"Home Game" (Film Recommendation)

5 Av 5769

This 12Tribe Films presentation about the expulsion of Jews from Netzer-Hazani was compiled mostly from video footage shot by the town's youth. It focuses on the basketball game played in Azza (Gaza) before the expulsion of Jews from their homes, and the handing over of their lands to the Yishma'eli (Arab) enemies.

(12TribeFilms.org) “Home Game” is a captivating new film that encapsulates the surreal story of normal teenagers trying to continue an annual basketball tournament during a very abnormal summer in Israel -- the summer of 2005 during the disengagement from Gaza. This powerful film emphasizes the journey of these teenagers and their determination to win against all odds, both on and off the court. "Home Game" tells part of the untold human story to a piece of Jewish history that was overshadowed by politics.

This week only, you can view "Home Game" for free on the up and coming media sharing site WeJew.com. Check it out for all of your media sharing needs. Bloggers, make sure to check out WeJew.com's special blogging tools and promotions page.

Friday, 10 of the Fifth Month (Av) marks the fourth anniversary of the expulsion of Jews from Azza and the Northern Shomron (Samaria). This film is important to see during this week of the Fast of the Fifth Month (Tisha b'Av), setting the tone for the commemoration the Destruction of the Miqdash (Temple) with an all too recent Jewish tragedy falling on the same day.

The film is in Hebrew with English subtitles.






Additional Expulsion-related Videos:

Meraglilm: YeSh"A Council Collaboration in the Expulsion

Remembering the Expulsion of the Tashnady Family (bring tissue)

Cross-posted on Esser Agaroth.

Return To French Hill, part 1

Erev Shabbath Qodesh Parshath Balaq 5769

When I tell people I was a victim of a terrorist attack in Jerusalem in Giv'ath Tzarfatith (French Hill), people always have to ask me, "Which one?"

There have been so many.

It was seven years ago. On 9 of the Fourth Month (Tammuz)/June 19, at around 7:00 pm, a Yishma'eli (Arab) blew himself up at the trempiada. Seven Jews were murdered as a result. Many Jews were also injured. I was one of them.

For seven years, I have wanted to write about this experience. For seven years I haven't. Shifra Hoffman of Victims OF Arab Terror [VAT] and SHUVA, and Gila of the My Shrapnel Blog have encouraged me to do so.

So, here I am,...finally....

The Attack
I was waiting for a "tremp" (ride) back home to Ofra, where I was living at that time. People waiting look for stickers on windshields, indicating the hometown of the driver, and probable destination. Everyone is focused on getting a ride, and holding on to their places in line, pretty much oblivious to anything else, including suspicious-looking individuals and activities.

All of a sudden there was a blast and clouds of smoke. A glance behind me revealed a chunk of something flying toward me. I felt the force of impact on my hip.

All of a sudden I could not hear anything, but a buzzing in my ears.

As a former lifeguard, my instinct was to see what I could do to help the injured. That was only after coming out of minutes of being frozen on the spot, not understanding how I ended up in this "movie," albeit with very realistic special effects. That was what it was like,...like being in a movie. Then countless news reports of previous terrorist attacks came back to me,...interviews of paramedics being interviewed, reminding people what to do:

Get out of the way! Allow the professionals easy access to the attack site, and let them do their jobs. Only afterwards, see what you can do to help.

After looking around at the dead bodies, and unrecognizable pieces of dead bodies, I knew that there was not anything that I could do to help anyone. I did not even have a spare piece of clothing to offer the screaming young lady, whose skirt seemed to have been blown off by the blast.

I left the trempiada, and started walking south in the direction of town, although I had absolutely no idea as to where I was going. I am not sure why, but I called a friend, let him know what had happened, and told him that I would call him later. I was surprised that I got through. The bump in cellular phone usage after terrorist attacks usually causes network overloads, and then it's impossible to get through to anyone. My friend told me to go to the hospital and get checked out. I told him not to worry, that I was OK, and did not need to go to the hospital. He reiterated his advices once more, then let it go, knowing how stubborn I can be.

My walk southward turned into a circular wander. A paramedic approached me, asking me how I was. I said I was OK, yet to him it was obvious that I was not. He began insisting that I take my pants down, which threw me. He was religious, and thus must know that would not be the most tzanu'a (modest) thing for me to do in the middle of the street. He said that he had to check to see if I had been injured, and that if I did not take my pants down, then I would have to go in an ambulance to the hospital. I thought he was crazy, until he showed the gaping hole in back of my pants with blood seeping though.

"I'll go in the ambulance," I said, figuring I needed a ride back to town, yet not knowing why needed to go back to town. In retrospect, I still cannot believe just how clouded me thinking was at the time.

In the ambulance, I was met by three young female volunteers, all very nice. I insisted on speaking Hebrew. Part of me may have been injured, but the Hebrew chip on my shoulder was still there. Then the one in the skirt mentioned that she was actually from Chicago. I had not been in the U. S. for years, and had no interest in an American identity, yet suddenly, I felt less alone. I do not remember what we talked about, probably nothing. But I remember beginning to feel better. I remember the kindness of all three of them. I remember thinking that Chicago was just around the block from my hometown of San Diego, even though it's not. I remember thinking that young lady from Chicago was my neighbor's daughter or even my neice I hadn't seen in a long time, even though she's neither, and I don't even have a niece.

As I later learned, she was not the only special person HaQadosh Barukh Hu (The Holy One, Blessed Be He) would be placed in my path that day, that week, and that first year afterward.

The Hospital
I was taken to Biqur Holim Hospital in the center of town. I given a bed in the emergency room, and a place where I could put my things. I remembered that I had done my Shabbath shopping that day. The nurses let me put my groceries and chicken into their tiny refrigerator, so they would not spoil.

Then, almost immediately, doctors and nurses started poking and prodding. I was take for x-rays, brought back, and given hospital clothes. I saw that the backsides of my clothes were soaked and caked with blood and guts (I am afraid I did not know how to be any more delicate about this.).


The nurses, Sefardi Chen and Russian Svetlana were the next "angels" sent to me.

I mention the their backgrounds to emphasize how diverse the involved with my treatment were. Later the American sonogram technician and French, haredi psychiatrist were to enter the scene. Many were visiblly religious; quite a few were not. See what I mean? In addition, at least half of the staff I was to encounter was made up of olim (immigrants), just like myself.

My initial emotional reactions to the attack were that I was worthless and undeserving of anything. Literally, I felt damaged and no good. For some reason, the nurses were able to relieve me of these feelings temporarily (I am tearing up as I write this. It's been seven years already, yet I still tear up when I think of those nurses and what they did for me.)

Chen held my face, encouraging me to look at her, and not satisfy my curiosity by looking at the procedure to remove the shrapnel. With every "ow" that came out of my mouth, she insisted that the surgeon shoot me up with more anesthetic. It's OK, I said. It felt more weird than painful, even though it was definitely painful. The amazing thing was that after the local anesthetic wore off, I did not need anything more than Acamol (similar to Tylenol) to get relief from the pain. Meanwhile, Svetlana was careful not to startle me as she aided the surgeon by maneuvering my hip and leg to his specifications. She had a pleasant face.

I will spare you the details as to how long it took to dig around the tissue of my gluteus maximus to find and remove the elusive of shrapnel implanted there. When it finally was removed, it was clearly recognizable as a mangled screw. The Yishma'elim pack their bombs with screws, ball bearings, and other assorted for maximum destructive effect. The surgeon washed it off, placed it in a corked test tube, and presented it to me, almost as if it was a souvenir from a very bad vacation. Actually, it was a souvenir of sorts, a souvenir which which I could showed to others, and to look upon myself, as proof that what happened to me, actually did happen. I have since lost that "souvenir." But, I don't really need it anymore.

At this point, I received a few phone calls of support, and two visitors from Ofra. They were strangers to me. I also had a couple of friends visit, my former roommate and former neighbors from Jerusalem.

Several hours after my arrival, things began to calm down. As is standard procedure, I met with the psychiatrist on duty. I just wanted to go home. But the decision was his, and his decision was no. I had no choice but to stay overnight.

I opened a siddur to say Qeri'ath Shema'. When I looked down at the page to find my place, I saw that I had opened the siddur to a song many Jews sing on Moss'ei Shabbath.

אל תירא, עבדי יעקב
(Do not fear, My servant Ya'aqov)

I could not sleep that night, but only because of lights that were on. After seeing the above song in my hands, though, I felt at ease.

When I woke up the next morning, as you could imagine, I was still sort of just moving through time, less like the movie that was the attack itself, but similar. The night before, I saw the blood all over my sandals, and washed them off. I only had one pair. Although I prefer to go barefoot anyway, I doubted I would be allowed on the bus without shoes.

Before I could think about going home, I had an early appointment with an ear, nose, & throat [ENT] doctor across the street. Everything was arranged for me, and I wasn't really given a choice. That was probably a good thing, as I was not in a position to make these kinds of decisions for myself. Several of us entered the ENT clinic. An announcement was made to those waiting that the victims of last night's attack would have priority in receiving appointments that morning. Everyone else would have to wait. Entering the waiting room, I could see from the Arabs' faces that they were none to pleased. The Jews maintained pleasant faces, yet faces of curiosity. Focusing on the Arabs, a leer and a grimace were all that I could muster up against the cousins of the Yishma'eli who killed seven Jews, not to mention shooting a piece of metal in my backside, and taking away my hearing.

The ENT was patient and gentle. She told me that my right eardrum had been blown out. Actually, there nothing left to speak of. Her instructions were simple. Don't get it wet, and it should grow back within nine months. If it didn't, then grafts were in order. She was optimistic that those would not be necessary.

Rather than get angry at HaQadosh Barukh Hu, I thanked Him for not taking away my eyesight instead. I have always been more visual than auditory, depending much more on my eyes than ears. I do not care to think what it would have been like the other way around.

I am not a terribly grateful nor spiritual person, or at least I wasn't at the time, but that thought just came to me. From where? I don't know. It just came to me.

Waiting IMPATIENTLY for the resident surgeon's final OK to be released, I received another visit from my former roommate. Upon hearing what had happened to my beged tzitzith, which was rolled up with my other bloodied clothes, he told me he would "be right back." Ten minutes later, he returned with a brand new talith qetanah. He knew me well enough to know that I did not like receiving gifts. So, he did not bother to mention what he was doing. He presented me with the new garment, saying that I had no choice but to accept it, as I had to perform this misswah. I begrudgingly accepted it with a half-smile on my face, and said thank you. He could tell I was grateful nonetheless.

After my friend left, a nurse asked me a how I was getting home, anticipating my imminent release. I said by bus. She pressed me to think of someone I could call to give me a ride. There was no one. I was getting back by bus or tremp. Not yet ready to go back to the trempiada, I chose the bus. Although uncomfortable, she knew she could not stop me. I would soon be released unconditionally. She had one last card to play. "You are NOT going on the bus in hospital clothes," she said, and picked up the phone to make call. I couldn't hear her. She explained that a man from the Electric Company would be coming shortly. Huh? What did the Electric Company have to do with anything? Was I that out of it?

The nurse explained that the Electric Company had a special charity which provided clothes to victims of terror attacks. Did I actually think I was the first to get my clothes plastered with blood and guts of murdered Jews?

The tall, curly-headed, headband-clad man in his 20's came bouncing into the hospital, smiling with a package to present me. It was an Electric Company uniform. Almost in tears, I asked him where I should return it. He said, no, it's yours. (Thinking and writing about the guy from the Electric Company is the other memory which never fails to make me tear up.) You don't return it; it's yours. He shook my hand and said refu'ah shlemah (complete recovery). It was obvious he had done this before. I took the clothes.

I was released shortly after noon. I picked my groceries, a plastic bag filled with my bloodied clothes, and made my way through the corridors to the exit.

I knew deep inside that this was only the first stage in a journey I would not recommend to anyone. But I was not thinking about this at the time.

To be continued...

Cross-posted on Esser Agaroth.

The Jerusalem Viewpoints series is published by the Institute for Contemporary Affairs, founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation at the Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs.

Jerusalem Viewpoints

No. 562 Adar II - Nisan 5768 / March-April 2008

The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran
and Its Aftermath:

A Roundtable of Israeli Experts

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Ze'evi Farkash, former Head of IDF Military Intelligence

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, former Head of Research and Assessment,
IDF Military Intelligence

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, former Head of Research and Assessment, IDF Military Intelligence

• The opening sentence of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of
November 2007 stated: "We judge with high confidence that in Fall 2003,
Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." This conclusion put the U.S.
intelligence community at odds with Israel, which believes that Iran only
engaged in a temporary halt in 2003, and since that time the Iranian nuclear weapons program had been resumed.

• Israel is not alone in disagreeing with the conclusion of the NIE. Already in
December, just after the NIE's release, Britain's Daily Telegraph reported
London's response with the headline: "Britain: Iran 'Hoodwinked' CIA Over
Nuclear Plans," stating that Britain's intelligence chiefs had "grave doubts
that Iran...mothballed its nuclear weapons program."

• It was in the context of the Western detection of their nuclear program and the Iraq War that led Iran to halt its nuclear program across the board in 2003, with the exception of their surface-to-surface missile program. But prior to that freeze, Iran had been developing a military nuclear capability under a broad civilian cover for fifteen years.

• The Iranian ballistic missile program is part of the Iranian nuclear
weapons program; Iran does not have a civilian space program and it is
doubtful that it would develop ballistic missiles with a range of
thousands of kilometers in order to carry conventional warheads alone.

• Between 2003 and 2005, the Iranians refrained from any nuclear activity
under the influence of the impression created by America's pre-emptive
policies in the region, which served as the main instrument that enabled the Europeans to force Iran to postpone uranium conversion and enrichment. But when the Iranians realized in 2005 that there was no actual threat behind their fears of U.S. pre-emption, they decided to start conversion and then enrichment. As a result, the Iranians already have prepared enough uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) for more than ten atomic bombs.

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror:

The NIE - More Confusion than Clarity

The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of November 2007, entitled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, has created more confusion than clarity. To many observers who heard news reports when it was first released, it appeared that the U.S. intelligence community had concluded that there was no longer any nuclear threat from Iran. That impression was fostered by the opening sentence of the report: "We judge with high confidence that in Fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." Moving beyond the NIE's first sentence, however, there are other conclusions that seem to suggest the very opposite.

It might be suggested that the seemingly contradictory statements in the NIE are due to the fact that it is a product of sixteen different agencies that belong to the US intelligence community.1 But this would be too simple an explanation. There must have been a consensus of those drafting the report that caused them to lead with the idea that in 2003 Iran was no longer developing nuclear weapons. This conclusion put the U.S. intelligence
community at odds with Israel, whose Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, stated openly that Iran only engaged in a temporary halt in 2003, and since that time the Iranian nuclear weapons program had been resumed.

It was not the first time that the U.S. and Israel disagreed over their assessments about Iran. In 1995, I was the head of the Research and Assessment Division of IDF Military Intelligence and we found the first signs that the Iranians were going nuclear. In those days, we thought the most important action that we could take was to brief our counterparts in Washington and convince them that this was a danger soon to be faced by
the entire Free World. It was not easy to convince them that this subject should be on the table. We sought to do so at a meeting in Washington where a very well-known ambassador represented the U.S. side and I tried to convince the Americans that the Iranians had indeed decided to go nuclear.

At the end of our discussions, the U.S. side gave us the impression that they were thinking to themselves: "After we Americans finish off Iraq as an enemy of the State of Israel, then you Israelis are going to build a new threat because you cannot live without such a threat." During my more than four years as the head of the Assessment Division, this was one of my great failures. It took American experts another two years, until 1997, for the American intelligence community to understand that the Iranians were going nuclear.

Today, Israel is not alone in disagreeing with the conclusion of the NIE. Already in December, just after the NIE's release, Britain's Daily Telegraph reported London's response with the headline: "Britain: Iran 'Hoodwinked' CIA Over Nuclear Plans," stating that Britain's intelligence chiefs had "grave doubts that Iran...mothballed its nuclear weapons program."2 French President Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel also went out of their way to state that Iran still remained a danger and pressure
had to be kept up over its nuclear program.3 Even officials at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who were traditionally more forgiving about Iranian behavior than the U.S., expressed doubts about the NIE right after it was released. One official stated: "We don't buy the American analysis 100 percent. We are not that generous with Iran."4

While we are dealing only with the public version of the NIE, we understand that there is no fundamental difference between this version and the unpublished version. For this reason, it is very important that the NIE be carefully analyzed. There is no argument about the civilian side: Iranian enrichment efforts continue. But what we need to focus upon are Iran's purely military capabilities. We believe that this report of the U.S. intelligence community was a huge mistake from both a methodological and professional point of view. I would not have permitted such a report to be issued by Israeli Military Intelligence while containing such holes in its arguments.

It is noteworthy how Admiral Mike McConnell, the U.S. Director of National
Intelligence, tried to correct the impression created by the NIE in his remarks to the Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2008: "The only thing they've halted was nuclear weapons design, which is probably the least significant part of the program."5 For a detailed look at the NIE, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Ze'evi Farkash, who served as head of Israeli Military Intelligence from 2001 to 2006, offers his own insights into the evolution
of the Iranian nuclear program.

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Ze'evi Farkash:

No Evidence that Iran Did Not Renew Nuclear Weaponization Work

In August 2002, Iran understood that the Western countries - U.S., the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), and Israel - had obtained hard information that Iran was conducting a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Shortly thereafter, in March 2003, the regional environment quickly became dominated by the outbreak of the Iraq War and the downfall of Saddam Hussein. By July 2003, the Iranians opened negotiations with the EU-3, which sought to halt the Iranian nuclear program. At the end of the same year, Qaddafi stopped Libya's nuclear military plans.

It was in the context of the Western detection of their nuclear program and the Iraq War that led Iran to halt its nuclear program across the board in 2003, with the exception of their surface-to-surface missile program. But prior to that freeze, Iran was developing a military nuclear capability under a broad civilian cover. The participants were the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the Iranian Ministry of Defense (MOD).
A nuclear weapons program is comprised of three key elements:

1) A delivery system, requiring the development of surface-to-surface missiles.

2) The accumulation of fissile material through uranium enrichment and plutonium production.

3) Weaponization - preparing a warhead from the fissile material and fitting it into a missile.

Several of these elements in the Iranian nuclear program were in fact soon resumed. At the beginning of 2003, the Iranians were concentrating all their efforts on the centrifuge program at their facility in Natanz, where they had managed to build a cascade with 164 centrifuges. Today, they have reached a capacity of 3,000 centrifuges. If parts of the nuclear weapons program were restarted, there is every reason to believe that all parts were reactivated as well. Indeed, Iran's development of surface-to-surface missiles had never ceased, even when uranium enrichment had been temporarily halted.

At the same time, the Iranians were busy with procurement activities, with a focus on obtaining all the materials and components needed for uranium enrichment. At the beginning of 2004, we know that Iran was attempting to procure fast high voltage switches suitable for a nuclear weapons system. The Iranian Ministry of Defense was also supervising the mining of uranium in southeast Iran.

According to information provided by the Iranian opposition, Lavizan was one of the sites that dealt with Iran's weaponization program, and the IAEA requested to visit Lavizan in September-October 2003. By March 2004, the Lavizan facility had disappeared; it had been dismantled. When Iran renewed its nuclear enrichment program in January 2005, there is no evidence that they did not renew the work of the weaponization group at the same time.

Editor's note: In February 2008, the Iranian opposition charged that Iran had erected a new command and control center: code-named Lavizan-2. In addition, they identified yet another facility at Khojir, where they claimed the production of nuclear warheads was being undertaken.6

Developing the Missiles to Deliver a Nuclear Payload

Together with developing a nuclear weapon, Iran has been developing an
appropriate long-range delivery system. Its Shihab 3 missile can carry a warhead of approximately 700 kilograms over a distance of 1,300-1,500 kilometers. These missiles are under the command of the Revolutionary Guard, not the Iranian military. The Revolutionary Guard reports to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and it is not under the authority of President Ahmadinejad. Iranian missile exercises showed that the missiles are aimed at both Tel Aviv and Riyadh.

Iran is continuing to develop even longer-range missiles with a range of 3,500-5,000 kilometers that could reach all of Europe (perhaps with the exception of Portugal), while those with a range of 6,000-10,000 kilometers could reach the east coast of the U.S. The original missile technology was delivered to the Iranians by North Korea, and the Iranians have made substantial efforts to improve their range. As we know, the Iranian ballistic missile program is part of the Iranian nuclear weapons program; Iran does not have a civilian space program and it is doubtful that it would develop ballistic missiles with a range of thousands of kilometers in order to carry
conventional warheads alone.

European Reaction to the Iranian Missile Threat

As Director of IDF Military Intelligence, I briefed leaders in Europe about Iran's nuclear military plans and met personally with decision-makers in Italy, France, the UK, and other European countries over a period of six months. Most of the European leaders understood the data about Iran's nuclear plans, but their response was not encouraging.

The Europeans said they did not understand why Israel was trying to scare them with a nuclear military threat since they had lived with such a threat during the Cold War. They were also of the opinion that, in the end, if Iran did achieve a nuclear military capability, the U.S. and Israel would solve the problem, and I believe this remains their attitude today.

What Does the NIE Say?

The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate summary report says that in 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program, but the NIE's headline finding is written in such a way that guarantees that its other conclusions will be misunderstood.

• In Paragraph C, the NIE summary states that Iran made significant
progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz. Based upon this
finding, Israeli military intelligence estimates that late 2009 is the
earliest possible date that Iran will be technically capable of
producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon.

• Paragraph D of the NIE says that Iranian entities are continuing to
develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to
producing nuclear weapons if a decision is made to do so. Thus, Iran's
continuing civilian uranium enrichment program could produce
enough fissile materials by the end of 2009 or 2010.

• Paragraph F of the NIE notes: We assess that Iran probably would use
covert facilities rather than its declared nuclear sites for the
production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon.

• Finally, Paragraph H of the NIE states: We assess that Iran has the
scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to produce nuclear
weapons if it decides to do so.

All of this means that the Iranians will have enough fissile material no later than 2010 and that if they decide to build a nuclear military plant, no one can promise that we or the Americans will know about it, if they indeed actually did halt their nuclear weapons program in 2003. It would be a mistake to conclude that Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions have been halted on the basis of reading the first sentence of the NIE alone.

In my view, any distinction between Iranian military and civilian nuclear programs is artificial. The enrichment of uranium, critical to both civilian and military uses, is continuing. Once they have enough enriched uranium, they will be 3-6 months away from building a nuclear bomb if they decide to do so.

Pressure on Iran Dissipates after the NIE

After the NIE report was released, the declaration that Tehran had halted its nuclear weapons program was reported by all of the world's major media without any contradicting information. Soon thereafter, Russia and Iran reached agreement on a schedule to complete the plutonium-based nuclear facility in Bushehr. This was followed by an announcement that China and Iran had signed a $2.3 billion economic agreement related to energy that had been on hold for more than half a year. Prior to this, China had come to join the economic pressure on Iran. In addition, Ahmadinejad formally visited Riyadh, and a new Egyptian-Iranian relationship began to develop for the first time since Sadat's assassination.

The NIE has clearly weakened international support for tougher sanctions against Iran, and it closes off any military option for the Bush administration. The NIE has sent a signal to Tehran that the danger of external sanctions has ended. Furthermore, the NIE has weakened Turkey and the moderate Sunni countries in the region that were seeking to build a coalition against Iran. So, ironically, the NIE opens the way for Iran to achieve its military nuclear ambitions without any interference.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser:

The NIE: A Very Poor Intelligence Product

The main problem with the NIE is the phrasing of its message. It's a very poor intelligence product because it is not only a matter of what you say but also how you say it and what you don't say.

One of the major issues that arise from the report is its admission that the Iranians had a nuclear weaponization project for fifteen years, from the end of the 1980s until 2003.How far did the Iranians go in those fifteen years? How many obstacles do they still face?

By saying that if the Iranians have the ability to enrich uranium, they can have a bomb within a very short period of time, the NIE actually alludes to the idea that the Iranians have already gone a very long way in the context of weaponization. So why doesn't the NIE say so explicitly? The first thing an intelligence organization has to know is to ask the right questions, but this question is not asked, nor is it answered.

Furthermore, it is a totally wrong approach to make this differentiation between the military and the civilian parts of the Iranian nuclear program. It's all one program. Part of it can be justified by civilian needs, so the Iranians do it under civilian cover. Part of it cannot be justified by civilian needs, but it is all part of the same program, and the part of the program that is designated to develop the fissile material is ongoing.

Between 2003 and 2005, the Iranians refrained from any nuclear activity. They were under the influence of the impression created by America's pre-emptive policies in the region in Iraq and Afghanistan, which served as the main instrument that enabled the Europeans to force Iran to make a deal and to postpone uranium conversion and enrichment. But when the Iranians realized in 2005 that there was no actual threat behind their fears of U.S. pre-emption, they decided to take the risk and start conversion and then
enrichment.

In other words, once the U.S. appeared to be entangled in Iraq, a situation to which the Iranians themselves made no small contribution, Tehran could return to vigorously advancing its nuclear program. The fact is that Iran has moved forward with conversion. As a result, the Iranians already have prepared, through the conversion process, enough uranium hexaflouride gas (UF6) for more than ten atomic bombs.

Iran has moved forward with enrichment too. There is a debate in the NIE report over where exactly the Iranians are in their enrichment R&D. Some claim that maybe they have not yet reached the point where they can really perform enrichment in a robust way and not worry about failing. But there's no doubt that they have spent at least two years on R&D.

If we believe the NIE judgment about their technical capabilities, then the Iranians are not far away from the point where they will have the ability to produce an ample supply of enriched uranium in order to make a bomb. Bearing in mind that they probably have everything else they need to proceed, the Iranians will be able to do whatever is still needed to finish their weaponization activities without being worried about a military
move. Only such a military move can really stop them right now. So we see the harsh repercussions of the very poor work that the American intelligence agencies have done.

* * *
Notes
1. Mark Mazzetti, "U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work," New York Times, December 3, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/world/middleeast/03cnd-iran.html
2. Tim Shipman, Philip Sherwell and Carolynne Wheeler, "Britain; Iran 'Hoodwinked' CIA Over Nuclear Plans," Daily Telegraph, December 10, 2007,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/12/09/wiran109.xml
3. Katrin Bennhold, "Despite Report, France and Germany Keep Pressure on Iran," New York Times, December 7, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/world/middleeast/07iran.html
4. Elaine Sciolino, "Monitoring Agency Praises U.S. Report, But Keeps Wary Eye on Iran," New York Times, December 5, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/05/world/middleeast/05iran.html
5. Demetri Sevastopulo, "Intelligence Official Revives Iran Doubts," Financial Times, February 6, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a1ce672e-d456-11dc-a8c6-0000779fd2ac.html
6. David Brunnstrom, "Iranian Dissidents Urge Immediate Nuclear Checks," Reuters, February 20, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL20165281
* * *
Maj.-Gen. (res.) Aharon Ze'evi Farkash served as Director of IDF Military
Intelligence from 2001 to 2006. He previously served as Head of the Technology and Logistics Division, and as Deputy Head of the IDF Planning Division.

Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, Program Director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and Vice President of the Lander Institute in Jerusalem, is former commander of the IDF's National Defense College and the IDF Staff and Command College. He is also the former head of the Research and Assessment Division of Military Intelligence, with special responsibility for preparing the National Intelligence Assessment. In addition, he served as the military secretary of the Minister of Defense.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser served in a number of senior roles in the IDF, most recently as head of the Research and Assessment Division of Military Intelligence. Previously, he was the senior intelligence officer of the IDF Central Command.

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IDF WANTS NEW VERTICAL TAKE-OFF FIGHTERS...NOW!!!

Israel Looks to STOVL JSF
(IAF to acquire Vertical take-off fighter)


The IDF assesses that its bases and runways could potentially be targeted by enemy missiles during wartime, leading to a decision to consider the purchase of a JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) squadron with vertical take-off and landing capabilities (VTOL), such as the F-35B.
According to Lockheed Martin, the F-35B employs a short-takeoff/vertical-landing (STOVL) capability via a shaft-driven lift fan propulsion system. The STVOL, designed to replace the AV-8B Harrier, also carries a refueling probe fitted into the right side of the forward fuselage. It has more than twice the range on internal fuel, operates at supersonic conditions, and houses internal weapons.
"The plan is that we will get the F-35 as soon as it's possible," a senior IAF official told Aviation Week & Space Technology. He noted that the IAF will eventually acquire more than 100 F-35s and emphasized that the IAF wanted the JSF "the minute it is available."
A senior Israeli general explained that "the number of aircraft [we obtain initially] could be irrelevant...The main issue now is that we get the first squadron as soon as possible. We give the basic capability to the squadron, and later on we increase it [with technology upgrades]...At the beginning, we expect to get at least one squadron, with more to follow by the end of the decade [in 2020]."
The Israeli rush to gain VTOL capability is certainly understandable, as the Jewish state faces the possibility of sustained missile and rocket attacks from at least three enemy states: Syria, Iran and Lebanon (via Hizballah).
The Israel Missile Defense Association (IMDA) notes that during the Second Lebanon War, (July 12 - August 13 2007), the IDF Home Front Command reported 3,970 rocket impacts in Israel. 907 rockets impacted on buildings or in close enough proximity to cause severe damage. 1,012 rockets landed in the northern city of Kiryat Shemona, while the coastal Nahariya sustained 808 rocket impacts. In addition, the Port of Haifa was forced to close and the Navy base at Haifa relocated south.
Hizballah still maintains an impressive arsenal of lethal projectiles that includes: Katyushas, 220mm and 302mm rockets, the FADJR-3 and FADJR-5, the Zelzal-2, the C-802 and Fatah-110.
Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd estimate that Syria has a stockpile of several hundred SCUD-B, SCUD-C and SS-21 missiles. Damascus may also possess a number of SCUD-D missiles with a range of 650 kilometers. In addition, the Assad regime maintains 10 squadrons of fighter-ground attack aircraft (including Su-24, Su-22 and MiG-23 BN) and 16 squadrons of fighter aircraft (including MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25 and MiG-29A and Su-27).
According to Steven A. Hildreth, a specialist in missile defense and non-proliferation, the Iranian Shahab-3 (a derivative of the North Korean No-Dong 1 ballistic missile) is reportedly capable of achieving a range of 1,000-1,500 kilometers. The Shahab-3A may have a range of 1,500 to 2,500 kilometers and could potentially reach targets throughout the Middle East, Turkey and southern Europe.
-- Aharon Etengoff
January 3, 2008 04:05 PM JSF Watch

U.S. pressure against Israel Increases...

U.S. pressure against Israel Increases...

by Bill Maniaci
Chief, Intellingenc
B'nai Elim

Pentagon Blocks Sale of F-22 Fighters to Israel

The U.S. Congress in consort with the Pentagon has blocked the purchase of the F-22 Fighter to Israel. The F-22 is the newest and best stealth combat fighter aircraft in the United States arsnel. It will ultimately replace the ageing F-15s in service with the U.S. Military.

Legislation was passed by the House Appropriations Committee specifically prohibiting the sale of the Fighter outside the United States. Israel had been negotiating with the Pentagon to purchase the Jet Fighter in order to maintain air superiority over hostile Arab countries. The Pentagon officially rejected the Israeli request to procure the F-22 (this preceded Congressional action to prohibit the sale to any foreign power). Japan had also been in discussions regarding its desire to purchase the F-22.

This is another blatant example of how the United States is keeping its heel on Israel. One must note that as a precondition of the sale to Israel of the now outdated F-15 Fighters and other U.S. combat aircraft, Israel is specifically prohibited from make any modifications to the aircraft that would upgrade or otherwise increase or improve their combat capabilities. This restriction remains in place while the Arabs have no such restrictions placed upon them regarding their purchase of American weaponry and technology. With the completion of the recently announced twenty billion dollar arms sale to "moderate" or "friendly" Arab countries, the balance of military power in the region is tilting dramatically against the Israel Defense Forces.

Little, if any, backlash or opposition to this decision is expected in the U.S. by the American Jewish Community which is largely comprised of liberal leftist Democrats, many of whom openly oppose Israel and support the Palestinian cause.

Each stumbling block placed before Israel's ability to defend herself only strengthens her enemies. Israel has become the sacrificial lamb to, in the greatest tradition of Neville Chamberlain, appease the Arabs and continue the flow of Crude to the West. What more must we suffer at the hands of the Islamo Nazis before the West realizes that promises, agreements, treaties, and the like made by the Arab/Islamic world are worthless prevarications, designed only to weaken the West and strengthen their world-wide Jihadist ambitions?

SYRIAN BIO-WEAPONS THREAT TO ISRAEL

Note: The information below which was published three months ago scratches the surface regarding Open-source intelligence and other classified information gathered which indicate that an attack against Israel by Syria (supported by Iran) is imminent. Unless Israel takes immediate preemptive steps to prevent the Syrians from using WMDs against Israel, they may not be stoppable. In addition, the button pushers in Iran (the PM and the Mullahs) need to be dealt with with extreme prejudice. If the United States will not act against Iran in consort with Israel, then Israel must take unilateral action against both Syria and Iran. IDF - WAKE UP - THE CLOCK IS TICKING..... Blogmaster This is a WorldNetDaily printer-friendly version of the article which follows. To view this item online, visit http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=54542 Monday, March 5, 2007 BIOLOGICAL WAR-FEAR Syria ready with bio-terror if U.S. hits Iran Damascus reportedly hiding WMD among commercial pharmaceuticals Posted: March 5, 2007 1:00 a.m. Eastern By Jerome R. Corsi © 2007 WorldNetDaily.com Jill Bellamy-Dekker An American biodefense analyst living in Europe says if the U.S. invades Iran to halt its nuclear ambitions, Syria is ready to respond with weapons of mass destruction – specifically biological weapons. "Syria is positioned to launch a biological attack on Israel or Europe should the U.S. attack Iran," Jill Bellamy-Dekker told WND. "The Syrians are embedding their biological weapons program into their commercial pharmaceuticals business and their veterinary vaccine-research facilities. The intelligence service oversees Syria's 'bio-farm' program and the Ministry of Defense is well interfaced into the effort." Bellamy-Decker currently directs the Public Health Preparedness program for the European Homeland Security Association under the French High Committee for Civil Defense. She anticipates a variation of smallpox is the biological agent Syria would utilize. "The Syrians are also working on orthopox viruses that are related to smallpox," Bellamy-Decker said, "and it's a good way to get around international treaties against offensive biological weapons development. They work on camelpox as a cover for smallpox." According to the Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy (CIDRAP) at the University of Minnesota, camelpox is a virus closely related to smallpox, that causes a "severe and economically important disease in camels," but rarely, if ever, causes the disease in humans. (Story continues below) Bellamy-Decker also told WND the North Koreans were working closely with the Syrians on their biological weapons program. "The Syrians have made some recent acquisitions in regard to their smallpox program from the DPRK," she explained. "Right before the recent Lebanon war, the Syrians had a crash program in cryptosporidium." According to the Washington State Department of Health, cryptosporidium is a one-celled parasite that causes a gastrointestinal illness with symptoms of diarrhea, abdominal cramps, headaches, nausea, vomiting, and a low-grade fever. The symptoms can last for weeks and may result in weight loss and dehydration. "Because cryptosporidium is impervious to chlorine," Bellamy-Decker continued, "you could infect the water supply by the bucket full of cryptosporidium, if you know where to get it. The resulting illness would put down a lot of civilians and military who might oppose you going into their country." "The Syrians have a modus operandi of covert operations and deniability," she stressed, "so biological weapons are absolutely perfect for them." WND asked Bellamy-Decker if the Syrians have any history of having used biological weapons. "I believe they are testing biological weapons right now, in Sudan, in the conflict in Darfur," she answered. "There is credible information about flyover activity in Darfur, where little parachutes have been dropped down on the population. This is consistent with dispersal methods in bioweapons attacks. I've also seen evidence of bodies that have been recovered from Darfur that look as if they had been exposed to biological weapons." President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran met with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum Feb. 28 to exchange expressions of support and solidarity. "The Syrians now consider biological weapons as part of their arsenal," Bellamy-Decker said. "The Syrian military is also beginning to plan the eventual integration of biological weapons in its tactical and strategic arsenals." She referenced an April 2000 article published by Syrian defense minister General Mustafa Talas, titled "Biological (Germ) Warfare: A New and Effective Method in Modern Warfare." The article was republished in a Farsi translation in Tehran. "All indications suggest that Syria's ultimate objective is to mount biological warheads on all varieties of the long-range surface-to-surface missiles in its possession," Bellamy-Decker maintained. "This is a goal that can probably be achieved within a few years, and it may already have been realized in part." She argued that instead of producing large quantities of bioweapons agents, Syria is seeking to develop a smaller, but high-quality arsenal, which it can deliver accurately against military and civilian targets. When asked how Syria might be expected to retaliate against Israel or Europe if the U.S. attacked Iran, she responded, "Syria has most likely forward-deployed some of their covert operatives. Smallpox does not need to be weaponized. Aerosol release is the way to go." Bellamy-Decker explained the methodology of a terrorist bio-attack: So with a good primary aerosol release in an airport in Israel or Europe and you could get 100 index cases. If you've made the strain sufficiently virulent, you could have a ratio of 1 to 13 for infectivity, where the normal ratio is 1 to 3. If every index case infects 13 other people, you unfortunately have a great first hit. "A terrorist bio-attack could go global," she noted. "A good biological hit will spread rapidly with international travel. Smallpox is a better weapon than anthrax. Smallpox has been field-tested, it is highly stable, and highly communicable, especially if you look at some of the strains the Russians manipulated. Syria probably retained some of [its] smallpox strains from the last outbreak back in 1972." Another risk is the possibility Syria's military might give bioweapons to terrorists. "We are close to seeing a breakthrough where Syria could provide biological weapons to some of the terrorist groups they work with, like Hezbollah in Lebanon," Bellamy-Decker argued. "The Syrians believe they can vaccinate themselves and they are working within the Syrian military. They're certainly not worried about releasing these biological weapons in a military setting, or even if civilians were infected as well, as long as they are vaccinated. I think it is a real threat." Bellamy-Decker is presenting a paper at this week's Intelligence Summit in St. Petersburg, Fla. It is expected to focus on the sophisticated state of development of the Syrian bioweapons program. "The Syrians have developed a rather remarkable bioweapons capability that has gone under the radar of U.S. intelligence," she said. "U.S. intelligence continues to insist that the Syrian capability is not highly developed. The Syrian program mirrors how the Russians have developed their program, as well as Iraq under Saddam Hussein, North Korea, and Iran. The emphasis in the Syrian program is on latent potential and outbreak capability." Bellamy-Decker explained we should not expect to find stockpiles of biological weapons. "Stockpiles are just not how biological weapons are done," she said. "With biological weapons, it is not the quantity, but the quality that counts. If you can produce a virulent, communicable strain, then you have a great biological weapon and it doesn't matter how much of it you have, it depends on what the weapon looks like." Bellamy-Decker also referenced a paper she had co-authored for the European Homeland Security Association (EHSA) titled, "Public Health Security and Preparedness." This paper is intended to be used as part of a new initiative EHSA is launching in Brussels to hold a quarterly bioterrorism forum bringing together national and international experts with high-level decision-makers "to discuss the threat posed by deliberate disease and the appropriate preparedness and response mechanisms vitally needed to address this threat." Are you a representative of the media who would you like to interview the author of this story? Let us know. Related offers: "Atomic Iran: How the Terrorist Regime Bought the Bomb and American Politicians" Whistleblower magazine: "'MOST DANGEROUS NATION ON EARTH: Why America must wake up now and deal with Iran's imminent threat" "Everlasting Hatred: The Roots of Jihad" Stun a Muslim – with the truth, for FREE! Previous stories: Israel training for war with Iran, Syria? 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Corsi received a Ph.D. from Harvard University in political science in 1972 and has written many books and articles, including co-authoring with John O'Neill the No. 1 New York Times best-seller, "Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry." Corsi's most recent book was authored with Michael Evans: "Showdown with Nuclear Iran." Dr. Corsi's other recent books include "Black Gold Stranglehold: The Myth of Scarcity and the Politics of Oil," which he co-authored with WND columnist Craig. R. Smith, and "Atomic Iran."