of a tyrant, and You annihilated the people of 'Aad with a fierce, icy gale. Oh Allah, You annihilated the people Thamoud at the hand of a tyrant, You annihilated the people of 'Aad with a fierce, icy gale, and You destroyed the Pharaoh and his soldiers — oh Allah, take this oppressive, tyrannical band of people. Oh Allah, take this oppressive, Jewish, Zionist band of people. Oh Allah, do not spare a single one of them. Oh Allah, count their numbers, and kill them, down to the very last one. If CAIR were interested in a real discussion of these matters, as they suggest in their letter to Rep. Myrick, they have lacked neither opportunities nor platforms. Instead, they engage in the rankest form of ad hominem and issue statements denouncing "terrorism" and the murder of "innocents" and the need for "justice" in the world. But anyone who has spent any time studying this Shariah propaganda understands it for what it is. All of the Shariah authorities, including OBL (who is not himself a Shariah authority), issue the same pronouncements because, per Shariah, jihad is not "terror"; the "killing of infidels" is not the "murder of innocents"; and "justice" is only achieved, as Mufti Usmani and Sheikh Qaradawi tell us ever so clearly, when Shariah-Islam rules the world and CAIR and its minions can shed their western disguises and apply Shariah's rule of law without apology or ruse and dominate all others who continue to resist Shariah-Islam. NB: Full disclosure: CAIR isolates on David Yerushalmi because he is representing several African American Muslims who are suing CAIR in federal court for racketeering, fraud and other crimes. See here.

ARE FATAH FORCES VIABLE IN GAZA?

The Jerusalem Viewpoints series is published by the Institute for Contemporary Affairs,
founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

Jerusalem Viewpoints
No. 569 January-February 2009

Can the Palestinian Authority's Fatah Forces Retake Gaza?

Obstacles and Opportunities

Dan Diker and Khaled Abu Toameh

Israel's recent military operation in Gaza has raised the issue of the possible return of Fatah to Gaza. However, a previous U.S.-funded and armed Fatah security regime in Gaza had entirely failed. In fact, the PA in the West Bank has offered safe haven to terror groups, and the PA Interior Ministry pays monthly salaries to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades terrorists.
Today, some PA forces are far more professional, having been equipped and trained by U.S. security officials in Jordan. However, these forces are still in their infancy. They have less than one year's experience, number fewer than 1,500 men, and lack a central command structure.
It is widely believed that the PA in Ramallah only pays the salaries of civil service employees in Gaza to encourage them to stay at home to avoid working with Hamas. However, PA Prime Minister Fayyad also pays the monthly salaries of between 6,000 and 12,000 Hamas Executive Force operatives in Gaza, in line with the 2007 Mecca national unity agreement.
Former PA Civil Affairs Minister Mohammed Dahlan, whose forces were routed by Hamas in June 2007, has re-emerged as a leading candidate to command Fatah's security forces, particularly to secure the Gaza crossing points into Egypt and Israel. Palestinian documents captured in 2002 revealed Dahlan's involvement in major racketeering, including revenues from cigarettes, cement, and the collection of illegal crossing fees. Dahlan's personal wealth has been estimated at well over $120 million.
The U.S. must avoid the temptation of once again blindly relying on Fatah as the sole security and reconstruction subcontractor for Gaza. The Obama administration must implement tough and verifiable directives to facilitate internal Palestinian housecleaning: no militias, good governance, complete accountability, full transparency, effectiveness, and zero tolerance for corruption, gangsterism, and terror within PA ranks.


Overview

Israel's three-week military operation in Gaza in December-January has raised the issue of the possible return of Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party to Gaza to replace the Hamas regime. The Israelis, Americans, the major European powers, and especially the Egyptians favor Abbas' forces regaining control not only over Gaza's border crossings, but also over the entire Strip. However, international demands for Fatah's return to Gaza face seemingly intractable obstacles.

A previous U.S.-funded and armed Fatah security regime in Gaza had entirely failed. Years of massive corruption and gangsterism by Fatah security forces resulted in an Iranian-financed, armed and trained Islamic emirate ruled by Hamas. Abbas had had the full backing of the international community to turn Gaza into the Hong Kong of the Middle East. Instead, Fatah collapsed under a Hamas assault in summer 2007.

Currently, the U.S.-sponsored Fatah forces in the West Bank are still ill-prepared for the task of taking control in Gaza. Two modest paramilitary forces have been trained to police crime and enforce public order, but not to uproot terror groups. In fact, the PA has increasingly offered safe haven to terror groups. Brig.-Gen. Radhi Assida, the PA National Security Forces (NSF) commander in Jenin, revealed to the Palestinian website Maan on January 24, 2009, that PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's NSF had agreed to provide protection to four senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists wanted by Israel. Assida also confirmed that PIJ operatives continue to receive monthly salaries from the PA Interior Ministry, just like their colleagues in the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades.1 Furthermore, thousands of Fatah security operatives in Gaza and the West Bank have realigned their loyalties away from Abbas and Fayyad. Other armed militias are currently less active or dormant but remain armed and intact. Some local militia commanders continue mafia-like criminal enterprises while simultaneously working as local commanders in PA security forces, thereby continuing to undermine public trust.

In post-war Gaza, Fatah forces would face a wall of opposition from Hamas and many other Jihadi groups. Hamas' military leadership remains intact, as do most of its terror capabilities. Hamas continues to enjoy popular support from a majority of Palestinians, particularly those living in Gaza, despite public anger over the war. Fatah will be hard-pressed to re-take the Gaza Strip because the party has lost credibility among Palestinians, largely because of its failure to reform itself and get rid of icons of corruption among the top brass.2


International Calls for Fatah's Return to Gaza

Israel's military campaign to destroy the Hamas army and terror infrastructure in Gaza triggered broad international efforts to implement a cease-fire that would include the return of Palestinian Authority forces to Gaza. The international community appears determined to help stop weapons smuggling into Gaza and reopen the Gaza border crossings to Egypt and Israel and restore a Gaza-West Bank link.3

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is backing the return of Abbas' forces to the crossings in line with the U.S.-brokered 2005 border crossing agreements.4 He hosted the major European powers at Sharm al-Sheik on January 18, 2009, immediately following the Gaza cease-fire, to discuss new security measures to stop Hamas weapons smuggling beneath the Egyptian-Gaza border and to secure the flow of humanitarian aid via the crossings.

The UN Security Council approved Resolution 1860 that explicitly called for restoring the 2005 Gaza crossing agreement between the PA and Israel and affirming Gaza as an integral part of PA-controlled territory.5 Abbas traveled to the UN in New York to support the resolution.6 PA officials in the West Bank also indicated a readiness to send forces to Gaza, but noted, "It depends on whether Israel manages to get rid of the Hamas regime."7 U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the UN Security Council that stabilizing Gaza will "require a principled resolution of the political challenges in Gaza that reestablishes ultimately the Palestinian Authority's legitimate control and facilitates the normal operation of all crossings."8 President Barak Obama has called for the reopening of the Gaza border crossings, while making his first overseas phone call to a foreign leader to PA Chairman Abbas to express support.9


Which "Fatah Forces" are Jerusalem, Washington, and Cairo Counting On?

The convergence of opposition to Hamas in Washington, Cairo, Riyadh, Jerusalem, and Ramallah could serve as a pretext for regime change in Gaza. However, international hopes for such a change may be premature since the PA's security forces do not constitute a single, professional, experienced and disciplined military organization under a centralized chain of command. Rather, Fatah security forces are divided into several paramilitary groups in the West Bank and Gaza, some more reformed and effective than others.

Since Oslo, Fatah's multiple security forces constitute several militias that were originally established and commanded by Yasser Arafat, who employed Palestinian "graduates" of Israeli prisons and others who lacked any formal police or security training.10 Today, however, some of the PA forces are far more professional, having been equipped and trained by U.S. security officials in Jordan.11 PA National Security Forces report to Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, while Mahmoud Abbas controls the Presidential Guard, a smaller force that protects the Abbas regime and functions as a police force. However, these forces are still in their infancy. They have less than one year's experience, number fewer than 1,500 men, and lack a chief of staff and an overall "top-down" central command structure. Fayyad's NSF has not yet demonstrated the ability or will to uproot both active and dormant terror groups and militias.12

In Gaza, Fatah retains a residual, yet completely decentralized, force infrastructure of competing security militias that are not loyal to Abbas but to local leaders, militia commanders, and crime families.13

One of the problems in creating a robust PA military force large enough to reassert control in Gaza is that Palestinian commanders do not automatically enjoy the loyalty of their soldiers. Palestinian allegiances are invariably influenced by Arab cultural affiliations to clan, family, town, neighborhood, and political group. Many Palestinian NSF officers have family members and close relatives that are employed by competing security organizations or armed militias, which makes all-out armed confrontation highly unlikely. That explains in part the Fatah collapse in June 2007, as its forces were unable to confront their brothers, cousins, and uncles in Hamas.


Fatah Forces in Gaza

In Gaza, tens of thousands of former Fatah security personnel and activists maintain loyalties to various former PA security forces and commanders, such as the deposed former strongman Mohammed Dahlan. Some former Fatah security personnel have found employment with the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as Hamas and local crime families such as the Dughmush and al-Samhadana clans, and local al-Qaeda-inspired Salafist groups such as Jaish al-Islam, Fatah al-Islam, and Jaish al-Umma. The Fatah umbrella in Gaza also includes a number of smaller militias such as the Abu Rish Brigades, which had broken away from Fatah's Preventive Security forces.

Some of the fourteen competing security organizations Arafat had established after the signing of the Oslo agreements were disbanded in 2005 under the direction of the U.S. Special Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton, who moved to enforce Quartet Roadmap reforms. However, the unofficial militias have never been uprooted or disbanded. Instead, militia members froze their activities by agreement with the PA in exchange for compensation from the PA and clemency from Israel. Some local militia group commanders were even integrated into the "reformed" security forces under U.S. supervision, as ranking officers, while they continued to extort and threaten local businessmen.14

In 2009, thousands of "unemployed" Fatah militiamen, such as members of the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades, still hold weapons that they conceal in their homes. In their current dormant status, they also continue to receive monthly salaries from the Palestinian Authority on the instructions of Abbas and Fayyad,15 who are eager to avoid conflict with these groups and to protect themselves from the death threats made by the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Hamas against them.16


Hamas Threatens, Fatah Pays

The enmity between Fatah and Hamas is far greater than Palestinian hatred of Israel.17 Nasser Juma'a, a Palestinian Legislative Council member from Nablus, described Hamas as "insects" in the final week of Israel's offensive in Gaza.18 Hamas legislator Salah Bardaweel countered that PA Chairman Abbas "played a major role" in the Israeli killing of Hamas Interior Minister Said Siam "through his men in the Gaza Strip, who have been pointing out the homes of Hamas members."19 However, what is remarkable and ignored in Western diplomatic circles is that Fayyad has continued to pay the monthly salaries of between 6,000 and 12,000 Hamas Executive Force operatives in Gaza, in line with the 2007 Mecca national unity agreement that brought Hamas under the umbrella of the Palestinian Authority for budgetary purposes.20

It is widely believed in Western diplomatic circles that the PA in Ramallah was only paying the salaries of civil service employees in Gaza to encourage them to stay at home to avoid working with Hamas, especially after Hamas' expulsion of Fatah in June 2007. This is incorrect. The PA, and indirectly the U.S., and international donor countries have continued to pay monthly salaries to Hamas security operatives (Read: terrorists) and their commanders from the PA's $120 million monthly budget allocation to the Gaza Strip.21 The height of irony in this regard may have been seen during the Gaza war when Hamas fighters received their salaries from the PA at Gaza City's Shifa Hospital which was immune from IDF fire.22


Understanding the Hidden Complexities of the Fatah Security Forces

The prospective return of any Fatah security forces to Gaza must take into account the complexities of the many competing centers of Fatah power, as well their implications within the context of Palestinian political culture. For the past 16 years, U.S., European, and Israeli policy-makers have lavished billions of dollars on "strong" leaders like Arafat, or actively sought to strengthen "weak" leaders like Abbas, without assessing the effect of these policies on the internal Palestinian political discussion.23 For example, the PA received $3 billion in 2008, according to French estimates,24 while the December 2007 Paris donor's conference committed to transfer over $7 billion in aid to the PA over the years 2008-2010.25 Yet the Palestinian public still sees U.S.-led international assistance as a virtual "payoff" to a corrupt government and security forces in exchange for PA cooperation.

After years of unsuccessful Western-backed PA security regimes, since the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993, and through the Annapolis agreement in 2008, the Palestinian street is largely convinced that U.S. backing of the PA has sanctified brutality, state-approved "gangsterism," and corruption in the name of stopping radicals and advancing the peace process. Palestinian public cynicism translated into Hamas' landslide parliamentary victory in 2006 and its subsequent takeover of Gaza in 2007. This analysis, then, may serve as a basis for careful reconsideration of past misassumptions about Fatah's security capabilities and help clarify current security realities in Gaza.


Back to Square One? The Return of Mohammed Dahlan

Former PA Civil Affairs Minister Mohammed Dahlan, who had headed the U.S.-backed Fatah Preventive Security force in Gaza until Hamas routed his forces in June 2007, has re-emerged as a leading candidate to command Fatah's security forces, particularly to secure the Gaza crossing points into Egypt and Israel. Despite Hamas' bloody thrashing of Dahlan's forces, his prospective return to Gaza reportedly aroused the interest of former Secretary of State Rice.26 Palestinian and Egyptian leaders have also been interested in Dahlan's reassertion of control.27 While Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak reportedly told PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad that, "For me, Dahlan does not exist,"28 current circumstances would point to his involvement in any new PA security force in Gaza.

Dahlan appears to have emerged from retirement to his Cairo villa where he had kept a low profile since the Hamas takeover. However, he has of late given many interviews on Egyptian and Saudi media outlets, blasting Hamas' deep connection to Iran while making thinly veiled suggestions as to his potential role in rebuilding Gaza.29 It is no coincidence that the Egyptians and Saudis are providing Dahlan a platform to condemn Hamas. Cairo and Riyadh quietly backed the Israeli operation in Gaza and had backed Dahlan's forces with some $20 million before the 2007 coup.30

Although Dahlan lost many men and even his home to Hamas, he continues to enjoy the backing of several thousand armed Fatah activists who have remained in Gaza under Hamas rule. A major motivating factor behind Dahlan's possible return is the billions of dollars in international aid that have been promised to finance reconstruction efforts. Dahlan had built his personal fortune by being Fatah's key man in Gaza between 1996 and 2007.31 Perhaps most significantly, Dahlan may be the only Palestinian leader unfazed by threats of revenge by other Palestinian groups.32

Reports of U.S. interest in Dahlan's re-involvement in Gaza follow nearly twelve years of close coordination with the United States. He had been a long-time favorite of the Clinton and Bush administrations and was praised as a reformer during the Oslo years for publicly criticizing Arafat's dictatorship and calling for Palestinian security reforms.33 Starting in 1996, President Clinton approved intensive CIA and FBI backing of Dahlan's Preventive Security forces and other PA security organs.34

Dahlan's relationships with Washington were top-tier.35 He referred to Bill Clinton as "a friend." Dahlan was also embraced by lawmakers and senior security officials alike.36 A senior member of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence told the authors in 2005 that Dahlan was "charming." Dahlan too understood the importance of his U.S. partners. In early 2008 Dahlan said of CIA Director George Tenet, "He is simply a great and fair man."37 President George W. Bush also met with Dahlan on several occasions. After talks at the White House in July 2003, Bush publicly praised Dahlan as "a good, solid leader" and reportedly called him "our guy" to advisors behind closed doors.38


Reviving a Failed Security Paradigm?

A key question is whether Dahlan's possible return essentially revives a failed strategy. Until Dahlan's forces collapsed before Hamas, the U.S. had placed its full weight behind him, investing at least $56 million in the PA security infrastructure at the Karni crossing39 where General Dayton had invested much of his time before the Hamas coup.40 The U.S. had also backed a high-risk, covert State Department plan code-named "Plan B,"41 that was drafted jointly by U.S., Jordanian, and PA officials, that called for Dahlan's Fatah forces to overthrow Hamas in Gaza and reassert control.42 While the White House vigorously denied any such designs, the plan was widely known among senior Fatah officials.43

Dayton, though listed as a key figure in the Dahlan project, would later deny any material involvement with the plan.44 However, he testified before Congress on May 23, 2007, just weeks before the Fatah collapse in Gaza, saying, "the $3 million assistance package to the (Palestinian) Office of National Security ensures that the U.S. Security Coordinator has a strong and capable partner as we proceed with Palestinian security sector transformation and our focus on a smaller but more capable Palestinian security force, operating under the rule of law and with respect for human rights."45 Yet Dayton's security program was roundly criticized by senior Israeli defense officials as "a complete failure."46

It is widely recognized in Palestinian circles that at the time of the Hamas coup, Dahlan's Fatah force simply refused to fight. Fewer than 10,000 armed Hamas men managed to defeat 70,000 U.S.-backed Fatah loyalists. It is also no secret among Palestinians that Dahlan was shuttling between Cairo and Germany for "medical treatment" for bad knees during the fighting, despite having been paid handsomely for his security efforts.47 Hamas did not have to work hard to repel a Fatah takeover attempt. Hamas operatives recruited Fatah family members to convince their relatives in uniform to surrender without fighting.

The Gaza debacle was a setback for Dahlan. The extent of his personal fortune - amassed during the time when he cooperated closely with Washington on the peace process - may not be well known by the incoming U.S. administration. Palestinian documents captured in the IDF's 2002 Defensive Shield operation revealed Dahlan's involvement in major racketeering, including revenues from cigarettes, cement, and the collection of illegal crossing fees.48 He was also known as a partner in the smuggling networks involving the Rafah border tunnels, together with the al-Samhadana crime family.

Ironically, even prior to 2007, U.S. security officials had not been deterred by Dahlan's actions and reputation on the Palestinian street. He had been a key architect of the 2005 border crossing agreements that he designed with U.S. Secretary of State Rice, but which fell apart after Hamas violence drove European monitors to abandon their posts. Glenn Kessler noted in his 2007 biography of Rice that in the 2005 Gaza crossing agreements, "Rice focused especially on Mohammed Dahlan, the Palestinian Authority's civil affairs minister, but in effect Fatah's boss in Gaza, because Abbas would never agree to a deal unless Dahlan gave his approval."49 Dahlan had controlled the security and economic aspects of the Karni and Rafah crossing points, where at least 750 truckloads of goods and 1,000 Palestinians passed daily including many Hamas leaders that were on Israel's "wanted" list.50 Costly import licenses and crossing permits were all in the hands of Dahlan's people and are widely believed to have generated millions of dollars in profits.

A former senior World Bank official had estimated Dahlan's personal wealth at well over $120 million as of mid-2005, just before Israel's disengagement from Gaza.51 Dahlan's personal fortune is a notable achievement, since most of his life has been spent in and around Gaza refugee camps, Israeli prisons, and Fatah security installations.


Palestinian Impatience with Dahlan

Gazans and West Bankers have been less forgiving than the U.S. of Dahlan's record. The former Gaza strongman's reputation for brutality, extortion, and corruption precedes him. Torture of Hamas and other opponents in Gaza by Dahlan loyalists have even been documented on "YouTube."52 Fatah websites implicated him, together with the Gaza-based Dughmush clan, in the 2005 murder of General Musa Arafat, Fatah's former head of Military Intelligence and National Security forces in Gaza.53 The Palestinian street had branded Dahlan "the CIA" for years, ever since the U.S. agency had provided him a black bullet-proof SUV.

No less troubling for Israel is the fact that years of CIA and Israeli Security Agency coordination did not prevent Dahlan's alleged complicity in ordering a deadly terror attack against an Israeli school bus in Gaza on November 18, 2000, that killed two adults and severely wounded three children from the Cohen family who were former Gush Katif residents.54


Mahmoud Abbas' PA Presidential Guard

While the United States, Egypt, and Western countries have mentioned the possible return to Gaza of PA forces loyal to Mahmoud Abbas, his direct authority and influence has been limited to the Ramallah-based Presidential Guard - a modest 1,500-man armed force. The Presidential Guard is tasked with protecting the PA Chairman and the Fatah regime but not foiling terror attacks, or uprooting militias in the West Bank. Even with dedicated security forces that continue to undergo U.S.-sponsored training at bases near Jericho in line with the Roadmap security reform program, Abbas rarely ventures out of Ramallah.

The dangers to Abbas posed by various terror groups, militias, warlords, and gangs have prevented him from visiting most Palestinian cities and towns in the West Bank, let alone refugee camps, earning him the reputation on the Palestinian street of being "the Mayor of Ramallah." The Presidential Guard's record in Gaza is mixed. They were among the first to surrender to Hamas in June 2007, and subsequently were not officially disbanded but became dormant, as opposed to their West Bank counterparts that were retrained and resupplied by U.S. military advisors under General Dayton.55


Salam Fayyad's Palestinian National Security Forces

The Palestinian National Security Forces that are funded by and report to the office of PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are the most likely security command that could be deployed to Gaza in the framework of a cease-fire agreement. The NSF was restructured following the 2007 defeat by Hamas. Secretary of State Rice worked closely with General Dayton and Fayyad to retrofit a verifiably reformed Palestinian force in line with the Annapolis peace process framework of a shelf agreement between Israel and the PA that would come to fruition if and when the PA would be capable of fulfilling its security requirements under the first stage of the Quartet Roadmap. The U.S. provided $86 million in July 2007 to train 1,100 recruits, while another $75 million was earmarked for a national security installation under construction near Jericho.56

The NSF's motivation to succeed stems from the Fatah leadership's fear of a Hamas takeover in the West Bank. The NSF's initial successes in several West Bank cities, including Jenin, Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem, have restored a certain sense of public security to local residents, as well as attracting thousands of Israeli Arabs to shop in Jenin and Nablus which has helped jumpstart the West Bank economy.

Since its first deployment in May 2008, the NSF - which Hamas has branded "the Dayton forces" - has forcefully confronted Hamas supporters in the West Bank. The NSF has also closed down some Hamas charities in public displays of force, while redirecting Hamas charity money to PA coffers. PA security forces have also arrested Hamas activists and have reduced threatening activity in Hamas-controlled mosques. The readiness of the NSF to confront Hamas publicly is unprecedented; Arafat had avoided confronting Hamas, while Fayyad is doing so.

Despite intensive U.S. and Palestinian efforts to maximize performance, there still remains a large question mark over whether these forces possess the ability and will to take more aggressive action against terror groups and armed gangs in the West Bank, and whether they stand a chance of successfully redeploying to Gaza. General Dayton admitted in a December 2008 interview that the NSF "is not the Israel Defense Forces. They are orienting their efforts totally on the lawless elements within Palestinian society.so that Palestinian families can walk down the streets at night and not be intimidated or threatened by either criminals or men with guns."57

Some Israel Defense Forces senior commanders agree with Dayton. In fact, IDF Central Command has been highly critical of the U.S.-backed PA forces, insisting that PA forces in the West Bank cities are not combating terrorists, while warning that "terrorist organizations in Nablus, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, were cooperating in their attempts to perpetrate terror attacks against Israel, and building an underground tunnel system in Nablus."58 According to a senior IDF official, "There is no doubt that the moment the IDF leaves this territory, the Palestinians will have a rocket capability in the West Bank."59


Fatah's Rejection of Fayyad: A Roadblock to Gaza

The PA's NSF is funded by and reports to the office of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. His office and the PA Interior Ministry vet candidates and pay salaries, while Mahmoud Abbas is not directly involved with the NSF. This is significant because U.S. and European efforts to implement a Gaza cease-fire have included discussion of the return of PA security forces to Gaza that are "loyal to Abbas." Yet the U.S.-backed post-Gaza security reform concept was to create a non-Fatah professional army. However, other than an initial round of recruited commanders who were not from Fatah, subsequent officer recruits were mostly affiliated with Fatah. This reflects Fayyad's own problematic political status in the PA areas. He is not a Fatah member and receives no political backing from the Fatah power structure.

Moreover, Fayyad's lack of grassroots support handicaps his ability to maintain control and loyalty of commanders and forces in the field, which would only be exacerbated should Fatah seek a return to Gaza. This is significant because Fayyad's close cooperation with the United States, the West, and Israel must also translate to implementation on the ground. While Fayyad is probably the most impressive professional Palestinian statesman the U.S. and the West have ever worked with, Palestinian elites and the public essentially view Fayyad as a de facto American agent. While Abbas has also cooperated closely with Israel, the U.S., and the West, and has also received death threats on Hamas and Fatah terror group websites, his status as Fatah royalty protects him from opponents and maintains his political base.

Senior Fatah advisors and former ministers close to Abbas have been critical of the U.S. decision to place the PA's major security force in the hands of Fayyad. The Fatah central committee even voted in Ramallah in November 2008 to compel Abbas to remove Fayyad from being in charge of the NSF and to replace with him with a Fatah member. In late January 2009, Fayyad offered to resign his post following accusations by Fatah that Fayyad was an obstacle to reconciliation with Hamas.60


Dormant Terror Groups: The Hidden Threat to the West Bank and Gaza

Hamas is not the only major threat to Fayyad's forces in the West Bank. There are multiple armed terror groups and militias that have temporarily kept a low profile. However, they are capable of undermining the entire PA security regime. Despite reports in early 2008 by Fayyad's office that militias such as the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Islamic Jihad in the West Bank had been dismantled, it turned out that Fayyad had essentially agreed to a mutually advantageous modus vivendi with these groups. Gunmen have agreed to hide their weapons, and Fayyad has agreed to "hide" operatives on Israel's target list in PA jails under a "revolving door" policy allowing freedom of entry and exit, which had created serious concern among senior IDF commanders.61 Fayyad also reached agreement with Israel on a general clemency program for some militia members in exchange for their commitment to cease all terror activity against Israel.62 However, senior IDF commanders have also expressed related concerns that since the NSF deployment, "weapons provided by the U.S. to the PA are finding their way to Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists in Jenin as well as in Nablus."63 Abbas also had expended great efforts to incorporate the Islamic terrorist organizations into the Palestinian government.64

Another major concern of the IDF senior command has been that local terror militias, such as the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the West Bank, have also been integrated into local NSF units. Such militia leaders include Abu Jaber, an infamous local gang leader in Nablus who is also a NSF commander, who regularly extorts Nablus business owners for protection money.65


Gaza: From "Hamastan" to "Fatahland"

While the West sees the PA's Abbas and Fayyad as the only legitimate Palestinian address, the issue is far more complex within the Palestinian political discussion. Abbas is seen by the Palestinian street as "done," incapable of delivering peace or anything of value to the Palestinians.66 Despite Palestinian anger at Hamas for causing the recent IDF incursion, many Palestinians, including elites and even traditional Fatah allies, still see Hamas as democratically legitimate since it won the 2006 parliamentary elections. Hamas appears to be more popular than ever among the Palestinians residents of Gaza. In mid-December 2008, some 250,000 Palestinians took to the streets to celebrate Hamas' 21st anniversary.67

Abbas is likely to face substantial roadblocks to reestablishing Fatah control or coming to a modus vivendi with Hamas. Fatah-Hamas tensions are at a high point. Hamas and much of the Gazan public are convinced that Abbas supplied Israel with intelligence and other operational information to use to destroy the Hamas terror infrastructure. As Palestinian analyst Mohammed Yaghi noted, "Hamas even accused Nimir Hamad, Abbas' political adviser, of calling Israeli defense official Amos Gilad and advising him to target Hamas operators and installations only."68 In fact, since the outset of Israel's military operation in Gaza, Fatah members there have been rounded up and brutally tortured by Hamas operatives, who have turned school buildings and hospitals into make-shift interrogation centers.69 Hamas also renewed house arrest orders against Fatah officials and activists in Gaza shortly after the military operation started. Since the cease-fire, Hamas has stolen international relief shipments, even hijacking international aid trucks to prevent Fatah from taking any credit in the eyes of the Palestinians.

Hamas no longer recognizes the presidential authority of Mahmoud Abbas after his four-year term ended on January 9, 2009, although Abbas has decided to remain in office, based on his reading of Palestinian law.70 More importantly, the Hamas leadership is still intact. The IDF estimates that 400 to 700 Hamas operatives were killed in the Gaza operation.71 That leaves most of Hamas' 15,000-man army and 10,000-man police force in place, including Izaddine al-Kassam, the Hamas Executive Force, and internal security forces. A significant quantity of Hamas weapons and ammunition remains hidden. Furthermore, during and after the IDF operation, Hamas continued to smuggle weapons and contraband via underground tunnels from Sinai to Gaza.

Hamas is not concerned about a tactical reconciliation with Fatah. Several scenarios can serve Hamas interests. Hamas may agree to a Fatah-Hamas national "reconciliation" government for tactical reasons, as it did in 2007, to gain international recognition, benefit from the billions of dollars of international aid, and rebuild their offensive capabilities against Israel using the Fatah-led PA as a fig leaf. At the same time, Hamas will again subvert Fatah control on the ground.

Alternatively, Hamas may return to its more natural role as the agent of muqawama (Islamic armed resistance) while reengaging Fatah forces in another round of civil war, which has killed hundreds of Palestinians since Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in September 2005. The armed strife intensified after the Palestinian national unity government was brokered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in February 2007 and lasted until the Hamas takeover in June of that year.

Hamas is not the only opposition force that Abbas will face. Fatah's armed wing, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, announced on January 19, 2009, that its men in Gaza fought against Israel alongside Hamas, together with Islamic Jihad's Al-Quds Battalions. The Al Aksa Brigades said they fired 102 rockets and 35 mortars, and detonated explosive devices that wounded a number of IDF soldiers.72


The U.S. and European Role in Securing and Rebuilding Gaza

Frenetic Western diplomatic efforts have been focused on rebuilding Gaza under the control of the PA's West Bank leadership as a prelude to a final settlement. Washington and European powers have already committed several billion dollars to Gaza's reconstruction. They are anxious for a final settlement, and European leaders led by French President Nicholas Sarkozy are reportedly even willing to recognize Hamas in the context of a Fatah-Hamas unity government.73 Special UN envoy Tony Blair has also expressed his support for the idea.74 However, the current realities in Gaza may frustrate Western diplomatic plans.

It is far from clear that under current conditions any constellation of Fatah forces could successfully restore stability in Gaza, hope for Gazans, and long-term security for Israel. Despite the important yet limited security and economic reforms PA Prime Minister Fayyad has undertaken in the West Bank, the Palestinian public, both in Gaza and the West Bank, are far from confident that Fatah is anything but an incorrigibly corrupt and brutal regime that continues to be rewarded with billions of dollars from the U.S., Europe, and Israel. Since the cease-fire, some senior Fatah leaders have allegedly moved quickly to set up "straw" construction and contracting firms in the hope that the estimated $2.5 billion earmarked for rebuilding Gaza will be funneled through the PA and its privileged elites in Ramallah.75 Indeed, the Fatah-led P.A. will need to do much confidence-building to earn the trust of the Palestinian public.

The United States and the West must avoid the temptation of once again blindly relying on Fatah as the sole security and reconstruction subcontractor for Gaza. The Obama administration must implement tough and verifiable directives to facilitate internal Palestinian housecleaning: no militias, good governance, complete accountability, full transparency, effectiveness, and zero tolerance for corruption, gangsterism, and terror within PA ranks in Gaza and the West Bank. These steps are critical for the future of the Palestinian project and take immediate precedence over current negotiations with Israel.76

At the same time, U.S.-backed security efforts in the West Bank will need to be upgraded to ensure the complete cessation of all direct and indirect militia involvement on the ground or as part of the current NSF security regime. Only a decision to uproot the active and dormant militias and armed groups will ensure stability and enable the socioeconomic, "bottom-up" infrastructure-building that special envoy Tony Blair has worked diligently to develop in advance of renewed diplomacy.77

Any new Fatah-related security regime and government in Gaza that receives U.S. and Western financial support must also be required to submit to unprecedented oversight of rebuilding efforts, in order to implement missing financial controls and adopt "best-practice" standards. Corrupt and brutal warlords, gangs, and militias must no longer be allowed to undermine the Palestinian national project while they remain protected, privileged and empowered by the U.S.-backed Palestinian Authority.


* * *
Notes

1. http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=139862.
2. Fatah officials in the West Bank are also demoralized. Nasser Juma'a, a Palestinian Legislative Council member from Nablus, told a British reporter that the "Hamas are insects" and noted that the Palestinians would likely not see a Palestinian state in his lifetime. Qadura Fares, a senior Fatah official, said that the PA would not succeed either in the West Bank or Gaza without "tackling the privileges of the Fatah elite, who, he said, "have become like princes" with regard to personal wealth, referring to rampant Fatah corruption. David Rose, "In the Smart West Bank Health Club, Between Jogging and Swimming Laps, People Were Screaming 'Death to Israel'," Mail on Sunday, January 17, 2009.
3. French President Nicholas Sarkozy said: "We have pledged to help Israel and Egypt with all the technical, military, naval and diplomatic ways to help end the smuggling of weapons into Gaza," http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1056208.html. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown also offered to send British naval vessels to battle smuggling, http://www.wtop.com/?nid=105&sid=1577726.
4. Mona Salem, "Egypt Rejects Calls to Open Border with War-Battered Gaza," AFP, December 30, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20081230/wl_mideast_afp/ mideastconflictgazaegyptborder_081230191014.
5. For the full text of UNSC Resolution 1860, see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9567.doc.htm.
6. Barak Ravid, "Egypt's Truce Plan: Cease-fire Followed by Border Security Talks," Ha'aretz, January 7, 2009.
7. Khaled Abu Toameh, "PA Ready to Take Gaza if Hamas Ousted," Jerusalem Post, December 28, 2008.
8. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009/01/113629.htm. President Bush also called for international monitors in a radio speech on January 2, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090102-3.html.
9. Natasha Mozgovaya, "Obama.: We will Aggressively Seek Middle East Peace," Ha'aretz, January 23, 2009. See also Roni Sofer, "Obama Calls Abbas, Olmert on First Day," Ynet, January 21, 2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3659961,00.html.
10. Khaled Abu Toameh and Dan Diker, "What Happened to Reform of the Palestinian Authority?," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 3, 2004, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp? DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=701.
11. David Horowitz, "This Time It Will Be Different," Interview with U.S. Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton, Jerusalem Post, December 11, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1228728164523& pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull.
12. Senior officials close to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas confirmed the lack of a Palestinian chief of staff and a disciplined, centralized command structure in several meetings with author Dan Diker in 2008, most recently in Tel Aviv, December 8, 2008. Also, the authors draw a distinction between the Palestinian National Security Forces' success in confronting Hamas activists in Ramallah and closing down Hamas charities, and the PA security forces' lack of will to uproot Hamas and other terror groups. This has been common to PA control in Gaza and the West Bank and had characterized PA security force failures in the 1990s. Other less active, yet competing, Fatah militias include PA Preventative Security under the command of Ziad Hab al-Rih, a Fatah operative and former colleague of former West Bank Fatah strongman Jibril Rajoub. There are also other smaller Fatah-affiliated armed groups.
13. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat and the Battle for the Spoils of Gaza," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, October 10, 2005, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=254&PID=0&IID=542
14. Patrick Devenny, "Training Our Enemies," Front Page Magazine, October 18, 2005. In a more recent example, local Nablus warlord Abu Jabber was integrated in Fayyad's National Security Forces in 2008 as a mid-level commander, but this did not stop his local militia from continuing to extort local business owners for protection money. One local real estate developer related to the authors that Abu Jabber had demanded an apartment for free in exchange for his militias' forced protection services. This same phenomenon - national security by day and mafia member by night - has characterized the PA Fatah forces in the West Bank from Arafat's entry into the territories in 1994 until today under the Dayton reform plan outlined at Annapolis. American security programs under the Clinton administration had ended up training numerous PA terror operatives such as Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades terrorist Khaled Abu Nijmeh, who had used his CIA training to supervise multiple suicide bombings in Bethlehem in 2001 and 2002. A July 2005 report compiled by the security consulting firm Strategic Assessments Initiative (SAI) on behalf of the U.S. government found that, "even with millions of American dollars and years of CIA training, the PA police were wholly ineffective, wracked with divided loyalties and inferior equipment." SAI charged that "many of the PA officers were active or complicit in terrorist attacks or organized crime rings." See Devenny, "Training Our Enemies."
15. http://www.maannews.net/arb/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=139862.
16. For example, Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades websites have called for the murder of Fayyad since 2003, while Hamas' Izaddine al-Kassam Brigades website called Abbas "a murderer" for his actions against Hamas operatives and "justified exercising the use of divine justice against him, relying on religious decrees that permit the killing of a Muslim who collaborates in a crime against another Muslim." See Lt.-Col. (res.) Jonathan D. Halevi, "The Hamas Regime in the Gaza Strip: An Iranian Satellite that Threatens Regional Stability," in Iran's Race for Regional Supremacy, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008, p.76.
17. Reports from Gaza indicate that hundreds of Fatah members were killed and tortured by Hamas during and after Israel's military campaign in Gaza. See Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas Rounding Up, Torturing Fatah Members in the Gaza Strip," January 19, 2009. Fatah and Hamas websites reveal the bitter hatred and enmity between the groups that will not be solved if the groups agree for tactical reasons to enter into a national unity government. This is frequently misunderstood in the West, which believes that a Fatah-Hamas "reconciliation" - like the one brokered in Mecca in 2007 and which resulted in more deaths between Fatah and Hamas than in previous years - would be a pretext for advancing the peace process. A senior advisor to French President Nicholas Sarkozy told Ha'aretz that a Fatah-Hamas national unity government would trigger EU acceptance of Hamas as a governmental partner to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.
18. Dan Diker, "A Deterrent Restored," Powerlineblog, January 9, 2009, http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2009/01/022505.php.
19. Khaled Abu Toameh Hamas: Abbas' Spies Led Israel to Siam," Jerusalem Post, January 17, 2009, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ ShowFull&cid=1232100169312.
20. http://www.janes.com/security/law_enforcement/news/jdw/jdw070115_1_n.shtml. A high-ranking official at a senior Palestinian ministry confirmed PA monthly salary payments to Hamas' Executive Force in Gaza and the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades in the West Bank, in a meeting with the authors in Jerusalem, December 7, 2008.
21. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Palestinian Straw Firms Said Aiming to 'Steal' Gaza Funds," Jerusalem Post, January 26, 2009.
22. Amir Mizroch, "Hamas Salaries Paid at Shifa Hospital," Jerusalem Post, January 12, 2009.
23. See the strategic assessment by former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon on the error of Israeli and Western backing of "strong" and "weak" Palestinian leaders in "Israel and the Palestinians; a New Strategy," op. cit.
24. "French Envoy, Palestinians Given $3B in Foreign Aid in 2008," AP/Ha'aretz, December 23, 2008.
25. Elaine Sciolino, "$7.4 Billion Pledged for Palestinians," New York Times, December 18, 2007, as cited in Yaalon, "Israel and the Palestinians."
26. According to a conversation with a senior Israeli security official, January 13, 2009.
27. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas Shuns Bid to Give Rafah to PA," Jerusalem Post, January 8, 2009. Dahlan's candidacy to reassert Fatah control in Gaza was confirmed by senior PA officials in a meeting with author Dan Diker on December 8, 2009. Two Arab diplomats familiar with negotiations over an Israeli-Hamas cease-fire also confirmed his candidacy in separate conversations with Diker on January 6 and January 11, 2009. Hamas leaders have also pointed to Dahlan's possible return. A Hamas official in Gaza City claimed that former Fatah security commanders who fled Gaza during the Hamas takeover in June 2007, including Mohammed Dahlan and his deputy Rashid Abu Shabak, "were holding meetings in Cairo and Ramallah to discuss returning home." See Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas: PA Conspiring with Israel," Jerusalem Post, December 31, 2008.
28.According to a senior source in the Bureau of PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, January 12, 2009.
29. Mohammed Dahlan interview, Egyptian State Television, January 21, 2009.
30. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell," Vanity Fair, April 2008.
31. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat," op. cit. Dahlan was believed to be a local partner in the UK Portland Trust plan to develop hundreds of low-cost housing units in post-disengagement Gaza.
32. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Analysis: A Viable Successor to Hamas Is Hard to Find," Jerusalem Post, December 29, 2009. Ramadan Shallah, secretary-general of Islamic Jihad, warned that any Palestinian "who dares to return to the Gaza Strip aboard an Israeli tank would be condemned as a traitor." Senior Arab diplomats told author Dan Diker on January 9, 2009, that Dahlan is not concerned with Palestinian threats against him.
33. Yaalon, "Israel and the Palestinians: A New Strategy."
34. Patrick Devenny, "Training Our Enemies."
35. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
36. A senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee told author Dan Diker that Dahlan was "very charming" at a meeting on Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C., June 2005.
37. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. A former State Department employee familiar with the concept and planning of what was called "Plan B" to replace Hamas with Dahlan's forces confirmed the plan to the author in an off-the-record interview, Washington, D.C., July 1, 2008. See also David Horowitz, "This Time, It Will Be Different," op. cit.
40. Horowitz, "This Time, It Will Be Different."
41. See a copy of the note reportedly left in a meeting in Ramallah between PA and U.S. officials, http://www.vanityfair.com/images/politics/2008/04/gaza_PlanB0804.pdf. See a copy of the pre-"Plan B" U.S. security plan from 2006 left behind at a meeting between U.S. and Palestinian officials in Ramallah, http://www.vanityfair.com/images/politics/2008/04/gaza_Walles0804.pdf.
42. David Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell." See also David Horowitz, "This Time, It Will Be Different."
43. Former PA Interior Minister and senior Abbas advisor Hanni al-Hassan shared his sharp criticism of the plan with the author in a meeting several days after the coup on June 17, 2007.
44. Aluf Benn, "Top U.S. General Lays Foundation for Palestinian State," Ha'aretz, August 14, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1009578.html.
45. "Remarks by U.S. Security Coordinator, LTG Keith Dayton, Update on the Israeli-Palestinian Situation and Palestinian Assistance Programs," House Foreign Affairs, Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, May 23, 2007, www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/day052307.htm.
46. Yaakov Katz, "Israeli Official: Dayton Failed," Jerusalem Post, June 17, 2007.
47. According to Hanni al-Hassan, former senior advisor to Mahmoud Abbas, in a meeting with the author, June 17, 2007. Hani al-Hassan, former senior political advisor and member of Fatah's central committee, said in an Al-Jazeera TV interview on June 27, 2007, that what was happening in Gaza was not a Hamas defeat of Fatah but defeat of plans of American Major General Keith Dayton, Mohammed Dahlan and his Fatah followers. See http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3418486,00.html. See the Al-Jazeera interview at http://uk.truveo.com/Hani-AlHassan-of-the-Fatah-Executive-Committee/id/517194181. David Wurmser, former Middle East Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney, would later note, "It looks to me that what happened wasn't so much a coup by Hamas but an attempted coup by Fatah that was pre-empted before it could happen." See David Rose, "Gaza Bombshell."
48. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat."
49. Glenn Kessler, The Confidante, Condoleezza Rice and the Bush Legacy (New York: St. Martins Press, 2007), p. 133.
50. Erica Silverman, "Two Steps Back," Al-Ahram Weekly, December 8-14, 2005.
51. Dan Diker meeting with former senior World Bank official, Jerusalem, July 2005.
52. David Rose, "Gaza Bombshell."
53. Pinchas Inbari and Dan Diker, "The Murder of Musa Arafat."
54. According to Haggai Huberman writing in Hatzofe, the former Sharon government had been provided a secret CIA tape recording of Dahlan ordering the attack.
55. For many months in 2008 Abbas and Fayyad did not speak, coordinate positions, or cooperate. More recent reports indicate that their working relationship has slightly improved. They are essentially leaders of two separate Palestinian Authorities. Fayyad is the U.S. contact, while Abbas is the leader of the Fatah establishment and has been a source of disappointment to the Bush administration. See Glenn Kessler, The Confidante, p. 130. This point was also reiterated at a series of meetings in 2008 with a senior advisor to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas based in Ramallah.
56. Aluf Benn, "Top U.S. General Lays Foundation for Palestinian State."
57. David Horowitz, "This Time It Will Be Different."
58. Yaakov Katz, "IDF: Jenin Forces Not Fighting Terror," Jerusalem Post, June 15, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1212659734963&pagename= JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
59. Ibid.
60.. Mohammed Abu Khadair, "Dr. Fayyad Places His Government at the Disposal of the President to Pave the Way for National Reconciliation," Al Quds, January 23, 2009.
61. Yaakov Katz, "IDF: Jenin Forces Not Fighting Terror."
62. Isabel Kirshner, "Volatile City Tests Palestinian Police and Peace Hopes," International Herald Tribune, November 13, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/14/africa/14nablus.php.
63. Yaakov Katz, "IDF: Jenin Forces Not Fighting Terror."
64. Moshe Yaalon, "Israel and the Palestinians: A New Strategy."
65. A Nablus businessman told author Dan Diker of the direct threats made against him by local Nablus Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades commander Abu Jabber, in a meeting in Rome, December 9, 2009.
66. Steve Erlanger, "On Palestinian Question, Tough Choices for Obama," New York Times, January 22, 2009.
67. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas and the Palestinians," Hudson New York, January 2, 2009.
68. Mohammed Yaghi, "The Impact of the Gaza Conflict on Palestinian Politics," Policy Watch, No. 1446, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 31, 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2978.
69. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas Rounding Up, Torturing Fatah Members in the Gaza Strip," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2009.
70. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Hamas: Abbas No Longer Heads PA," Jerusalem Post, January 9, 2009.
71. Tova Lazeroff and Yaakov Katz, "Israel Disputes Gaza Death Toll," Jerusalem Post, January 22, 2009.
72. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Al Aksa: We Also Fought IDF in Gaza," Jerusalem Post, January 19, 2009.
73. Akiva Eldar, "Report: EU to Lift Sanctions on Hamas if Palestinian Unity Government Formed," Ha'aretz, January 19, 2009.
74. http://tonyblairoffice.org/2009/01/gaza-ceasefire-must-be-followe.html.
75. Khaled Abu Toameh, "Palestinian Straw Firms Said Aiming to 'Steal' Gaza Funds."
76. Robert Satloff, "In the Wake of the Hamas Coup: Rethinking America's 'Grand Strategy' for the New Palestinian Authority," Policy Watch, No. 1252, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 26, 2007.
77. The notion of "bottom-up" peace-making based on broad Palestinian reform was coined by former IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon, and alluded to as a point of reference by Special Quartet Envoy Tony Blair. See http://tonyblairoffice.org/2008/05/towards-a-palestinian-state.html. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also referred to "bottom-up" peace-making in concert with his program of "economic peace" for the West Bank.

* * *

Dan Diker is Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs. He is also a senior foreign policy analyst at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and an Adjunct Fellow of the Hudson Institute in Washington.

Khaled Abu Toameh is Palestinian affairs correspondent and analyst for the Jerusalem Post and a number of foreign TV stations and newspapers. They are currently co-authoring a book on the Middle East peace process.



The Jerusalem Letter and Jerusalem Viewpoints are published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 13 Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel; Tel. 972-2-5619281, Fax. 972-2-5619112, Internet: jcpa@netvision.net.il. In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community Studies, 5800 Park Heights Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21215 USA, Tel. (410) 664-5222; Fax. (410) 664-1228. © Copyright. All rights reserved. ISSN: 0792-7304.
The opinions expressed by the authors of Jerusalem Viewpoints do not necessarily reflect those of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

THE VIOLENCE OF ISLAM - HATRED IN THE KORAN

January 16, 2009

Is Islam a Violent Faith?

...Violence, Hatred and Discrimination in the Koran



















Dr. Sami Alrabaa

If you say that Islam is a violent faith, you are accused of being anti-Islam and you are propagating “Islamophobia.”

There are more than one billion Muslims around the world, and I’m one of them. We are told that the Koran is the “word of God.” When you read the Koran, however – which over 90% of all Muslims have never read, according to a survey by Bielefeld University in Germany, and if they ever do, either they do not understand its archaic language or they do not ponder on what it says – you find out that it is full of passages that incite to hatred, killing, and discriminate against women.

Below are some quotations from the Koran. We begin with what the “holy book” of Muslims says about people of other religions.

According to the Koran and many Muslims, Christians and Jews have left the true path of their religion. Therefore, they are infidels (unbelievers) like Buddhists and Hindus, for example. In other words, according to the Koran, only Muslims, i.e. 19% of the world population, are true believers. The rest are “unbelievers” and “infidels.”

Literally, the Koran says the following about the Jews, Christians, and other “unbelievers:”

“O you who believe! do not take the Jews and the Christians for friends; they are friends of each other; and whoever amongst you takes them for a friend, then surely he is one of them; surely Allah does not guide the unjust people.” (Sura 5, verse 51).

“And the Jews say: Uzair is the son of Allah; and the Christians say: The Messiah is the son of Allah; these are the words of their mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved before; may Allah DESTROY them; how they are turned away!” (Sura 9, verse 30).

“And the Jews will not be pleased with you, nor the Christians until you follow their religion. Say: Surely Allah's guidance, that is the (true) guidance. And if you follow their desires after the knowledge that has come to you, you shall have no guardian from Allah, nor any helper.” (Sura 2, verse 120).

“And KILL them (the unbelievers) wherever you find them, and drive them out from whence they drove you out, and persecution is severer than slaughter, and do not fight with them at the Sacred Mosque until they fight with you in it, but if they do fight you, then slay them; such is the recompense of the unbelievers.” (Sura 2, verse 191).

“Let not the believers take the unbelievers for friends rather than believers; and whoever does this, he shall have nothing of (the guardianship of) Allah, but you should guard yourselves against them, guarding carefully; and Allah makes you cautious of (retribution from) Himself; and to Allah is the eventual coming.” (Sura 3, verse 28).

“And guard yourselves against the fire which has been prepared for the unbelievers.” (Sura 3, verse 131)

“And when you journey in the earth, there is no blame on you if you shorten the prayer, if you fear that those who disbelieve will cause you distress, surely the unbelievers are your open ENEMY.” (Sura 4, verse 101).

“O you who believe! fight those of the unbelievers who are near to you and let them find in you hardness; and know that Allah is with those who guard (against evil).” (Sura 9, verse 123).

“Surely We have prepared for the unbelievers chains and shackles and a burning fire.” (Sura 76, verse 4).

“O you who believe! if you obey a party from among those who have been given the Book (The Jews and Christians), they will turn you back as unbelievers after you have believed.” (Sura 3, verse 100).

“And their taking usury (interests on money) though indeed they were forbidden it and their devouring the property of people falsely, and We have prepared for the unbelievers from among them a painful chastisement.” (Sura 4. verse 161).

“Surely Allah has cursed the unbelievers (Jews, Christians and followers of other faiths) and has prepared for them a burning fire.” (Sura 33, verse 64).

“And whoever does not believe in Allah and His Apostle, then surely We have prepared burning fire for the unbelievers.” (Sura 48, verse 13).

Does Allah discriminate? The Koran says:

“You are the best of the nations raised up for (the benefit of) men; you enjoin what is right and forbid the wrong and believe in Allah; and if the followers of the Book had believed it would have been better for them; of them (some) are believers and most of them are transgressors.” (Sura 3, verse 110).

Therefore, what does the Koran say about those who turn their back to Islam and commit apostasy?

“They desire that you should disbelieve as they have disbelieved, so that you might be (all) alike; therefore take not from among them (the unbelievers) friends until they flee (their homes) in Allah's way; but if they turn back, then seize them and KILL them wherever you find them, and take not from among them a friend or a helper.” (Sura 4, verse 89).

Now, what does the Koran say about women? Here are some quotations:

“Men are superior to women because Allah has made so. Therefore good women are obedient, and (as to) those (women) on whose part you fear desertion, admonish them, and leave them alone in the sleeping-places and BEAT them; then if they obey you, do not seek a way against them; surely Allah is High, Great.” (Sura 4, verse 34).

“And as for those who are guilty of an indecency from among your women, call to witnesses against them, four (witnesses) from among you; then if they bear witness confine them to the houses until death takes them away or Allah opens some way for them.” (Sura 4, verse 15).

According to the Koran, a woman’s testimony is worth half of that of a man.

“O you who believe! when you deal with each other in contracting a debt for a fixed time then call in to witness from among your men two witnesses; but if there are not two men, then one man and two women from among those whom you choose to be witnesses, so that if one of the two errs, the second of the two may remind the other.” (Sura 2, verse 282).

As far as sex is concerned, women are sex objects, according to the Koran. They must be ready for intercourse any time the husband wishes so.

“Your wives are a tilth for you, so go into your tilth when you like, and do good beforehand for yourselves, and be careful (of your duty) to Allah, and know that you will meet Him, and give good news to the believers.” (Sura 2, verse 223).

During menstruation, however, men should keep away from women; they are filthy. The Koran says:

“It (menstruation) is a discomfort; therefore keep aloof from the women during the menstrual discharge and do not go near them until they have become clean; then when they have cleansed themselves, go in to them as Allah has commanded you; surely Allah loves those who turn much (to Him), and He loves those who purify themselves.” (Sura 2, verse 222).

Women, according to the Koran, are, in general, unclean creature. After a Muslim has washed and prepared himself for prayer, he should not touch a woman. Therefore, “pious” Muslims never shake hands with women.

“O you who believe! do not go near prayer until you have washed yourselves; and if you have touched women, and you cannot find water, betake yourselves to pure earth, then wipe your faces and your hands; surely Allah is Pardoning, Forgiving.” (Sura 4, verse 43).

In case of inheritance, a woman inherits half of the portion a man inherits:

“They ask you for a decision of the law. Say: Allah gives you a decision concerning the person who has neither parents nor offspring; if a man dies (and) he has no son and he has a sister, she shall have half of what he leaves, and he shall be her heir she has no son; but if there be two (sisters), they shall have two-thirds of what he leaves; and if there are brethren, men and women, then the male shall have the like of the portion of two females; Allah makes clear to you, lest you err; and Allah knows all things.” (Sura 4, verse 176).

And what kind of punishment does a thief get, according to the Koran, regardless how much they steal?

“And (as for) the man who steals and the woman who steals, cut off their hands as a punishment for what they have earned, an exemplary punishment from Allah; and Allah is Mighty, Wise.” (Sura 5, verse 38).

Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world that uses the Koran as its day-to-day law for all kinds of disputes and crimes. It is the Shari’a (Islamic law). For Islamists and conservative Muslims, Shari’a is the constitution and law that must prevail everywhere. They argue, what is better than the law of Allah which He, via the Engle Gabriel revealed to the Prophet Mohammed 1400 years ago?

King Abdullah, the absolute monarch of Saudi Arabia, said on a televised speech August 27, 2008, “We do not need democracy, we do not need political parties, we do not need Western human rights, we do not need their freedom of speech. What we need is the Koran. It regulates our life perfectly. It is the best legislation in the history of mankind, it is the word of Allah. There is nothing better than Allah’s law.”

The “Hadeeth,” a collection of statements and comments which Prophet Mohammed allegedly made during his lifetime, is also full of atrocities. Here is a sample:

“A woman came to the Prophet and admitted that she had committed adultery and thereafter became pregnant. The Prophet summoned her husband and all people of Median (in Saudi Arabia). He said, ‘This woman committed adultery. Therefore, after she delivers her innocent baby, all of you are going to stone her to death. This is Allah’s verdict.’ After she delivered her baby she was stoned to death in the center of the town.” (Narrated by Muslim, (a close contemporary follower of Mohammed), cited by Khoury, The Koran, p. 550).

Stoning women and flogging men for adultery are widely practiced in Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Hester on the scaffold in puritan Massachusetts, America of the 17th century, in the Scarlet Letter by Nathaniel Hawthorne, must have felt happy that she was not born among the “believers” in the Arabian Peninsula.

The Koran is filled with contradictions. While in sura 2, verse 256, it says “There is no compulsion in religion,” it urges Muslims to kill those Muslims who convert to other religions.

Both the Koran and the Hadeeth were collected after the death of Prophet Mohammed in 632. The second Caliph, Othman ordered collecting the Koran and the Hadeeth which had been written no where. They were memorized by Mohammed’s followers. Then Mohammed and his followers were illiterate. He disseminated Islam by the word of mouth. A committee was formed in Mecca and followers of the new faith queued up to deliver what they could remember from the Koran and Hadeeth. This campaign lasted for over 70 years.

That the vast majority of Muslims have not read or digested the Koran has two major implications. First, if rational, modern-thinking Muslims read the Koran thoroughly, they would desert Islam. They would argue that God cannot incite to hatred and violence. The Koran cannot be the “word of God.” Second, if simple-minded Muslims read the Koran and digested it, they would stick to the above “commandments” and we would have more radical and extremist Muslims around the world.

Certainly the Torah, the Bible, and other holy books have their own atrocious passages, especially those discriminatory ones against women, though with one difference: Muslim fundamentalists adhere to the above cited passages – in belief they are commanded directly by Allah – and implement them to the letter. Think of those suicide bombers in the Middle East and elsewhere and of the violent demonstrations against the “Mohammed cartoon” in some Muslim cities. But it is also true that the majority of Muslims simply ignore these dreadful passages like many Jews and Christians ignore their own.

After he received and read this piece, Henrik Clausen from Europe News asked me if I was not afraid of being declared apostate. I said, “No.” I’m fighting for a human and modern Islam. Besides, the truth must be told at all costs. I also told him, it is not my personal opinion that the Koran incites to hatred, violence, and discrimination, etc., as we have seen above – it is our “holy” book that is preaching all this. The cited passages prove that beyond any shred of doubt. I’m just citing what the Koran commands.

Further, the above quotations are intended to help critics of Islam present tangible evidence for their arguments. It is not enough to say, “I think, I believe, etc.” It is also not enough to say “I’m exerting my right of freedom of speech.”

There is no room for theological interpretations unless you handle the Koran in its own historical perspective. The religious establishment rejects any interpretation anyway. The slightest attempt to do so is rejected and its authors are persecuted as heretics. Think of the Egyptian theologian Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, who is now living in hiding in the Netherlands. Besides, for conservative Muslims and fundamentalists, the Koran, as it is, is valid for all times and for everywhere. It is the “word of God.” He is not fallible and moody like we humans are.

Reformers of Islam, and I consider myself one of them, argue that the Koran and the Hadeeth should be looked at in a historical perspective. Muslims 1,400 years ago were fighting Christians and Jews. Therefore, they hated them. The Muslims wanted to prevail at all costs, therefore these passages in the Koran. Women were discriminated against because this was natural in the Arab culture at the time, and is to some extent today. Apropos, the situation in Medieval Europe was not better.

In addition, it is one of two things: Either the Koran was concocted by the Muslim leader, Mohammed, or at least partly, or it was made up by his zealous followers after his death. Remember that hundreds or thousands of Muslims at the time contributed to compiling this work. They were promised Paradise for their contributions like suicide bombers are nowadays promised it plus 60 virgin girls.

*Note: The verse numbers may vary from one Koran translation to another.

FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Dr. Sami Alrabaa, an ex-Muslim, is a professor of Sociology and an Arab-Muslim culture specialist. Before moving to Germany he taught at Kuwait University, King Saud University, and Michigan State University.