Israeli general warns Hezbollah of harsh response
By JOSEF FEDERMAN
JERUSALEM (AP) —
Israel will use "disproportionate force" if Hezbollah guerrillas attack Israel, a senior military commander said in published comments Friday, adding that any village used to fire missiles against the Jewish state will be destroyed.
Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, who commands forces along Israel's northern border, issued a similar threat against Syria.
Eizenkot spoke to the Yediot Ahronot daily more than two years after Israel fought an inconclusive 33-day war against Hezbollah. That war, in which Hezbollah lobbed some 4,000 rockets and missiles into Israel, was widely seen as a failure, and Eizenkot has been busy rehabilitating the army's readiness since taking up his post in the aftermath of the fighting.
Eizenkot said Israel would show no mercy on Lebanese villages that harbor Hezbollah fighters. Israel has repeatedly complained that Hezbollah fighters used residential areas for cover, limiting Israel's ability to respond.
Eizenkot stressed that this is "not a recommendation," but a plan approved by the highest levels. "If fire is carried out from Shiite villages in Lebanon, this is the operational plan: Very aggressive fire."
He said Israel would use what he called the "Dahiya doctrine," a reference to the southern suburbs of Beirut where Hezbollah's headquarters are located. During the 2006 war, Israel destroyed dozens of buildings in Dahiya, including the offices of Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah.
"What happened in the Dahiya quarter in Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired upon. We will apply disproportionate force upon it and cause great damage and destruction there," he said. "From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases."
In the interview, Eizenkot warned Syria against launching missiles into Israel. "Everything I said about Hezbollah, regarding punishment and severe harm, is all the more true for a country that has assets." He also indicated Syria could be punished for Hezbollah's actions.
Syria is a key backer of Hezbollah. Despite the recent resumption of indirect peace talks with Syria, Israel believes the Damascus regime continues to help rearm Hezbollah.
There was no immediate response from Hezbollah or Syria. But Nasrallah has warned in recent weeks that Hezbollah's response to a future Israeli incursion will be more fierce than what took place in 2006.
The 2006 war broke out when Hezbollah fighters burst across Israel's northern border, killing three Israeli soldiers and capturing two others. More than 1,000 Lebanese, mostly civilians, and 159 Israelis died in the fighting. The war ended with a U.N.-brokered truce, and in July, the bodies of the two abducted soldiers — believed to have died during or shortly after their capture — were returned to Israel in a swap with Hezbollah.
The cease-fire has largely held, but Israel believes Hezbollah has replenished its arms supplies with Iranian and Syrian help.
Eizenkot said "dozens of rockets" are concealed in homes in Shiite villages throughout southern Lebanon. He said Hezbollah has sent fighters to Iran for training, and Iranian military trainers have been spotted in Lebanon.
"You can see today the walls behind which the rockets are concealed, ready for launching. At the moment of truth, the walls will be knocked down — and the rockets fired."
While Hezbollah has beefed up its capabilities, Eizenkot stressed that Israel has also greatly improved its training, readiness and intelligence since the war.
"I have great force relative to what existed then. I have no excuse for not achieving the objectives that will be assigned to me," he said.
Copyright © 2008 The Associated Press. All rights reserved
Jerusalem On Line - Channel 2 News from Israel
Showing posts with label SYRIAN AGGRESSION. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SYRIAN AGGRESSION. Show all posts
06 October 2008
16 September 2007
Has Hezbollah's Rise Come at Syria's Expense?
This item is available on the Middle East Forum website, at http://www.meforum.org/article/1755
Has Hezbollah's Rise Come at Syria's Expense?
by Robert G. RabilMiddle East QuarterlyFall 2007
The Iranian and Syrian relationship with Hezbollah developed from a combination of ideological, domestic, and regional factors. Both Tehran and Damascus found Hezbollah to be a useful proxy to further regional objectives. Today, however, Hezbollah's position has changed. Tehran's growing strength is matched by Damascus's regional weakness. As overt Syrian suzerainty over Lebanon fades and Hezbollah increases its regional role without regard to the Lebanese government, the nature of Hezbollah's relations to Syria has changed. The group has outgrown its subservient relationship to Damascus. Hezbollah is no longer the junior partner in the axis.
Background
Hezbollah's roots lie in both the Lebanese Shi'i revival of the 1960s and 1970s and, more directly, to the return of Lebanese clerics who had studied in Najaf under the supervision of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. After the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Jerusalem sought to set up a Lebanese government friendly to itself. Tehran and Damascus sought proxies to undermine this new government and, in Tehran's case, advance its new revolutionary agenda. In 1982, Shi‘i political activist Hussein al-Musawi broke away from Amal, then the Shi‘i community's main political movement, and allied himself with radical Shi‘i clerics to form Hezbollah (Party of God).
Tehran adopted the new group. It bankrolled it and sent its own Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to train it. Syrian president Hafez al-Assad also supported Hezbollah. He and the Iranian leadership agreed to a strategic framework to govern their relationship with the group: Tehran would organize Hezbollah, subsidize it, and provide it with weaponry. Damascus would oversee Hezbollah operations against Israeli troops to ensure that Hezbollah operations did not expose the Syrian army to military confrontation with Israel and would allocate the Bekaa Valley as a location for the IRGC to establish training camps. In addition, Syrian authorities would secure a supply route and assist with logistics.[1]
In a number of terrorist attacks through the 1980s, Hezbollah proved its capability and lethality. But Assad's support for Hezbollah's terrorism was not unconditional. He expected to maintain a tight grip over the group. When, on July 19, 1982, Hezbollah, acting under Iranian direction but without Syrian knowledge kidnapped David Dodge, the acting president of American University in Beirut, Assad was furious and threatened to expel the IRGC from Lebanon.[2] Damascus and Tehran also sparred over Hezbollah's June 14, 1985 threat to execute hijacked TWA flight 847 passengers on the tarmac of Beirut International Airport. On June 17, 1987, Syrian troops beat Hezbollah members for kidnapping ABC correspondent Charles Glass near a Syrian checkpoint[3] and, later that year, Syrian troops shot twenty-seven Hezbollah fighters after they refused to obey a Syrian officer's order to remove a West Beirut checkpoint.[4] Clashes the following year between Amal and Hezbollah reflected continuing tension between Damascus and Tehran. Still, such tension was the exception, not the norm, and improving processes to resolve conflicts improved their working relationship. Assad began to see Hezbollah not only as a "resistance movement" but also as a strong Lebanese political force.[5]
Transforming Hezbollah
On October 22, 1989, Lebanese deputies meeting in Saudi Arabia signed the Ta'if accord, a compromise brokered by the Syrian government and mediated by Saudi and Algerian diplomats, ending the 15-year Lebanese civil war.
The agreement recognized Syria's "special relationship" with Lebanon, a trusteeship augmented by the May 20, 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination and the September 1, 1991 Lebanon-Syria Defense and Security agreement.
As the Syrian government exerted more formal suzerainty over Lebanon, Hezbollah clerics such as Secretary-general Hasan Nasrallah and Political Council president Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed understood the need to compromise the party's ideology to adjust to Lebanon's changing circumstances. Although the mission of "Islamizing Lebanon" remained a central tenet of their party, it became a long-term objective. In the more immediate term, Hezbollah sought to become a mainstream political party. At the same time, Damascus sought to use Hezbollah both to pressure Israel for a return of the Golan Heights and to undermine the development of any opposition movement in Lebanon.
Such objectives were difficult to reconcile. How could Syria build Lebanon's state institutions and support Hezbollah's military role? Assad established rules to govern the relationship among the state, Lebanese political forces, and Hezbollah, which the Syrian intelligence chief in Lebanon would oversee:[6]
Pro-Syrian officials would staff Lebanese state institutions and the army.
The cabinet of ministers would exclude any anti-Syrian official, and Damascus would retain effective veto power over sensitive government portfolios such as the ministries of the interior, defense, and foreign affairs.
The Syrian chief of intelligence in Lebanon would oversee elections and gerrymander districts to control them.
Hezbollah would take the lead on military operations against Israel but enjoy the implicit political support of the Lebanese government.
Unless otherwise approved by Damascus, Hezbollah would limit its operations to the Israeli-occupied "security zone" in southern Lebanon.
Neither Hezbollah nor the state could use force against the other with Damascus the arbiter in disputes.
Lebanese political parties could pursue their objectives so long as they did not conflict with Syrian policies.
Absent Damascus's approval, no political party could use external forces to advance a political agenda.
While Damascus would supervise Hezbollah's operations against Israel, Hezbollah could decide the timing within windows specified by Damascus.
Hezbollah could capitalize on its resistance role and financial assistance from Iran to advance its political agenda but could not do so at the expense of pro-Syrian parties such as Amal.
Assad, through his intelligence apparatus in Lebanon, enforced those rules. For example, Ghazi Kana‘an, Syria's intelligence chief in Lebanon, closely oversaw the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections. The Lebanese government toed the Syrian line and exiled, jailed, or liquidated major opposition figures.
The year 2000 marked a new phase in the Hezbollah-Syrian relationship. Israel's unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon undercut the legitimacy of the Syrian presence. With Syrian encouragement, Hezbollah exerted a claim to Lebanese sovereignty over the mountainous Shebaa Farms.[7]
On June 10, 2000, Hafez al-Assad died; his son Bashar took the reins of power. Though Bashar sought to observe the rules governing Syria's relationship with Lebanon and Hezbollah, he enhanced Hezbollah's political status and power not only by receiving Nasrallah warmly in Damascus but also by supplying Hezbollah with increasingly sophisticated weaponry.
His rapprochement accelerated after the United States launched military operations against Iraq in March 2003. Assad said he "wished that its [U.S.] military plan would fail in Iraq"[8] and his foreign minister, Farouq al-Shara, told the Syrian parliament that "Syria has a national interest in the expulsion of the invaders from Iraq."[9] Syrian officials turned a blind eye toward jihadist infiltration from and through Syria into Iraq.
Relations between Damascus and the United States deteriorated. On May 3, 2003, the Bush administration sent Secretary of State Colin Powell to Damascus to demand Syria close terrorist organizations' offices, decommission Hezbollah's armed groups in Lebanon, and support the extension of Lebanese army authority throughout southern Lebanon. On December 12, 2003, over State Department objections, the Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act calling upon Syria "to halt Syrian support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, and stop its development of weapons of mass destruction."[10] With the cosponsorship of the French government and its successful passage, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 placed Lebanon on the international stage with the call for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon and for Hezbollah to be disarmed.[11]
Encouraged by these events, many Lebanese sought to reclaim their country from Syrian occupation. While Damascus sought to extend the mandate of pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud and accelerated the delivery of enhanced Iranian weaponry to Hezbollah, former Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt began to rally anti-Syrian politicians.[12]
The Syrian regime fought back. It responded, according to the suspicion of many governments and U.N. investigators, by ordering the February 14, 2005 assassination of Hariri, which sparked mass protests—the so-called Cedar Revolution.[13] Several bombings, assassinations, and violent clashes followed in subsequent months. But, under significant international pressure, on April 26, 2005, Syrian forces officially withdrew from Lebanon.
Damascus still used Lebanon's state institutions to support and give political cover to Hezbollah, which opposed the Cedar Revolution, and directed Lebanon's state security apparatus to support logistically the arming of Hezbollah. [14] The directors of institutions who provided safe routes for shipping arms by land and air and those who interceded to handle emergency cases included such pro-Syrian officials as Brig. Gen. Jamil Sayyed, the chief of the General Security Department (known as Sûreté General); Gen. Edward Mansour, director-general of the State Security Apparatus; Gen. Ali Hajj, chief of the Internal Security Forces; Brig. Gen. Raymond Azar, chief of Military Intelligence; Brig. Gen. Mustafa Hamdan, commander of the army's presidential brigade; and Col. Ghassan Tufeili, chief of the "Eavesdrop Apparatus" in Military Intelligence.[15] Syrian rearmament not only of Hezbollah but also of Palestinian groups in Lebanon such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Abu Musa Organization coincided with the Lebanese debate about their disarmament.
Perhaps Syrian officials hoped that their campaign of violence and intimidation would demonstrate that only Damascus could prevent Lebanon from descending into chaos. Syrian actions both undercut Lebanon's national dialogue and undermined the argument that Hezbollah needed to disarm. The Israel Defense Forces launched air raids against Palestinian terrorist bases in Lebanon on May 28, 2006, to retaliate against rocket attacks on its northern border. Lahoud responded by commending Hezbollah's "resistance" and criticized political forces calling for the party's disarmament.[16]
A New Relationship for a New Reality
As international pressure increased on both the Syrian regime and Hezbollah,[17] both parties retrenched their relationship. Their intimacy metamorphosed into a quasi-strategic relationship in which Hezbollah no longer remained the junior partner. Though Damascus could count on pro-Syrian officers in Lebanon's state institutions and pro-Syrian forces and parties, the Syrian army's withdrawal from Lebanon and the consolidation of a Lebanese nationalist opposition in parliament to the Syrian presence undercut Syria's position. Damascus needed Hezbollah should Syria wish to reclaim its "historical" role in Lebanon. And, while Syrian intelligence could activate its Palestinian allies inside Lebanon, these were not organic to Lebanon's society. Only Hezbollah could serve as the Trojan horse which could bring Syria back into Lebanon.
Recommitment to Iran accompanied Assad's increasing ties to Hezbollah. On February 26, 2004, the Syrian and Iranian governments signed a "memorandum of understanding" to outline expansion of bilateral defense cooperation—and to codify an Iranian commitment to protect Syria in case of attack by either Israel or the United States.[18] Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's January 2006 trip to Damascus further underlined the relationship.[19] In June 2006, the two countries signed a defense treaty. Cooperation between Tehran and Damascus continues to increase with both countries signing an additional defense protocol underlining their joint approach toward the United States and Israel.[20] In this approach, Hezbollah is a shared tool.
But whereas the Syrian regime sees its struggle as a fight for survival, the Iranian leadership is angling for regional hegemony. Damascus is the linchpin in the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. Its location allows Syria to extend Iran's reach into the Levant, as well as to provide Arab nationalist cover for Iranian regional ambitions. But Syria is also the junior partner in the alliance. In the words of former Syrian vice-president Abdel Halim Khaddam: "Bashar Assad is not a strategic ally of Iran but only a strategic tool."[21] As Syrian troops left Lebanon, Damascus lost leverage over Hezbollah and some Palestinian groups operating there.
Still, the Syrian-Hezbollah relationship is important.[22] Hezbollah provides a means by which the Syrian government can exert pressure on the government of Lebanese prime minister Fouad Siniora. The group has impeded his ability to appoint anti-Syrian officials to sensitive posts. The Syrian government has also used Hezbollah to break the unity of Cedar Revolution forces. Hezbollah has significant room to maneuver as many Lebanese remain reluctant to confront it over its demands, fearing the renewal of civil and sectarian strife which cost 150,000 lives during the 1975-90 civil war.
It is in this context that the summer 2006 war erupted. Given the history of the Hezbollah-Syrian relationship and the recent subversive activities allegedly orchestrated by Syria in Lebanon, it is likely that senior Syrian officials knew beforehand about Hezbollah's cross-border operation into Israel that sparked the crisis. At the same time, it is also plausible that Hezbollah carried out the operation in order to deflect growing Lebanese domestic criticism over its arms and to highlight the need to preserve the party as a militia to defend Lebanon.[23] The two explanations are not mutually exclusive.
In the wake of the summer 2006 war, Hezbollah consolidated its position. Its ability to launch a war unilaterally undermined the position of Siniora's government as did the resulting political crisis although the war did create grumbling about Iran's sacrifice of Lebanon for greater Shi‘i interests.[24] The war augmented Hezbollah's stature—and therefore Syrian and Iranian influence—within Lebanon. In an article in An-Nahar, Mona Fayed, a Lebanese University professor, asked "Who is a Shiite in Lebanon today?" and suggested it is someone "who terrorizes coreligionists into silence and leads the nation into catastrophe without consulting anyone."[25] However, some officials, such as Christian leader Michel Aoun, sought closer alliance with Hezbollah and adopted many of their demands.[26]
The Syrian government has not hesitated to ride the wave of victory which Hezbollah claimed. While Nasrallah's declaration of victory may have been spurious given the destruction wrought upon both Lebanese infrastructure and Hezbollah members—he himself declared "had I known about the scope of Israel's response, we would not have kidnapped the two soldiers"[27]—the group could argue that not only had the Israeli government failed to achieve their objectives,[28] but Hezbollah had also become the first Arab "army" since 1948 to attack Haifa.
Assad embraced the new Hezbollah strategy. In an August 15, 2006 speech to the Syrian Journalists Union in Damascus, he supported Arab resistance as the new paradigm of Arab nationalist struggle against a weakened Israel. He criticized Arab leaders as "half men" who brought humiliation to the Arab world and lauded Hezbollah's achievements by reaffirming Syria's support of the "legitimacy of the central role of resistance as a viable alternative to conflict resolution when peace negotiations fail."[29] The Syrian leadership, which sought until summer 2006 to maintain a balance between its relationship with Iran and Arab states, has now cast its lot with Tehran.
Whatever semblance of national unity Lebanon had exhibited during the summer crisis dissipated upon the end of the crisis. Recriminations and counter-recriminations became a staple of Lebanese politics. At the heart of this charged political climate has been both a clash over the attempt by the government in Beirut and its Cedar Revolution allies to implement U.N. Security Council resolutions and establish an international tribunal[30] and also to prepare for the 2007 presidential elections which could create a showdown over whether or not the titular head of state remains a Syrian proxy. At a minimum, Hezbollah seeks veto power over government decisions under the pretext of national unity;[31] at a maximum, Hezbollah desires the collapse of the Siniora government. It was in this context that on November 30, 2006, Nasrallah called for a mass protest and sit-in in Beirut to topple the prime minister's government,[32] an action which many Lebanese nationalist activists labeled a "Syrian coup attempt."[33] Sporadic clashes continue.[34]
While the outcome of the struggle between pro- and anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon is unclear, the struggle reflects Syria's diminished status in the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. On February 8, 2007, Lebanese authorities detained a truck transporting weapons to Hezbollah in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. Hezbollah confirmed that the weapons belonged to it but reiterated its right to fight to liberate "the remainder of occupied territories,"[35] a position the Lebanese cabinet endorsed before it supported U.N. Resolution 1701.[36] While the Lebanese government is emboldened to confront Syrian interests, Hezbollah's position remains secure. Given increased polarization of Lebanon's society, the group has become impervious to compromise.
Lebanese authorities have moved instead to confront other Syrian proxies. On February 13, 2007, terrorists bombed two commuter buses in Ain Alaq, a Christian town north of Beirut, killing three people and wounding twenty. Lebanese authorities arrested three Syrians, who confessed to being members of a new jihadist organization called Fatah al-Islam, and charged them with carrying out the bombing.[37] In May and June 2007, the same group became the focal point of an uprising in the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp.[38] The Lebanese government, despite threats from Hezbollah,[39] continues to pursue formation of an international tribunal to hold Syrian officials accountable for Hariri's assassination. Hezbollah might have once been, in part, a Syrian proxy, but it is no longer the most vulnerable member of the axis. Syria is. While by no means sovereign, Hezbollah's embrace of Lebanese nationalism has augmented its stature at Syria's expense. Addressing members of parliament sympathetic to Siniora and to his demands for Syrian accountability, Hezbollah parliamentarian Ali Ammar remarked that the "sovereignty of Lebanon precedes the sovereignty of international institutions."[40] While Assad likewise ruled out cooperation with the international tribunal,[41] Hezbollah's obstructionism has become a more serious impediment to the tribunal's formation than Syrian complaints.
Patterns and Expectations
While Hezbollah may appear to be operating in Lebanon to safeguard the interests of the Syrian regime, deeper analysis suggests that Hezbollah's actions go beyond either protecting the Syrian regime or forcing the collapse of the Beirut government. Hezbollah has escalated its political brinkmanship far beyond what is needed to counteract the government's policies.
Hezbollah has, for example, changed its position on several sensitive national matters. Hezbollah denied that it ever supported Siniora's seven-point plan to end hostilities between it and Jerusalem in August 2006. It has tried to preempt the Lebanese government from placing the Shebaa Farms under U.N. jurisdiction in the event that Israel withdraws from the territory. After failing on January 23, 2007, to grind transportation to a halt in its attempt to extend authority over the entire country, Hezbollah dropped its demand that the pro-Syrian opposition should possess eleven ministries, giving it an effective veto. This is not a good sign: Rather than compromise with the Siniora government, Hezbollah is staking out a more maximalist position to eschew cooperation and instead dominate the country and transform its political character into an Iranian-style fundamentalist state. Nasrallah's speech of April 8, 2007, in which he sarcastically questioned whether or not to give the majority forces of the current government one-third of the cabinet seats in the forthcoming legislative elections, attests to his ambition to dominate Lebanon.[42]
To accomplish this, Hezbollah and its allies have called for more "democratic" measures, which they believe would advance the group's power: early national elections, direct presidential elections, and policy by referendum.[43] As the Shi‘a claim a plurality, Hezbollah believes that such measures could translate into irreversible power. At the same time, the group couples its quest for such reforms with its traditional reliance on military measures. Naim Qassem, Hezbollah's deputy secretary-general, brags that Hezbollah has "rebuilt its defenses in a way to respond to any new Israeli attack."[44] By keeping Lebanon in constant sociopolitical and military flux, Hezbollah believes it can whittle away at the power of the majority.
Against this backdrop, it becomes difficult to conceive that Damascus is behind Hezbollah's political challenge. This is not to deny that Damascus could use its agents in Lebanon to wreak havoc. But the reality is that Damascus—in contrast to the 1980s and 1990s—can no longer match its ability to inflict damage on Lebanon with an ability to force the major parties in the country (particularly Hezbollah) to reconcile as it did in 1989 when it helped broker the Ta'if accord. Syria's role in Lebanon today is far less powerful than it was then.
Rather, it is Tehran that is orchestrating and backing both Hezbollah and Assad's moves. The Iranian government is confident that the Bush administration is in deep crisis in the Middle East and will not be able to regain its capacity to "manage" the region before its term ends in January 2009. It also feels secure in its new influence in Lebanon where Tehran's agents have consolidated a state within a state. Here, the Islamic Republic has adopted Damascus's former role in the country and is sending a message to Washington as well as to Arab capitals that there can be no resolution to the crisis in Lebanon without Iranian involvement.
Robert G. Rabil is director of graduate studies and an assistant professor of political science at Florida Atlantic University. His most recent book is Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in the Middle East (Praeger, 2006).
[1] Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 38.
[2] Robert Baer, "It's Not Syria's Problem Anymore," Newsweek International, Aug. 14, 2006.
[3] Ibid; Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 99-100.
[4] For a Hezbollah account of the incident, see Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005), p. 240.
[5] Robert G. Rabil, "The Evolution of Hizbollah-Syrian Relations," paper presented at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA CORP), Oct. 27, 2006 and at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, CNO Executive Panel, U.S. Department of Navy, Nov. 17, 2006.
[6] Harik, Hezbollah, pp. 43-52.
[7] Gary C. Gambill, "Syria and the Shebaa Farms Dispute," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, May 2001.
[8] As-Safir (Beirut), Mar. 27, 2003.
[9] Alfred B. Prados, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, Congressional Research Service (Washington: The Library of Congress, Oct. 10, 2003), p. 6.
[10] Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Public Law 108–175, Dec. 12, 2003.
[11] U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559, Sept. 2, 2004.
[12] Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 29, Feb. 3, 2006.
[13] Peter Fitzgerald, "Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Lebanon Inquiring into the Causes, Circumstances and Consequences of the Assassination of Former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri," United Nations, New York, Mar. 24, 2005; Detlev Mehlis, "Report of the International Independent Investigation Commission Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1595 (2005)," United Nations, New York, Oct. 21, 2005 (hereafter "Mehlis Report.")
[14] Interviews by the author with a senior Lebanese army official and political activist, Beirut, June 30, July 10, 2006.
[15] Interview by the author with a senior Lebanese army official, Beirut, July 10, 2006; An-Nahar (Beirut), Mar. 3, 2005.
[16] Lahoud's statements on Lebanese Broadcasting Company International (LBCI) May 28, 29, 30, 2006.
[17] See U.N. Security Council S/Res/1636 (2005) and S/Res/1644 (2005); "Mehlis Report."
[18] Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA, Tehran), Feb. 29, 2004.
[19] Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 20, 2006.
[20] An-Nahar, Mar. 13, 2007.
[21] Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), June 5, 2006.
[22] Interview by the author with a senior Lebanese army official, Beirut, July 10, 2006.
[23] Emile El-Hokayem, "Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007.
[24] Jihad al-Zein's letter, An-Nahar, July 26, 2006.
[25] An-Nahar, Aug. 7, 2006, in Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series, no. 1258, Aug. 22, 2006.
[26] An-Nahar, Aug. 16, Sept. 25, Dec. 2, 2006; United Press International, Nov. 20, 2006.
[27] An-Nahar, Aug. 28, 2006.
[28] "Winograd Commission Interim Report," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Apr. 30, 2007; Ha'artez (Tel Aviv), May 18, 2007.
[29] Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA, Damascus), Aug. 15, 2006.
[30] UNSCR 1559, Sept. 2, 2004; UNSCR 1701, Aug. 11, 2006.
[31] An-Nahar, Mar. 10, 2007.
[32] Al-Manar television (Beirut), Nov. 30, 2006.
[33] Al-Mustaqbal, Nov. 30, 2006.
[34] As-Safir, Jan. 24, 25, 2007; An-Nahar, Jan. 24, 25, 2007.
[35] An-Nahar, Feb. 9, 2007.
[36] As-Safir, July 26, 2005.
[37] As-Siyassa (Kuwait), Mar. 6, 2007.
[38] BBC News, May 21, 2007; Al-Jazeera (Riyadh), May 20, 2007.
[39] See Nasrallah speech, Al-Intiqad (Beirut), Apr. 11, 2007.
[40] Al-Intiqad, May 18, 2007.
[41] Al-Jazeera, May 30, 2007; Nahar.net, May 10, 2007.
[42] Al-Intiqad, Apr. 11, 2007.
[43] An-Nahar, Apr. 10, May 1, 2007.
[44] An-Nahar, May 6, 2007.
This item is available on the Middle East Forum website, at http://www.meforum.org/article/1755
10 July 2007
THE U.S. POLICY ON SYRIA - DRAW A LINE IN THE SAND AND WHEN CROSSED, PRETEND YOU DIDN'T NOTICE
Blogmaster's Notes: We should all be aware by now of little boy Assad's
determination to show himself as a "Real Man" in the Arab World, despite
his girlish tendencies. Israel is his intended victim and because of this,
Assad has the full support, urging and financial backing of his bedroom partner,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The
aggression against
on
large population centers for years. If you read the Congressional Act below, signed
into law by President George W. Bush in 2003, you would think that the
would, in no uncertain terms, block
President Bush saying "Saddam - Read my lips!). The provisions and language below are
harsh... tough talk, and leave no room for misinterpretation. This document confirms
unequivocally, the existence and intended target of Syria's stockpiles of nerve-agents,
biological and chemical weapons, long-range and modern rockets and missiles, state
of the art anti-tank weapons, etc., etc., etc!!! The
4 Years Ago!.. To stand down, or face serious and severe repercussions. What has the
Well let me see, Nancy Pelosi violated this law to visit "little boy" Assad and give him a
hug (boosted his confidence level about a thousand percent wouldn't you say?).
Reminds me of Hillary Clinton hugging and kissing Shua Arafat. The bottom line here is...
Israel will face Syria and Iran alone and if the U.S. intervenes at all, it will only be after
Have you ever read this bill?.............
[DOCID: f:publ175.108]
[[Page 2481]]
SYRIA ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEBANESE
SOVEREIGNTY RESTORATION ACT OF 2003
[[Page 117 STAT. 2482]]
Public Law 108-175
108th Congress
An Act
To halt Syrian support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, and
stop its development of weapons of mass destruction, and by so doing
hold Syria accountable for the serious international security problems
it has caused in the Middle East, and for other purposes. <>
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
SECTION 1. <> SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``
Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003''.
SEC. 2. <> FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On
choose the right side in the war on terror by closing terrorist
camps and expelling terrorist organizations''.
(2) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373
(September 28, 2001) mandates that all states ``refrain from
providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or
persons involved in terrorist acts'', take ``the necessary steps
to prevent the commission of terrorist acts'', and ``deny safe
haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist
acts''.
(3) The Government of Syria is currently prohibited by
United States law from receiving United States assistance
because it has repeatedly provided support for acts of
international terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of State
for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)) and other relevant
provisions of law.
(4) Although the Department of State lists Syria as a state
sponsor of terrorism and reports that Syria provides ``safe
haven and support to several terrorist groups'', fewer United
States sanctions apply with respect to Syria than with respect
to any other country that is listed as a state sponsor of
terrorism.
(5) Terrorist groups, including Hizballah, Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine--General Command, maintain offices, training camps,
and other facilities on Syrian territory, and operate in areas
of Lebanon occupied by the Syrian armed forces and receive
supplies from Iran through Syria.
[[Page 117 STAT. 2483]]
(6) United Nations Security Council Resolution 520
(
sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political
independence of
of the Government of
throughout
(7) Approximately 20,000 Syrian troops and security
personnel occupy much of the sovereign
exerting undue influence upon its government and undermining its
political independence.
(8) Since 1990 the Senate and House of Representatives have
passed seven bills and resolutions which call for the withdrawal
of Syrian armed forces from
(9) On
declared that it is the objective of the
[the Syrian] occupation army''.
(10) Large and increasing numbers of the Lebanese people
from across the political spectrum in Lebanon have mounted
peaceful and democratic calls for the withdrawal of the Syrian
Army from Lebanese soil.
(11) Israel has withdrawn all of its armed forces from
Lebanon in accordance with United Nations Security Council
Resolution 425 (March 19, 1978), as certified by the United
Nations Secretary General.
(12) Even in the face of this United Nations certification
that acknowledged Israel's full compliance with Security Council
Resolution 425, Syrian- and Iranian-supported Hizballah
continues to attack Israeli outposts at Shebaa Farms, under the
pretense that Shebaa Farms is territory from which Israel was
required to withdraw by Security Counsel Resolution 425, and
Syrian- and Iranian-supported Hizballah and other militant
organizations continue to attack civilian targets in Israel.
(13)
fulfill its obligation in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 425 to deploy its troops to southern
(14) As a result, the Israeli-Lebanese border and much of
southern Lebanon is under the control of Hizballah, which
continues to attack Israeli positions, allows Iranian
Revolutionary Guards and other militant groups to operate freely
in the area, and maintains thousands of rockets along Israel's
northern border, destabilizing the entire region.
(15) On February 12, 2003, Director of Central Intelligence
George Tenet stated the following with respect to the Syrian-
and Iranian-supported Hizballah: ``[A]s an organization with
capability and worldwide presence [it] is [al Qaeda's] equal if
not a far more capable organization * * * [T]hey're a notch
above in many respects, in terms of in their relationship with
the Iranians and the training they receive, [which] puts them in
a state-sponsored category with a potential for lethality that's
quite great.''.
(16) In the State of the Union address on January 29, 2002,
President Bush declared that the United States will ``work
closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state
sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and
deliver weapons of mass destruction''.
[[Page 117 STAT. 2484]]
(17) The Government of
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
(18) According to the December 2001 unclassified Central
Intelligence Agency report entitled ``Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015'',
``Syria maintains a ballistic missile and rocket force of
hundreds of FROG rockets, Scuds, and SS-21 SRBMs [and] Syria has
developed [chemical weapons] warheads for its Scuds''.
(19) The Government of
production of biological and chemical weapons and has a nuclear
research and development program that is cause for concern.
(20) According to the Central Intelligence Agency's
``Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions'', released January 7, 2003: ``[Syria]
already holds a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin but
apparently is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve
agents.
elements of its [chemical weapons] program, including precursor
chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable
that
capability.''.
(21) On
Control and International Security, John Bolton, stated: ``The
warfare program. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and
is engaged in research and development of the more toxic and
persistent nerve agent VX. Syria, which has signed but not
ratified the [Biological Weapons Convention], is pursuing the
development of biological weapons and is able to produce at
least small amounts of biological warfare agents.''.
(22) According to the Central Intelligence Agency's
``Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions'', released January 7, 2003: ``Russia and
Syria have approved a draft cooperative program on cooperation
on civil nuclear power. In principal, broader access to Russian
expertise provides opportunities for
indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear
weapons.''.
(23) Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (21
to which Syria is a party, Syria has undertaken not to acquire
or produce nuclear weapons and has accepted full scope
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to detect
diversions of nuclear materials from peaceful activities to the
production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.
(24)
or the Biological Weapons Convention, which entered into force
on
(25) Syrian President Bashar Assad promised Secretary of
State Powell in February 2001 to end violations of Security
Council Resolution 661, which restricted the sale of oil and
other commodities by Saddam Hussein's regime, except to the
[[Page 117
extent authorized by other relevant resolutions, but this pledge
was never fulfilled.
(26)
during Saddam Hussein's regime earned
per month as
market prices.
(27)
earned Saddam Hussein's regime $2,000,000 per day.
(28) On
warned: ``[W]e have information that shipments of military
supplies have been crossing the border from
including night-vision goggles * * * These deliveries pose a
direct threat to the lives of coalition forces. We consider such
trafficking as hostile acts, and will hold the Syrian government
accountable for such shipments.''.
(29) According to Article 23(1) of the United Nations
Charter, members of the United Nations are elected as
nonpermanent members of the United Nations Security Council with
``due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the
contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance
of international peace and security and to other purposes of the
Organization''.
(30) Despite Article 23(1) of the United Nations Charter,
nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council
beginning
Security Council during June 2002 and August 2003.
(31) On
al-Sharra, made the Syrian regime's intentions clear when he
explicitly stated that ``
defeated in
(32) On
charged that ``busloads'' of Syrian fighters entered
``hundreds of thousands of dollars'' and leaflets offering
rewards for dead American soldiers.
(33) On September 16, 2003, the Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, appeared
before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of
the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives, and underscored Syria's ``hostile actions''
toward coalition forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Under
Secretary Bolton added that: ``
to flow into
permitted volunteers to pass into
service members during the war, and is still doing so * * *
[
the importance of taking seriously reports and information on
(34) During his appearance before the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives on
September 25, 2003, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer,
Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq,
stated that out of the 278 third-country nationals who were
captured by coalition forces in Iraq, the ``single largest group
are Syrians''.
[[Page 117
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Government of Syria should immediately and
unconditionally halt support for terrorism, permanently and
openly declare its total renunciation of all forms of terrorism,
and close all terrorist offices and facilities in Syria,
including the offices of Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General
Command;
(2) the Government of Syria should--
(A) immediately and unconditionally stop
facilitating transit from Syria to Iraq of individuals,
military equipment, and all lethal items, except as
authorized by the Coalition Provisional Authority or a
representative, internationally recognized Iraqi
government;
(B) cease its support for ``volunteers'' and
terrorists who are traveling from and through Syria into
Iraq to launch attacks; and
(C) undertake concrete, verifiable steps to deter
such behavior and control the use of territory under
Syrian control;
(3) the Government of Syria should immediately declare its
commitment to completely withdraw its armed forces, including
military, paramilitary, and security forces, from Lebanon, and
set a firm timetable for such withdrawal;
(4) the Government of Lebanon should deploy the Lebanese
armed forces to all areas of Lebanon, including South Lebanon,
in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution
520 (September 17, 1982), in order to assert the sovereignty of
the Lebanese state over all of its territory, and should evict
all terrorist and foreign forces from southern Lebanon,
including Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards;
(5) the Government of Syria should halt the development and
deployment of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles
and cease the development and production of biological and
chemical weapons;
(6) the Governments of Lebanon and Syria should enter into
serious unconditional bilateral negotiations with the Government
of Israel in order to realize a full and permanent peace;
(7) the United States should continue to provide
humanitarian and educational assistance to the people of Lebanon
only through appropriate private, nongovernmental organizations
and appropriate international organizations, until such time as
the Government of Lebanon asserts sovereignty and control over
all of its territory and borders and achieves full political
independence, as called for in United Nations Security Council
Resolution 520; and
(8) as a violator of several key United Nations Security
Council resolutions and as a nation that pursues policies which
undermine international peace and security, Syria should not
have been permitted to join the United Nations Security Council
or serve as the Security Council's President, and should be
removed from the Security Council.
[[Page 117
It is the policy of the United States that--
(1) Syria should bear responsibility for attacks committed
by Hizballah and other terrorist groups with offices, training
camps, or other facilities in Syria, or bases in areas of
Lebanon occupied by Syria;
(2) the United States will work to deny Syria the ability to
support acts of international terrorism and efforts to develop
or acquire weapons of mass destruction;
(3) the Secretary of State will continue to list Syria as a
state sponsor of terrorism until Syria ends its support for
terrorism, including its support of Hizballah and other
terrorist groups in Lebanon and its hosting of terrorist groups
in Damascus, and comes into full compliance with United States
law relating to terrorism and United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001);
(4) the full restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty, political
independence, and territorial integrity is in the national
security interest of the United States;
(5) Syria is in violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 520 (September 17, 1982) through its continued
occupation of Lebanese territory and its encroachment upon
Lebanon's political independence;
(6) Syria's obligation to withdraw from Lebanon is not
conditioned upon progress in the Israeli-Syrian or Israeli-
Lebanese peace process but derives from Syria's obligation under
Security Council Resolution 520;
(7) Syria's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile programs threaten the security of the Middle
East and the national security interests of the United States;
(8) Syria will be held accountable for any harm to Coalition
armed forces or to any United States citizen in Iraq if the
government of Syria is found to be responsible due to its
facilitation of terrorist activities and its shipments of
military supplies to Iraq; and
(9) the United States will not provide any assistance to
Syria and will oppose multilateral assistance for Syria until
Syria ends all support for terrorism, withdraws its armed forces
from Lebanon, and halts the development and deployment of
weapons of mass destruction and medium- and long-range surface-
to-surface ballistic missiles.
AUTHORIZATION.
(a) <> Penalties.--Until the President makes
the determination that Syria meets all the requirements described in
paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (d) and certifies such
determination to Congress in accordance with such subsection--
(1) the President shall prohibit the export to Syria of any
item, including the issuance of a license for the export of any
item, on the United States Munitions List or Commerce Control
List of dual-use items in the Export Administration Regulations
(15
(2) the President shall impose two or more of the following
sanctions:
(A) Prohibit the export of products of the United
States (other than food and medicine) to Syria.
[[Page 117
(B) Prohibit
or operating in
(C) Restrict Syrian diplomats in Washington, D.C.,
and at the United Nations in
only within a 25-mile radius of
United Nations headquarters building, respectively.
(D) Prohibit aircraft of any air carrier owned or
controlled by
overfly the
(E) Reduce
this Act).
(F) Block transactions in any property in which the
Government of
with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the
(b) Waiver.--The <> President may waive the
application of subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or both if the President
determines that it is in the national security interest of the United
States to do so and submits to the appropriate congressional committees
a report containing the reasons for the determination.
(c) Authority To Provide Assistance To Syria.--If the President--
(1) <> makes the determination that
Syria meets the requirements described in paragraphs (1) through
(4) of subsection (d) and certifies such determination to
Congress in accordance with such subsection;
(2) determines that substantial progress has been made both
in negotiations aimed at achieving a peace agreement between
Israel and Syria and in negotiations aimed at achieving a peace
agreement between Israel and Lebanon; and
(3) determines that the Government of Syria is strictly
respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and
political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive
authority of the Government of Lebanon through the Lebanese army
throughout Lebanon, as required under paragraph (4) of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 520 (1982),
then the President is authorized to provide assistance to Syria under
chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to
development assistance).
(d) Certification.--A certification under this subsection is a
certification transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees of
a determination made by the President that--
(1) the Government of Syria has ceased providing support for
international terrorist groups and does not allow terrorist
groups, such as Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command to
maintain facilities in territory under Syrian control;
(2) the Government of Syria ended its occupation of Lebanon
described in section 2(7) of this Act;
(3) the Government of Syria has ceased the development and
deployment of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface
ballistic missiles, is not pursuing or engaged in the research,
development, acquisition, production, transfer, or deployment of
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, has provided credible
assurances that such behavior will not be undertaken
[[Page 117
in the future, and has agreed to allow United Nations and other
international observers to verify such actions and assurances;
and
(4) the Government of Syria has ceased all support for, and
facilitation of, all terrorist activities inside of Iraq,
including preventing the use of territory under its control by
any means whatsoever to support those engaged in terrorist
activities inside of Iraq.
(a) <> Report.--Not later than 6 months after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter until
the conditions described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 5(d)
are satisfied, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on--
(1) Syria's progress toward meeting the conditions described
in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 5(d);
(2) connections, if any, between individual terrorists and
terrorist groups which maintain offices, training camps, or
other facilities on Syrian territory, or operate in areas of
Lebanon occupied by the Syrian armed forces, and terrorist
attacks on the United States or its citizens, installations, or
allies; and
(3) how the United States is increasing its efforts against
Hizballah and other terrorist organizations supported by Syria.
(b) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be in
unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.
In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means
the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
Approved
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 1828:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HOUSE REPORTS: No. 108-314 (Comm. on International Relations).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 149 (2003):
Oct. 15, considered and passed House.
Nov. 11, considered and passed Senate, amended.
Nov. 20, House concurred in Senate amendments.
WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 39 (2003):
Dec. 12, Presidential statement.
There will be no sanctuary for those who attack Jewish people,
Jewish Institutions, or Jewish Interests anywhere in the world.
Never Again!
Erets Yisrael Le’Am Yisrael
LeShana HaBa'ah BeYerushalayim SHELANU
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any copyrighted work published here, is under fair use without
profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in
reviewing the included information for personal use, non-profit
research and educational purposes only.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml
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