The U.S. Policy of Placating Terrorists

Why U.S. Policy Leans Too Close to Terrorist Appeasement

"A well-organized plan to infiltrate and influence U.S. policymakers at the highest levels has been operating on American soil for well over a decade." And the Muslim Brotherhood is involved -- who else?

Clare M. Lopez of the Intelligence Summit explains in Human Events: "Why U.S. Policy Leans Too Close to Terrorist Appeasement,"

Under the Bush administration we had no Iran policy. Now, our policy leans too close to appeasement. How did it get this way?

America’s foreign policy toward Iran did not reach this level of malleability overnight or by accident. A well-organized plan to infiltrate and influence U.S. policymakers at the highest levels has been operating on American soil for well over a decade. Conceived in Tehran under the direct authority of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the plan set out to create a network of top U.S. academics, diplomats, journalists, NGOs, and think tanks that would advocate a policy of appeasement towards Iran. Iran’s top strategic objective has always been to buy time for its nuclear weapons program, which now is well along in developing the three critical components: enriched uranium, warhead weaponization, and a credible missile delivery system.

Beginning in the late 1990s, a de facto alliance between Muslim Brotherhood fronts in the U.S. (such as CAIR -- the Council on Islamic American Relations) and frank Tehran regime advocates like the American-Iranian Council (AIC) openly began to promote public support for a U.S. foreign policy based on the favored positions of the Islamic Republic. In 2002, a new pro-Iran group was formed by a young Swedish-Iranian immigrant named Trita Parsi. That group, the National Iranian-American Council (NIAC) quickly established itself as the nexus of a growing network of individuals and organizations that openly lobby for a U.S. policy of acquiescence, diplomacy, incentives, and negotiations with the Tehran regime -- while strongly opposing coercive diplomacy, sanctions, or threat of military action. Part and parcel of this advocacy on behalf of Tehran is a pattern of antipathy towards Israel that minimizes its security concerns and dismisses its legitimate defense needs.

Under Parsi, who is closely connected to the Tehran regime, the NIAC network has expanded to include a growing number of new groups. Some of them -- such as The Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran (CASMII) -- are NIAC clones. CASMII was founded in December 2005 to oppose all forms of pressure on Iran. Others, such as the Center for a New American Security (CNAS, founded in February 2007) play the role of useful idiots. CNAS had Dr. Susan Rice, the Obama administration’s appointee as Ambassador to the UN, on its Board of Directors.

Dr. Vali Nasr, who has been named senior advisor to U.S. Afghanistan/Pakistan envoy Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, was one of the authors of a September 2008 CNAS publication called Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options. Nasr’s chapter, "The Implications of Military Confrontation with Iran," urged the U.S. to take the military option for dealing with Iran off the table and instead focus on how best to accommodate Tehran’s rising power in the Middle East region. The Campaign for a New American Policy on Iran (CNAPI) launched its pro-Iran activities with a cross-country event called The Folly of Attacking Iran Tour, which crisscrossed the U.S. in February and March 2008.

The American Foreign Policy Project (AFPP) was founded in December 2008 with an “experts list” that reads like a remix of other CAIR and NIAC affiliates, including former Ambassadors Thomas Pickering, James Dobbins, and William Miller plus well-known academic figures such as Professors Gary G. Sick of Columbia University and Juan R. Cole of the University of Michigan. These groups’ interlocking Boards of Advisors, Directors, and Experts include many other nationally-known figures from public policy and international business arenas, including some big oil companies.

All are associated in one way or another with Trita Parsi and NIAC and all advocate a policy of accommodation with Iran.

The Iranian regime makes no attempt to disguise its links to this network. NIAC, for instance, was openly mentioned in the 7 December 2007 issue of the government-controlled Aftab News, where the NIAC network was called the regime’s “Iran lobby in the U.S.” In March 2007, the Fars News daily described NIAC as ‘a non-profit’ organization with headquarters in Washington, D.C. that was established to counter the influence of AIPAC [the American-Israeli Political Action Committee, a legal lobby group] and to enlist the support of Iranian expatriates living in the U.S. in order to ‘penetrate U.S. politics.’

Maneuvering behind Washington, D.C. policymaking scenes to exert influence on U.S. decision makers is pretty standard for a host of legitimate interest groups, including many foreign countries. Concern is indicated, however, when the guiding influence behind such maneuvering emanates from the top levels of a regime like Iran’s that holds top spot on the Department of State’s state sponsors of terror list, makes no secret of its hatred and enmity for the U.S. and our ally Israel, and acts in myriad ways to support those who have assassinated, held, kidnapped, killed, and tortured American civilians and military over a 30-year period. The expanding influence of this pro-Iran lobby on U.S. foreign policy attests to a determined and sophisticated operation that serves only the interests of regime implacably hostile to America’s own national security interests.

Decoupling Syria from Iran:

Jerusalem Issue Brief
Institute for Contemporary Affairs
founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation

Vol. 8, No. 15 3 December 2008

Decoupling Syria from Iran:
Constraints on U.S.-Syrian Rapprochement

David Schenker

Damascus' foray into diplomacy with Israel has had little discernable effect on Syria's longstanding, unhelpful policies vis-à-vis Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestinian politics.
While moving Syria into the Western camp would be a great accomplishment, it's not clear that this development would necessarily constitute a long-term strategic setback for Iranian efforts to undermine U.S. policy in Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, and Iraq. In the absence of Syria, Iran would still be capable of supporting Hizbullah, Hamas, and its Shiite allies in Iraq.
Developments in Damascus point to an erosion of state security and a domestically-weakened regime. Internationally, however, Syrian diplomatic gains are irrefutable and have buoyed the regime.
In this fluid environment, the Assad regime is betting that an Obama administration will provide relief, and the opportunity to reassert itself in Lebanon and reintegrate into the international community.
Yet the ultimate disposition of the new administration's policy toward Syria is far from certain, particularly if the Assad regime continues to pursue its unhelpful regional policies. In this regard, Assad's hopes for a dramatic change in U.S. Syria policy may be short-lived.

Like many authoritarian states, developments in Syria are notoriously difficult to interpret. The closed and conspiratorial nature of Syria's Assad regime has always made it a challenge to divine exactly what is going on in Damascus. Lately, however, this task has been further complicated by two seemingly contradictory trends in Syrian politics.
Since November 2008, a spate of killings and a suicide bombing in Damascus have fueled speculation that the Assad regime is facing unprecedented infighting or succumbing to terrorism and/or destabilizing external meddling. At the same time, however, the regime has derived enormous political and diplomatic benefit from its indirect negotiations with Israel, sponsored by Turkey. These talks have effectively undermined the international isolation of Syria in place since the 2005 murder of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri.
Is the Assad regime under threat, or increasingly confident, buoyed by the election of Barak Obama and the apparent shift in international attitudes regarding its status as a rogue state? Dynamics on the ground suggest that the answer lies somewhere in between. Despite significant challenges facing Syria, the Assad regime today appears cautiously optimistic that trends are once again working in its favor.

Pressures Spike...
Since 2003, Damascus has found itself under unprecedented pressure. Syria's policy of sending military materiel to Saddam Hussein on the eve of the Iraq war and facilitating the movement of al-Qaeda and other insurgents to Iraq not surprisingly proved a real irritant to the bilateral relationship with Washington. As a result of these Syrian policies, in 2004, the Bush administration levied sanctions against Damascus and subsequently pushed for the passage of several UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) targeting unhelpful Syrian behavior in Iraq and Lebanon, including, most prominently, UNSCR 1559, which demanded an end to the decades-long Syrian occupation of Lebanon.
The watershed in the deterioration of Syria's bilateral relationship with Washington and Syria's heretofore cordial relations with the international community was the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, a crime for which Damascus is the leading suspect. Two months after the murder, pressures drove Syrian forces out of Lebanon. And in the aftermath of the killing, the Security Council initiated an independent investigation (UNSCR 1644) and later voted to establish an international tribunal (UNSCR 1701) to prosecute the culprits.
Subsequently, not only was Damascus treated as a pariah, the Assad regime faced the very real prospect that senior regime officials - including members of Assad's family and inner circle - would be implicated in the killing, a development that could shake the very foundations of the regime. These pressures were compounded in September 2007, when Israeli jets bombed a presumed Syrian nuclear facility near the village of al-Kibar.

...And Diminish
Severe pressures lasted about a year, but then chinks in the armor of the isolation policy started to appear. First, the Iraqi prime minister visited Damascus in August 2007; then trips by delegations of U.S. congressmen headlined by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. At the same time, Syria saw dramatic increases in foreign direct investment, particularly from the Gulf, most significantly Qatar. Despite these challenges, however, the policy of diplomatic isolation largely remained in place until the announcement on May 21, 2008, of indirect negotiations in Turkey between Syria and Israel.
The impact of this announcement was compounded by Damascus' decision, the very same day in Doha, to consent to the election of a new, ostensibly pro-Syrian president in Lebanon1 - a move that temporarily ended a seven-month standoff between the pro-West government and its Syrian and Iranian allies led by Hizbullah.2
For Damascus, the publication of the talks with Israel - and the appearance of being helpful on Lebanon - opened the floodgates of European engagement. President Assad traveled to Paris for Bastille Day celebrations and talks with President Sarkozy. Shortly thereafter, Sarkozy appealed to the European Union to end its opposition to Syrian membership in the EU Economic Association. He also raised the possibility of Airbus sales to Damascus, and gave the green light to Total and Lafarge to sign major business deals.3 Sarkozy himself visited Syria in September 2008, setting the stage for a visit by Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem to London in October.
Echoing the European position and that of the newly-appointed Lebanese president - who called in August for the world to "open up to Syria" - Washington followed suit.4 On September 26, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Mouallem on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. The meeting was followed by an additional round of talks between Mouallem and Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs David Welch on September 29.
This seeming reversal in the longstanding Bush administration policy of isolating Damascus was only interrupted on October 26, when U.S. helicopters targeted a senior al-Qaeda operative on Syrian territory responsible for shuttling terrorists into Iraq. Responding to the strike, the Assad regime organized mass protests,5 shuttered the American school and cultural center in Damascus, and expelled U.S. personnel working for these institutions.6 Syrian officials likewise indicated that their government would aver future negotiations with Washington and instead wait for the next administration to further pursue dialogue.
Even after the U.S. cross-border strike, Damascus continued its progress in securing European diplomatic gains. Mouallem traveled to London to meet with British Foreign Minister David Miliband to discuss a renewal of bilateral ties and London's support for Israeli-Syrian negotiations. In November, in the first senior-level visit since 2005, Miliband went to Damascus to meet President Assad. On November 19, it was announced that Britain had reestablished high-level intelligence ties with the Assad regime.7

Damascus Murder Mysteries and Other Security Breaches
While developments with Europe appeared to be in Syria's favor, events at home generated concern. The Assad regime long prided itself on the capabilities of its state security, but several security breaches in 2007-2008 undercut this carefully cultivated image. The first blow came on September 6, 2007, when Israeli planes penetrated Syrian airspace and destroyed what Western intelligence agencies almost universally agree was a Syrian nuclear facility at al-Kibar.8
On February 12, 2008, longtime Hizbullah military commander Imad Mughniyeh was killed by a car bomb in a tightly controlled area of Damascus. In the aftermath of the assassination, recriminations flew. While most people attributed the operation to Israel, Mughniyeh's widow blamed "Syrian traitors" for her husband's murder,9 and there are some signs that the killing may be contributing to tensions in the Syrian-Iranian alliance.10
A second high-profile assassination involved Mohammed Suleiman, a top military aide to President Assad who reportedly managed both weapons transfers to Hizbullah and the Syrian nuclear program. Initial reports of the August 1 killing focused on the possibility of an Israeli sniper hit, but subsequent speculation has focused on the possibility that the killing was related to Syrian infighting,11 Iranian revenge for an alleged Syrian role in the Mughniyeh killing, and/or an operation to cover up evidence regarding al-Kibar. According to International Atomic Energy Agency Director Mohamed ElBaradei, Suleiman was the IAEA's "main interlocutor" in the investigation into the facility.12
On September 27, a suicide car bomb went off in the heart of Damascus, killing 17. Official spokesmen immediately blamed "Islamic extremists" (i.e., al-Qaeda) for the strike, although it remains unclear whether the incident is being seriously investigated. No claims of responsibility have been forthcoming. Still, if al-Qaeda did perpetrate the attack, it would come as little surprise: Damascus facilitated the organization's movement across, and allowed it to train on, Syrian territory since 2003. Over the years, some of these jihadis may have taken up residence in Syria, adding to the regime's security concerns.
Responding to the attack, Syria intimated a connection to Fatah al-Islam, the Lebanon-based al-Qaeda affiliate.13 The linkage was odd, given Syria's close relationship to the group.14 Nevertheless, the regime started to mass troops on the Lebanese border, ostensibly to protect Syria from further attack.15
In October 2008, U.S. forces crossed the Syrian border to target a high-value al-Qaeda operative in Syria. The brazen raid, which occurred during daylight hours and was captured by a local on video, infuriated Syrian authorities.16 Foreign Minister Walid Moualem denied the al-Qaeda connection, described the U.S. strike as a violation of sovereignty, and pledged to "defend [Syrian] territories" in the future. He also claimed the U.S. strike was intended to undermine recent Syrian diplomatic inroads in Europe.17 At the same time, Syrian Ambassador to Washington Imad Mustafa indicated that his government would no longer engage with the Bush administration. Instead, he said, Syria would wait for a new [Obama] presidency.18

Shoring Up the Alliance with Tehran
The security setbacks for Damascus and the ongoing talks with Israel have likely been viewed by Iran with concern. Israeli officials articulate the view that talks with Syria constitute a tool to "help isolate Iran."19 Iranian officials have likewise issued public warnings to the Assad regime not to go too far in these discussions. In June 2008, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini cautioned Syria on the "consequences of 'peace' on its relations with Tehran."20
In response, Damascus has sought to reassure Tehran that it has no intention of undertaking the kind of strategic reorientation toward the West envisioned by Israel as underpinning a peace treaty. In May 2008, for example, a day after Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni mentioned the Israeli quid pro quo for a peace deal - i.e., a Syrian split from Tehran and an end to support for Hizbullah and Hamas as the price for the Golan Heights - Damascus dispatched Defense Minister Hassan Turkmani to Tehran for three days of talks, including a meeting with President Ahmadinejad.21 Turkmani returned to Syria with a signed memorandum of understanding for military and defense cooperation with Iran.22 In August, President Assad himself traveled to Tehran for meetings with Ahmadinejad.
During 2008, Syria and Iran signed several additional agreements dealing with cooperation in electricity, science, and communications, among other fields. In July 2008, just two months after the Israeli talks were announced, Iran and Syria signed a preferential trade agreement and agreed to establish a joint bank.23
At the same time, Syria has worked to reassure Hizbullah that it remains committed to their relationship. In a September 2008 interview with Hizbullah's Al-Manar television, President Assad explained Syrian policy: "We don't see an interest in abandoning the resistance [i.e., Hizbullah]..Our clear position remains in all our political discourse - our steadfast position for resistance" in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.24 One month later, Syrian Ambassador to Washington Imad Mustapha referred to Hizbullah as a "close ally" which Syria regarded with pride.25

A New Page?
Damascus' foray into diplomacy with Israel has had little discernable effect on Syria's longstanding, unhelpful policies vis-à-vis Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestinian politics. Indeed, according to Iraqi military sources, prior to the October 2008 U.S. cross-border strike, Baghdad had informed Damascus of the senior al-Qaeda official's presence on Syrian territory and had requested that Syria take action.26
Even as Syria continued to pursue policies seemingly designed to undermine U.S. interests in the region, the Assad regime has made no secret of its preference for an Obama administration. During the summer, presidential confidant and Minister of Expatriates Bouthaina Shaaban opined that "America desperately needs a logo change."27 Obama, she said, would change both the content and tone of American foreign policy, presumably in a direction more amenable to Syrian interests. On the eve of the U.S. elections, with Obama far ahead in the polls, President Assad similarly announced that Syria was waiting for the next administration to mediate Israeli-Syrian negotiations.28
However, several senior advisors to the president-elect have suggested that Washington will continue to maintain high expectations of Syrian behavior as the sine qua non for bilateral progress.29 Moreover, there is no indication that an Obama administration would be willing to sacrifice Lebanon and its democratic pro-West allies in exchange for marginal and likely temporary improvements in Syrian policy.
Even if the Obama administration wished to "test" Damascus' intentions regarding the potential for a split with Tehran, Washington would be somewhat constrained in the kind of concessions it could make to cajole Syria. The international tribunal on the Hariri assassination, for example, is not under U.S. but rather UN auspices; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigation into illegal Syrian nuclear activities is likewise independent and not subject to U.S. political interference. In fact, given the IAEA's initial report about the Syrian nuclear facility at al-Kibar - and in light of Damascus' lack of cooperation in the investigation - the IAEA may be particularly tenacious in pursuing this matter.30
An Obama administration may also face constraints from its Arab allies, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, which possess few illusions about Syria's capacity and willingness to change. This "moderate" Arab bloc would not welcome a policy that freely gives away the few precious levers of pressure on Syria while strengthening Iran. These Arab states, and particularly Saudi Arabia, are concerned about recent Syrian diplomatic gains, and have tried to revitalize the Arab peace proposal - focused on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations - as a means to counter progress on the Syria-Israel track and the international rehabilitation of Damascus.
Of course, even if Washington's diplomatic efforts to foster a Syria-Israel deal ultimately fail, it's possible that the negotiations themselves could result in U.S.-Israel bilateral tensions. While it seems unlikely, Israel could face pressure from an Obama administration to ink a deal that does not explicitly demand a verifiable shift of Syria away from the Iranian orbit. In the absence of a Syrian strategic realignment, however, it would be difficult to imagine Israel consenting to such a deal.
Furthermore, while moving Syria into the Western camp would be a great accomplishment, it's not clear that this development would necessarily constitute a long-term strategic setback for Iranian efforts to undermine U.S. policy in Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, and Iraq. In the absence of Syria, Iran would still be capable of supporting Hizbullah, Hamas, and its Shiite allies in Iraq.

Conclusion
Developments in Damascus point to an erosion of state security and a domestically-weakened regime. Internationally, however, Syrian diplomatic gains are irrefutable and have buoyed the regime. In this fluid environment, the Assad regime is betting that an Obama administration will provide relief, and the opportunity to reassert itself in Lebanon and reintegrate into the international community. Yet the ultimate disposition of the new administration's policy toward Syria is far from certain, particularly if the Assad regime continues to pursue its unhelpful regional policies. In this regard, Assad's hopes for a dramatic change in U.S. Syria policy may be short-lived.

* * *
Notes
1. See, for example, Hussein Abdallah, "Suleiman Urges World to Open Up to Syria," Daily Star (Beirut), August 28, 2008, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=95494
2. See David Schenker, "Lebanese Crisis Ends: Hizballah Victory or Temporary Truce?" Policywatch #1375, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 21, 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2883
3. "Lafarge, Total to Sign Syrian Deals," Reuters, September 4, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSL44186420080904. See also Ibrahim Hamide, "Nahu 'Khatwa malmusa' li'ilaqat diplomasiya khilal ziyarat Sleiman." Al Hayat, August 8, 2008, http://www.daralhayat.com/arab_news/levant_news/08-2008/Article-20080808-a38664f0-c0a8-10ed-01bf-ee331773c621/story.html
4. Hussein Abdallah, "Suleiman Urges World to Open Up to Syria," Beirut Daily Star, August 28, 2008, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=95494
5. Graham Bowley, "As If on Cue, Syrians Protest U.S. Incursion on Their Soil," New York Times, October 30, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/world/middleeast/31syria.html
6. "Syria Asks Foreign Staff of U.S. Institutions to Leave Country," Deutsche Press Agentur, November 4, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1033940.html
7. "Britain Resumes High-Level Intelligence Links with Syria," AFP (Middle East Times), November 19, 2008, http://www.metimes.com/Politics/2008/11/19/britain_resumes_highlevel_intelligence_links_with_syria_report/afp/
8. See, for example, Paul Richter, "Syria-N. Korea Nuclear Link Seen, Diplomat Says," Los Angeles Times, January 8, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/17/world/fg-syria17
9. "Iran: Slain Hezbollah Military Chief's Widow Points the Finger at Syria," AKI Adnkronos International, November 4, 2008, http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=1.0.1912415171. Still others have suggested that the Mughniyeh killing represented elements of Hizbullah infighting.
10. For example, the day after the Mughniyeh assassination, Tehran announced a joint Syrian-Iranian investigation into the killing ("Iran, Syria Open Joint Investigation into Mughniyeh Assassination," AP, February 15, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/15/africa/ME-GEN-Syria-Iran.php). The next day, Damascus' official news agency SANA issued a terse statement indicating the investigation would be completed by Syria alone ("An Official Information Source Denies Reports on the Formation of a Joint Committee to Investigate Moghnia Assassination," SANA, February 16, 2008, http://www.sana.sy/eng/21/2008/02/16/161180.htm). Likewise, in the aftermath of the Mugniyeh affair, a large deal in which Syria was slated to purchase busses from Iran was cancelled without explanation.
11. For a discussion of the infighting theory, see Amir Kulik, "The Assassination of General Mohammed Suleiman," Canada Free Press, August 15, 2008, http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/4481
12. "Shooting Delays UN Syria Inquiry," BBC News, September 26, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7638499.stm. If Suleiman was indeed killed by Syrian intelligence, it would be consistent with the apparent Syrian practice of executing officials possessing detailed knowledge of sensitive issues acting as key interlocutors in UN investigations. Former Syrian viceroy in Lebanon Ghazi Kena'an - believed to be a key witness for the UN investigation of the Hariri murder - "committed suicide" in October 2005.
13. Weeks later, "confessions" from the alleged Fatah al-Islam perpetrators of the attack were aired on Syrian television. See Natalia Antelava, "Behind the Syria TV 'Confessions'," BBC, November 7, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7715850.stm. Few observers believed these "confessions" were credible.
14. See, for example, Gary Gambill, "The Rise of Fatah al-Islam," Global Politician, July 10, 2007, http://www.globalpolitician.com/23075-lebanon, and David Schenker, "Syria's Export of Terrorism to Lebanon: Threat and Response," Policywatch #1245, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 14, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2618
15. Not coincidentally, this move occurred just one day prior to newly-elected President Suleiman's first visit to Washington, serving as a not so subtle message to the president not to stray off the reservation.
16. Video may be viewed at "Syria Raid Killed 'Major Target'," BBC News, October 28, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7694528.stm
17. Patrick Goodenough, "Syria Says US Trying to Undermine Its European Diplomatic Successes," CNSNews.com, October 28, 2008, http://www.cnsnews.com/Public/Content/Article.aspx?rsrcid=38235
18. "Seven Questions for Syrian Ambassador Imad Moustapha," Foreign Policy, October 2008, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4544
19. Herb Keinon, "Syria Talks Meant to Pressure Iran," Jerusalem Post, November 2, 2008.
20. "Itabar tafawad Hizballah wa Hamas maa Israel 'Shiun mukhtalifun'," Al Arabiyyah (TV), June 14, 2008, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/07/14/53053.html
21. "Iranian Defense Minister Hails 'Strategic Ties' with Syria," Reuters, May 25, 2008, http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/986876.html
22. "Waqaan muthakara tafahum lil taawun al askari wal difai'," Tishreen, May 28, 2008, http://www.tishreen.info/__archives.asp?FileName=431053566200805280122153
23. "Itifaqiya al tijara al tifadaliya binya Syria and Iran," Syrian Time, July 12, 2008, www.syriantime.com/economic/2316.html
24. "Al Asad lil Manar: Mowqifna min al muqawama thabit was lam yataghayir," Al Manar, September 4, 2008, http://www.almanar.com.lb/newssite/newsdetails.aspx?id=55724&language=ar
25. "Syria Envoy: Future Generations Will Pay If Israel Scuttles Peace Talks," Ha'aretz, October 22, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1030438.html
26. "Iraqi Official to NOW Lebanon: Syria Was Aware of Terrorist Base," NOW Lebanon, October 31, 2008, http://nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=65154. The story quoted Iraqi Interior Ministry spokesman Abdulkarim Khalaf.
27. Judith Miller, "Obamamania in Damascus," City Journal, June 3, 2008, http://www.city-journal.org/2008/eon0603jm.html
28. Given Republican presidential candidate John McCain's stated opposition to "engagement" with Syria, it is a fair presumption that Assad was referring to an Obama administration.
29. See, for example, Dennis Ross, "A Ceasefire Reality: Engaging Syria," Washington Post, August 17, 2006, and Ross' quotes in Natanya Mozgovaya, "Dennis Ross on Why He's Working for Obama and How He'd Talk to Iran," Ha'aretz, November 7, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1030931.html. On July 29, 2005, then Senator Obama and Senator Hillary Clinton - the Obama Administration Secretary of State designate - signed a letter urging the Bush administration to identify Hizbullah's Al-Manar television as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization, because "Hizbullah, a known terrorist organization, funds Al-Manar." http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=S11652&dbname=2005_record
30. "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," Report by the Secretary General of the IAEA, GOV/2008/60, November 19, 2008.
* * *
David Schenker is a senior fellow in Arab politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. From 2002 to 2006, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as country director for Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories. He is a member of the Board of Advisers of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

This Jerusalem Issue Brief is available online at:
http://www.jcpa.org/
Dore Gold, Publisher; Yaacov Amidror, ICA Chairman; Dan Diker, ICA Director; Mark Ami-El, Managing Editor. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (Registered Amuta), 13 Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel; Tel. 972-2-561-9281, Fax. 972-2-561-9112, Email: jcpa@netvision.net.il. In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community Studies, 5800 Park Heights Ave., Baltimore, MD 21215; Tel. 410-664-5222; Fax 410-664-1228. Website: www.jcpa.org. ©Copyright. The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Fellows of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

Israel will use "Disproportionate Force" if attacked:

Israeli general warns Hezbollah of harsh response

By JOSEF FEDERMAN
JERUSALEM (AP) —

Israel will use "disproportionate force" if Hezbollah guerrillas attack Israel, a senior military commander said in published comments Friday, adding that any village used to fire missiles against the Jewish state will be destroyed.

Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, who commands forces along Israel's northern border, issued a similar threat against Syria.

Eizenkot spoke to the Yediot Ahronot daily more than two years after Israel fought an inconclusive 33-day war against Hezbollah. That war, in which Hezbollah lobbed some 4,000 rockets and missiles into Israel, was widely seen as a failure, and Eizenkot has been busy rehabilitating the army's readiness since taking up his post in the aftermath of the fighting.

Eizenkot said Israel would show no mercy on Lebanese villages that harbor Hezbollah fighters. Israel has repeatedly complained that Hezbollah fighters used residential areas for cover, limiting Israel's ability to respond.

Eizenkot stressed that this is "not a recommendation," but a plan approved by the highest levels. "If fire is carried out from Shiite villages in Lebanon, this is the operational plan: Very aggressive fire."

He said Israel would use what he called the "Dahiya doctrine," a reference to the southern suburbs of Beirut where Hezbollah's headquarters are located. During the 2006 war, Israel destroyed dozens of buildings in Dahiya, including the offices of Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah.

"What happened in the Dahiya quarter in Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired upon. We will apply disproportionate force upon it and cause great damage and destruction there," he said. "From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases."

In the interview, Eizenkot warned Syria against launching missiles into Israel. "Everything I said about Hezbollah, regarding punishment and severe harm, is all the more true for a country that has assets." He also indicated Syria could be punished for Hezbollah's actions.

Syria is a key backer of Hezbollah. Despite the recent resumption of indirect peace talks with Syria, Israel believes the Damascus regime continues to help rearm Hezbollah.
There was no immediate response from Hezbollah or Syria. But Nasrallah has warned in recent weeks that Hezbollah's response to a future Israeli incursion will be more fierce than what took place in 2006.

The 2006 war broke out when Hezbollah fighters burst across Israel's northern border, killing three Israeli soldiers and capturing two others. More than 1,000 Lebanese, mostly civilians, and 159 Israelis died in the fighting. The war ended with a U.N.-brokered truce, and in July, the bodies of the two abducted soldiers — believed to have died during or shortly after their capture — were returned to Israel in a swap with Hezbollah.

The cease-fire has largely held, but Israel believes Hezbollah has replenished its arms supplies with Iranian and Syrian help.

Eizenkot said "dozens of rockets" are concealed in homes in Shiite villages throughout southern Lebanon. He said Hezbollah has sent fighters to Iran for training, and Iranian military trainers have been spotted in Lebanon.

"You can see today the walls behind which the rockets are concealed, ready for launching. At the moment of truth, the walls will be knocked down — and the rockets fired."

While Hezbollah has beefed up its capabilities, Eizenkot stressed that Israel has also greatly improved its training, readiness and intelligence since the war.

"I have great force relative to what existed then. I have no excuse for not achieving the objectives that will be assigned to me," he said.

Copyright © 2008 The Associated Press. All rights reserved

If I forget thee...

If I forget thee...

by David Wilder
The Jewish Community of Hebron
July 15, 2008

Tomorrow's planned prisoner exchange is very bittersweet. Almost everyone has an opinion and all sides have some element of legitimacy. On one hand, the price is so very high; on the other hand, we have a responsibility to bring our soldiers home, dead or alive. A soldier, entering battle, must know that anything and everything will be done to bring him home, be it to his family, or to 'kever Yisrael' – to a Jewish grave. Yet, perhaps the swap will serve as motivation to capture more soldiers, and exchange them for other terrorist killers. But, who can forget the unbelievable 'mesirut nefesh' – total dedication, of Rabbi Shlomo Goren, then Chief Rabbi of the IDF, to wade through enemy mine fields to recover bodies of Israeli soldiers killed in action.

It's something of a catch 22 – whatever you do is right, and whatever you do is wrong. I know that I've asked myself countless times, 'what would I do if, (G-d forbid), it was one of my sons.' In truth, I don't know.

Of course, with the release of two Israeli soldiers, either dead or alive, a huge dark cloud shadows their return: where is Ron Arad, whose fate is still unknown? Is he dead or alive? Is he in Lebanon or Iran? According to Israeli intelligence sources, having studied the newly-released photos of Arad, taken about 20 years ago, the pictures were taken not in Lebanon, rather in Iran. Perhaps Ron Arad is still alive, wasting away in an Iranian dungeon?

However, with enigma surrounding Ron Arad and the as of yet unknown condition of Regev and Goldwasser, at least people know their names, show some concern for them and their families. Unfortunately, it's not that way with all Israeli MIAs, POWS. There are those, who, for one reason or another, have been forgotten, despite that fact that they wore the same uniform as the others, fought for the same country as the others, and whose fate is just as unknown as the others.

Ron Arad was captured in October, 1986. Four years earlier, in June, 1882, during the battle of Sultan Ya'akub, Israel lost three of its finest. During the battle, commanded by Ehud Barak, three tank warriors, Tzvi Feldman, born in 1956, Yehuda Katz, born in 1959, and Zacharia Baumel, born in 1960, disappeared. They may have been killed during the brutal fighting. However, there were accounts of people who saw them displayed during a parade in Syria. Their families have gathered accounts over the years, which, at the very least, raise a reasonable doubt as to their fate. Perhaps they are long gone. But perhaps not. And, if we use the Regev-Goldwasser measuring stick, what difference does it make? Why have the IDF and the Israeli government totally forgotten about these three men? Why aren't they household names, as is Ron Arad? Why didn't Israel demand a full report from Hizballah concerning the fate and location of these three men just as they did concerning Ron Arad? Why doesn't the Israeli media exert pressure on the government and IDF concerning then, as they did concerning Regev, Goldwasser, Arad and Gilad Shalit? Why does Gilad Shalit's name continue to make headlines, while most Israelis, 22 years later, have no idea who Katz, Feldman and Baumel are?

I have an answer, but don't really like it. As a matter of fact, I despise what I think. It really stinks.

It's even worse than that. But I can't think of any other viable reason.

These three men came from the wrong side of Israeli society. They all had Kippas on their heads. They belonged to religious tank units. Their families were not left-wing supporters of 'peace,' Labor, and Arabs. The men weren't media lovelies. Rather, they were young idealistic patriots, who fought for their country, their people and their belief. Their belief hasn't betrayed them, but their country and their people have.

But that's not all.

It's clear that serious negotiations for the release of Gilad Shalit will continue between Israel and Hamas. Clearly, Israel should demand information and release of the three above-discussed men. But in my opinion, that's not enough.

Hamas terrorists are not stupid. If, as is expected, Israel receives two bodies for killer Kuntar, Hamas is going to demand an even higher price for a 'live' Israeli. That price will almost undoubtedly include Marwan Barghuti, a convicted murderer and leader of the '2nd intidada' which claimed thousands of Israeli lives, dead, maimed and wounded.

The present Israeli government will almost assuredly OK the deal. However, Israel must demand more than the release of POW Gilad Shalit. After all, Barghuti will only be one of the hundreds of terrorists freed by Israel. Israel must look towards its best friend and ally, put its foot down, and tell the United States: look at what we are being forced into in order to release one Israeli soldier. What is the price of one man? Is there a price? Yet, the price is too high. We must bring home more than one POW.

When we release Barghuti and Hamas releases Shalit, you must free Jonathan Pollard. If we can do it, so can you.

At every Jewish wedding, the happiest day in a person's life, we repeat the words, 'If I forget thee Jerusalem….' I add :

If we forget thee, Tzvi…
If we forget thee Yehuda…
If we forget thee Zacharia…
If we forget thee Jonathan…
If we forget all of you, who are we, what are we, why are we?

TERRORISTS BOMB ISRAELI OFFICIAL IN RHODE ISLAND

Jewish Agency Official Survives Terrorist Bombing in U.S.

by Velvel ben Moshe
B’nai Elim Blogmaster
‏17 מרץ 2008

Below my comments is the article in the Jerusalem Post which reported this attempted murder of an Israeli representative.

Spontaneous…The Jerusalem Post has said that Israeli Authorities and the FBI believe that the firebombing attack on the home of the local representative of the Jewish Agency in Rhode Island was “Spontaneous”, hmmm??? Just what is the definition of “Spontaneous”? Very simply put, and according to the internet’s “Word Web”, Spontaneous means: “Said or done without having been planned or written in advance”

They said that Yossi Knafo’s, the Jewish Agencies representative for Rhode Island, house was firebombed at 0200 hours. The method of attack was by the use of not one, but TWO Molotov Cocktails and the perpetrators are supposed to be, get this…a “local group” who just happened to launch a “spontaneous” attack.

The preparation of a Molotov Cocktail takes premeditated planning and preparation (which is not “Spontaneous”). This was clearly a botched Terrorist Attack, the purpose of which was the murder of a Jew!

My main concern is why this has not only been ignored by the U.S. media, but why is it being played down in Israel? If my memory serves me correctly, didn’t Hassan Nasrallah, the chief terrorist for Hezbollah, along with the Iranian Putz, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad call for direct attacks and against Israelis “anywhere in the world”?

Isn’t it logical that if a bomb is thrown through the living room window of a Jewish home at 0200 that it was not simply a random “spontaneous” act? Oy vey! We might be dumb, but we ain’t stupid.

I see this omission in coverage as the Israeli Government (and the good ole embarrassed U.S. Government & CondiSleeza Rice) trying to put the lid on the story. This attitude is our carry-over from 1930s Europe when the political correctness of the day was “leave it alone…don’t do anything to call attention to ourselves!!!”. Then we were Sheeple…Today we should be the Sheep Dogs and Sheep Dogs protect the Sheep.

So I say… tell it like it is, we can take the heat because we’re already in the kitchen. I will also say this, isn’t it about time that we responded with this statement:

There will be no sanctuary for those who attack Jewish people, Jewish Institutions, or Jewish Interests anywhere in the world.
Never Again!

The Jerusalem Post story follows:

Haviv Rettig , THE JERUSALEM POST
Mar. 16, 2008
Israeli security officials believe Saturday's Molotov cocktail attack on the home of Jewish Agency emissary in Rhode Island Yossi Knafo was most likely perpetrated by a local group launching a spontaneous attack, The Jerusalem Post has learned.
No one was wounded in the attack, which took place just before 2 a.m. near the Brown University campus in Providence, Rhode Island. One firebomb hit an outside wall of the house and lit a fire in the yard, while a second firebomb passed through a window into the living room, but failed to explode.
Knafo, who was awake in the adjacent bedroom at the time of the attack, immediately alerted local police and Jewish Agency security personnel. He was transferred temporarily to a hotel.
Though the attack was spontaneous, "this marks a serious escalation," a source familiar with the case told the Post. "This isn't a threatening letter, a stone through the window or an anonymous phone call."
Security officials point to other spontaneous anti-Jewish attacks on American soil that had deadly results, such as the July 2006 shooting in the Seattle Jewish Federation and the 2002 shooting attack on an El Al ticket counter at the Los Angeles International Airport.
"This is terrorism in the full meaning of the term," said the source.
Police and the FBI had opened an investigation into the attack. A neighbor reportedly told law enforcement officials that she had seen two unidentified individuals near the house at the time. The unexploded cocktail was being examined for fingerprints and other possible clues to the identity of the assailants.
The Jewish Agency's security apparatus in North America was on alert after the attack, and the Post has confirmed that agency personnel are in contact with the individual detectives handling the case in the FBI and local police.
The context for the attack is as yet unclear. Knafo has said he knew of no reason anyone would target his home, while Amos Hermon, a member of the Jewish Agency Executive and chair of its Task Force on Anti-Semitism, echoed other agency officials in noting the attack may mark an unparalleled escalation of anti-Israel campus activism.
"This is unprecedented," said Hermon. "A Jewish Agency emissary hasn't been attacked in America for decades, and we've never known a Molotov cocktail attack that came from anti-Israel or anti-Semitic groups."
As a semi-official organization, the Jewish Agency is a "protected entity," the security of which is under the purview of the Israel Security Agency (ISA), which coordinates security for Israeli representation overseas.
Agency officials, including Hermon, cite tensions that may have risen over the weekend due to a massive Jewish Agency campaign on dozens of university campuses and in hundreds of synagogues and schools in the US and worldwide to commemorate the March 6 terror attack on Jerusalem's Mercaz Harav Yeshiva which killed eight students.
The agency has also received warnings from Israeli security services over possible retaliation attacks in the wake of the assassination in Damascus of Hizbullah mastermind Imad Mughniyeh on February 12. At the time, Israeli officials welcomed Mughniyeh's death, but did not claim responsibility for the operation.
Following the Saturday attack, hundreds of Jewish Agency emissaries throughout the US and Canada were briefed on the event and its security implications.