TERRORISM' 12 STEPS

Terrorism's Twelve Step Program

by Bruce Hoffman

01.13.2009

1. The fundamental organizing principle of America’s struggle against terrorism as a global war has outlived its utility. Although relevant to the challenge that the United States faced in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the term global war on terrorism (GWOT) has increasingly alienated our friends and discouraged our allies. This is particularly so in the Muslim world where the GWOT has unfortunately, and however erroneously, nonetheless become synonymous with a war on Islam. Accordingly, it may be more useful to reconceptualize this struggle in terms of a global counterinsurgency (GCOIN). Such an approach would a priori knit together the equally critical political, economic, diplomatic, information and developmental sides inherent to the successful prosecution of counterinsurgency to the existing dominant military side of the equation.

Greater attention to an integration of American capabilities and instruments of U.S. power would provide incontrovertible recognition of the importance of endowing a GCOIN with an overriding and comprehensive, multi-dimensional, policy. Ideally, this policy would embrace several elements: including a clear strategy, a defined structure for implementing it, and a vision of inter-government agency cooperation, and the unified effort to guide it. A more focused and strengthened interagency process would also facilitate the coordination of key themes and messages and the development and execution of long-term "hearts and minds" programs.

2. The central front in the war on terrorism today is not Iraq, but the lawless border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. America’s continued preoccupation with Iraq has exacted a heavy price in terms of mounting instability and growing jihadist strength in both South Asian countries. If 9/11 has taught us anything, it is that al-Qaeda is most dangerous when it has a sanctuary or safe haven from which to operate—as it now indisputably does. Indeed, virtually every major terrorist attack or plot of the past four years has emanated from al-Qaeda’s reconstituted sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). Perhaps most important, however, is that the broader movement’s ability to continue to appeal to its hardcore, political base and thus guarantee a flow of recruits into its ranks, money into its coffers, and support for its aims and objectives, ensures that this struggle will neither abate on its own accord nor be easily—and quickly—defeated.
The problem to date is that the United States has no effective political or military strategy for either Afghanistan or Pakistan and appears to treat them separately and not synergistically. Given that the security challenges in both countries are now ineluctably symbiotic, any serious effort to stabilize and secure Afghanistan must begin with a clear and consistent policy designed to achieve the same in Pakistan. Accordingly, the highest priority for the Obama administration must be to refocus our—and our allies’—attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qaeda began to collapse after 2001, but has now regrouped. This will entail understanding that al-Qaeda and its local militant jihadist allies cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success will require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities—that is, continuing to kill and capture al-Qaeda commanders and operatives—along with breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among radicalized "bunches of guys" as well as more effectively countering al-Qaeda’s effective information operations. The United States thus requires a strategy that harnesses the overwhelming kinetic force of the American military as part of a comprehensive vision to transform other, non-kinetic instruments of national power in order to deal more effectively with irregular and unconventional threats.

3. The interagency process is broken and requires fixing. This is as much a matter of a change in mindset as it is bureaucratic reorganization. Success in the campaign against global terrorism and radical jihadism will ultimately depend on how effectively the United States can build bridges and untangle lines of authority, de-conflict overlapping responsibilities and improve the ability to prioritize and synchronize interagency operations in a timely and efficient manner. Organizations will therefore have to do—or be compelled to do—what they have been reluctant to do in the past: reaching across bureaucratic territorial divides and sharing resources in order to defeat terrorists, insurgencies and other emerging threats. Clarifying these expectations and processes is a critical step in efficiently addressing contemporary threats to U.S. security as is creating incentives to more effectively blend diplomacy, justice, development, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military capabilities and coherently generating and applying resources to defeat terrorist and insurgent threats.
Arguably, by combating irregular adversaries in a more collaborative and integrative manner with key relevant civilian agencies, those charged with countering terrorism and insurgency can better share critical information, track the various moving parts in terrorist/insurgency networks and develop a comprehensive picture of this enemy—including their supporters, nodes of support, organizational and operational systems, processes and plans. With this information in hand, the United States would then be better prepared to systematically disrupt or defeat all of the critical nodes that support the entire terrorist/insurgent network, thus rendering them ineffective. Achieving this desideratum, however, will necessitate the coordination, de-conflicting and synchronization of the variety of programs upon which the execution of American counterterrorist and/or counterinsurgency planning are dependent. An equally critical dimension of this process will be aligning the training of host nation counterparts with U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations: building synergy; avoiding duplication of effort; ensuring that training leads to operational effectiveness; and ensuring that the United States interagency team and approach is in complete harmony. In other words, aligning these training programs with operations to build indigenous capabilities in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency will be absolutely fundamental to the success of such a strategy.

4. Decapitation strategies only work if fully and successfully executed at the onset of a counterterrorism campaign. Accordingly, in tandem with decapitation efforts, continue to emphasize targeting mid-level leaders in terrorist groups. Killing or capturing Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2001 or 2002 would then have dealt a stunning, perhaps even fatal, blow to al-Qaeda. Although it is still absolutely vital to fulfill President Bush’s 2001 pledge to get these killers “dead or alive,” we should be under no illusion that this act in and of itself will now completely stop al-Qaeda. Instead, U.S. counterterrorism strategy should continue to focus on eliminating senior and mid-level al-Qaeda commanders and thus progressively weakening its bench alongside a re-doubled hunt for bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. Mid-level leaders and commanders, in fact, are often more important than top decision makers to the long-term survival of a terrorist organization. Strategies aimed at removing these mid-level leaders more effectively disrupt control, communications, and operations up and down the chain of command. In addition, such strategies may also inhibit a group’s long-term growth by eliminating the development of future leaders. The targeted assassinations in Pakistan of eight key al-Qaeda commanders since July is an example of the proven efficacy of this strategy.

5. Information operations that delegitimize the top leaders of terrorist groups and undermine the image of these groups’ omnipotence is an essential adjunct to kinetic approaches. The top leaders of terrorist organizations are more than just policymakers for the group. They occupy an enormously influential and important symbolic position at the head of a terrorist organization that is often inextricably connected to that organization’s very existence. Therefore focused and sufficiently resourced public diplomacy and information-operations campaigns to discredit these leaders and undermine images of their and their groups’ omnipotence are critical elements in effectively countering terrorism.

6. Focus on disrupting support networks and trafficking activities. In tandem with point five is the effective targeting of essential support and logistics networks. This tactic primarily entails focusing on the middlemen that help terrorist organizations access funds and purchase supplies on the black market: financiers and smugglers. Attention has mostly been focused on front organizations and individuals that provide money to terrorist organizations. However, experience has shown that it would be more advantageous to expand this approach and target specifically the middlemen that, for instance, purchase diamonds from terrorists on the black market, or individuals that sell weapons to terrorist organizations. This tactic is a more effective way of disrupting the everyday activities that a terrorist organization must engage in to maintain its operational capabilities. It hinders the ability of a group to gather resources and plan sophisticated attacks in advance because they cannot rely on a steady stream of money or other essential resources.

7. Knowing the enemy is an essential prerequisite for any successful counterterrorism campaign. “If you know the enemy and know yourself,” Sun Tzu famously advised centuries ago, “you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.” Yet, what remains missing seven-and-a-half years into this struggle is a thorough, systematic and empirical understanding of our enemy: encompassing motivation as well as mindset; decision-making processes as well as command and control relationships; and ideological appeal as well as organizational dynamics. Too often, a “one size fits all” mindset has predominated in our approach to countering what is in fact a diverse, and often idiosyncratic, array of enemies. Indeed, without fully knowing our enemy we cannot successfully penetrate their cells; we cannot knowledgeably sow discord and dissension in their ranks and thus weaken them from within; nor can we think like them in anticipation of how they may act in a variety of situations, aided by different resources. Further, we cannot fulfill the most basic requirements of either an effective counterterrorist strategy—preempting and preventing terrorist operations and deterring their attacks—or of an effective counterinsurgency strategy, gaining the support of the population and through the dismantling of the insurgent infrastructure.

8. Equal emphasis has to be given to the importance of information operations, psychological operations and public diplomacy alongside kinetic approaches. The most effective and lasting counterterrorism strategy will be one that effectively combines the tactical elements of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities (the “kill or capture” approach) alongside the equally critical, broader strategic imperative of breaking the cycle of terrorist and insurgent recruitment and replenishment that have respectively sustained both al-Qaeda’s continued campaign and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Psychological operations that seek not only to kill and capture terrorists or insurgents, but also to persuade them to surrender have a particularly important role in these efforts. Even if the results of such efforts require time to succeed, the suspicion and mistrust sown within terrorist and insurgent ranks might force our enemies to expend more time and energy on watching their backs and monitoring their comrades than in planning and attacking us. The problem is that no agency or office has the lead for overseeing, coordinating and integrating information operations. Multiple agencies share this mission and within those agencies multiple offices claim responsibility: the result is duplication and redundancy and many voices speaking at once rather than one voice with one clear, authoritative message directing this process. Inadequate resources are an additional problem as information operations and public diplomacy remain distinct secondary priorities in the struggle against terrorism.

9. Playing an active and positive role in the resolution of iconic Muslim conflicts will accomplish more, have a greater immediate and long-term impact, and potentially will more decisively improve America’s image in the eyes of the Muslim world than foreign political reform, economic development and agrarian programs applied to individual Muslim countries. The United States needs to be more involved in actively attempting to broker long-term resolutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the conflict between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Although foreign aid, American-backed efforts to promote political reform and economic development are important, arguably the most critical and beneficial element of U.S. foreign-policy efforts in countering terrorism is an America that is seen as working for peace in particularly sensitive regions of the Muslim world.

10. Protecting and securing the United States from terrorist attack depends on state and local law enforcement officers who are both the first and last lines of homeland defense. Their familiarity with the communities which they patrol enables these law enforcement officers to observe and detect criminal activity that may indicate a terrorist plot and thus to thwart its commission. American police departments and law enforcement agencies—and especially their street cops and patrol officers—need more and better information about both terrorism and the most effective strategic and tactical responses. The cop on the street, for instance, may likely be the key player in disrupting and preventing a terrorist incident. But to do so, this officer needs training based on the experience and best practices of other jurisdictions, both domestic and international, who have long been involved in countering terrorism as well as the requisite knowledge of terrorist behavior, patterns and modus operandi. Further, officers not only need to know what to look for but that what they are looking for may be a small piece of the larger puzzle that may reveal terrorist connections (e.g., investigations into crimes involving smuggling, human trafficking, fraud, extortion or narcotics that may also be terrorist activities).

11. Terrorism is more than a technical issue and requires a new political relationship between U.S. and European partners. Existing opportunities to learn lessons from respective experiences in counterterrorism and to develop best practices and common approaches with European law-enforcement counterparts are insufficient. Such efforts would improve trust and information flow between those working on terrorism issues on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States and Europe have a strong common interest in countering terrorism, especially from Islamist groups like al-Qaeda. In addition, our European law-enforcement counterparts already have long experience in combating homegrown terrorist threats and more recently acquired knowledge in countering Islamist threats. This confluence of interests provides the foundation to establish new political and counterterrorism relationships between the United States and Europe, and further build trust and cooperation and facilitate the exchange of information, through a broader and more coordinated program of secondment and exchange of law-enforcement officers.

12. NYPD (New York Police Department) has played a leading role in facilitating cooperation with international partners on counterterrorism issues, but current federal efforts to broaden these programs and make them available to other jurisdictions on a national basis are as inchoate as they have been inadequate. Unlike many other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Israel, terrorism is not necessarily a daily issue for the U.S. law-enforcement officer. For that reason, American law enforcement requires regular awareness and education programs to keep pace with the terrorism threat and the knowledge needed to prevent, preempt or respond to an incident. Sufficient funding and resources should be provided to establish a program whereby state and local law-enforcement officers could be deployed to overseas locations to observe the operations of foreign jurisdictions long involved in counterterrorism and with more recent experience in countering Islamist threats. Such deployments would enhance the knowledge of American officers, identify best practices and assist in the development of policies, practices and procedures relevant to U.S. law enforcement that could be adopted or emulated here. A parallel program could bring foreign law enforcement officers from key overseas jurisdictions to the United States on similar secondment assignments that would further enhance international-counterterrorism law-enforcement cooperation and promote the identification and exchange of lessons learned.

Conclusion
In sum, the current threat environment posed by terrorism and insurgency makes a new strategy, approach and new organizational and institutional behaviors necessary. The nontraditional challenges to U.S. national-security and foreign-policy imperatives posed by elusive and deadly irregular adversaries emphasizes the need to anchor changes that will more effectively close the gap between detecting irregular adversarial activity and rapidly defeating it. The effectiveness of U.S. strategy will be based on our capacity to think like a networked enemy, in anticipation of how they may act in a variety of situations, aided by different resources. This goal requires that the American national security structure in turn organize itself for maximum efficiency, information sharing, and the ability to function quickly and effectively under new operational definitions. A successful strategy will therefore also be one that thinks and plans ahead with a view towards addressing the threats likely to be posed by the terrorist and insurgent generation beyond the current one.

Bruce Hoffman is a contributing editor to The National Interest and a professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He is also the author of Inside Terrorism (2006).

WE WANT THIS INDIVIDUAL

Amer El-Maati

Aliases: Amro Badr Eldin Abou El-Maati, Amro Badr Abouelmaati
DESCRIPTION
Date of Birth Used: May 25, 1963
Hair: Brown
Place of Birth: Kuwait
Eyes: Brown
Height:6'0"
Sex: Male
Weight:209 pounds
Complexion:Olive

Remarks:
El-Maati may be wearing a full beard and mustache. He requires corrective lenses and may be wearing eyeglasses.
DETAILS:
Amer El-Maati is being sought in connection with possible terrorist threats against the United States.

SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS

IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE OR THE NEAREST AMERICAN EMBASSY OR CONSULATE

.
ROBERT S. MUELLER, III DIRECTOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535 TELEPHONE: (202) 324-3000
Boston Field Office Seeking Information - War on Terrorism

FBI Home Page FBI Field Offices

Published as a public service in the War on Terror by the B'nai Elim Blog

NYPD Report on ‘Homegrown’ Terror Threat

Police Issue Report on ‘Homegrown’ Terror Threat

August 15, 2007, 12:03 pm

By Sewell Chan












The so-called Lackawanna Six, six Americans of Yemeni descent who were arrested
in 2002 and later pleaded guilty to charges of providing material support to Al Qaeda. (Photos: Associated Press)

Updated, 5:54 p.m. The city’s Police Department this morning released a report, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” that examines, in 90 pages, how ordinary people in the West can become radicalized and followers of what the report calls a jihadist ideology. Although the findings in the new analysis are similar to those of other studies, Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly said the report — prepared by the department’s Intelligence Division — was an important addition to his department’s arsenal of counterterrorism tools.
The full report is available at this link [pdf] on the department’s Web site.

Somewhat like a psychology textbook might, the report identifies four steps in the process of radicalization: pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadization. The report found that “homegrown” terrorist plots — involving seemingly “unremarkable” people — were behind terror plots or attacks in Britain, Spain, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands.
The report examined three cases of “homegrown” terrorist activity in the United States: the so-called Lackawanna Six, six Yemeni-Americans who were arrested in 2002 and later pleaded guilty to charges of providing material support to Al Qaeda; the so-called Portland Seven, a diverse group of American Muslims who were charged in 2002 and 2003 with trying to join Al Qaeda; and the case of 11 Muslim men who played paintball in the Virginia woods in 2000 and 2001 as a means of training for global holy war and were later convicted of terrorism. The report also cited two New York City cases: a 2004 plot to bomb the Herald Square subway station and a 2004 case in which two New Yorkers traveled to Britain and joined up with elements of Al Qaeda.
READ MORE:Click Here

INTELLIGENCE IN ACTION (FBI)

INTELLIGENCE IN ACTION

A New Day in New York,

08/06/07

Think of intelligence as a way to understand the world—in this case, the world and underworld of terrorist threats and actors.
Now, consider what you'd do if you learned—as our New York Joint Terrorism Task Force did last January—that there was a plot germinating to attack J.F.K. airport.
Sure, you'd want to gather enough information to stop the attack and

enough evidence to mount an eventual case in a court of law. But you'd also want to keep an eye open, to see where this initial bit of intelligence might take you. Because the point is not just to prevent this particular attack, but to stop the next bomb from going off and the next, and ultimately to take down the larger worldwide terrorist network.
And so our New York anti-terror task force took that first morsel of intelligence and began to mine it. Within six months, we had a source working to get information first-hand from the suspects. We watched as the plot unfolded—who got involved, what their strategies and capabilities were, how they scoped out the target and reached out overseas for potential money and support. For 18 months we learned as much as we could about the players and their connections before four suspects were arrested in New York, Trinidad, and Guyana in early June.
"Intelligence drove this investigation, no question," says Amy Lopes, supervisory intelligence analyst in New York. "We did a tremendous amount of intelligence work before we made the arrests. We wanted to see who and what these guys knew."
The diversity of expertise in the task force made the operation much more successful than it would have been otherwise, says Lopes. "We called on whoever was in the best position to fill in a particular gap in our understanding or to run down a certain piece of information."
The end result was not only a prevention of a potentially serious terrorist strike on the airport and its fueling systems, but big picture insights into the ever morphing terrorist threat, especially as it plays out in our own backyard.
"This wasn't a plot hatched by some discontented Middle Easterners," Lopes points out. "The alleged mastermind was an American citizen who became radicalized around religion. When he did reach out for money, support, and equipment he didn't go far—he turned to contacts on our side of the pond, in the Caribbean and in South America." That included an extremist organization called Jamaat Al Muslimeen, which had plotted a deadly coup in Trinidad in 1990.
"The threat is forever changing," Lopes continues. "Intelligence is what gives us our edge, our crystal ball if you will. We've seen terrorism become more localized, more homegrown since 9/11. What shape will it take tomorrow? That's what we have to be continually on the look out for."
And so the nation's longest-running joint terrorism task force has refashioned itself anew, marrying up investigative and intelligence disciplines. "There's a saying here, "Intelligence drives investigations…and investigations drive intelligence,'" Lopes says. "That's so true. The two feed off each other. It's creating a synergy that's making New York and America safer."

AMERICA'S TRUTH FORUM TO CONTINUE EXPOSING ISLAMO-NAZI FIFTH COLUMN IN THE UNITED STATES

July 23, 2007
Click here to watch America's Truth Forum's promotional video


Dear Friends:

America’s Truth Forum intends to host its third in a national series of educational symposiums October 26th through the 28th in the Midwest. The event, by design, will not only prove to be intellectually controversial but should serve as a catalyst to awaken our citizenry and generate much-needed media coverage. Due to security protocol, the exact location of the venue will not be disclosed for several more weeks.

As you know, America’s Truth Forum, in conjunction with Basics Project, is engaged in the production of a first-of-its-kind national educational symposium series that addresses the threat of global terrorism. This series provides attendees with the opportunity to gather first-hand, fact-based knowledge from internationally renowned counter-terrorism experts, researchers, authors and operatives. This national symposium series provides in-depth examination of the ideological and theoretical aspects of this most critical issue, as well as real-time, intellectual, non-political information on current events and strategies used in the battle against an advancing Islamofascist agenda.

In 2006, by means of your generous financial support, America’s Truth Forum and Basics Project produced two critically acclaimed symposiums on the underlying roots of the current terrorist threat to the United States, specifically, the threat posed by radical Islamists utilizing terrorism as their weapon of choice

Those attending these two ground-breaking events heard from among seventeen speakers including: former CIA Director James Woolsey, David Horowitz, Dr. Harvey Kushner, Dr. Paul Williams, Wafa Sultan, Dr. Whalid Phares, former PLO operative Whalid Shoebat, Kenneth Timmerman (Nobel Prize nominee), Dr. Bruce Tefft, Joe Kaufman, Laura Mansfield, Jim Gilchrist and Hamid Mir, the only journalist to have interviewed Osama bin Laden after September 11, 2001, to name but a few.

These events were attended by representatives from government agencies, the military, law enforcement, the counter-terrorism community, the first responder community and the general public. The critique from everyone who attended was overwhelmingly positive.

We have assembled many of the same panel of globally recognized, counter-terrorism experts and have added a few more. Many have appeared as counter-terrorism experts on a variety of news channel talk shows and each is published on the subject, some numerous times. Their areas of expertise range from having provided counter-terrorism training to those in our government to having seen the horrors of radical Islamist terror first hand.

Apathy and political correctness have proven to be our worst enemies. Few of our fellow citizens realize what is at stake. Clearly, the freedoms that we all hold as sacrosanct are threatened and our country – as well as the legacy we will leave our children and our children’s children – is under siege. We simply cannot afford to turn a blind eye to this looming danger. If we fail to take the appropriate actions now, the next generations – our children – will be left to carry on the battle against and even stronger and more dedicated foe, an evil whose flame we failed to extinguish. Our legacy should be one of bravely confronting our adversaries, of diligently defending what is rightfully ours. Our actions need to serve as motivating examples for future generations, instilling in them the proclivity to stand resolute in the face of evil.

In order to effectively diminish and eradicate the threat of radical Islam to the United States – and the world – our culture must dispenses with alarmism and instead embrace the gathering of knowledge and the advancement of realistic and sometimes very serious solutions. Our initiative combines education and the stimulation of critical thinking geared toward solutions, two basics requirements for the successful resolution to this conflict

The national symposium series produced by America’s Truth Forum and Basics Project facilitates not only the education of the public and the private sectors, but it also affords a forum in which the participating counter-terrorism experts can exchange ideas, develop theories and formulate solutions they can then advance to our government and the defenders of freedom throughout the world.

In order to facilitate these advancements we need your financial support in underwriting the October event. Your continued support of our initiative will enable us to facilitate fact-based and realistic solutions over rhetoric.

Let us not forget, the onus of responsibility for the dissemination of accurate and truthful information regarding this looming danger has fallen on our shoulders. It has become the civic responsibility of We the People. It has become a duty of vigilance, demanded by the spirit of our Founders, in defense of our nation. We owe it to the millions of brave souls that made the ultimate sacrifice on our behalf – our Nation’s finest who paid with their lives so we could live free.

Because both America’s Truth Forum and Basics Project are recognized 501(c)(3) organizations, your generous donations are now fully tax deductible to the fullest extent of the law. Please contribute what you can. No amount it too small and no amount can ever be too large. By contributing toward this selfless cause, you will be securing the right of freedom for our children and hope for continuation of the Great American Experiment.

Please help us to help America by contributing at either our website via the PayPal link or forward your donation to:

America’s Truth Forum
P.O. Box 802
Glastonbury, CT. 0603
www.AmericasTruthForum.com

It is crucial that you take the initiative to share this appeal with other like-minded individuals and please take a moment to let us know if you will be in attendance for our October 2007 event.

Your continued support and generosity is greatly appreciated.

Respectfully,

Jeffrey M. Epstein
President, America’s Truth Forum

Frank Salvato
Executive Director, Basics Project

America’s Truth Forum Copyright © 2007


America's Truth Forum | PO Box 802 | Glastonbury | CT | 06033

The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland

The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland

July 2007

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the Intelligence Community
(IC), overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and
acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is charged with:
• Integrating the domestic and foreign dimensions of US intelligence so that there are
no gaps in our understanding of threats to our national security;
• Bringing more depth and accuracy to intelligence analysis; and
• Ensuring that US intelligence resources generate future capabilities as well as
present results.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL
Since its formation in 1973, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) has served as a bridge
between the intelligence and policy communities, a source of deep substantive expertise on
critical national security issues, and as a focal point for Intelligence Community
collaboration. The NIC's key goal is to provide policymakers with the best, unvarnished,
and unbiased information. Its primary functions are to:
• Support the DNI in his role as Principal Intelligence Advisor to the President and
other senior policymakers.
• Lead the Intelligence Community's effort to produce National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) and other NIC products that address key national security
concerns.
• Provide a focal point for policymakers, warfighters, and Congressional leaders to
task the Intelligence Community for answers to important questions.
• Reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector—and use
alternative analyses and new analytic tools—to broaden and deepen the Intelligence
Community's perspective.
NIEs are the DNI's most authoritative written judgments concerning national security
issues. They contain the coordinated judgments of the Intelligence Community regarding
the likely course of future events.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND THE NIE PROCESS
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most
authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US
civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests.
NIEs usually provide information on the current state of play but are primarily
“estimative”—that is, they make judgments about the likely course of future events and
identify the implications for US policy.
The NIEs are typically requested by senior civilian and military policymakers,
Congressional leaders and at times are initiated by the National Intelligence Council (NIC).
Before a NIE is drafted, the relevant National Intelligence Officer is responsible for
producing a concept paper, or terms of reference (TOR), and circulates it throughout the
Intelligence Community for comment. The TOR defines the key estimative questions,
determines drafting responsibilities, and sets the drafting and publication schedule. One or
more IC analysts are usually assigned to produce the initial text. The NIC then meets to
critique the draft before it is circulated to the broader IC. Representatives from the
relevant IC agencies meet to hone and coordinate line-by-line the full text of the NIE.
Working with their Agencies, representatives also assign the level of confidence they have
in key judgments. IC representatives discuss the quality of sources with collectors, and the
National Clandestine Service vets the sources used to ensure the draft does not include any
that have been recalled or otherwise seriously questioned.
All NIEs are reviewed by National Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the DNI and is
composed of the heads of relevant IC agencies. Once approved by the NIB, NIEs are
briefed to the President and senior policymakers. The whole process of producing NIEs
normally takes at least several months.
The NIC has undertaken a number of steps to improve the NIE process under the DNI.
These steps are in accordance with the goals and recommendations set out in the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and WMD Commission reports and the 2004 Intelligence
Reform and Prevention of Terrorism Act. Most notably, over the last two years the IC has:
• Created new procedures to integrate formal reviews of source reporting and
technical judgments. The Director of CIA, as the National HUMINT Manager, as
well as the Directors of NSA, NGA, and DIA and the Assistant Secretary/INR are now
required to submit formal assessments that highlight the strengths, weaknesses, and
overall credibility of their sources used in developing the critical judgments of the NIE.
• Applied more rigorous standards. A textbox is incorporated into all NIEs that
explains what we mean by such terms as “we judge” and that clarifies the difference
between judgments of likelihood and confidence levels. We have made a concerted
effort to not only highlight differences among agencies but to explain the reasons for
such differences and to display them prominently in the Key Judgments.
THE US HOMELAND THREAT ESTIMATE: HOW IT WAS PRODUCED
The Estimate, Terrorist Threats to the US Homeland, followed the standard process for
producing National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), including a thorough review of
sourcing, in-depth Community coordination, the use of alternative analysis, and review by
outside experts. Starting in October 2006, the NIC organized a series of roundtables with
IC experts to scope out terms of reference (TOR) for the Estimate. Drafters from
throughout the Community contributed to the draft. In May, a draft was submitted to IC
officers in advance of a series of coordination meetings that spanned several days. The
National Clandestine Service, FBI, and other IC collection officers reviewed the text for
the reliability and proper use of the sourcing. As part of the normal coordination process,
analysts had the opportunity--and were encouraged--to register “dissents” and provide
alternative analysis. Reactions by the two outside experts who read the final product were
highlighted in the text. The National Intelligence Board, composed of the heads of the 16
IC agencies and chaired by the ODNI, reviewed and approved the Estimate on 21 June. As
with other NIEs, it is being distributed to senior Administration officials and Members of
Congress.
What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language
When we use words such as “we judge” or “we assess”—terms we use synonymously—
as well as “we estimate,” “likely” or “indicate,” we are trying to convey an analytical
assessment or judgment. These assessments, which are based on incomplete or at times
fragmentary information are not a fact, proof, or knowledge. Some analytical judgments
are based directly on collected information; others rest on previous judgments, which
serve as building blocks. In either type of judgment, we do not have “evidence” that
shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.
Intelligence judgments pertaining to likelihood are intended to reflect the Community’s
sense of the probability of a development or event. Assigning precise numerical ratings
to such judgments would imply more rigor than we intend. The chart below provides a
rough idea of the relationship of terms to each other.
We do not intend the term “unlikely” to imply an event will not happen. We use
“probably” and “likely” to indicate there is a greater than even chance. We use words
such as “we cannot dismiss,” “we cannot rule out,” and “we cannot discount” to reflect
an unlikely—or even remote—event whose consequences are such it warrants
mentioning. Words such as “may be” and “suggest” are used to reflect situations in
which we are unable to assess the likelihood generally because relevant information is
nonexistent, sketchy, or fragmented.
In addition to using words within a judgment to convey degrees of likelihood, we also
ascribe “high,” “moderate,” or “low” confidence levels based on the scope and quality of
information supporting our judgments.
• “High confidence” generally indicates our judgments are based on high-quality
information and/or the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid
judgment.
• “Moderate confidence” generally means the information is interpreted in various
ways, we have alternative views, or the information is credible and plausible but not
corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.
• “Low confidence” generally means the information is scant, questionable, or very
fragmented and it is difficult to make solid analytic inferences, or we have significant
concerns or problems with the sources.
Key Judgments
We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next
three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al-
Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by
these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities.
We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years
have constrained the ability of al-Qa’ida to attack the US Homeland again and have led
terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11. These
measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11.
• We are concerned, however, that this level of international cooperation may wane as
9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge.
Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central
leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni
communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has
protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a
safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational
lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of
individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge
that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.
• As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat
environment.
We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the Homeland
through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that al-Qa’ida
will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), its
most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack
the Homeland. In addition, we assess that its association with AQI helps al-Qa’ida to
energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and
indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks.
We assess that al-Qa’ida’s Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent
political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties,
visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the US
population. The group is proficient with conventional small arms and improvised explosive
devices, and is innovative in creating new capabilities and overcoming security obstacles.
• We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use
them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability.
We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-US attacks outside the United
States in the past, may be more likely to consider attacking the Homeland over the next three
years if it perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the group or Iran.
We assess that the spread of radical—especially Salafi—Internet sites, increasingly
aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number of radical, self-generating
cells in Western countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the West’s Muslim
population is expanding, including in the United States. The arrest and prosecution by US
law enforcement of a small number of violent Islamic extremists inside the United States—
who are becoming more connected ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical sense to the
global extremist movement—points to the possibility that others may become sufficiently
radicalized that they will view the use of violence here as legitimate. We assess that this
internal Muslim terrorist threat is not likely to be as severe as it is in Europe, however.
We assess that other, non-Muslim terrorist groups—often referred to as “single-issue” groups
by the FBI—probably will conduct attacks over the next three years given their violent
histories, but we assess this violence is likely to be on a small scale.
We assess that globalization trends and recent technological advances will continue to enable
even small numbers of alienated people to find and connect with one another, justify and
intensify their anger, and mobilize resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized
terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.
• The ability to detect broader and more diverse terrorist plotting in this environment
will challenge current US defensive efforts and the tools we use to detect and disrupt
plots. It will also require greater understanding of how suspect activities at the local
level relate to strategic threat information and how best to identify indicators of
terrorist activity in the midst of legitimate interactions.

U.S. CITIZEN TRAINED BY AL QAEDA TO FIGHT JIHAD

Blogmaster comment: Complacency is rampant among the citizens of the United States since 911. Most have forgotten that over 3000 Americans and the citizens of other Nations were murdered a few short years ago by the Islamo-Nazis. The capture of the creten below by the FBI is only the tip of the iceburg. There is a fifth column in the U.S. and Europe and we must recognize the danger and maintain our viligance. Otherwise, we will face destruction from within.

US CITIZEN SENTENCED TO PRISON FOR

RECEIVING MILITARY TRAINING FROM A

TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

(HOUSTON) Daniel Joseph Maldonado, a.k.a Daniel Aljughaifi, a United States citizen convicted of receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization has been sentenced to 10 years in prison, Don DeGabrielle, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Texas, Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, and Joseph Billy, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, announced today.
The 10- year sentence is the maximum statutory penalty for receiving military training from a terrorist organization. U. S. District Judge Gray H. Miller handed down the maximum sentence during a hearing held in Houston this morning. The prison term is to be followed by a three year term of supervised release. Additionally, the court imposed a $1000 fine.
"Those who would consider training with enemies of our national security or otherwise feel inclined to align themselves with foreign agents of international discord should consider the very real consequences of federal prison for their actions like the ten years of incarceration awaiting Mr. Maldonado," said U. S. Attorney Don DeGabrielle.
Assistant Attorney General Wainstein said, "We cannot tolerate our own citizens joining the ranks of our enemies and foreign terrorists. Any American who does so can expect swift prosecution and a severe sentence."
"By attending a terrorist training camp, Daniel Maldonado betrayed his country and endangered the national security of the United States and its allies with his support of the ICU and al Qaeda," said Assistant Director Joseph Billy, Jr., FBI Counterterrorism Division. "The FBI will continue to work with our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence communities to aggressively pursue suspected terrorists and disrupt their activities."
Daniel Joseph Maldonado, a.k.a. Daniel Aljughaifi, 28, pleaded guilty in April 2007 admitting he had traveled from Houston to Africa in November 2005 and then on to Somalia in December 2006 to join the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and elements of Al Qaeda to fight "jihad" against the Transitional Federal Government to establish an independent Islamic State in Somalia.
While in Somalia, Maldonado was provided an AK-47, equipped with military combat uniforms and boots in Mogadishu, and participated in training camps in Kismaayo and Jilib, Somalia. The camps included physical fitness, firearms and explosives training, all in preparation to go to the front to fight for the ICU. Al Qaeda members were present at the training camps. ICU and al Qaeda, a recognized foreign terrorist organization, worked together to train fighters in the camps to fight jihad to establish an independent Islamic state in Somalia.
Maldonado was captured by Kenyan military forces on January 21, 2007 as he fled to avoid Ethiopian and Somalian forces. Expelled by Kenyan officials, Maldonado was turned over to American authorities and flown to Houston accompanied by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Maldonado has been in federal custody since his return to the United States.
The investigation leading to the conviction in this case was conducted by the Joint Terrorism Task Force including special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and officers of the Houston Police Department. The case was prosecuted by Assistant U. S. Attorney Gary Cobe.

THERE IS A NEW SNAKE IN TOWN

Blogmaster's Comments: There is a new snake in town and it is preparing to strike in the Middle East and in Egypt in particular. I have seen intelligence information which indicates that fighters from the "Islamic Maghreb" have infiltrated into Egypt with a sizable quantity of explosives and weapons. Their intended targets are believed to be areas where tourists are apt to be heavily concentrated and Metro lines in Cairo. Their intent is to de-stabilize and embarass the Egyptian secular government and to recruit more into their ranks.They also seek to divert attention away from Hamas and the activities of Syria and Iran. Violence is not limited to attacks against Israel. Analysts recommend all organizations with interests in Egypt, specifically Cairo, and tourist interests country-wide, to refrain from the use of the Cairo Metro and other transportation nodes and to stay clear of large crowds at the nation's tourist sites.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

(aka Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)

The items below will be addressed in this article:

• Introduction


• What is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?


• What’s the connection between GSPC and al-Qaeda?


• What are GSPC’s goals?


• What are the group’s tactics?


• Is the group capable of carrying out global attacks?


• Who are the group’s main leaders?


• How is the group funded?


• Does the recent name change represent a resurgence of the GSPC?


• Why is North Africa susceptible to Islamic terrorism?


• Does GSPC have a significant presence in Iraq?
  
  

  ---

Introduction

Reports from North Africa point to a recent resurgence in terrorist activity by several local Islamist movements, the most prominent of which is the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). An Algeria-based Sunni group that recently renamed itself al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb, the organization has taken responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks in the region, declared its intention to attack Western targets, and sent a squad of jihadis to Iraq. Experts believe these actions suggest widening ambitions within the group’s leadership, now pursuing a more global, sophisticated and better-financed direction. Long categorized as part of a strictly domestic insurgency against Algeria’s military government, GSPC claims to be the local franchise operation for al-Qaeda, a worrying development for a region which has
been relatively peaceful since the bloody Algerian civil war of the 1990s drew to a close.

What is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?

The group originated as an armed Islamist resistance movement to the secular Algerian government. Its insurrection began after Algeria’s military regime canceled the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992 after it became clear the Islamic Salvation Front, a coalition of Islamist militants and moderates, might win and take power. The GSPC declared its independence from another insurgent group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1998, believing the GIA’s brutal tactics were hurting the Islamist cause. The GSPC gained support from the Algerian population by vowing to continue fighting while avoiding the indiscriminate killing of civilians. The group has since surpassed the GIA in influence and numbers to become the primary force for Islamism in Algeria, with the majority of its members refusing government offers of amnesty after Algeria’s civil war of the mid-1990s. According to a 2005
U.S. State Department report (PDF) on terrorism, its ranks have dwindled to only a few hundred from nearly 28,000 at the height of its power.

What’s the connection between GSPC and al-Qaeda?

Collusion between the GSPC and al-Qaeda is not a new phenomenon. According to a report by Emily Hunt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Osama bin Laden provided funding for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and was involved in the GSPC’s early formation. Many of the group’s founding members trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The GSPC declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda as early as 2003, but al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahari, officially approved GSPC’s merger in a videotape released on September 11, 2006. The GSPC claimed responsibility for February 2007 attacks against Algerian police stations under its new name.

What are GSPC’s goals?

Originally, its aims included the overthrow of Algeria’s secular, military government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, a theocracy based on Islamic law that for twelve
centuries spanned the Muslim world. Counterterrorism experts, however, say the group’s folding into the global al-Qaeda structure may indicate a shift to take up the banner of global jihad and collude on future attacks in North Africa, Western Europe, and Iraq. “Pressed by Algerian counterterrorism successes, the once Algeria-centric GSPC has become a regional terrorist organization, recruiting and operation all throughout the Maghreb—and beyond to Europe itself,” said Harry Crumpton, the U.S. ambassador at large for counterterrorism, during an April 2006 Senate testimony (PDF). In a January speech, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, the GSPC commander, declared solidarity (PDF) with Islamists in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, Somalia and Chechnya.

Hugh Roberts, head of the International Crisis Group’s North Africa project, says it’s too early to tell if its new allegiance to al-Qaeda will shift its mission statement or operational
strategies to take on an international role beyond Algeria’s borders. “We need to wait and see is if it starts operating as a regional attachment of the global jihad,” he says. “Plenty of
people are worried that it’s going to do this. So far we haven’t really seen it.”

What are the group’s tactics?

The GSPC employs conventional terrorist tactics (PDF) to achieve its objectives in Algeria, including guerilla-style ambushes against military personnel and truck bombs against government targets, according to the Center for Policing Terrorism (CPT) at the Manhattan Institute. GSPC militants kidnapped thirty-two European tourists traveling in the Algerian Sahara in February 2003. Money from the kidnapped victims’ ransom is alleged to have purchased surface-to-air missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and satellite-positioning
equipment. In December 2006, the group attacked two buses carrying contractors near Algiers, wounding several foreign nationals. Four months later, the group killed twenty three people with twin bombings in Algiers. One of the bombs exploded outside the prime
minister’s office, a move CFR Fellow Steven A. Cook describes as “a major escalation.”

Some experts warn the group’s growing confidence could increase its willingness to target Westerners both inside and outside Algeria. The GSPC has also taken over, and some say
revitalized, many of the Europe-based cells of the former GIA both for the purpose of fundraising and for launching attacks.

Is the group capable of carrying out global attacks?

Analysts point to thwarted attacks in France and several arrests of GSPC-linked groups as evidence the group is capable of attacks in Western Europe. Authorities arrested
a London-based GSPC militant who conspired to launch a chemical attack, and
arrested four members of a GSPC cell in Frankfurt for possession of chemicals and arms. In spite of this, some experts doubt their ability to carry out an al-Qaeda-scale attack. “They haven’t done aything spectacular,” says Roberts. “They have not actually pulled off a
single terrorist attack in Europe in the eight years they’ve existed. And that’s a fact
that you have to put in balance against European security services that say the
group is a major threat.”

Who are the group’s main leaders?

After the 1979-1989 jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, hundreds of North African volunteers known as “Afghan Arabs” returned to the region and radicalized Islamist movements in North Africa. Most of the group’s main leaders are believed to have trained in Afghanistan. Within Algeria, leadership is essentially divided into northern and
southern groups.

• Abu
  Musab Abdulwadood. The current chief of the northern group, also known
  as Abdelmalek Droukdel, is a former university science student turned bomb
  maker. He has led the group since September 2004 after the previous
  leader, Nabil Sahraoui, was killed in a firefight with Algerian forces in
  June of that year.


• Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Known as the "One-eyed," Belmokhtar is a former
  Algerian soldier who spent time fighting in Afghanistan. He allegedly joined the group through his role as the leader of a smuggling gang, which subsequently joined the GSPC. According to Hunt’s report, his family connections allow the group to capitalize on
  criminal opportunities in the South, such as smuggling. He was reportedly
  killed in northern Mali, but Algerian authorities have yet to confirm his death.


• Ammari Saifi. Also known as Abderrazak the Para because he was trained as an Algerian special forces paratrooper, Saifi organized the 2003 kidnapping of European tourists in
  the Algerian Sahara. He was known as the “Bin Laden of the desert” and
  designated as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” by the United States, a classification shared by top al-Qaeda commanders before he was captured by a Chadian rebel group, the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJC) and eventually extradited to Algeria.
  

How is the group funded?

Smuggling and petty crimes are a lucrative source of income, according to the CPT report. The porous, unpoliced borders of the Sahara region make smuggling vehicles, cigarettes, drugs, and arms particularly easy. The organization’s operatives in Europe may provide new forms of income through theft and document forgery carried out by new recruits, according to the report. The ransom paid as a result of the 2003 kidnapping also provided a significant
windfall for the group. Algerian authorities accuse Iran and Sudan of giving material support to the GSPC, but experts say such support is unlikely.

Does the recent name change represent a resurgence of the GSPC?

Algeria-watchers are divided as to whether it signifies a new resurgence of Algerian Islamism or is simply a public relations move. Algerian authorities consider the shift to be a last-ditch attempt to revitalize a domestic insurgent movement enfeebled by years of combat and
internal divisions. The Algerian state, however, has been known to suppress reporting on the real strength of insurgent groups in Algeria, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.

Indeed, there are indications that terrorism in North Africa is on the rise and that the GSPC is alive and well in Algeria. “Despite the official happy talk,” says Olivier Guitta, a Washington-based foreign affairs consultant, “kidnappings by Islamists to raise money for their cause are a routine occurrence in Algeria. And not a day goes by without terrorists' attacking military personnel, government employees, or ordinary civilians, whom they regard as allies of the government.”

The group is reported to have cross-border association with separatist groups in Niger, Chad, Mauritania, and Libya, in addition to Islamist organizations in Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco. But the name change doesn’t necessarily indicate a pan-Maghreb al-Qaeda front. “The most we can say is that the GSPC has had contact with these groups,” says Roberts of the International Crisis Group. “But the change of name is not a sign of unification of these groups.”

Why is North Africa susceptible to Islamic terrorism?

North Africa is culturally and geographically distant from more radical strains of Islam in the Middle East. Experts say although the population doesn’t condone al-Qaeda-style terrorism, political Islam has given people a means of social criticism under otherwise repressive regimes. As Ray Takeyh, a senior CFR fellow, points out, “An increasingly disillusioned
middle class turned to the Islamists and their devastating critique of the prevailing order.” Unemployment is high in the region, and there are large numbers of young people, two factors that could fuel terrorist activity. Emily Hunt observes that for those who would join terrorist groups, “al-Qaeda’s global ideology intersects with local anger directed at undemocratic regimes that for years allowed mosques to be focal points of popular political
activity.”

Does GSPC have a significant presence in Iraq?

Yes. The GSPC has funneled North African insurgents to Iraq to fight as suicide bombers, foot soldiers, and mid-level commanders, says Hunt. Although counting foreign fighters is
difficult, Evan F. Kohlmann, a terrorism consultant, estimates that North Africans represent
between 9 percent and 25 percent of foreign fighters in Iraq are from North Africa, although the vast majority are still of Saudi and Jordanian origin. “They’re a significant but not dominant presence,” he says. Adil Sakir al-Mukni—a key link between the GSPC and al-Qaeda in Iraq, a group of foreign jihadis founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—was deported by the Syrian government for helping shuttle foreign fighters into Iraq. The GSPC reportedly called on the Zarqawi network to attack French nationals in Iraq and applauded the 2005 killing of two Algerian diplomats there.

ISLAMO-NAZIS RECRUITING ON-LINE WITH GREAT SUCCESS

The Blogosphere for Killers

Tech-savvy terrorists use the Web for propaganda and incitement.

BY DANIEL HENNINGER

Living as we do now afloat the incoming and outgoing tides of media, perhaps the aborted London and Glasgow car bombings of a fortnight ago are worth another thought before these attempted mass murders drift away on the sea of bad memories. What about those doctors? The apparent complicity of U.K.-resident Muslim physicians in the attempted murder of innocent British civilians had many in the West asking why. The short answer is that these trained M.D.s somehow convinced themselves that these British people didn't deserve to live--that it would be morally good to kill them. That's insane. Why would they think that?
The best answer I have seen in a long time is found in a new study of Islamic media propaganda by a research team from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas" by Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo (with Radio Free Iraq correspondents, two of whom were abducted and murdered this year) is an astounding compilation of the high-tech methods being used by the insurgency in Iraq to propagate the ideology of the Islamic jihadist movement. This is the blogosphere for killers.
There is no more unchallenged verity in our times than that the World Wide Web, the Internet, is a boon to mankind. But as with nuclear or biological warfare, the Web is a dual-use technology. Technically adept Muslims, using out-of-the-box PC software and hardware, are outputting an electronic torrent of slick Web sites, discussion forums, videos, e-magazines and long-form movies, all with one purpose--to incite Muslims to join the jihad against the enemies of Islam in Baghdad, London, Glasgow or New York. Forget those Iraqi attack videos on YouTube; this is a sophisticated, globally distributed propaganda operation.
As always with the Web, anything done in the analog past--the propaganda of World War II or the Cold War--can be ramped up exponentially by Islamic jihadists on the Internet. In March, at least 11 self-identified insurgency groups posted 966 "statements" on the Web about battles and engagements, looking much like those put out by the U.S. Army. Their casualty claims often have no basis in reality, but that's not the point. The point is to convince credulous minds in their world that they are a potent, thriving force.
Example: Over March 26-27 this year, a Baghdad suicide bomber killed two people, a roadside bomb killed an Iraqi policeman, and a bombing killed four U.S. soldiers in Diyala. Press releases, or "statements," about events were sent over the Web by Al-Fajr Media Center, the Just Vengeance Brigades, the Mujahidin Army and Ansar al-Sunnah. The Al-Fajr Media Center's March 27 statement claimed that "our brother . . . detonated the car . . . killing more than 11 soldiers of the idolatrous Guard."
The language is invariably religious. There's no effort here to appeal to nationalistic sentiment; thus, for a global audience, the Islamic argument becomes wholly religious. Those produced for Islamic State of Iraq/Al-Qaeda (primarily by the Al-Furqan Institute for Media Production) refer to "martyrdom-seeking operations."
Many of the sites offer graphically attractive texts explaining "Who We Are" or "Our Creed." The texts can be shared on the Internet via free upload and download services such as sendspace.com or archive.org, using Microsoft Word or Adobe Acrobat. There are downloadable, full-color e-magazines with opinion pieces and jihadist articles ("The Courage of a Boy"). The Mujahidin Shura Council regularly produces elaborately formatted, full-color "biographies of martyrs."
According to the RFE study's authors, the utility of the written word is well understood by the jihadists: "The written word everywhere remains the preferred medium of record and authority. . . . Texts are also the traditional medium of ideological discourse." Nearly all this material, incidentally is "branded" with the group's unique logo floating in the corner of the screen.
They often embed audio clips from jihadist leadership in the texts. Audio polemics and hate speech are commonplace across the Islamic Web. Or they'll include links to attack videos, as noted in the "Top 20" graphic nearby. "Top 20's" seven-minute compilation of 20 attacks on U.S. forces comes with a rousing jihadist song, "Arise from Slumber." Its final lyric: "We have returned with the machine gun and now we are leaders."
A 28-minute film by Ansar al-Sunnah, "Just Vengeance," records the kidnapping, interrogation and execution of Shiite policemen. Another video of a suicide bomber's truck exploding reveals the centrality of distributable media: It was filmed from three different camera angles. Jihadist video comes in several file sizes: high resolution (up to 500 megabytes), medium (8 megabytes) or in highly compressed files for downloading to mobile phones, popular in PC-deficient Iraq. They enable free uploads of the videos via Windows Media Player, RealPlayer and DivX.
The reach of insurgent and jihadist propaganda increases exponentially when it is picked up by Arab TV--Al-Jazeera, of course, or the Al-Rafidayn satellite channel in Cairo or even the Iraqi Al-Zawra, which claims to be operating from a satellite truck in Iraq.
In an interview this week, RFE's Mr. Kimmage said they have presented the media study to both the House and Senate intelligence committees and to government national security agencies. Reactions range from "wow" to "we already know all that." In any event, what would they do? This is propaganda on an unprecedented scale.
If you are a young Muslim male, even a doctor, with a PC in Egypt, the Gulf states, Somalia, Morocco or Glasgow, as always with the Web you are marinating your mind in its content, and the content here is homicide on a mass scale. The answer--technical or political--is not obvious to me. But the one unacceptable answer is doing nothing.
Mr. Henninger is deputy editor of The Wall Street Journal's editorial page. His column appears Thursdays in the Journal and on OpinionJournal.com.

Palestinian Mamzers Fire on Elderly Coupel

Qassam hits elderly couple's home

Islamic Jihad cell fires two rockets at western Negev; no one wounded but two houses and a factory damaged. Regional council head says 'scandalous' government has not yet started program to shield homes
Tova Dadon

Palestinians in Gaza fired two Qassam rockets into the western Negev late Friday, one of which hit the home of an elderly couple.

A third rocket was fired Saturday afternoon and landed in an open area near Sderot. No casualties or damages were reported.

Late Friday the first rocket slammed through the roof of a house where an elderly couple lived, then ricocheted into the yard of the neighboring home, where it exploded. No one was wounded, but the rocket caused severe damage to both houses.

A second rocket landed on the premises of the Kal-Katif factory and damaged a storage container. The al-Quds Martyrs' Brigades, the armed wing of the Islamic Jihad, claimed responsibility for the attacks. Yoav Peled, security officer for the Shaar Hanegev regional council, told Ynet it was a miracle no one was hurt. "The Qassam accelerated when it hit the concrete roof of the elderly couple's home. They were awake when it hit and luckily weren't hurt. Due to the acceleration, the rocket continued on into the neighbors' yard, where it exploded and shattered all the house's windows," Peled said. The couple spent the night at a guest house on the kibbutz where they live, due to the severe damage to their house. They did not need any medical treatment and did not suffer shock.

Alon Schuster, head of the Shaar Hanegev regional council, said, "The Islamic Jihad launched the rocket to tell the prime minister (Ehud Olmert) that time and statistics weren't in his favor. Instead of telling Gaza perimeter residents that there's no such thing as 100 percent security, Olmert should do what he personally promised me and the other council heads – and shield the houses right away."

"It's scandalous. The program has been dragging for six months, and now we hear that it may even be cancelled. I demand of the new defense minister (Ehud Barak) that he join our demands and bring up the matter this Sunday at the cabinet meeting. There are people here whose lives need to be protected," he declared.